A. Paul Gribilas

The plaintiff sought specific performance of a commercial real estate transaction that failed to close in April 2020, arguing that pandemic-related financing delays prevented closing and that the vendor acted unreasonably in refusing a further extension.

The court found the vendor tendered on closing and was ready, willing, and able to complete the transaction, while the purchaser lacked funds and had only conditional financing that was not available on the closing date.

The court held that COVID-19 did not create a free-standing legal excuse for contractual non-performance and distinguished authorities where pandemic conditions formed only part of the factual matrix or where the opposing party was not ready to close.

The action for specific performance was dismissed, and the vendor's counterclaim for a declaration of forfeiture of the $200,000 deposits was granted.

Relief from forfeiture was refused.

This costs endorsement follows summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Samuel Stern, in a mortgage enforcement action.

The court awards substantial indemnity costs of $62,817.10 to the plaintiff, finding the defendant’s conduct intentionally delayed the proceedings and wasted time and expense.

The court reviews the contractual entitlement to costs, the relevant statutory and case law principles, and the proportionality of the costs award.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondents damages for oppression.

The trial judge found that the parties had entered into an oral agreement and a shareholders' agreement for the respondents to receive a 20 percent equity share in a new car dealership, which the appellants breached by excluding the respondents and obtaining the dealership through a different corporate entity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or extricable error of law in the trial judge's conclusions regarding the existence of the agreements, the breach, the respondents' standing as complainants under the Business Corporations Act, and the finding of oppression.

This appeal addressed whether an innocent purchaser for value obtains good title to property sold under a power of sale, despite the mortgagee's breach of section 22 of the Mortgages Act (failure to provide a default statement, suspending enforcement rights).

The lower court had set aside the transfer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the purchaser's appeal, holding that the "Safe Harbour Protections" under sections 35 and 36 of the Mortgages Act and section 99(1.1) of the Land Titles Act protect an innocent purchaser, providing good title upon registration.

The mortgagor's remedy for the mortgagee's non-compliance lies against the mortgagee, not the innocent third-party purchaser.

Following the dismissal of the applicant tenant's application for court approval of a lease assignment, the respondent landlord sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The underlying application had been dismissed without prejudice to being re-opened, but the issue became moot when the proposed new tenants withdrew.

The court declined to award costs to the landlord, finding that the dismissal was not a vindication of the landlord's legal position and that the litigation conduct of both parties was driven by mistrust.

No order as to costs was made.

The applicant mortgagor defaulted on a mortgage and the respondent mortgagees commenced power of sale proceedings.

The mortgagor requested a discharge statement under s. 22 of the Mortgages Act, which the mortgagees refused to provide, claiming the mortgagor was stalling.

The mortgagees then sold the property to a third party.

The court held that the mortgagees had no reasonable excuse to refuse the discharge statement, meaning their enforcement rights were suspended under s. 22(3).

Consequently, the sale to the third party was invalid.

The court rejected the argument that ss. 35 and 36 of the Mortgages Act or s. 99(1.1) of the Land Titles Act protected the third party purchaser's title from a breach of s. 22.

The applicant tenant, a dentist, sought to assign his commercial lease to two younger dentists purchasing his practice.

The respondent landlord refused to consent, initially requesting a demolition clause and later demanding extensive financial information.

The tenant brought an application under the Commercial Tenancies Act, arguing the refusal was unreasonable.

The court found that neither party acted in good faith, as the landlord's requests were overreaching but the tenant failed to provide basic financial information.

The application was dismissed without prejudice, allowing the tenant to re-open it if the landlord continued to refuse consent after receiving reasonable financial disclosure.

This action arose from a dispute between two individuals, Bateni and Jamali, concerning the acquisition and ownership of a Chrysler Canada car dealership.

Bateni claimed damages for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, diversion of corporate opportunities, oppression under the Business Corporations Act, and wrongful dismissal.

The court found that an oral agreement existed between Bateni and Jamali for Bateni to acquire a 20% ownership interest in a new dealership (Caledon Hills) through "sweat equity" and serve as general manager.

Jamali breached this agreement by causing the initial dealership application (Caledon Hills LOI) to be rescinded due to an ownership dispute with a third partner (Totonchian), and then unilaterally applying for the dealership under a new entity (Caledon Chrysler) without Bateni.

The court also found Jamali's actions to be oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to Bateni's interests.

Furthermore, Bateni was found to have been wrongfully dismissed from Caledon Chrysler.

The plaintiff moved to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on a commercial property following a failed real estate transaction.

The defendant opposed the motion.

The court applied the test for CPLs, considering factors such as the uniqueness of the land, the adequacy of damages as a remedy, and the harm to each party.

The court found that the property was not unique, damages were a viable alternative remedy, and the plaintiff's use of a shell corporation was not a factor.

The motion for a CPL was denied, and the existing Caution on Title was ordered to be removed.

The plaintiff and defendant are neighbours involved in a property dispute over a concrete wall.

The plaintiff previously sued the defendant in Small Claims Court, which resulted in a consent dismissal.

The plaintiff then commenced a new action in the Superior Court for negligence, trespass, and nuisance.

The defendant moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the new action was barred by cause of action estoppel and constituted an abuse of process, as it was an attempt to re-litigate the previously dismissed claim.

The appellants appealed an order finding that Ontario had jurisdiction over the litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was a sufficient connection to Ontario.

The court noted that the plaintiff was in Ontario, the harm was suffered there, and the tort as pleaded involved the appellants effecting a breach of contract in Ontario, making it reasonably foreseeable that their actions would cause harm in the province.

The appellants appealed an order finding that Ontario had jurisdiction over the litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was a sufficient connection to Ontario.

The plaintiff was located in Ontario, the harm was suffered there, and the tort as pleaded involved the appellants effecting a breach of contract in Ontario, which they should have reasonably anticipated would cause harm in the province.