Sam B. Rogers

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude the expert testimony of Professor Bernard Dickens, an ethicist, regarding the ethical standards of psychiatric care and research applicable in the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishine Mental Health Centre.

The defendants argued that Prof. Dickens, not being a physician, was unqualified to speak on psychiatric standards of care and that his reports primarily constituted legal analysis.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Prof. Dickens highly qualified as an expert in medical ethics, distinguishing ethical standards from medical standards of care and legal analysis.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to determine the admissibility of two reply expert reports (Prof. Shane O’Mara and Dr. Stephen Xenakis) served by the plaintiffs just before trial.

The defendants argued the reports were late and constituted impermissible case splitting.

The plaintiffs contended the lateness was due to unforeseen circumstances and that the evidence would assist the court.

The court found that the issues addressed by the reply reports were foreseeable and had already been covered by the plaintiffs' initial experts, thus constituting new evidence rather than proper reply.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling the reports inadmissible to avoid prejudice to the defendants and further trial delays, emphasizing the importance of adhering to trial schedules in a long-standing action.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to amend their statement of claim to include reliance on section 16(1)(h.2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and the common law doctrine of discoverability.

The claims arose from their treatment as involuntary patients at a mental health facility between 1966 and 1983, alleging assault through abusive experimentation and physical abuse.

The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing prejudice due to lack of particularity and insufficient discovery on discoverability.

The court granted the motion, finding no prejudice to the defendants as the allegations of assault and dependency were already pleaded, and the defendants had prior notice of the plaintiffs' intent to rely on section 16(1)(h.2) and had extensively explored issues related to discoverability (laches) during previous discovery examinations.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude video footage of an interview between a deceased plaintiff and a documentary filmmaker.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the unsworn footage to demonstrate the deceased plaintiff's sincerity and counter credibility attacks in the defendants' expert reports.

The court held that the video footage did not meet the criteria of necessity and reliability under the principled approach to hearsay, noting that the best available evidence was the deceased plaintiff's sworn examination for discovery transcript and affidavit.

The motion to exclude the evidence was granted.

At a pre-trial conference for a six-week trial, the court provided procedural directions regarding the presentation of evidence.

The court permitted the plaintiffs to use affidavits for their evidence-in-chief to save time, but declined to admit discovery transcripts en masse.

The court also agreed with the defendant that the judge should not read the expert reports until after hearing the plaintiffs' viva voce evidence, to avoid being influenced by the experts' interpretation of the plaintiffs' testimony before hearing it firsthand.

The plaintiff, a solar power installation company, sued the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) for misfeasance in public office.

The plaintiff alleged that the OPA unlawfully amended the microFIT Program rules without providing the required 90 days' notice, intentionally causing harm to the plaintiff's business.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the OPA did not engage in deliberate unlawful conduct or act with bad faith.

The court held that the OPA acted in good faith to balance ratepayer interests and implement Ministerial directives regarding renewable energy procurement.

Although the court assessed potential damages at $470,250, no liability was found.

Former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre in Penetanguishene brought a multi-party action against two physicians and the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, battery, negligence, and violations of international law norms relating to torture and cruel treatment.

The patients alleged they were subjected to intensive therapy programmes involving psychological and physical torture between 1966 and 1983.

The motions judge granted partial summary judgment for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissed the defendants' motions to dismiss the action as statute-barred or barred by laches.

The appellants appealed, arguing procedural fairness violations and that the action was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred in granting partial summary judgment without proper notice and opportunity for the defendants to respond, and set aside those paragraphs.

The court remitted the matter for trial, finding genuine issues requiring trial on limitation and laches issues.

The applicant's lawyer brought an emergency ex parte application to enjoin a hospital from withdrawing life support from a patient.

The court initially granted the order but rescinded it the next day after the hospital and treating physician provided evidence that the patient was brain dead and the family had consented to withdrawing support.

The hospital and physician sought costs personally against the applicant's lawyer.

The court found the lawyer brought the application without instructions, submitted misleading material, and caused costs to be incurred unnecessarily.

The court ordered the lawyer to personally pay $15,000 in costs to the respondents.

The Plaintiffs sought costs following their successful partial summary judgment motion, where the Defendants' motion to dismiss claims as statute-barred was dismissed, and the Plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment on breach of fiduciary duty was granted.

The Plaintiffs requested $821,580.08 in costs and disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The Defendants argued for a significantly lower award of $50,655, alleging over-lawyering and inclusion of costs unrelated to the specific summary judgment motion.

The court awarded the Plaintiffs $282,504.34, disallowing costs for an unsuccessful productions motion and reserving discovery costs for the final adjudication, while finding the Plaintiffs' remaining claims for the summary judgment motion reasonable despite the Defendants' "over-lawyering" argument.

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' multi-plaintiff action as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs, former involuntary patients at the Oak Ridge psychiatric facility, alleged they were subjected to abusive human experimentation and torture by the defendant doctors between 1966 and 1983.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the plaintiffs had a free-standing claim for breach of fiduciary duty that was not subsumed by the expired limitation periods for medical malpractice or tort claims.

The court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, leaving issues of harm and damages for trial.

The plaintiff air freight company brought a motion under Rule 45.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order requiring the defendant sales agents to pay 732,376.72 EUR into court.

The plaintiff argued the funds represented unpaid cargo sales revenues.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a legal right to a specific, readily identifiable fund, as the defendants deposited all monies into a general corporate account without segregation.

The court concluded the plaintiff's claim was essentially for damages and granting the relief would amount to execution before judgment.

The appellant emergency room physician appealed a trial judgment finding him liable in negligence for the death of a patient from bacterial meningitis.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by failing to consider meningitis, perform a lumbar puncture, or administer standard treatment when the patient presented with confusion, fever, and a history of decreased consciousness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the patient's mental status, her reliance on an infectious disease specialist's standard of care evidence, or her causation analysis applying the 'but for' test.

A Sanderson costs order against the appellant was also upheld.

In an estates application concerning capacity and management of property, a respondent brought a motion to prevent the use of a transcript from an examination conducted in unrelated prior litigation.

The applicant sought to rely on the transcript to demonstrate incapacity.

The court held that the transcript was subject to the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and could not be used in collateral proceedings without leave.

The court found that the interests of justice did not outweigh the privacy and litigation integrity concerns underlying the rule.

The transcript was ordered to remain sealed and excluded from the application record.

The moving party, Prince Edward County Field Naturalists, sought to stay an order of the Divisional Court that reinstated a renewable energy approval for a wind energy project.

The project overlapped with the habitat of the endangered Blanding's turtle.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the proposed appeal raised serious issues of first impression in environmental law.

The Court also found that the moving party would suffer irreparable harm if the habitat was destroyed before the appeal could be heard, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted.