Eric J. Adams

The appellant airline appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for defence costs against the respondent ground services provider.

The claim arose after a passenger sued both parties for injuries sustained in a wheelchair accident at the airport.

The trial judge found that the airline's employee was pushing the wheelchair at the time of the accident and that the commercial contract's indemnity provision did not cover the airline's own negligence.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the commercial contract, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual conclusions.

Following a short civil trial in which the defendant obtained dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The parties had streamlined the trial through an agreed statement of facts and the legal issue was comparatively narrow.

The defendant sought approximately $30,000 in costs while the plaintiff argued that approximately $18,645 would be reasonable given proportionality and the amount claimed.

Applying the principles governing costs, including reasonable expectations and proportionality, the court fixed costs payable to the defendant at $20,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The plaintiff brought an action against the LCBO for damages in conversion after his credit card was used without authorization to purchase approximately $37,000 worth of alcohol for a nightclub.

The plaintiff failed to notify his credit card company of the unauthorized charges within the required 30-day period.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the LCBO did not commit the tort of conversion as it merely processed the orders and delivered the goods in the normal course of business without any wrongful act or intent to negate the plaintiff's title.

The court noted that had the action been framed in negligence, the plaintiff would have been found wholly responsible for his losses due to his failure to monitor his credit card statements.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding whether a leasing company's insurer is protected by the $1 million liability cap under s. 267.12 of the Insurance Act for bodily injury or death arising from the use of a leased motor vehicle.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge that s. 267.12 precludes a lessee from coverage under a lessor's insurance policy beyond the qualified $1 million cap.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following earlier motion decisions involving crossclaims between defendants in an action arising from an oil spill at a residence, the successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $25,000.

The responding defendant argued for a significantly lower award.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding no misconduct warranting a punitive award and emphasizing the governing principle of reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

Although the moving party obtained partial summary judgment and a declaration regarding future defence costs, the success was only partial.

The court fixed costs at $12,000 inclusive.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for property damage caused by an oil spill.

The defendant Bluewave brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the co-defendant Daniel Charles Transport for the costs of defending the action, arguing that Daniel Charles Transport breached a contractual obligation to obtain liability insurance naming Bluewave as an additional insured.

Daniel Charles Transport brought a motion to withdraw admissions and a cross-motion to dismiss Bluewave's crossclaim based on a Pierringer Agreement it had reached with the plaintiffs.

The court dismissed Daniel Charles Transport's motions, finding no justification to withdraw the admissions and that the Pierringer Agreement did not extinguish Bluewave's crossclaim for several liability.

The court granted Bluewave's motion for summary judgment, finding that Daniel Charles Transport breached its covenant to insure and that the pleaded allegations triggered a duty to defend.

Applying the principle of equitable contribution, the court ordered Daniel Charles Transport to pay 50% of Bluewave's past and future defence costs.

Following a 20‑day trial in which the plaintiffs obtained judgment exceeding $2.3 million against their insurance broker for failure to procure appropriate coverage, the court determined issues relating to the calculation of the judgment, costs, and interest.

The plaintiffs had delivered a Rule 49 offer to settle for $1.95 million plus interest and costs, which was less than the amount ultimately awarded at trial.

Applying Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Considering proportionality, the conduct of the parties, the length of the trial, and duplication arising from a change of counsel, the court reduced the plaintiffs’ claimed costs and fixed total costs at $475,000 plus disbursements.

The applicants sought a determination of whether a lessee of a leased vehicle could access the lessor’s insurance coverage beyond the statutory $1 million cap under s. 267.12 of the Insurance Act following a motor vehicle accident.

They argued that a legislative gap existed between the 2006 amendments to the Insurance Act limiting lessor liability and the later approval of the OEF 110 endorsement restricting coverage for lessees, allowing lessees to access the lessor’s insurance as unnamed insureds during the interim.

The court rejected this argument, holding that s. 267.12 must be interpreted in light of the legislative purpose of protecting lessors and their insurers by capping exposure.

Interpreting the statute to permit lessees to access excess or umbrella policies would undermine the legislative scheme.

The court further held that the excess and umbrella policies at issue did not provide coverage to the lessee based on their wording and the fact that the lessor was not a named insured under the relevant policies.

The application was dismissed.

Homeowners sued their insurance broker alleging negligence and breach of contract after a burglary resulted in the theft of a safe containing jewellery and cash exceeding insurance policy limits.

The broker had placed policies that limited jewellery coverage to $10,000 without advising the plaintiffs of the limitation or recommending additional coverage.

The court held that an insurance broker who assumes responsibility for a client’s insurance program must review the client’s circumstances, identify coverage gaps, and advise on available insurance products.

The broker failed to meet the standard of care by not conducting a proper review, failing to warn of jewellery coverage limits, and failing to recommend scheduling valuable items.

The court found that the plaintiffs would have obtained adequate coverage if properly advised and rejected arguments of contributory negligence.

Damages were assessed based on the coverage that likely would have been obtained, subject to deductions for premiums and amounts already paid.

The moving plaintiff sought leave to amend the statement of claim to add a new corporate plaintiff, additional defendants, and new allegations relating to the alleged non‑payment of professional fees for psychological services.

The responding defendants opposed the amendments on the basis that limitation periods under the Limitations Act, 2002 had expired and that some proposed amendments raised new causes of action.

The court held that where it is unclear whether a limitation period has expired, leave to amend should generally be granted subject to the responding parties retaining the right to raise a limitation defence.

Leave was granted to add certain parties, including a law firm as a defendant, and to make most amendments, while some proposed paragraphs were refused or required revision for failing to plead material facts.

The motion was therefore partially granted with conditions.