Susan Magotiaux

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a child.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by excluding evidence of the complainant's prior sexual abuse by another individual under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, failing to provide limiting instructions regarding prior consistent statements and extrinsic misconduct, improperly characterizing a defence witness's evidence as potentially 'scripted', and inadequately answering a jury question on the standard of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed a first degree murder conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable because the Crown's case was entirely circumstantial and that police vetting of prospective jurors constituted an abuse of process.

The court applied the unreasonable verdict standard and held that the cumulative effect of the evidence of motive, opportunity, access, and post-offence conduct was capable of supporting findings of unlawful killing, murder, and planning and deliberation.

The court also held that police checks for criminal records and outstanding charges, without Crown involvement and without any resulting unfairness in jury selection, did not amount to a per se abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed convictions arising from a vicious, pre-meditated group assault intended to intimidate a victim from testifying at an upcoming murder trial, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding an unsavoury key witness and misdirected the jury on confirmatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the caution, framed consistently with standard jury instructions and reinforced by repeated references to the witness's frailties, was more than adequate in the context of the case as a whole.

It further held that the cited confirmatory evidence was capable of bolstering material aspects of the witness's account and was not misleading.

On sentence, the court found an error in the trial judge's statement that there were no mitigating factors, but concluded that denunciation and deterrence properly predominated and that the four-year global sentence remained fit.

The appellant challenged a criminal charge under s. 127(1) for allegedly disobeying an injunction, arguing Ontario civil contempt rules provided an express alternative mode of proceeding.

The majority held the statutory exception applies only where legislation provides the legal foundation for contempt, defines contempt circumstances, and provides punishment or procedure.

The Court found Rules 60.11 and 60.12 are procedurally detailed but remain dependent on common law substratum for legal foundation and contempt definition.

Accordingly, the exception was not triggered and prosecution under s. 127(1) could proceed.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding the rules themselves constituted an express legislative mode of proceeding.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of possession of child pornography.

The police had obtained a warrant to search the accused's computer for evidence of fraud.

During the search, an analyst found images of child pornography and, after consulting with the Crown, continued to search video files for further evidence of child pornography without obtaining a second warrant.

The trial judge found a breach of s. 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal held that while the search of the video files violated s. 8, the trial judge erred in characterizing the Crown's advice as reckless and finding a systemic failure.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence should not be excluded, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fourteen sexual offences involving eight complainants at group homes where he worked.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a confession the appellant gave to police while he was a voluntary psychiatric patient suffering from depression.

The appellant argued his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated because the police did not obtain a clear waiver after he gave an equivocal response about wanting a lawyer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant understood his rights and had a reasonable opportunity to exercise them, and the police were not required to do more in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that rejected a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that, aside from a comment regarding the appellant being treatment consent incapable, the Board's decision was reasonable and amply supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge erred in dismissing the theory of an alternate suspect.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting that the complainant's testimony was corroborated by circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's DNA on a rock covered in the complainant's blood and on a discarded shirt.

The court found the trial judge made no errors in assessing the evidence or rejecting the alternate suspect theory as speculative.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting expert police evidence regarding a 'code of silence' in the community where the shooting occurred.

The Crown introduced this evidence to explain why the sole eyewitness initially lied to police about witnessing the murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence was relevant and necessary to provide context for the witness's behaviour, and that the trial judge implemented extraordinary safeguards to prevent prejudice, including prohibiting the word 'gang' and providing clear limiting instructions to the jury.

The appellant appealed his 3-year sentence for break and enter and theft, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give adequate reasons and failed to consider his expressions of remorse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the reasons were sufficient as the judge adopted the Crown's submissions and emphasized public protection.

The Court also found the appellant's remorse was not genuine, as he disputed factual findings and blamed the victims.

The appellant, a social worker, appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault involving two former patients.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that consent was vitiated by an abuse of trust, that the trial judge's interventions compromised trial fairness, and that improper use was made of a prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were amply supported by the evidence and that the trial was fair.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on two youthful offenders who pled guilty to a home invasion robbery.

One respondent received two years less a day and the other received 21 months, both followed by three years' probation.

The trial judge emphasized the respondents' significant rehabilitative progress while on strict bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentences were lenient, the trial judge made no error in principle and the sentences were not manifestly unfit given the strong prospects for rehabilitation.

The appellants appealed convictions for two counts of first degree murder and two counts of conspiracy to commit murder arising from planned execution-style killings.

They argued that undisclosed police criminal-record checks on prospective jurors created an unfair jury selection process and that the trial judge's final charge contained multiple reversible errors, including inadequate Vetrovec cautions and erroneous instructions on duress, conspiracy, included offences, bad character, and written jury materials.

The court held that any positive criminal-record information should have been disclosed, but the appellants failed to show a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure affected the verdict or the overall fairness of the trial, particularly given trial counsel's awareness and inaction.

Although aspects of the charge were imperfect, the instructions were adequate when read as a whole and the prosecution case was overwhelming.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was found guilty of domestic assault and sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing his s. 9 rights were violated by a police policy of routinely detaining those charged with domestic violence.

The trial judge found a Charter breach but refused a stay, instead granting enhanced pre-trial custody credit.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' discretionary choice of remedy and noting the police policy had been properly denounced.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on a psychiatrist convicted of two counts of sexual assault against a patient.

The offences occurred over a nine-year period and involved a significant breach of trust, as the offender exploited the patient's vulnerabilities and later orchestrated a cover-up.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by discounting the victim impact statement due to a pending civil suit and by failing to treat the breach of trust as an aggravating factor.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to two years' imprisonment.

The appellants, a newspaper and its journalists, received an allegedly forged document from a confidential source implicating the Prime Minister in a conflict of interest.

The police obtained a search warrant and assistance order to seize the document and its envelope to identify the source through forensic testing.

The appellants challenged the warrant, claiming a constitutional or common law journalist-source privilege.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 2(b) of the Charter does not provide a blanket constitutional immunity for journalists, a case-by-case privilege may be established using the Wigmore criteria.

On the facts, the public interest in investigating the serious crime of forgery outweighed the public interest in protecting the confidential source.

The search warrant and assistance order were upheld as reasonable under s. 8 of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give proper weight to the parity principle, treated a prior sentence as a floor, and failed to adequately consider his rehabilitative potential.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge drew valid distinctions between the appellant and his co-accused, did not treat the prior sentence as a floor, and appropriately prioritized general and specific deterrence over rehabilitative potential.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and his sentence of 30 months' imprisonment after time served.

During a physical confrontation, the appellant slashed the complainant's neck with a 12-inch bread knife.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in finding the specific intent to kill and in rejecting his claims of self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions on intent and the unavailability of self-defence were firmly grounded in the evidence, and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision, arguing that there were inconsistencies in the Crown's evidence.

The Court of Appeal noted that both the trial judge and the summary conviction appeal judge were alive to these inconsistencies, yet the trial judge accepted the Crown witness's evidence and found the case proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal concluded the inconsistencies were not stark enough to give rise to a ground of appeal under the test in R. v. R.R. and denied leave to appeal.

The appellant was charged with disobeying a court order under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code after allegedly violating an interlocutory injunction prohibiting anti-abortion protest activity.

The trial judge quashed the information, finding that the Rules of Civil Procedure provided another mode of proceeding for contempt, thereby triggering the exception in s. 127(1).

The summary conviction appeal court reversed this decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the authority to punish for civil contempt originates in the common law, not statute, and therefore is not 'expressly provided by law' as required to exclude the application of s. 127(1).