Ghazala Zaman

The defendant brought a Jarvis application seeking to exclude evidence obtained through search warrants on the grounds that the CRA's audit function had improperly transitioned into a criminal investigation, thereby breaching his Charter rights under sections 7 and 8.

The defendant was charged with two counts of fraud and four counts of tax evasion related to a GST refund scheme involving a dormant company.

The court found that the defendant lacked standing to bring the application, as he had no legitimate privacy interest in the mail box or bank account that were the subject of the search warrants, having fraudulently misappropriated the identity of the company.

Alternatively, the court found no breach of the Jarvis doctrine, as the predominant purpose of the inquiry remained audit-focused until after November 4, 2005, when the bank requirement revealed the connection between the defendant and the fraudulent refunds.

The court admitted all evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking crack cocaine.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The trial judge was unable to identify the appellant from surveillance photographs but relied on the opinions of police officers who identified the appellant in court.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in relying on the officers' opinions, as they had no special knowledge or advantage over the judge in comparing the photographs to the appellant.

The in-dock identification was inherently frail, and the verdict could not be supported by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility and that of a trainee police officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error.

The trial judge permissibly rejected the appellant's testimony because it contrasted starkly with the senior police officer's account and differed materially from the version suggested by defence counsel during cross-examination.

The trial judge was also justified in attaching more weight to the senior officer's testimony than to the trainee officer's, given the latter's lack of independent recollection and limited experience.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by relying on the appellant's testimony from a pre-trial Charter voir dire to determine guilt at trial.

The appellant argued this error should result in an acquittal due to a lack of evidence linking the drugs seized to the Health Canada certificate of analysis.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding a sufficient link, and ordered a new trial based on the trial judge's error.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine.

The Crown conceded that the guilty verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal.

The court noted it could not address the sentence for a separate marijuana possession conviction as leave to appeal sentence was not sought.

The respondent pleaded guilty to participating in a terrorist plot to detonate bombs at the Toronto Stock Exchange, CSIS Headquarters, and a military base.

The sentencing judge imposed a 14-year sentence (7 years after pre-trial custody credit) and declined to increase parole ineligibility, emphasizing the respondent's youth, lack of criminal record, and rehabilitative prospects.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge gave inadequate weight to the enormity of the planned mass murder and the unique nature of terrorism offences.

The sentence was increased to 20 years (13 years after credit), and the respondent was ordered to serve one-half of his sentence before being eligible for parole.

The Crown appealed the 12-year sentence imposed on the respondent for his role in a terrorist bomb plot targeting locations in Toronto.

The respondent had pleaded guilty to doing anything with intent to cause an explosion for the benefit of a terrorist group.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge over-emphasized mitigating factors and under-emphasized the enormity of the crime.

The effective sentence was increased from 12 to 18 years, and an order was made requiring the respondent to serve one half of his sentence before being eligible for full parole.

The appellant, the mastermind of a terrorist bomb plot targeting locations in Toronto, pleaded guilty to terrorism offences and was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 10 years.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the judge failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors and that a fixed term of 18 to 20 years was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a life sentence was warranted given the catastrophic potential of the plot and the appellant's guarded prospects for rehabilitation.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud and defrauding the Government of Canada of over $3 million.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that his silence at trial could not be used against him.

The trial judge had relied on Supreme Court of Canada obiter dicta suggesting s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act prohibited such an instruction.

The Court of Appeal held that the SCC obiter was non-binding and conflicted with earlier binding SCC ratio, meaning the instruction could have been given.

However, the court found the jury instructions as a whole were adequate and the delay was reasonable given the complexity of the proceedings.

The appeal from conviction and the three-year sentence were dismissed.

The respondent pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 and two counts of income tax evasion after operating a tax preparation business that submitted false charitable donation receipts, resulting in $3.28 million in improper refunds.

The sentencing judge originally imposed a sentence of one day in jail and a global fine.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the original sentence manifestly unfit given the magnitude of the fraud, the breach of trust, and the respondent's pivotal role.

The court substituted a sentence of two years' incarceration and separate fines for each count of tax evasion.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada and multiple counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to a scheme involving sham vehicle sales to exploit aboriginal tax exemptions and fraudulently claim GST refunds.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made conclusory findings of guilt without identifying the specific evidence establishing the appellants' participation in the illegitimate transactions or addressing the individual fraud counts.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.