Hudson Chalmers

In a delayed-diagnosis medical malpractice action, the defendant physician appealed findings on liability only.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s negligence and causation analysis and found no reversible error.

The appeal was dismissed and the liability determination stood.

The applicant, West York Sales and Leasing Inc., sought a declaration that it was entitled to a defence under an automobile liability insurance policy issued by the respondent, The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company (Travelers Canada).

The dispute centered on whether a specific vehicle was covered by the policy at the time of an accident, given the operation of a monthly reporting fleet endorsement.

The court found that the vehicle was covered, that late reporting did not invalidate coverage, and that any breach of statutory conditions was subject to relief from forfeiture.

The application was granted.

The applicants, Greenwin Inc. and Chubb Insurance Company of Canada, sought a declaration that St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company was obligated to fund 50% of an $18.75 million settlement for Greenwin's share of property damages in a subrogated claim by Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC).

The court dismissed the application, finding that St. Paul did not deny coverage or breach its policy, and that the owned property exclusion applied, precluding coverage for damage to TCHC's property.

The court also found that the applicants failed to obtain St. Paul's consent to the settlement, breaching a fundamental term of the insurance contract, and denied relief from forfeiture.

The defendant requested an adjournment of a fixed trial date at a case conference, citing outstanding production issues including pre-accident medical notes and employment records.

The plaintiffs opposed the adjournment.

The court dismissed the request, noting that discoveries occurred over a year prior and the defendant had ample time to bring production motions.

The court maintained the fixed trial date, emphasizing that such dates are only adjourned in extenuating circumstances, which were not present.

The appellant, Sarfraz Malik, appealed a Superior Court decision that denied his motion to amend his statement of claim to add Family Law Act (FLA) s. 61 claims for losses arising from injuries to his children, more than four years after the accident.

The Superior Court judge had reversed a Master's decision, finding that s. 61 FLA claims constitute a distinct statutory cause of action, subject to the Limitations Act, and not merely a claim for additional damages within an existing negligence action.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision, holding that a s. 61 FLA claim is a separate statutory cause of action that was statute-barred in this case, thereby dismissing the appeal.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary damages following a jury trial in a personal injury action.

The jury awarded general damages but zero for past income loss, future income loss, future housekeeping, and future healthcare costs.

The motion judge, exercising statutory duty to determine the threshold under s. 267.5(5)(b) of the Insurance Act, found that the plaintiff's impairments were not permanent, important, or serious.

The judge considered the jury's implied findings regarding the plaintiff's credibility and the non-permanence of injuries, preferring the defendants' medical expert evidence.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary loss was dismissed.