Samuel Isaac Weinstock

The offender pled guilty to possession of 6.2 grams of heroin and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a sentence of four to nine years imprisonment, while the defence sought time served and probation.

The court considered the offender's lengthy criminal record and the highly addictive nature of the drugs as aggravating factors, balanced against his guilty plea and employment as mitigating factors.

The court imposed a sentence of 2.5 years imprisonment, less 7.5 months credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in 22.5 months of additional custody.

The offender, Narmatha Satkunananthan, was convicted by a jury of possession of Oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered sentencing submissions, noting the disastrous impact of opiates on the community.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of criminal record, strong family and community support, youthful age at the time of arrest, and a prior Charter breach related to her arrest.

The Crown sought 16-18 months custody, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court, balancing denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, determined that a suspended sentence with two years' probation and ancillary orders was appropriate, concluding that specific and general deterrence could be achieved without incarceration given the unique circumstances and mitigating factors.

The Crown sought to amend the Information to change the charge from possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking to simple possession under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to proceed summarily rather than by way of preliminary hearing.

The defendant opposed the amendment, having prepared for and requested a preliminary hearing.

The court denied the Crown's application, finding it inappropriate to permit the amendment given that the defendant had requested a preliminary hearing, had not prepared for trial, and had not been given timely notice of the Crown's intention to change the mode of proceeding.

The defendants, Tanisha Evans and Chantelle Rochester, were found guilty by a jury of importing cocaine, contrary to section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

They were arrested at Pearson International Airport with approximately 2.4 kg of cocaine each, concealed in their luggage.

Both claimed they believed they were importing money, but the jury rejected their defence.

The court considered mitigating factors such as their lack of criminal records, consistent employment, and strong support systems, as well as the aggravating factor of importing a significant quantity of cocaine.

Applying the sentencing guidelines from R. v. Cunningham, the court imposed a sentence of six years imprisonment for each defendant, along with ancillary orders for DNA samples, a ten-year weapons prohibition, and forfeiture of the cocaine.

During a trial for possession for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown applied to admit expert opinion evidence from a police officer regarding whether the accused's possession of Oxycodone and fentanyl patches was for the purpose of trafficking.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible.

The officer's opinion on the Oxycodone lacked probative value because he conceded the quantity was equally consistent with legitimate prescription use as with trafficking.

Regarding the fentanyl, the court found the officer lacked the necessary medical knowledge and experience with prescription patterns to provide a reliable expert opinion, noting that a doctor or pharmacist would be the appropriate expert.

The applicants, charged with importing cocaine, brought an application to stay the charges against them due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total time to the anticipated end of trial was over 43 months, exceeding the 30-month ceiling established in Jordan.

After deducting periods of defence delay and delay caused by exceptional circumstances (a change of counsel and a Crown medical emergency), the net delay remained above the ceiling at 35.67 months and 35 months for the respective applicants.

The court found the delay unreasonable and stayed the charges.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after police entered a short-term rental condominium unit without a warrant to arrest him for fraud.

The court found that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the unit and that the warrantless entry and subsequent search of a suitcase violated his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the drug evidence under section 24(2) due to the seriousness of the police misconduct.

Alternatively, the court found the Crown failed to prove knowing possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused, Vincent Ham, faced charges of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000.

He brought an application to exclude all evidence, arguing violations of his sections 7, 8, and 9 Charter rights due to an alleged lack of reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest.

The court determined that the relevant time for assessing reasonable and probable grounds was at the time of arrest, not when the decision to arrest was initially made.

Based on extensive police surveillance (Project Union) of a suspected drug stash house and Hoang's activities, including two observed drug-related transactions on the day of the arrest, the court found that the police had both subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused.

Consequently, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and the accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused, Deanna Passera, was found guilty by a jury of importing cocaine.

Prior to sentencing, she filed a constitutional challenge to sections 719(1) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the provisions, which govern the commencement of sentences and credit for pre-sentence custody, violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

She contended that the legislative scheme resulted in offenders detained pending trial serving a lengthier period in custody before parole eligibility compared to identically situated offenders released on bail, thereby being overbroad, arbitrary, and grossly disproportionate.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding that the legislative scheme, when considered holistically with the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, was not unconstitutional.

It held that Parliament's intent was to create reasonable parity at the statutory release date and that any disparity in parole eligibility was justified by public safety and rehabilitation objectives.

The court then proceeded to sentence Ms. Passera to six years imprisonment for importing 1.994 kg of cocaine, crediting her 1.5:1 for 992 days of pre-sentence custody (1488 days) and an additional 90 days (3 months) for harsh lock-down conditions, resulting in a remaining sentence of 613 days.

This decision addresses a voir dire concerning the voluntariness of statements made by the accused, Anne Marie Asia Maerkl, to Canada Border Services Officers (CBSA).

The accused had abandoned a Charter application.

The court reviewed the testimony of three CBSA officers and applied legal principles regarding the admissibility of unrecorded and partially recorded statements.

While some statements were found voluntary and admissible, others were excluded due to issues with contemporaneous recording and clarity of attribution, particularly those made during the initial roving inspection.

Babak Rajaei-Mehrabadi was convicted by a jury of importing 6.45 kilograms of opium into Canada.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, the significant quantity and value of the opium, and the accused's lack of criminal record, good rehabilitation prospects, and history of depression and anxiety.

The court established a sentencing range of three to seven years for commercial importation of multiple kilograms of opium, distinguishing it from more addictive drugs like heroin or cocaine.

A sentence of four years four months and 22 days imprisonment was imposed, along with a DNA order and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay in their criminal trial for production and possession of controlled substances.

The court found a total delay of 44.5 months, with 10 months attributable to egregious Crown delay and 9 months to institutional delay.

Despite minimal prejudice to fair trial rights, the significant impact on the applicants' liberty and security interests, exacerbated by the Crown's failure to manage the case responsibly, led the court to conclude that the right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The accused, charged with importing heroin, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained from a cell phone, alleging a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found the accused had standing to challenge the search.

However, the court held that the search warrant was validly issued, as the Information to Obtain contained sufficient evidence even if the text messages obtained during a prior search incident to arrest were excised.

Alternatively, the court found that even if a s. 8 breach occurred, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and necessary for adjudicating serious charges.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and obstructing police after officers observed what they believed to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction from her vehicle.

The accused testified she was retrieving a lost cell phone, and her boyfriend testified he had hidden the drugs in her car without her knowledge.

The court found the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding her knowledge of the drugs, resulting in acquittals on the drug charges.

However, the accused was convicted of obstructing police for actively resisting her arrest.