His Majesty the King v. Mostafa Fahiye, 2026 ONSC 3876

CITATION: R. v. Fahiye, 2026 ONSC 3876

COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-30000192-0000

DATE: 20260703

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

MOSTAFA FAHIYE

Rihanna Woodward, for the Crown

Karen Symes, for Mr. Fahiye

HEARD: December 10, 2025 and May 12, 2026

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

R.F. GOLDSTEIN J.

1On December 10, 2025, Mostafa Fahiye pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm. He was investigated and found in possession of the firearm on April 18, 2024. He now comes before the court for sentencing.

Facts

2Mostafa Fahiye and Andre Pyne were part of a group playing basketball in the Chester Le housing complex in Scarborough on April 19, 2024. The two young men were arrested together. The facts pertaining to each, while not identical, closely overlap.

3That day, Toronto Police officers were investigating a robbery reported in the neighbourhood. The police had descriptions of the clothing worn by the suspects. A police officer parked near the basketball court at 4:15 pm. He observed a group of about 15 young Black men arrive at about 4:30 to play basketball and listen to music. The officer did not observe anyone with clothing matching the description of the robbers or observe any suspicious behaviour.

4At the same time, Toronto City Housing Corporation (“TCHC”) security officers were monitoring the young men on the basketball court. They were aware that three days earlier a different group on the same basketball court passed around a firearm.

5At about 5:15 pm the TCHC officers observed Mr. Fahiye holding an object in his hand that they believed to be a firearm. In fact, it was a cell phone, and Mr. Fahiye was filming. The TCHC officers informed the police that they had observed a firearm. The Toronto Police officer watching the group of males took a photograph and passed on information to other police officers. At about 7:30 pm the males on the basketball court began to disperse. Mr. Fahiye and Mr. Pyne were detained by police officers as they walked away. Mr. Fahiye was arrested for possession of a firearm and Mr. Pyne was detained. The police searched both men. Both men possessed loaded prohibited firearms with extended magazines.

Background of Mr. Fahiye

6An Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report (“EPSR”) was prepared in relation to Mr. Fahiye. Ms. Symes, wisely, did not rely on it. I have read many EPSRs when carrying out my duties as a judge. They have usually been very helpful. This one was not. While the report outlines the different structural barriers faced by Black individuals generally, it does not adequately connect these barriers to Mr. Fahiye’s background and personal circumstances. The author did not adequately identify how systemic racism negatively affected Mr. Fahiye: Morris, at para. 8. In fact, some of the systemic barriers outlined in the report seem to have nothing to do with Mr. Fahiye’s circumstances. I had the very strong impression that much of the report was simply cut and pasted.

7The author of the report appeared to misunderstand the purpose of an EPSR, which the Court of Appeal outlined in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, at para. 56:

A sentencing judge has a specific and focused task. A sentencing judge must impose a sentence tailored to the individual offender and the specific offence. While evidence relating to the impact of anti-Black racism on an offender will sometimes be an important consideration on sentencing, the trial judge’s task is not primarily aimed at holding the criminal justice system accountable for systemic failures. Rather, the sentencing judge must determine a fit sentence governed by the fundamental tenets of criminal responsibility, including free will, and the purposes, principles and objectives of sentencing laid down in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code… [Emphasis added].

8The court went on to explain the proper approach in paras. 74-79, which I quote at length:

The trial judge indicated that if systemic racism effectively limited the choices available to an offender, general deterrence and denunciation should have a less significant role in sentencing.

With respect, we do not agree that the gravity or seriousness of Mr. Morris’s offences is diminished by evidence which sheds light on why he chose to commit those crimes. We do agree with the trial judge that an offender’s life experiences can certainly influence the choices made by the offender, and can explain, to some degree at least, why an offender made a choice to commit a particular crime in the specified circumstances. Those life experiences can include societal disadvantages flowing from systemic anti-Black racism in society and the criminal justice system.

