Maxime Faille

The applicant, a Member of Provincial Parliament, sought judicial review of a censure decision by the Legislative Assembly of Ontario following her social media posts about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The respondents moved to strike the application for want of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and dismissed the application, holding that the censure and the motion leading to it fell squarely within the established categories of parliamentary privilege, specifically the control over debates and proceedings and the disciplinary authority over members.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the matter, even on Charter grounds.

Five non-rights holder parents applied to the Minister to exercise discretion to admit their children to a French first language education program in the Northwest Territories, with the support of the francophone school board.

The Minister denied each application, finding the parents did not meet the categories established in the ministerial directive.

The SCC held that the Minister was required not only to consider s. 23 of the Charter but to conduct a proportionate balancing of the values underlying that provision — including preservation and development of the minority language community — against the government's interests.

Applying the Doré framework, the Court found the decisions unreasonable because the Minister gave disproportionate weight to consistency and cost, and insufficient weight to pedagogical requirements and the remedial purpose of s. 23.

The appeal was allowed and the Court of Appeal orders set aside.

The appellant, a Senator, sued the Senate and the Attorney General of Canada for damages arising from his suspension from the Senate for allegedly claiming inappropriate expenses.

The Senate successfully moved to dismiss the action against it for lack of jurisdiction based on parliamentary privilege.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the Senate's actions fell within established categories of parliamentary privilege, including the power to discipline its members, administer its internal affairs, and control parliamentary proceedings and freedom of speech.

The Court held that parliamentary privilege immunized the Senate's actions from judicial review, even where unlawful conduct or Charter breaches were alleged.

Two Innu First Nations filed suit in the Quebec Superior Court against mining companies operating a megaproject straddling Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador, seeking a permanent injunction, $900 million in damages, and declarations recognizing Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights over a traditional territory called Nitassinan.

The Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador moved to strike allegations relating to land situated in that province, arguing Quebec courts lacked jurisdiction.

The majority held that the claim was a non-classical mixed action involving sui generis Aboriginal rights (not real rights in the civil law sense) and personal obligations, and that Quebec courts had jurisdiction over both aspects under arts. 3134 and 3148 C.C.Q. because the defendant mining companies were domiciled in Montreal.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding that Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights are real rights for private international law purposes, that art. 3152 C.C.Q. deprived Quebec courts of jurisdiction over claims relating to land outside Quebec, and that allowing such jurisdiction would seriously undermine Canadian federalism and ultimately impede access to justice for Indigenous claimants.

Senator Michael Duffy sued the Senate of Canada for over $7 million in damages, alleging his suspension and denial of expenses were politically motivated, unconstitutional, and violated his Charter rights, despite his acquittal on criminal charges.

The Senate moved to dismiss the action, asserting parliamentary privilege.

The court granted the Senate's motion, finding that the Senate's decisions regarding member discipline, internal affairs, proceedings, and freedom of speech were protected by parliamentary privilege and thus immune from judicial review.

Following the settlement and abandonment of an application for judicial review regarding the Crown's duty to consult, the interveners and the respondent Ontario Power Authority sought costs against the applicants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the requests for costs.

The court held that interveners typically do not receive costs and that imposing costs on First Nations in disputes concerning constitutional rights and reconciliation would inappropriately deter such claims.

The court also denied costs to the Ontario Power Authority, noting it played a secondary role and the Crown itself did not seek costs.

The applicant, Senator Michael Dennis Duffy, sought an order requiring the Clerk of the Senate to produce an internal audit report prepared by Jill Anne Joseph regarding Senate expense policies and Senator Duffy's expense claims.

The Senate claimed parliamentary privilege over the document.

The court upheld the Senate's claim of privilege, finding that the internal audit report, prepared by a Senate employee and presented to a Senate subcommittee in camera, fell within recognized categories of parliamentary privilege including freedom of speech, exclusive cognizance over parliamentary proceedings, control over internal affairs, and disciplinary authority over members.

The court rejected arguments that the privilege had been waived and distinguished the case from R. v. Chaytor, which addressed expense claims themselves rather than internal audit reports.

In this constitutional and procedural appeal concerning minority-language education litigation, the Court upheld the finding that trial-level conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and warranted a new trial on remitted issues.

The Court confirmed that, absent territorial delegation, a minority-language school board cannot unilaterally expand admissions beyond criteria set by valid regulation under s. 23 of the Charter.

The Court rejected treating a judge’s community affiliation alone as a sufficient basis for bias without stronger contextual evidence.

It further held that statutory language-rights claims under territorial legislation should proceed at the new trial on a full evidentiary record.

The appeal was largely dismissed, with no order as to costs.

This was a costs endorsement following an appeal.

On consent, the parties agreed that the costs of the appeal should be fixed at $15,000 to the respondent to the appeal, inclusive of fees, disbursements and applicable taxes.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs in that amount.

The respondent contracted to provide fundraising services to the appellant Indian band for a fee of 15 percent 'including GST'.

The appellant, being tax-exempt under the Indian Act, argued that the phrase meant it was entitled to a discount equivalent to the GST a non-exempt client would pay.

The application judge rejected this interpretation, finding the contract unambiguous.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the phrase simply referred to the GST the appellant had to pay, which was zero, and did not imply any discount from the 15 percent fee.

The appellants sued an investment advisor and his company for bad investments.

The insurer defended the action for over a year before denying coverage because the advisor sold securities, not insurance.

The advisor went bankrupt, and the appellants obtained an assignment of his rights against the insurer.

The appellants argued the insurer was estopped from denying coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the insured suffered no prejudice from the insurer's conduct, as the insured was bankrupt and could not have defended the action anyway.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision allowing the severance of joint tenancies by a guardian of property.

They argued the severance constituted a change in testamentary disposition prohibited by s. 31(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the severance was a testamentary disposition, it was permitted under s. 35.1(3)(a) as necessary to comply with the guardian's duties.

The Court also upheld the application judge's decision to reject the appellants' contradictory affidavit evidence without directing a trial.