Dan Block

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party, Unity Health, sought summary judgment to dismiss four actions brought by subcontractor plaintiffs, arguing that the plaintiffs' settlement with the surety (Zurich) constituted an inconsistent election that precluded their alternative claims against Unity Health.

Unity Health also sought to dismiss the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims and, alternatively, to stay two of the actions for failure to immediately disclose the settlement.

The court dismissed the motions, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the doctrine of inconsistent election and the unjust enrichment claims.

The court also held that the settlement was disclosed in a timely manner once it was finalized, so a stay was not warranted.

The individual defendants, comprising management and major label directors of Re:Sound, brought motions under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike oppression claims asserted against them personally by ACTRA Performers’ Rights Society (ACTRA PRS).

ACTRA PRS alleged that the individual defendants, through their actions and inactions, caused Re:Sound to unfairly compete with ACTRA PRS, fail to adopt proper fee policies, neglect technological enhancements for equitable royalty distribution, and inadequately enforce tariffs, all for personal gain or to benefit their nominating organizations.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that the oppression claims were sufficiently pleaded, not plain and obvious to fail, and did not constitute an abuse of process.

The court applied the two-prong test for personal liability in oppression claims, concluding that the defendants were sufficiently implicated in the alleged oppressive conduct and that personal liability could be a fit remedy.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to approve a $125 million settlement in a class action against a major bank for secondary market misrepresentation related to subprime mortgage investments.

The plaintiffs also sought approval of class counsel fees of $37.5 million, representing a 30% contingency fee.

The court found the settlement to be fair and reasonable, noting the significant litigation risks the plaintiffs faced, including a due diligence defence and challenges to damages calculations.

The court also approved the requested counsel fees, emphasizing the substantial risk undertaken by class counsel over 14 years of litigation and the excellent result achieved for the class.

This action arose from a dispute between two individuals, Bateni and Jamali, concerning the acquisition and ownership of a Chrysler Canada car dealership.

Bateni claimed damages for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, diversion of corporate opportunities, oppression under the Business Corporations Act, and wrongful dismissal.

The court found that an oral agreement existed between Bateni and Jamali for Bateni to acquire a 20% ownership interest in a new dealership (Caledon Hills) through "sweat equity" and serve as general manager.

Jamali breached this agreement by causing the initial dealership application (Caledon Hills LOI) to be rescinded due to an ownership dispute with a third partner (Totonchian), and then unilaterally applying for the dealership under a new entity (Caledon Chrysler) without Bateni.

The court also found Jamali's actions to be oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to Bateni's interests.

Furthermore, Bateni was found to have been wrongfully dismissed from Caledon Chrysler.

Galleria Centre Inc. ("Galleria") applied for an order under s. 207 of the Business Corporations Act ("OBCA") to wind up a co-tenancy agreement or compel Terracap Galleria Centre Inc. ("Terracap") to purchase its interest in a condominium development project.

Terracap cross-applied for an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the OBCA, alleging Galleria's refusal to participate was oppressive, and sought to purchase the property on just terms, with proceeds distributed according to the co-tenancy agreement.

The court dismissed Galleria's application, finding its "expectations" were not reasonable and that the co-tenancy agreement provided a mechanism for ending the relationship, rendering s. 207 unnecessary.

Terracap's claim for an oppression remedy was also dismissed, as Galleria's conduct, while potentially a breach of contract, was not oppressive given that contractual remedies were available.

However, Terracap's cross-application was allowed in part, with the court ordering the parties' disengagement to occur in accordance with Article 18 of the Co-Tenancy Agreement, which included the liquidation of assets and the application of Terracap's preferential distribution right.

The plaintiffs sought judicial approval of two settlement agreements in class actions alleging price-fixing in the automotive parts industry.

The first settlement with T.Rad was for $1,167,452, and the second with S-Y Systems was for $50,000.

The court found both settlements to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting they fell within a zone of reasonableness.

The settlements and requested legal fees were approved.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from an application judge's decision setting aside an arbitrator's ruling that added subcontractors as parties to an arbitration.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the arbitrator's decision to add parties was a question of jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

Pursuant to section 17(9) of the Act, no appeal lies from a court's decision on a question of an arbitrator's jurisdiction.

The applicant, Covanta, brought an application to set aside an arbitrator's decision to join two subcontractors to an ongoing arbitration between Covanta and the general contractor.

The arbitrator had joined the subcontractors under Article 17(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

Covanta argued the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction because the subcontractors were not parties to the arbitration agreement.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the arbitrator's decision was jurisdictional in nature and subject to review on a standard of correctness.

The Court found that the subcontractors were not parties to the arbitration agreement, as the subcontract did not properly incorporate the arbitration clause by reference.

The Court set aside the arbitrator's ruling and awarded costs of $50,000 to the applicant.

On a Commercial List motion, the plaintiff liquidator sought to strike from the responding defendants' statement of defence the allegation that the action had been commenced for an improper purpose.

The court held the motion was not barred by delay and that leave was not required under the Rules of Civil Procedure in the circumstances of Commercial List trial scheduling.

Applying the plain and obvious test for striking a defence, the court held that improper motive is not a defence, while an improper purpose defence can survive only if the improper purpose was the sole purpose of commencing the action.

The impugned plea was permitted to stand only on a narrow factual basis, and other evidence directed to improper motive or unrelated allegations was ruled inadmissible for trial.