Evidence that an offender’s choices were limited or influenced by his disadvantaged circumstances, however, speaks to the offender’s moral responsibility for his acts and not to the seriousness of the crimes. Possession of a loaded, concealed handgun in public is made no less serious, dangerous, and harmful to the community by evidence that the offender’s possession of the loaded handgun can be explained by factors, including systemic anti-Black racism, which will mitigate, to some extent, the offender’s responsibility: see Hamilton, at paras. 134-39; R. v. Hazell, 2020 ONCJ 358, at paras. 30-32; see also Dale E. Ives, “Inequality, Crime and Sentencing: Borde, Hamilton and the Relevance of Social Disadvantage in Canadian Sentencing Law” (2004) 30 Queen's L.J. 114, at p. 149.

It is important to preserve the distinction between factors relevant to the seriousness or gravity of the crime on the one hand, and factors relevant to the offender’s degree of responsibility on the other. Unless the distinction is maintained, the proportionality principle may be misapplied. A sentence, like the sentence imposed here, which wrongly discounts the seriousness of the offence to reflect factors which are actually relevant to the offender’s degree of responsibility, will almost inevitably produce a sentence that does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offence and, therefore, fails to achieve the requisite proportionality.

Nothing in the social context evidence adduced on Mr. Morris’s behalf detracted from the seriousness of his crimes, or the need to denounce that criminal conduct and deter others from committing similar crimes. Mr. Morris’s own experiences in his community, as related to Ms. Sibblis, strongly make the case for the very real and deep harm caused to everyone in the community by persons who, like Mr. Morris, choose to engage in dangerous criminal conduct that inevitably compromises the security of the entire community.

The social context evidence can, however, provide a basis upon which a trial judge concludes that the fundamental purpose of sentencing, as outlined in s. 718, is better served by a sentence which, while recognizing the seriousness of the offence, gives less weight to the specific deterrence of the offender and greater weight to the rehabilitation of the offender through a sentence that addresses the societal disadvantages caused to the offender by factors such as systemic racism

9Unfortunately, the author the EPSR in this case missed the mark. The EPSR does not assist me, as the sentencing judge, in assessing Mr. Fahiye’s moral blameworthiness because it fails to explain how systemic racism has impacted his life specifically.

10I also note that while systemic racism that is directly related to Mr. Fahiye’s background and circumstances can impact his moral blameworthiness, those factors cannot totally absolve him of responsibility for his crime. What is relevant are the factors that may have shaped Mr. Fahiye’s decision to carry a gun. At the end of the day, however, the decision to carry a gun was his, not someone else’s. The EPSR seems to suggest that this decision was not Mr. Fahiye’s fault, but rather it was the inevitable consequence of systemic racism. If I accept that conclusion, then I must also accept that the fault principle – the organizing principle of Anglo-Canadian criminal law – has no relevance when sentencing offenders who have experienced structural racism. Indeed, if there is no fault then there can be no conviction in the first place.

11Mr. Fahiye himself obviously does not accept that. By pleading guilty, he accepted personal responsibility. By accepting personal responsibility, he showed that he has taken a very important step towards rehabilitation. The point of Morris is not that individual offenders bear no responsibility. The point of Morris is that structural racism can be connected to moral blameworthiness where there is evidence of a connection.

12At the end of the day, I give Mr. Fahiye’s decision to plead guilty and take personal responsibility great weight. I give the conclusions in the EPSR little weight, although the EPSR outlines some basic facts about Mr. Fahiye that I will refer to. As well, I rely on the information about Mr. Fahiye that Ms. Symes conveyed to me.

13According to the EPSR Mr. Fahiye and his sister described a “family environment that provided care, guidance, and stability.” He had not been in trouble prior to this offence. His father apparently worked in the United Kingdom, and Mr. Fahiye spent some time there, but his father was involved with the family. The EPSR stated that there was a pattern of good school engagement followed by disruptions, suspensions, and “increasing institutional disengagement.” Beyond that the EPSR provides no other details but does spend several pages describing educational barriers to Black people. I accept that, but nowhere in the EPSR does it indicate how that relates to Mr. Fahiye’s experience. As well, the EPSR mentions over-policing in Black communities. I accept that assertion, but the EPSR does not relate that to Mr. Fahiye’s personal circumstances – which, again, was supposed to be the point of the EPSR.

