Saeed Teebi

The defendant, having been entirely successful at trial, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the plaintiff's unsubstantiated allegations of fraud and dishonesty.

The court found that the plaintiff made serious allegations of deliberate wrongdoing without any effort to prove them, using the litigation to try to escape a commercial agreement.

The court held this conduct was reprehensible and warranted punitive costs.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of $456,560.11 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of a software license agreement, a general security agreement, and the duty of honest performance.

The dispute centered on whether the defendant's newly bundled software suite constituted 'Replacement Software' triggering higher royalty payments, and whether the defendant failed to negotiate in good faith regarding pricing changes.

The court dismissed the action, finding that only one module of the bundled suite met the contractual definition of Replacement Software.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove any breach of the duty of honest dealing, as there was no evidence of dishonesty or a refusal to negotiate by the defendant.

The bankrupt appealed a Master's order granting a conditional discharge that required him to pay $284,346 in accumulated surplus income and an additional $5,000 per month for six years.

The bankrupt argued the Master erred by treating the additional payments as a recalculation of surplus income under section 68 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master properly imposed the additional payments as a condition of discharge under section 172, not as a recalculation of surplus income.

The court held the condition was reasonable given the bankrupt's substantial ongoing disability income, his failure to pay surplus income during the bankruptcy, and his lack of remorse for misappropriating $5 million from clients.

The appellants commenced a proposed class action for damages for misrepresentations in a takeover bid circular under s. 131(1) of the Securities Act.

The motion judge ruled that plaintiffs must elect whether to sue the offeror or its directors/signatories, and that secondary market sellers could not rely on s. 131(1).

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that s. 131(1) allows a plaintiff to sue both the offeror and its directors/signatories for damages.

However, the Court upheld the ruling that secondary market sellers cannot assert a claim under s. 131(1), as they must rely on the statutory cause of action in Part XXIII.1.

Nortel Networks Corporation and its Canadian debtor affiliates brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss claims by SNMP Research International, Inc. and SNMP Research Inc. for breach of contract, breach of confidence, and copyright infringement.

SNMP's claims arose from Nortel's post-CCAA filing sales of its business segments (LOBs), during which SNMP's proprietary software source code was allegedly transferred to purchasers without authorization.

The court dismissed SNMP's claim for disgorgement of Nortel's profits, finding no evidence that Nortel received revenue derived from the copyright infringement, as purchasers knew they were not acquiring rights to SNMP software and negotiated separate licenses.

However, the court held SNMP's damage claim in abeyance for six months, acknowledging ongoing discovery in a related U.S. proceeding and the possibility of future evidence regarding LOB purchasers' use of unlicensed SNMP software.

The moving respondent sought a stay of a production order requiring corporate counsel to disclose patent application materials and related solicitor files in an oppression and fraud proceeding, together with directions for discoveries and an adjournment of a scheduled summary trial.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald framework and the leave to appeal standard in rule 62.02(4), the court held there was no serious issue to be decided because the alleged conflicting authorities did not conflict with the production ruling and there was no good reason to doubt its correctness or sufficient importance to justify leave.

The court further found no irreparable harm, given the confidentiality protections already imposed, and concluded the balance of convenience favoured disclosure in advance of the imminent summary trial.

The motion was dismissed, as were the requests for discoveries and an adjournment, and costs were fixed in favour of the applicants.