Susan Magotiaux

The Crown appealed the sentence of three years less a day imposed on the respondent for 36 offences, including assault, assault with a weapon, and criminal harassment, committed against two domestic partners.

The trial judge had improperly credited the respondent with one year for 133 days of pre-sentence custody based on an unsupported Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly unfit given the serious aggravating factors, including assaults on pregnant victims and blatant disregard for probation orders.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was increased to 4.5 years' imprisonment.

The appellant was convicted under s. 127 of the Criminal Code for breaching an interlocutory injunction prohibiting anti-abortion protests near clinics.

She appealed, arguing the prosecution was an abuse of process due to Crown delay in the civil proceeding, and that s. 127 was unconstitutional on division of powers and Charter s. 7 grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no abuse of process, characterizing the argument as an impermissible collateral attack, and upholding the constitutionality of s. 127.

The appellant brought an interlocutory appeal under s. 37.1 of the Canada Evidence Act challenging the trial judge's orders under s. 37 and s. 37.3 regarding the disclosure of information and the conduct of the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that evidentiary rulings are properly made by trial judges and that s. 37 orders target disclosure of specific information, often to protect the identity of a confidential informant.

The matter was remitted to the trial court for the continuation of the trial.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board erred in concluding he continues to pose a significant threat to the safety of the public.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable based on all the circumstances.

The appellant challenged multiple drug and criminal organization convictions following a jury trial, arguing the trial judge inadequately answered a jury question on constructive possession, failed to caution on voice identification evidence, and failed to instruct that uncertainty on voice identification could itself raise a reasonable doubt.

The court held the supplemental instruction on possession was erroneous because it conflated control over the place with control over the item, but found the error materially affected only the marijuana possession for the purpose of trafficking count arising from drugs found in common areas.

The remaining conviction grounds failed because the charge as a whole adequately conveyed the burden of proof and identity requirements, and a specific voice-identification caution was not mandatory on this record.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted; the sentence on the cocaine possession for the purpose of trafficking count was reduced to ten months, but the global sentence otherwise stood.

The respondent was convicted of 16 weapons and drug offences and sentenced to a global term of 42 months.

The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and seeking a seven-year term, and that the trial judge erred by making the drug and weapons sentences concurrent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the relevant sentencing principles, the effect of invalidated mandatory minimums, and the aggravating factor of combining guns and drugs.

The sentence was entitled to deference and was not demonstrably unfit.

The applicant, convicted of 36 counts related to domestic violence against two former partners, sought an extension of time to file an appeal and judicial interim release pending his appeal of conviction and sentence.

The Crown consented to the extension of time.

On the issue of bail, the chambers judge applied the test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

While the applicant would surrender into custody, the judge found the grounds of appeal were weak and the public interest favoured immediate enforcement of the sentence given the serious nature of the domestic violence offences, the applicant's history of breaching probation, and his high risk to re-offend.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual exploitation by a person in a position of trust, breach of trust, and making and possessing child pornography involving a complainant who had lived in the accused’s home as a teenager.

The Crown alleged the accused used his position as a police officer and landlord to coerce sexual activity and take nude photographs of the complainant when she was under 18.

The court found significant inconsistencies and credibility concerns in the complainant’s testimony, including contradictions regarding photographs, camera use, alleged coercion, and post‑incident conduct.

The court accepted defence evidence that certain sexual activity occurred consensually after the complainant turned 18 and found the Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

All charges were dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions for two counts of defamatory libel arising from sexually explicit communications sent and posted online in the complainant's name after a restaurant service dispute.

The court held the circumstantial evidence, including the origin of the IP address, password-protected internet access, and similarities in writing style, reasonably supported the finding that the appellant authored the communications.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted in part.

While a 90-day custodial sentence remained fit, the court held the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the impact of non-intermittent custody on the appellant's young children and varied the sentence to intermittent service.

In a youth criminal appeal from a conviction for possession of child pornography, the appellant argued that the search warrant was invalid because the information to obtain was sworn before a commissioner of oaths rather than a justice.

The court rejected that submission, holding that s. 487(1) of the Criminal Code requires only that a justice issue the warrant, not that the oath be sworn before a justice.

Relying on the statutory provisions permitting non-substantive deviations from prescribed forms and variation of Criminal Code forms to suit the case, the court held the local warrant application practice was appropriate.

The alleged s. 8 Charter breach was therefore not made out and the conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for second degree murder and aggravated assault arising from a fatal attack in a rest home, arguing that the jury unreasonably rejected his NCR defence based on schizophrenia and conflicting expert evidence.

The court held that, although the evidence could have supported an NCR finding, there was also evidence capable of supporting the jury’s conclusion that the appellant had not met his burden on a balance of probabilities.

The court further held that the jury charge adequately distinguished the NCR and mens rea inquiries, properly limited the use of protected assessment statements, and did not misdirect the jury on malingering or recall evidence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences involving a 12-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) test, assessing credibility, and relying on demeanour evidence.

He also argued the trial judge failed to give credit for his restrictive bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and demeanour.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately treated the restrictive bail conditions as a mitigating factor in the global sentence.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of luring and sexual assault.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused based on his belief that the 15-year-old complainant was 16, finding he took reasonable steps to determine her age by using an alternate internet profile.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by failing to conduct the required contextual and objective inquiry under ss. 172.1(4) and 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code, and by failing to properly address the issue of consent under ss. 265(3) and 273.1.

The acquittals were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The appellant argued the lower court erred in its characterization of the seriousness of a section 10(b) Charter breach under the Grant test.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding the case did not raise an issue of law capable of supporting an order for leave.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference but acquitted of invitation to sexual touching and sexual assault in relation to a single incident with a young complainant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdicts were inconsistent and therefore unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were supportable based on the trial judge's instructions, which directed the jury to consider each charge separately and distinguished between the 'touch' requirement for sexual interference and the 'force' requirement for sexual assault.

The appellant was tried by a judge and jury for arson.

In response to a jury question, the trial judge instructed the jury for the first time on the included offence of attempted arson, stating the mens rea included recklessness.

The jury convicted the appellant of attempted arson.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that whether recklessness applies to attempt offences is unsettled law.

Because the trial judge raised this issue late, depriving the defence of the opportunity to research or address it in closing, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and theft after hijacking a tractor-trailer of frozen chickens and shooting the driver.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting cell phone propagation maps and test calls, and in his jury instructions regarding the W. (D.) framework and the distinction between disbelief and fabrication of an exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the evidentiary rulings or the jury instructions.

The appellant challenged fraud convictions on the basis of improper jury vetting by prosecution offices and police database checks of prospective jurors.

The court held that while disclosure obligations were breached and some vetting conduct was improper, a new trial requires a reasonable possibility that proper disclosure would have produced a differently constituted jury.

On the record, that threshold was not met.

The court also held that the conduct did not amount to a miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The Court held that broad jury vetting consultations with police should not occur, that relevant jury-selection information from police must be disclosed, and that despite non-disclosure in this case there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have been differently constituted, no unfair trial, and no miscarriage of justice.