14In terms of his current personal circumstances, they are positive. Mr. Fahiye is currently taking alternative studies courses to complete his high school education. He is also employed and has been employed at Sahan Restaurant.

15I have reviewed letters submitted on behalf of Mr. Fahiye. His older sister Amina provided a letter that described him as a good, hardworking, and caring young man. She mentioned his work towards his diploma, his employment situation, and his helping out in the home. Amina did not attempt to minimize the seriousness of his situation. She understands that her brother made a poor decision but believes that this was a one-time mistake that is not reflective of his character.

16David Burridge, a community youth worker, has known Mr. Fahiye for many years, first as a youth and then as a volunteer. He mentioned Mr. Fahiye’s kind heart.

17Mr. Fahiye’s mother, Hayad Dihad, also submitted a letter to the court. Ms. Dihad has a disability and relies on her son to assist her. Like his sister, she did not minimize the seriousness of the offence and took the view that his offence was out of character. I do take Mr. Fahiye’s assistance to his mother into account as a collateral factor, although I must mention that collateral factors can not, on their own, render a fit sentence into an unfit one: R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830.

18Mr. Fahiye’s brother, Mana Osman, also wrote a letter of support. He also did not minimize Mr. Fahiye’s actions. He described his brother as caring, kind, and valuing his family. He too believes that this crime was out of character and noted the positive steps his brother has taken to rehabilitate himself.

19Mr. Fahiye’s father, Mohamed Fahiye, wrote a letter of support describing his son as a kind and respectful young man who made a mistake. He noted the support his son provides for his wife. He also noted the steps that Mr. Fahiye has taken towards rehabilitation, including showing remorse and trying to better himself.

Impact Of Guns On The Community

20So much has been said about the impact of guns on the community that it feels like the courts are on something of a hamster wheel. Unfortunately, there are people out there who seem to think they need to have a gun. As I have said in many cases, nobody in our society needs a gun for protection. If you have a gun, it is the rest of us who need protection from you. There is no evidence that Mr. Fahiye had a gun because he was involved in associated criminality, such as drug trafficking. Was it because he had some immature notion that guns are cool? Was it because so many other young men seem to feel that they need a gun that he decided he needed one too? Whatever the reason, it is pointless to speculate. What perhaps he, and so many others fail to grasp is that when they are in a neighbourhood like Chester Le, which has, unfortunately, seen much violence and death, by carrying a gun they are not part of the solution, they are part of the problem. They are inflicting that violence and death on their own community. They are putting their own neighbours and friends in danger. I understand the idea that some people feel they need a gun in a dangerous neighbourhood, but this is frankly a ridiculous notion. The vast majority of people in these neighbourhoods do not carry guns but go about the daily business of just trying to get by. It is regular hard-working people in the community who often bear the costs associated with the dangerous foolishness of those who carry guns. Thus, people who choose to carry guns are not just dangerous to each other. They are dangerous to everyone they are around. I’m quite sure that Mr. Fahiye, Mr. Pyne, and the others have not had even an hour of training or understand how to use these most dangerous weapons. The result is that when people pull out their guns and start shooting at each other, they have no idea what they are doing. They are not Navy SEALS. Playing a lot of Call of Duty or Grand Theft Auto in the basement does not make you a marksman. That is why so many gunfights in our city don’t result in the death or injury of the people shooting at each other, but the death or injury of bystanders who happen to be nearby. Courts must denounce the possession of guns, even if the possessor has never used it, flashed it, or used it to protect a drug stash.

21As the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in Morris at para. 68:

Gun crimes involving the possession of loaded, concealed firearms in public places pose a real and immediate danger to the public, especially anyone who interacts with the gun holder. When the person with the gun is confronted by the police, who are engaged in the lawful execution of their duties, the risk increases dramatically. It increases yet again when the gun holder flees, and still again when the gun holder discards the weapon in a public place. A person who carries a concealed, loaded handgun in public undermines the community's sense of safety and security. Carrying a concealed, loaded handgun in a public place in Canada is antithetical to the Canadian concept of a free and ordered society.

