LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL
APPEAL DIVISION
Date: April 27, 2026 Tribunal File No.: 25A-007
BETWEEN:
Georgiana Stefania Masgras-Irshidat Appellant
- and -
Law Society of Ontario Respondent in appeal
Before: Gerald Chan (chair), Ingrid Berkeley, Paul Le Vay, Natalia Rodriguez, Margaret Waddell
Heard: By written submissions
Appearances: Gavin MacKenzie and Brooke MacKenzie, for the appellant Joshua Elcombe, for the respondent in appeal
Summary: MASGRAS-IRSHIDAT- Appeals - Costs – The Lawyer had unsuccessfully appealed the hearing panel’s decision finding professional misconduct – The Law Society’s cross appeal on the penalty was also dismissed -The panel ordered costs of $16,000 in favour of the Law Society.
REASONS FOR DECISION ON COSTS
1Gerald Chan (for the panel):– In our reasons dated January 21, 2026, we dismissed the appeal of the lawyer, Georgiana Stefania Masgras-Irshidat (the Lawyer) regarding the findings of professional misconduct made against her, as well as the cross-appeal of the Law Society of Ontario regarding penalty (the failure to revoke the Lawyer’s licence): 2026 ONLSTA 1.
2Following our decision, we received the parties’ submissions on costs.
3For the reasons given below, we order costs on this appeal in favour of the Law Society in the amount of $16,000 with 90 days to pay.
PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS
4As the successful party on the main appeal, the Law Society seeks costs in the amount of $16,000. The Law Society submitted a bill of costs setting out its actual costs on the appeal in the amount of over $19,000. The discount from over $19,000 to $16,000 reflects the fact that the Law Society was unsuccessful in its cross-appeal of the penalty.
5In support of its position, the Law Society cites case law supporting a general range for costs on appeal of between $15,000 and $30,000, with the median being $20,000: Law Society of Ontario v Rogerson, 2025 ONLSTA 11 at paras 24-25; Law Society of Ontario v McLaughlin, 2025 ONLSTA 1 at paras 8-10. The Law Society notes that its claim of $16,000 falls on the low end of this spectrum and represents an appropriate quantum in light of the costs orders in comparable cases, the complexity of the appeal, the importance of the issues, the Lawyer’s ability to pay (the Lawyer had testified that her firm takes in about $3,000,000 in gross billings per year), and the parties’ reasonable expectations.
6The Lawyer submits that the Law Society’s claimed costs are unreasonable — not because the bill of costs is excessive, but because the Law Society is seeking full indemnity and because the Law Society’s cross-appeal was unwarranted and caused costs to be incurred by her without reasonable cause. With respect to the latter, the Lawyer argues that the cross-appeal on penalty was doomed to fail. By bringing the cross-appeal and seeking the drastic consequence of revocation on appeal, the Law Society forced the Lawyer to respond with a reply factum that cited numerous authorities refuting the Law Society’s meritless position and to prepare accordingly for oral argument.
7With respect to ability to pay, the Lawyer submits that we have to look not at her gross billings (given the amount of staff she has to pay, among other expenses), but at the fact that she will not be earning income for nine months beginning February 20, 2026, because she will be serving her suspension. The Lawyer submits that a costs order of $16,000 within 30 days is not reasonable and that the costs order should instead be $10,000 within 12 months.
ANALYSIS
8The power to award costs is rooted in Rule 15.1 of the Law Society Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure (the Tribunal Rules). Rule 15.1(2)(a) provides that costs may be awarded against a licensee where a determination adverse to the licensee has been made.
9In this case, the Law Society was successful on the main appeal and is therefore entitled to its costs. We agree with the Law Society that the general range of costs on appeal is $15,000-30,000 with the median being $20,000. The Lawyer does not argue to the contrary, nor does the Lawyer take issue with the Law Society’s bill of costs (in the amount of $19,000) as being excessive.
10Viewed within this range, and in light of the well-established factors on costs, we find that a costs claim of $16,000 is reasonable, bearing in mind that the Law Society has appropriately discounted its total costs incurred by the cost of its unsuccessful cross-appeal on penalty.
11The Lawyer challenges this amount on the basis that Law Society inappropriately seeks full indemnity for the its costs. The Tribunal’s case law, however, holds that it is inappropriate to analogize the costs requested by the Law Society — which are based on the tariff guidelines set out in Appendix A to the Tribunal Rules — to substantial or full indemnity costs in civil litigation: Kesten v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2011 ONLSAP 26 at para 6. Moreover, the rates set by the tariffs are in any event akin to “partial indemnity” costs in civil litigation in that they are considerably lower than the going rates set in the courts: Law Society of Upper Canada v Dyment, 2014 ONLSTA 41 at para 7; Law Society of Ontario v Robson, 2023 ONLSTA 8 at paras 10-11. Accordingly, we cannot accept the Lawyer’s submission that the Law Society’s costs represent an inappropriate claim of full indemnity.
12The Lawyer’s second challenge to the Law Society’s costs claim is based on the submission that the cross-appeal on penalty was unwarranted and caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause. Essentially, the Lawyer appears to rely on both prongs of Rule 15.1(1) to seek costs against the Law Society for its unsuccessful cross-appeal, which costs would then be set off against the costs that the Lawyer would have to pay to the Law Society for the main appeal. This appears to be how the Lawyer gets to a final number of $10,000 in costs owing to the Law Society.
13We do not accept that the Law Society’s cross-appeal on penalty was unwarranted, or that it caused costs to be incurred by the Lawyer without reasonable cause. As is evident from the language in Rule 15.1(1), it is not enough for the Lawyer to be successful on the cross-appeal in order to be awarded costs. Depending on which prong of the rule is applicable (which we do not have to decide in this case), the Lawyer must go further and show that the cross-appeal had no reasonable chance of success (and was therefore unwarranted), or that the Law Society conducted the proceeding in an unreasonable manner (and therefore caused the Lawyer to incur costs without reasonable cause).
14The Lawyer has failed to discharge her burden under either prong. While we disagreed with the Law Society’s submissions on the cross-appeal, we do not find that the Law Society’s argument that the hearing panel erred in refusing to revoke — either in the substance of the position or in the manner in which it was advanced — fell outside the bounds of reasonableness. The misconduct found by the hearing panel (and upheld by us) in this case was serious. It was not unwarranted for the Law Society to cross-appeal the decision to suspend rather than revoke, nor did the Law Society advance that argument in an unreasonable manner.
15Finally, there is the issue of time to pay. The Lawyer submits that 30 days is not reasonable and that she should instead be given 12 months to pay. However, the Lawyer points to no evidence of impecuniosity. Instead, she relies only on the fact that she already has an adverse costs order against her in the amount of $30,000 for the hearing below and will be suspended for nine months beginning February 20, 2026. In these circumstances, we agree that she should be given slightly more time to pay than 30 days but do not agree to a period of 12 months. We conclude that an appropriate time to pay is 90 days.
ORDER
16For all of the reasons given above, we make the following order:
The Lawyer is ordered to pay costs to the Law Society in the amount of $16,000, payable by July 27, 2026;
Interest will accrue on any overdue amount at a rate of 4% per year.