J. Lisus

The moving party brought a motion for an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of an Ontario Land Tribunal decision regarding a developer's site plan application.

The Tribunal had found the application complete despite the developer failing to attend a mandatory pre-application consultation.

The court granted the extension, finding the moving party's delay was short and adequately explained by its initial attempt to seek leave to appeal, and that the proposed application raised apparent grounds for relief that should be determined by a panel.

The plaintiff law firm brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction against a former associate and several staff members who abruptly left to start a competing firm, taking over 200 client files.

The court found the plaintiffs established a strong prima facie case for breach of fiduciary duty and good faith.

The court granted the injunction, ordering the defendants to pay the outstanding disbursements on the transferred files within five months and to hold a portion of the legal fees in trust upon settlement of the files to protect the plaintiffs' fee accounts.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for the production of a Cooperation and Common Interest Agreement between the defendants.

The plaintiffs sought the agreement to support their argument that the defendants mounted a joint defence, which would affect the apportionment of costs following summary judgment motions.

After reviewing the agreement in camera, the court dismissed the motion, finding that the document was protected by privilege.

The plaintiffs, standardbred horse breeders, sued Ontario and the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation (OLG) for breach of contract, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation following the cancellation of the Slots at Racetrack Program (SARP).

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action, and the plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on liability.

The court held that the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act (CLPA) retroactively extinguished the plaintiffs' tort claims because the cancellation of SARP was a policy decision made in good faith.

However, the court found that the 1998 Letter of Intent establishing SARP was a binding contract.

Applying the principled exception to the doctrine of privity, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the contract.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs against Ontario for breach of contract, finding that Ontario breached an implied term to provide reasonable notice of termination.

The action against OLG was dismissed.

The applicant, a self-represented family lawyer, brought a motion to remove Epstein Cole LLP as solicitors of record for his ex-wife in their family law dispute.

He argued that lawyers from the firm would be called as witnesses regarding their alleged interference with his livelihood and application for judicial appointment, and that they harboured animus toward him creating a conflict of interest.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no real likelihood that the lawyers would be called as witnesses, no evidence of untoward animus, and that removing the respondent's counsel of choice would cause her significant prejudice.

The appellant appealed an order of the Master that allowed some amendments to its statement of claim but disallowed others on the basis that they advanced new causes of action barred by the limitation period.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the disallowed amendments arose out of the same factual matrix as the original claim and merely clarified or expanded upon the existing allegations.

The court emphasized that pleadings should be read generously and amendments presumptively allowed unless they cause non-compensable prejudice or advance a completely separate claim.

The respondent wife in a family law proceeding brought a motion seeking an order that service of her Answer and Amended Answer on the applicant husband be deemed service on 36 added corporate and trust respondents, arguing the husband was their alter ego.

The court found insufficient evidence on the motion to make an alter ego finding.

The court validated service on one Ontario corporation and two entities in non-contracting states under the Rules of Civil Procedure as they had actual notice.

However, the court held it had no discretion to validate service on the remaining entities located in Hague Convention contracting states, as Rule 17.05(3) is mandatory and a complete code for service abroad.

The applicant obtained a default judgment for fraud against the respondents regarding a tax loss allocation scheme.

He subsequently obtained an ex parte order under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act appointing a receiver over the respondents' assets.

Through further ex parte applications, the receivership was expanded into a broad investigative receivership freezing the assets of 43 additional non-party individuals and entities to protect the interests of thousands of other investors.

The Court of Appeal set aside the orders, holding that while s. 101 permits investigative receiverships in appropriate circumstances, the orders here were unjustifiably overreaching and went beyond protecting the applicant's judgment recovery.

Following a complex motion involving amendments to a statement of claim and issues relating to government funding of a transportation consortium’s defence, the court addressed costs among multiple parties.

The moving plaintiffs were successful in obtaining leave to amend their claim and to add the provincial government as a defendant, but were unsuccessful in obtaining litigation funding from the government.

The court applied the principles under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing that costs must be fair and reasonable rather than reflective of actual legal fees incurred.

Costs of $150,000 were awarded to the plaintiffs payable by the Crown for the successful amendment issues, while the Crown was awarded $61,950 payable by the plaintiffs for the unsuccessful funding request.

The issue of the defendant consortium’s costs relating to funding was deferred to the trial judge or a future judicial review.

The plaintiffs, seven private school bus operators, brought a motion to amend their statement of claim and add the Ministry of Education as a party defendant in their action against a student transportation consortium regarding the use of Requests for Proposals (RFPs) for procurement.

The plaintiffs also sought an order declaring the Ministry's funding of the consortium's legal costs ultra vires and an interim costs funding order for their own legal fees.

The court granted leave to amend the pleadings and add the Ministry as a defendant, finding no non-compensable prejudice and that the Ministry was a necessary party given its role in directing the RFP process.

The court adjourned the issue of the consortium's funding to the trial judge, noting it required judicial review.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' request for interim costs funding, finding they had not established impecuniosity.

The defendant moved to strike the plaintiffs' amended statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b), arguing that sections 22 and 23 of the Broader Public Sector Accountability Act barred the action.

The plaintiffs, independent school bus operators, alleged the defendant breached common law duties and acted unlawfully in its procurement process for student transportation services.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was not plain and obvious that the Act immunized the defendant from unlawful acts or limited the plaintiffs' remedies solely to damages.

The court held that the novel legal issues raised required a complete evidentiary record.

A sales representative sued for commission arising from an exceptionally large pandemic-related order placed within his exclusive territory.

The employer argued that an internal notice limiting commissions and a later bonus agreement reduced the representative’s entitlement.

The court held that the original commission agreement did not permit unilateral alteration by notice, but the representative subsequently signed a bonus agreement accepting a reduced payment.

Although the agreement was harsh and the bargaining power unequal, the evidence did not establish coercion, duress, or unconscionability sufficient to invalidate the contract.

The representative’s claim for full commission failed and the bonus agreement governed.