Aggravating And Mitigating Factors

22Ms. Symes argues that Mr. Fahiye’s arrest was an example of racial profiling and therefore it is a mitigating factor on sentencing that he chose not to litigate. Respectfully, I am not going to make a finding of racial profiling or a finding that Mr. Fahiye’s Charter rights were violated. It is impossible to know how a motion would have turned out. There was, however, a viable Charter argument based on racial profiling that was not frivolous and may have succeeded. I will explain below how I will deal with this argument. What I can say is that the decision not to litigate and accept responsibility is a very important mitigating factor. Indeed, the most important mitigating factor is the guilty plea. Mr. Fahiye took responsibility for his criminal activity. A guilty plea is an acknowledgement of guilt and is often an important step towards rehabilitation. Mr. Fahiye also saved the community the resources required to prosecute him and hear the case.

23Other mitigating factors include Mr. Fahiye’s youth, the fact that he is a first offender, and his successful completion of over two years on bail with no breaches or other crimes on his record. As mentioned, I have reviewed the letters filed on his behalf by members of his family. I find it mitigating that he enjoys family support, that he is taking important steps to further his education, and that he has maintained a solid employment history.

24The most important aggravating factor is that Mr. Fahiye possessed the handgun in public. He did not have it locked away in his home where only he had access to it. It was on his person and available if needed. As such, when he was walking around with that gun he represented a significant risk to public safety. There is no evidence that Mr. Fahiye possessed the gun for an ancillary criminal purpose – for example, as a tool of the trade of drug dealing – but it was dangerous enough simply out and about with him.

Was This An Instance Of Racial Profiling?

25Ms. Symes argues that this was an instance of racial profiling. This was a circumstance of over-policing. She argues that the TCHC officers were essentially agents of the police. There was no reason to stop Mr. Fahiye and search him other than the fact that he was a young Black male among other young Black males who were simply playing basketball. The only connection that the security officers were able to make was the fact that a different group of young Black men had allegedly passed around a firearm on the same basketball court three days earlier.

26Ms. Woodward concedes that there was a viable Charter motion but does not accept that it would have been successful. She argues that the evidence does not point in the direction of the TCHC officers as agents for the police. Moreover, there was evidence that the TCHC officers had seen what they believed to be a gun in Mr. Fahiye’s possession.

27There is certainly some evidence to support Ms. Symes’ position. While I do not necessarily accept that a judge on an application would have accepted that the TCHC security officers were, in fact, agents of the Toronto Police, there was evidence upon which a judge could have made that finding. I hasten to add that this is not a negative comment about the TCHC and the Toronto Police generally. There is nothing wrong with TCHC and Toronto Police officers working cooperatively. Indeed, I would hope that they would do so in order to make the community safer. Whether the TCHC security officers become agents for the police for Charter purposes will, of course depend on the particular circumstances of the case.

28If the TCHC officers had been agents of the police that would become important because there is also some evidence on which a judge could find that the TCHC officers engaged in racial profiling – although I do not accept that a judge necessarily would have come to that conclusion. If the TCHC officers were indeed agents of the police, that could have an impact on the later search of Mr. Fahiye. Again, I do not say that it necessarily would have had such an impact, but it is not a frivolous argument.

29All that said, there was also evidence that the TCHC officers thought was a gun in Mr. Fahiye’s hand. Ms. Symes very fairly concedes that this is problematic, but it is an agreed fact that the TCHC security officers were mistaken and that in fact Mr. Fahiye was simply filming with his phone. In my respectful view, when faced with a report of a possible gun the police were duty bound to at least further investigate it as a threat to public safety.

30It is, of course, impossible for me to say what a judge would have done on a motion when faced with the evidence I have outlined. I cannot say that a Charter application would have succeeded. What I can say is that the application was manifestly not frivolous. It might have succeeded. It was a serious issue raised in a serious way by Ms. Symes and Ms. Woodward concedes that it was a serious issue. Mr. Fahiye gave up his right to litigate the issue and instead took responsibility for his actions. That is an important mitigating factor, as I have said.

