Steven Safieh

Peter Bouctsis, a youth, was convicted of second-degree murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, arguing that the presumption of diminished moral culpability was rebutted and a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability, rehabilitation, and public safety.

The court found that the offender demonstrated adult-level maturity and sophistication in planning the crime and continued criminal conduct while in custody.

The court granted the Crown's application, imposing a life sentence with parole eligibility after seven years, emphasizing the need for long-term monitoring for public protection.

The accused, a young person, was tried for second-degree murder following a drug rip-off where he shot the victim twice, including once in the head.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused had the requisite specific intent for murder under s. 229(a) of the Criminal Code, or whether he should be convicted of manslaughter.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to the accused's out-of-court exculpatory statements and found them implausible.

Applying the common sense inference that a sane and sober person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions, the court concluded the accused intended to cause bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless whether death ensued.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The applicant son brought a motion within an application regarding his elderly mother's capacity and the management of her property by his sister.

The mother had been diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease, but the sister disputed the diagnosis and procured new powers of attorney in her favour.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the mother was incapable of managing her property and personal care, noting flaws in previous capacity assessments arranged by the sister.

The court ordered a comprehensive capacity assessment, a functional assessment, and conditionally ordered the sister to pass her accounts.

The accused, Samuel Oduro, brought a pre-trial application to exclude cocaine evidence found in his car, alleging a violation of his Section 8 Charter rights.

He argued the search warrant was unlawfully obtained due to baseless generalizations, incomplete disclosure, failure to meet telewarrant preconditions, and insufficient information regarding the confidential informant's credibility.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the affiant made minor errors, they were in good faith and did not mislead the issuing justice.

The court concluded that the information to obtain the warrant, as amplified and redacted, provided reasonable grounds for its issuance, rendering the search lawful and no Charter breach.

The defendant was charged with three counts of dangerous driving and three counts of failing to remain at the scene of an accident arising from a motor vehicle collision between a tractor trailer and a group of motorcyclists on Highway 401.

The court ruled on the admissibility of the defendant's statements given at the accident scene as a pre-trial motion.

The defendant argued that his statements were statutorily compelled under section 199 of the Highway Traffic Act and therefore inadmissible in criminal proceedings.

The Crown argued that the defendant was merely a witness to the accident, not involved in it, and that his statements were motivated by self-interest rather than statutory compulsion.

The court found that the defendant was "directly or indirectly involved" in the accident, honestly and reasonably believed he was required to report it, was not motivated by self-interest, and reported the accident within the "forthwith" requirement.

Accordingly, the defendant's statements were excluded from evidence as statutorily compelled statements protected by the Charter.

The accused, charged with importing heroin, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained from a cell phone, alleging a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found the accused had standing to challenge the search.

However, the court held that the search warrant was validly issued, as the Information to Obtain contained sufficient evidence even if the text messages obtained during a prior search incident to arrest were excised.

Alternatively, the court found that even if a s. 8 breach occurred, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and necessary for adjudicating serious charges.

The defendant was charged with two counts of assault with a weapon and one count of theft of marijuana.

The Crown alleged that the defendant aided and abetted an individual known as "Pimp" in robbing the complainant of marijuana during a drug transaction.

The key issue was credibility.

The court found the defendant guilty of theft but acquitted him on both assault with a weapon charges.

The court determined that while the defendant's conduct supported an inference of knowledge and intent regarding the theft, the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of or intended the use of a weapon in the assault, and that the defendant's driving of the vehicle was motivated by escape rather than intent to apply force.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Following a traffic stop, police searched a backpack belonging to the accused after detecting the smell of alcohol in the vehicle and suspecting open alcohol under the Liquor Licence Act.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) and sought exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The court held the search was lawful because the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe open alcohol was present and conducted the search reasonably.

Although a later s.10(b) breach occurred when an officer spoke with the accused after he requested counsel, the Crown did not seek to rely on the resulting statements.

At trial, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the cocaine was possessed for the purpose of trafficking and instead convicted the accused of simple possession.