Karen E. Symes

During a jury trial for murder arising from a home invasion, the accused sought to call a cardiologist to testify that a congenital heart condition could have caused hypoxia leading to confusion and impaired cognition during the incident.

The Crown opposed the evidence, arguing it lacked relevance, necessity, and proper qualification and risked misleading the jury.

Applying the Mohan framework as refined in White Burgess and Abbey, the court held the proposed expert testimony was logically relevant, necessary to explain the accused’s serious medical condition, and within the expert’s qualifications.

The court further concluded that any limitations in the opinion affected weight rather than admissibility and that the probative value of the defence-led evidence was not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The expert evidence was therefore admitted for consideration by the jury.

During a jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the accused sought to call a cardiologist to provide expert evidence regarding congenital heart disease and its potential impact on mental functioning.

The Crown challenged the admissibility of the expert testimony, arguing issues of relevance, qualification, and reliability under the Mohan framework.

The court determined that a focused Mohan voir dire was required to clarify the precise opinion and assess the expert’s qualifications.

The judge held that the expert could testify on the voir dire only to identify the proposed opinion and establish qualifications, and that broader cross-examination was unnecessary for the admissibility determination.

During a jury trial for offences arising from a home invasion and robbery, the Crown sought to revisit a prior evidentiary ruling that had ordered references to the accused’s consultation with duty counsel removed from a police statement.

The Crown argued that subsequent testimony placing the reliability of the statement in issue increased the probative value of the fact that the accused had received legal advice before speaking to police.

The court reconsidered the issue under the residual discretion to exclude evidence where prejudicial effect outweighs probative value.

The judge held that the probative value of the consultation with counsel remained slight and that admitting the evidence would invite improper speculation about privileged communications.

The earlier ruling requiring redaction was therefore maintained.

The accused, along with three co-accused, was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion.

The accused brought a Corbett application to restrict cross-examination on his criminal record, which included five prior convictions for assault.

The Crown and a co-accused brought cross-applications to adduce evidence of the underlying facts of those assaults and other violent conduct as propensity evidence.

The court granted the accused's application, limiting cross-examination to his non-violent convictions, and dismissed the cross-applications.

The court found that the prejudicial effect of admitting the prior violent conduct substantially outweighed its probative value, particularly given the risk of propensity reasoning in a trial involving blunt force trauma.

In a jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a violent home invasion, the Crown challenged the sufficiency of a defence expert report disclosed under s. 657.3(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defence intended to call a cardiologist to testify about the accused’s congenital heart disease and the possible cognitive effects of exertion‑induced hypoxia, which could raise a reasonable doubt about the specific intent required for murder.

The court held that the report provided sufficient disclosure of the expert’s anticipated areas of evidence and the grounds underlying them, though it did not disclose the expert’s ultimate opinion regarding the accused’s symptoms at the time of the offences.

Considering the advanced stage and logistical constraints of the lengthy jury trial, the court declined to order further particulars or other remedial measures.

The issue of the expert’s qualifications to testify about hypoxia‑related cognitive effects was left to a focused Mohan voir dire.

In a jury trial for first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the accused brought applications for directed verdicts at the close of the Crown’s case.

They argued the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support inferences of planning and deliberation or the requisite intent for murder and attempted murder, and that the rule in Hodge’s Case required exclusion of those theories.

The court held that the governing test on a directed verdict motion is whether there is any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, and that the rule in Hodge’s Case does not apply at this stage.

The court found there was evidence capable of supporting inferences that the killing was planned and deliberate and that the accused participated with the necessary intent.

However, the Crown was barred from advancing second degree murder liability against the driver under the common unlawful purpose doctrine due to insufficient evidence of subjective foresight of death.

During a murder trial involving a home invasion, defence counsel for one of the co-accused sought to create a summary chart of a key Crown witness's testimony on an easel pad during cross-examination.

The Crown and counsel for another co-accused objected, arguing the chart was unnecessary, cumulative, and potentially misleading.

The court allowed the use of the demonstrative aid, finding that it was a useful organizational tool, met threshold reliability, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any trial management or trial fairness prejudice.

During a multi‑accused murder trial, the jury sent a note expressing concerns about safety after observing three men enter the courtroom whom they believed might be connected to the accused.

Defence counsel argued the note suggested potential racial bias or juror fear that could compromise impartiality and requested a jury inquiry.

The court conducted a focused inquiry questioning each juror individually about what they observed, whether they had concerns, whether race influenced their reaction, and whether they could remain impartial.

All jurors confirmed they had no concerns and could continue to decide the case solely on the evidence and legal instructions.

The court concluded the presumption of juror impartiality had not been rebutted and refused defence requests for a further inquiry.

In a jury murder trial arising from a planned robbery, the court ruled on the admissibility of text messages extracted from two accused persons' cell phones.

Applying the principles governing relevance, bad character evidence, and the balance between probative value and prejudicial effect, the court excluded one partial text exchange as too context-deficient and speculative to support the inference urged by the Crown.

Two other exchanges, accepted for the purpose of the ruling as drug-related communications, were admitted because their prejudice was minimal in the trial context and they provided relevant contextual evidence about the relationship between two accused.

The court directed that limiting instructions would address any propensity risk.

In a joint trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion, the co-accused applied to redact portions of two videotaped police statements made by two of the accused.

The applicants argued that the statements contained inadmissible hearsay that was highly prejudicial to the non-makers.

The court applied the principles for editing co-accused statements, balancing the probative value of the narrative context against the prejudicial effect.

The court ordered the redaction of gratuitous police comments, irrelevant bad character evidence, and highly prejudicial post-offence conduct (wiping a coffee cup), but retained the core narrative descriptions of the events, holding that limiting instructions would adequately protect the co-accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction and argued that the trial judge erred in concluding there was no breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court agreed that the full period from charge to completion of trial must be considered in assessing inferred prejudice, including neutral time periods, and noted the trial judge's reasons were open to error on that point.

However, taking both inferred and actual prejudice into account, the court held that no s. 11(b) violation was made out.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and the appellant was directed to begin serving the intermittent sentence imposed at trial.