Positions of the Parties, And Cases In Support

31Ms. Woodward argues that I should sentence Mr. Fahiye to 2 ½ years in the penitentiary. This, she says, is consistent with the case law and would meet the principles of deterrence and denunciation, which are paramount in gun sentencing cases. She points to the many cases setting out those principles. In R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773, the Court struck down the mandatory minimum but did not interfere with a 40-month sentence imposed on a first offender fleeing police and found in possession of a handgun. In doing so at the Court adopted Doherty J.A.’s formulation that in the majority of cases a three-year sentence may be appropriate. The Court stated at para. 82:

Section 95(1) casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct. Most cases within the range may well merit a sentence of three years or more, but conduct at the far end of the range may not. At one end of the range, as Doherty J.A. observed, "stands the outlaw who carries a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm in public places as a tool of his or her criminal trade. ... [T]his person is engaged in truly criminal conduct and poses a real and immediate danger to the public" (para. 51). At this end of the range — indeed for the vast majority of offences — a three-year sentence may be appropriate. A little further along the spectrum stands the person whose conduct is less serious and poses less danger; for these offenders three years' imprisonment may be disproportionate, but not grossly so. At the far end of the range, stands the licensed and responsible gun owner who stores his unloaded firearm safely with ammunition nearby, but makes a mistake as to where it can be stored. For this offender, a three-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to the sentence the conduct would otherwise merit under the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code.

32Ms. Woodward also points to the principles enunciated in R. v. Kawal, 2018 ONSC 7531 at paras. 12-15; and R. v. St. Clair, 2018 ONSC 7028. In that case, at para. 47, K. Campbell J. stated:

The courts have repeatedly noted that the possession of loaded handguns remains an all too prevalent threat to the people of Toronto, and to others in the Greater Toronto Area. Such firearms are frequently employed in connection with other kinds of serious criminal activity. Often, as illustrated by the facts in the present case, individuals engaged in the business of drug-trafficking have loaded firearms as one of the tools of their illicit trade. In any event, the possession and use of loaded firearms tragically results, all too frequently, in serious bodily harm or death to others. The unlawful possession of firearms remains a menace to society. To combat this serious social problem, these offences must be met with exemplary custodial sentences that proportionally reflect the sheer gravity of the crime, and which appropriately stress the need to denounce and deter such crimes. In the absence of such sentences, these offences and their disastrous consequences will only continue unabated. The public must be adequately protected. This can only be accomplished by sentences that ensure that potential offenders know that their illegal possession of loaded handguns will almost invariably be accompanied by serious penal consequences.

33Ms. Woodward, in keeping with her duties as Crown counsel, also pointed to Morris, where the Court imposed a conditional sentence for a 23-year-old first offender. Ms. Woodward also pointed to other cases where more exemplary sentences were imposed:

• R. v. Mansingh, 2017 ONCA 68: The Court upheld a 43-month sentence for a first offender who fled from police with a loaded handgun. He tossed the gun away in a public place as he fled. He had been engaged in petty trafficking of marijuana.
• R. v. Mohiadin, 2021 ONCA 122: The trial judge misapprehended the Crown’s submissions as to the length of sentence, which the Court of Appeal varied. The Court, however, imposed a 36-month sentence less pre-sentence custody on a youthful first offender. He was smoking marijuana in a car when approached by the police, who observed a handgun in a satchel around the offender’s neck.
• R. v. Mahamet-Zene, 2018 ONSC 1050: The offender was a youthful first-offender with family and community support. He visibly possessed a handgun while socializing with a group in a residential area. He was found guilty after a trial. (Note: the Court dismissed an appeal only from conviction: R. v. Zene, 2020 ONCA 99).
• R. v. Johnson, 2022 ONSC 2688: The offender was on bail for trafficking cocaine when a search warrant was arrested at his house. Police found a loaded handgun and a small amount of fentanyl. He pleaded guilty to possession of the gun and simple possession of the fentanyl. He came from an exceptionally difficult background. He had a criminal record. I was the sentencing judge. I imposed a three-year sentence less pre-sentence custody.

