Michelle Gibbs

International medical graduates appealed the dismissal of their breach of contract action against the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada.

The appellants sought a declaration that they had passed the Royal College's 2020 qualifying psychiatry exam and were entitled to certification for independent practice.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the Royal College's 6.5% downward adjustment of exam scores was psychometrically justified.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because she failed to meaningfully engage with contradictory expert evidence, did not address the breach of contract claim, and did not analyze whether the parties had entered into an enforceable contract or whether the Royal College breached its duty of good faith performance.

The appeal was granted and a new trial was ordered.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a summary judgment motion, the successful defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $59,338.05 plus disbursements.

The plaintiff objected, arguing the amount was excessive compared to his own costs.

The court found the defendant's costs reasonable given the complexity and lengthy factual history of the matter, noting it is easier to make unsubstantiated allegations of bad faith than to refute them.

Costs were fixed at $60,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff physician sued the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario for abuse of process and intentional infliction of mental distress after his medical license was revoked.

The College moved for summary judgment or to strike the claim.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that the plaintiff's claims were incapable of proof due to the absolute bar on admitting College proceeding records under s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

Furthermore, the College and its committees were protected by absolute privilege, judicial immunity, and statutory good faith immunity under s. 38 of the Act.

The plaintiff employer brought a motion for default judgment against a former employee for fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit.

The employee had falsified environmental site assessment reports and records over a three-year period.

The court granted default judgment, finding the employee's conduct constituted wilful misconduct.

The court awarded $629,226 in pecuniary damages for remediation, third-party fees, settlements, and fines, along with $50,000 in damages at large for loss of reputation, $20,000 in punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their summary judgment motion on the basis that the respondent's action was time-barred under the Limitations Act.

The respondent had commenced an action for dental work defects after initially pursuing a consensual resolution with the appellants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the limitation period did not begin to run until the appellants refused the respondent's request for repairs at no cost, as the respondent had reasonably relied on the appellants' ameliorative efforts to resolve the dispute without litigation.

The plaintiff brought a dental malpractice action against the defendants for defective implant surgery and dentures.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court applied the subjective and modified objective tests for discoverability and found that the plaintiff did not discover that a legal proceeding would be an appropriate remedy until the defendants refused to repair his dentures at no cost.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

Following a successful motion under Rules 20 and 21 resulting in the summary dismissal of an action, the moving defendants sought costs against the plaintiff.

The court considered the complexity of the issues, including arguments under the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 and the Health Professions Procedural Code concerning the regulatory authority of the professional college.

The court found the hours and rates of counsel generally reasonable but reduced the bill to account for duplication between two lawyers and travel time.

Partial indemnity costs were fixed with additional HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay the total amount within 30 days.

The moving parties sought to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b), dismiss the action as an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(d), or obtain summary judgment under Rule 20.

The claim alleged that a medical regulatory body conducted a bad‑faith investigation into physicians working at the plaintiff’s clinic, causing economic loss.

The court held the pleading was sufficient to allege misfeasance in public office, though not intentional interference with economic relations.

However, on the summary judgment record the plaintiff produced virtually no evidence establishing unlawful conduct or bad faith.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the action.

Following a prior decision striking the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim in its entirety without leave to amend, several successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered the governing principles for costs awards, including the requirement that costs be fair and reasonable and the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although the defendants sought higher partial indemnity amounts, the court exercised discretion to reduce the awards.

The court ordered the self-represented plaintiff to pay fixed costs to multiple defendants reflecting their success on the motions while ensuring the amounts were reasonable in the circumstances.

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiff’s Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim alleging fraud, negligence, defamation, breach of contract, and numerous other causes of action arising from a physician assessment and subsequent complaints to the professional regulator and review board.

The court held that the pleading failed to set out material facts supporting the alleged causes of action and instead consisted largely of bald allegations and inflammatory assertions.

Claims relying on materials from professional discipline proceedings were barred by s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, and the regulatory bodies and their officials were protected by statutory immunity absent properly pleaded bad faith.

The court also found the claim constituted an improper collateral attack on the outcomes of the regulatory complaint and review process.

The entire claim was struck without leave to amend.

The defendant regulatory body brought a motion under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim alleging damages arising from the regulator’s handling of a complaint against a physician.

The plaintiff sought $18 million and alleged the regulator failed to properly investigate the complaint and lacked transparency in its investigative process.

The court held that the claim was barred by statutory immunity under the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 and by the doctrine of adjudicative immunity applicable to quasi‑judicial regulatory functions.

The court also found that the regulator owed no individual duty of care to the plaintiff and could not be vicariously liable for the conduct of its members.

Concluding it was plain and obvious the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, the court struck the Statement of Claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking default judgment and to strike the defendant’s defence.

The defendant brought a motion under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the claim without leave to amend.

The court found the plaintiff had filed no evidentiary record and provided no basis for default or summary judgment.

The claim was struck on multiple grounds, including statutory inadmissibility of the plaintiff’s proposed evidence under the Regulated Health Professions Act, absence of allegations overcoming statutory immunity, and failure to plead a duty of care.

The court concluded that the claim was fundamentally inconsistent with settled legal principles and declined to grant leave to amend.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim under Rules 21 and 25.

The plaintiff, who had several actions assigned for case management and faced a pending vexatious litigant motion, failed to appear at the hearing.

The court granted the motion to strike on three grounds: the evidence relied upon was inadmissible under section 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991; there was no allegation of bad faith to overcome immunity under section 38; and no duty of care was pleaded.

The claim was struck without leave to amend, and costs of $8,000 were awarded to the defendant.