Daniel G. Cohen

The plaintiff general contractor sued the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) and other owners for approximately $193 million in damages arising from the delayed construction of the Steeles West Subway Station.

The project was delayed by 1,047 days due to incomplete designs, utility issues, and numerous changes directed by the TTC.

The court found the TTC responsible for the delay and awarded the plaintiff damages for extended contract performance, acceleration costs, underfunded change directives, and unpaid notices of intent to claim.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's attempt to flow through subcontractor claims where liquidating agreements had extinguished the plaintiff's liability.

The TTC's counterclaim for liquidated damages was dismissed as a penalty.

The plaintiff was granted a construction lien for $57,697,627.06.

Cineplex and Cineworld entered into an Arrangement Agreement for Cineworld to acquire Cineplex for $2.8 billion.

Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and mandated theatre closures, Cineplex deferred payments to landlords and suppliers to manage liquidity.

Cineworld terminated the agreement, alleging Cineplex breached the ordinary course covenant.

The court found that Cineplex's cash management measures were commercially reasonable and did not breach the agreement, noting that the pandemic risk was allocated to Cineworld under the Material Adverse Effect clause.

Cineworld's termination was a repudiation, and Cineplex was awarded $1.24 billion in damages for lost synergies and transaction costs.

Following a prior decision approving class counsel fees in a class proceeding settlement, class counsel sought clarification regarding the calculation of the fee award, treatment of consulting law firm fees, application of taxes, and comments regarding disclosure of a fee sharing agreement.

The court acknowledged that an arithmetic error had occurred in the original calculation and corrected the award by applying a 10% reduction to the claimed counsel fee before adding disbursements.

The court clarified that consulting law firms were to be paid from the approved counsel fee rather than treated as additional disbursements and confirmed that applicable taxes were payable in addition to the approved amount.

The court also addressed concerns about disclosure of the fee sharing agreement, reiterating that failure to fully disclose the agreement’s substance was a mistake despite counsel’s intentions.

Representative plaintiffs in a proposed national competition law class action sought court approval of partial settlement agreements with three defendants, approval of contingency fee agreements with class counsel, and approval of counsel fees and disbursements.

The court approved settlements totaling $13.63 million with Bank of America, Capital One, and Citigroup and found the agreements fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court also approved the contingency fee agreements but scrutinized a separate fee‑sharing agreement between class counsel and a rival law firm that had commenced competing class actions.

The judge held that the fee‑sharing agreement required court approval, was not fair or reasonable to class members, and may constitute champerty or maintenance.

Class counsel’s requested fee was reduced by 10%, and the court ordered that no payment be made to the rival firm under the unauthorized agreement.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a proposed class proceeding for settlement purposes against a credit card network defendant in a competition law action alleging conspiracy to fix merchant discount and interchange fees for Visa and MasterCard credit card transactions.

The claims included alleged breaches of the Competition Act, tortious conspiracy, intentional interference with economic interests, and unjust enrichment.

The court considered the certification criteria under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and held that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, an identifiable class was established, common issues existed, and a class proceeding was the preferable procedure with an adequate representative plaintiff.

The court noted that certification for settlement purposes still requires satisfaction of the statutory criteria, though the analysis may be less strict given the settlement context.

Certification was granted as against the settling defendant and the proposed notice and notice plan were approved.