34Ms. Symes argues that I should impose a conditional sentence. A jail sentence would disrupt all the progress that Mr. Fahiye has made. She relies on several cases where conditional sentences have been granted, including sentences where the circumstances of the offence were worse than Mr. Fahiye’s. I will summarize some of them:

• R. v. Alexander, 2025 ONSC 961: The offender fled from police and tossed a handgun in the bushes. He was and 18-year-old first offender when he committed the offences. Bale J. sentenced him to a conditional sentence.
• R. v. Beharry, 2022 ONSC 4370: The offender had a handgun in a fanny pack while seated in a car. He was a 32-year-old first offender.
• R. v. Desmond-Robinson, 2022 ONCA 369: The trial judge imposed a sentence of 18 months for a youthful first offender with promising prospects for rehabilitation. The trial judge found that a conditional sentence was outside the range of sentence set by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal disagreed and substituted a conditional sentence and probation.
• R. v. Ferron, an unreported decision of Camara J. of the Ontario Court of Justice dated February 20, 2026: The offender had a substance abuse problem. He was found in possession of a loaded prohibited handgun and 58 grams of crack cocaine. He pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the handgun.
• R. v. Francis, 2026 ONSC 1122: The youthful offender had possession of a handgun, ammunition, 2.48 grams of fentanyl, and 8.59 grams of methamphetamine. He had a minor youth record. He had experienced significant anti-Black racism.
• R. v. Hussey-Rodriguez, 2024 ONSC 2671: The youthful first offender was carrying a loaded handgun in a backpack. He fled when confronted by police. He had successfully been on bail and had taken significant steps towards rehabilitation, including caring for his high-needs child.

Principles Of Sentencing And Range Of Sentence

35Denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the public are the key sentencing principles in firearms cases “because of the prevalence and the great danger posed by loaded handguns”: R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817 at para. 35.

36The principle of restraint also plays a role. Where a court sentences an offender to less than two years, the court must consider whether to impose a conditional sentence. As the Court of Appeal stated in Morris, at para. 125: “The restraint principle favours conditional sentences over incarceration if a conditional sentence is consistent with the proportionality principle…” The Court of Appeal went on to state that a “a carefully fashioned conditional sentence that is responsive, both to the needs of denunciation and deterrence and the rehabilitative potential of the offender, can, in some situations, be a fit sentence for a s. 95 offence…”

37See also Desmond-Robinson, where the Court of Appeal confirmed that the seriousness of a handgun offence does not preclude the possibility of a conditional sentence in appropriate circumstances.

38In Graham at paras. 37-38 Code J. noted that post-Nur the range of sentence for well-situated first offenders is two years less a day to three years. The range of 3-5 years is the appropriate range for a first offender where there is associated criminal activity, such as drug trafficking. In Beharry at para. 31 Schreck J. analyzed the gun sentencing cases. He found that the 3–5-year range applies where possession of a handgun is associated with other criminal activity, such as drug trafficking. Sentences in the upper reformatory or lower penitentiary range can be imposed where there is no associated criminal activity.

39I agree with the general observations of Code J. and Schreck J. as to the range of sentence. I add that where a first offender is concerned, other factors may well take a sentence into the penitentiary range. These include:

• Engaging in other dangerous behaviour, such as brandishing a loaded handgun in public, or fleeing with a loaded handgun from police and discarding it in a public place, is more likely to take a sentence into penitentiary territory: Mansingh at paras. 21-25.
• An offender sentenced after trial is not entitled to the mitigation associated with a guilty plea: see Mahamet-Zene, for example.
• Litigating a Charter motion and inviting a finding of guilt where it is dismissed is also not entitled to the same mitigation as a guilty plea, although the saving of court time is relevant: Mohiadin, at paras. 3, 13.
• A penitentiary sentence is likely to be imposed on an offender with a criminal record and/or is on bail for other serious offences: Johnson at para. 40.

