Valerie Wise

The court found the Ontario Association of Architects (OAA) in contempt of court for circumventing a court order prohibiting it from licensing architectural technologists except as authorized by regulation.

After a prior order voided technologist licences, the OAA issued architect licences to technologists with the same practice restrictions as the banned licences, using a statutory committee process.

The court held this was a breach of both the letter and spirit of the order, as the process was a disguised continuation of the prohibited policy.

The decision reviews the statutory context, the events after the order, and the legal test for contempt, concluding that the OAA intentionally disobeyed the order.

This is an appeal from an Associate Judge's interlocutory order dismissing a motion to extend discovery time limits in a simplified procedure action and to examine non-parties.

The Associate Judge had concluded she lacked discretion to extend time under Rule 76.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellate court found that the Associate Judge erred in this conclusion, holding that general rules (such as Rule 3.02) allow for extension of time limits in simplified procedure actions unless explicitly exempted.

The court set aside the order dismissing the appellants' motion and dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal regarding costs and examination of non-parties.

The matter was remitted to the Associate Judge for further orders consistent with the finding of discretion.

The defendants brought a motion to extend the allotted discovery time under the simplified procedure rules to examine two non-parties.

The plaintiff had strictly enforced the three-hour limit under Rule 76.04(2) during his examination, despite having examined the defendants for over five hours.

The court found the plaintiff's conduct to be sharp practice but concluded it had no discretion to extend the time limit under Rule 76.04(2).

The motion was dismissed, but the defendants were awarded costs due to the plaintiff's lack of professional courtesy.

This case addresses a contractual dispute between a midwifery practice group (AMMA) and three former associate midwives regarding a clause requiring the withdrawal of hospital privileges upon termination of their agreements.

The court examined whether the clause applied to an expired contract, whether privileges were 'held through' the practice group, and if the clause constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.

The court found the 'termination' clause ambiguous and, applying contra proferentem, ruled it did not apply to an expired contract.

However, it found that privileges were indeed 'held through' the practice group for the purpose of the clause.

The court also determined that the clause was not a restraint of trade under Ontario's formalistic approach, as it did not prohibit competition but merely required the withdrawal of privileges obtained through the association.

The application was dismissed against one respondent (whose contract expired) but allowed against the other two (whose contracts were terminated).

Appeal from a trial judgment awarding damages for birth injuries caused by hospital negligence.

The trial judge found that hospital nurses negligently ruptured the membranes during delivery, causing the plaintiff to suffer hypotonic cerebral palsy with serious and permanent impairments.

The appellants admitted falling below the standard of care but contested causation and damages.

The trial judge awarded $5,568,393 in total damages, including $1,881,846 for future loss of income, and costs of $2,201,259.

The appellants appealed the damages award and costs decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.

Following a successful medical malpractice trial resulting in a $5.3 million judgment for the plaintiffs, the court assessed costs.

The plaintiffs had beaten their $4.5 million offer to settle, entitling them to substantial indemnity costs from the date of the offer.

The court considered the complexity of the case, the extensive expert evidence required, and the proportionality of the costs to the recovery, ultimately fixing costs at $2,201,259 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

Following a trial judgment in a medical malpractice action, the court issued supplementary reasons to address pre-judgment interest and adjustments to future pecuniary losses.

The parties reached an agreement on these issues, excluding costs.

The court issued an order revising the total judgment granted in favour of the plaintiffs to $5,568,393.00, inclusive of pre-judgment interest and adjusted future pecuniary losses.

This dental malpractice action involved two summary judgment motions based on limitation periods.

The defendant dental surgeon, Dr. Harper, argued the action was time-barred by the one-year limitation period in the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The defendant Hospital relied on the two-year limitation period in the Public Hospitals Act.

The court dismissed Dr. Harper's motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the plaintiff's discoverability of biological hazards.

However, the Hospital's motion was granted, as its limitation period was not subject to discoverability and had expired years before the action was commenced.

The minor plaintiff suffered a severe hypoxic-ischemic brain injury at birth due to the admitted negligence of the defendant hospital's nurses in artificially rupturing the membranes.

The defendant conceded the breach of the standard of care and that it caused the plaintiff's ataxic hypotonic cerebral palsy, but argued her cognitive and behavioural issues were caused by genetically inherited ADHD.

The court rejected the genetic ADHD theory, finding the birth injury was the sole cause of all the plaintiff's physical, cognitive, and behavioural deficits.

The court awarded over $5.2 million in damages, including $250,000 for general damages, $1.88 million for future loss of income, and extensive future care costs for therapies, supported independent living, and home modifications.

The defendant dentist moved for summary judgment in a dental negligence claim without filing any expert evidence on the merits of his defence, relying on previous case law suggesting defendants need not do so.

Following the release of the Court of Appeal's decision in Sanzone v. Schecter, which clarified that moving defendants must put their best evidentiary foot forward under Rule 20.01(3), the court dismissed the summary judgment motion.

The court held that the defendant failed to discharge his evidentiary burden to prove there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendant moved for summary judgment on a dental negligence claim, arguing the plaintiff failed to provide a proper expert report, and sought to strike several paragraphs from the statement of claim.

The court found the plaintiff's expert affidavit deficient in form and raised concerns about the admissibility of underlying reports due to potential conflicts with the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The court deferred a final decision on the summary judgment motion, ordering further submissions on the admissibility of evidence.

However, the court granted the motion to strike numerous paragraphs from the statement of claim that were deemed irrelevant or inconsistent with the RHPA.

The defendant dentist brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's dental malpractice action on the basis that it was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The court held a mini-trial to determine the issue of discoverability.

The plaintiff argued he only discovered the claim after a consultation with another dentist on June 15, 2010, while the defendant argued the claim was discoverable earlier when the plaintiff sought treatment from other dentists for ongoing issues.

The court found that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have realized the potential negligence by May 20, 2010, when the tooth treated by the defendant was extracted.

As the action was commenced more than two years after this date, the motion was granted and the action dismissed.

The defendants, a dentist and an oral surgeon, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for dental malpractice and battery.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants extracted the wrong tooth.

The court found that the case turned heavily on the credibility of the parties, particularly the plaintiff, and that the documentary record alone was insufficient to resolve the factual disputes.

Applying the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court concluded that a full trial was not necessary but that oral evidence was required.

The court ordered an abbreviated summary trial under Rule 20.05 to determine the specific factual disputes and damages.