40I will repeat what I said in Johnson at para. 40:

… the most serious gun possession cases are those involving using a firearm in conjunction with other criminal activity, such as drug trafficking; or moving about with a firearm in public, or transporting it in public, or abandoning it in a public or semi-public place, as happened in Mansingh. That is when firearms pose the most extreme danger to public safety. It is those cases that should attract the highest sentences.

Sentence Imposed and Ancillary Orders

41Like Mr. Beharry, the offender dealt with by Schreck J., Mr. Fahiye falls somewhere in the middle of the range. Carrying a firearm in public is a significant danger to public safety. It is not a mere regulatory infraction. At the same time, there is no evidence that Mr. Fahiye was engaged in other associated criminal activity, such as drug trafficking. He did not toss the firearm away in a public place in an effort to evade the police. A conditional sentence is not outside the range for a first offender like Mr. Fahiye who had no associated criminality, has done well on bail, and has good prospects for rehabilitation.

42I conclude that a conditional sentence in this case takes into account all of the important mitigating and aggravating factors, including the principle of restraint. It is within the range of sentence imposed in similar situations. It will permit Mr. Fahiye to get on with the business of rehabilitation. I find that a conditional sentence would not endanger the community and would be consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing: R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61; Criminal Code, s. 742.1(a).

43Mr. Fahiye is sentenced to two years less a day to be served in the community. I am aware that he has two days of pre-sentence custody. Given the relatively small amount of pre-sentence custody, I am simply going to treat it as a mitigating factor. Because firearms possession is such a significant offence, a more punitive and denunciatory sentence is required. I will also put Mr. Fahiye on probation to ensure that he remains on the right path.

44In addition to the statutory terms, Mr. Fahiye will be subject to the following conditions:

• He will report to a conditional sentence supervisor within two business days.
• He is to live at an address approved of by his conditional sentence supervisor. He is not to change address without informing his conditional sentence supervisor within 48 hours.
• He is to seek and maintain employment or go to attend educational courses. He is to provide proof of his efforts to obtain employment or his attendance at an educational course to his conditional sentence supervisor on a weekly basis. He is to provide his work schedule to his conditional sentence supervisor on a weekly basis.
• He is to attend and actively participate in any assessment, counselling, or rehabilitative program as directed and sign releases to allow his conditional sentence supervisor to monitor his progress.

45For the first 12 months of his conditional sentence Mr. Fahiye will be on a house arrest. He is required to be in his residence 24 hours a day, seven days a week, subject only to the following exceptions:

• For a medical emergency on behalf of himself or a member of his immediate family (spouse, parent, child, sibling).
• For pre-arranged medical or dental appointments for himself or his mother, with notice in advance to be given to his conditional sentence supervisor.
• Going to, being at, and returning home from work or educational classes, with his work schedule to be provided to his conditional sentence supervisor on a weekly basis.
• For one 3-hour period per week, at a time to be agreed upon with his conditional sentence supervisor, for personal errands.
• For religious observance 2 hours every Friday, at a time to be agreed upon with his conditional sentence supervisor.

46Mr. Fahiye will be on a curfew for the second 12 months less a day of his sentence. He must be in his residence from 9 pm to 6 am every evening, with the following exceptions:

• For a medical emergency on behalf of himself or a member of his immediate family (spouse, parent, child, sibling).
• Going to, being at, and returning home from work or educational classes, with his work schedule to be provided to his conditional sentence supervisor on a weekly basis.

47Mr. Fahiye will be placed on probation for two years. The terms of his probation will be as follows:

• Report to probation within two business days of the completion of your sentence and thereafter as required.
• Reside at approved address.
• Do not possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code.
• Do not apply for any permit, licence or registration certificate for any weapon as defined by the Criminal Code.

48Although possession of a firearm is a secondary designated offence, given the circumstances and the seriousness I order that there be a DNA order. There will also be a 10-year weapons prohibition order pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code.

R.F. Goldstein J.

Released: July 3, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Fahiye, 2026 ONSC 3876