David R. Neill

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought a determination that he was catastrophically impaired under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator considered whether the applicant suffered a marked or extreme impairment due to a mental or behavioural disorder, or a whole person impairment of 55 percent or more.

The arbitrator preferred the evidence of the insurer's experts, finding that the applicant's mental and behavioural impairments were mild to moderate.

Combining the physical and psychological impairments, the arbitrator determined the applicant's whole person impairment was 31 percent.

The application for a catastrophic impairment determination was dismissed.

The appellant emergency room physician appealed a trial judgment finding him liable in negligence for the death of a patient from bacterial meningitis.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by failing to consider meningitis, perform a lumbar puncture, or administer standard treatment when the patient presented with confusion, fever, and a history of decreased consciousness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the patient's mental status, her reliance on an infectious disease specialist's standard of care evidence, or her causation analysis applying the 'but for' test.

A Sanderson costs order against the appellant was also upheld.

The deceased driver was killed in a single-car accident after losing control of his vehicle at a transition point between freshly paved asphalt and a foam surface treatment.

The trial judge apportioned liability 50% to the driver, 25% to the paving contractor, and 25% to the municipality.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision, finding that the sole cause of the accident was the driver's reckless driving at excessive speeds, which absolved the appellants of liability under both statutory and common law duties of care.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident while riding his bicycle.

The insurer paid income replacement benefits for 104 weeks but terminated them, arguing the applicant did not meet the more stringent test of complete inability to engage in suitable employment.

The arbitrator found the applicant, who was functionally illiterate in English and had a history of heavy physical labour, suffered from chronic pain and psychological impairments caused by the accident.

The arbitrator rejected the insurer's expert evidence that the applicant was malingering, finding instead that he was completely disabled from working.

The applicant was awarded ongoing income replacement benefits.

However, his claim for a multidisciplinary pain management program was dismissed as he failed to prove it was reasonable and necessary, given a previous similar program had not yielded further recovery.

The plaintiff was injured in two separate motor vehicle accidents and brought actions against both drivers.

The trial judge struck the jury due to the complexity of the plaintiff's medical history and found the plaintiff 100% liable for the first accident, but the defendant Hayik 100% liable for the second.

The trial judge awarded damages and made a Sanderson order requiring Hayik to pay the successful first defendant's costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions on striking the jury, liability, and damages, but set aside the Sanderson order, finding that the two actions were independent and the plaintiff had the ability to pay the costs of the unsuccessful action.

The applicant, who was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought statutory accident benefits for home modifications under section 15 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The parties disputed whether a property owned by the applicant's family, which they were allegedly planning to move into before the accident, qualified as his 'existing home.' The parties also disputed whether the insurer was required to pay for remedial work, such as mould removal and structural repairs, necessary before the home modifications could proceed.

The arbitrator found that the property was the applicant's 'existing home' because the Schedule allows flexibility in choosing a home and the applicant had a reasonable connection and settled intention to live there.

However, the arbitrator ruled that the insurer was not required to pay for the remedial work, as it was not required to reduce or eliminate the effects of any disability resulting from the accident.

The appellant sued multiple defendants for malicious prosecution, defamation, and other claims arising from a child sexual abuse investigation that resulted in criminal charges which were later stayed.

After his civil action was dismissed at trial, he appealed, primarily arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the ineffective assistance claim was an abuse of process because the appellant had already sued his trial counsel for negligence and settled that action.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge should have ordered a mistrial and that the trial judge erred in dismissing the defamation claim against the child's grandmother.

The respondents in a civil appeal brought a motion to quash the part of the appeal that relied on the alleged incompetency of the appellant's trial counsel.

The moving parties argued that incompetence of counsel is not a recognized ground for a civil appeal, that the appellant had already recovered damages from his former lawyer, and that the appeal lacked merit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the ground relating to a mistrial was sufficiently interrelated with the other grounds and should be considered by the panel hearing the appeal.

The court also directed that the appellant's former counsel be served with the materials and given an opportunity to respond.

The respondent, an Ontario resident, was catastrophically injured in a single-vehicle accident in New Mexico while driving a vehicle registered and insured in New Mexico.

She sought statutory accident benefits from the Ontario Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The trial judge declared her entitled to the benefits.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that she was ordinarily resident in Ontario but allowed the appeal on the basis that the accident did not fall within the scope of Ontario's motor vehicle insurance regime.

The court held that Part VI of the Insurance Act did not apply because the vehicle was not required to be registered in Ontario and was not being operated in Ontario, meaning she had no recourse against the Fund.

The appellants appealed a costs order, arguing that their Rule 49 offer should have attracted cost consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion.

The trial judge correctly held that the offer lacked clarity, particularly regarding multiple claimants and the absence of reference to the Family Law Act claimant.

The Court affirmed the policy that Rule 49 offers must be crystal clear to be effective.

The insurer appealed an arbitration decision awarding $35,000 in death benefits to the mother of a man killed in a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued the arbitrator erred in finding the mother was principally dependent on her son for financial support, specifically challenging the weight given to a decision of an Ethiopian communal court and the sufficiency of the evidence.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding that the arbitrator applied the correct legal principles and made no error of law in weighing the available evidence, which included statutory declarations and bank records.

The applicant's son was killed in a motor vehicle accident when he was struck as a pedestrian by a vehicle insured by the respondent.

The applicant, who lived in Ethiopia, claimed entitlement to death benefits under section 25 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, arguing she was principally dependent on her son for financial support.

The insurer disputed the dependency claim, questioning the sufficiency of the evidence provided, which included a decision from an Ethiopian communal court and a statutory declaration.

The arbitrator found that the applicant had made best efforts to provide the requested information and that the evidence, including the Ethiopian court decision, established she was financially dependent on her son.

The arbitrator ordered the insurer to pay $35,000 in death benefits plus interest.

The respondent's counsel filed an application for arbitration without knowing his client had died a few days earlier.

The insurer argued the application was a nullity.

The arbitrator allowed the application to proceed, relying on the doctrine of relation back and Rule 9.03(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

On appeal, the Director of Arbitrations held that neither the doctrine of relation back nor the Rules of Civil Procedure applied to the arbitration.

However, the Director concluded that the Dispute Resolution Practice Code provided sufficient authority to correct the defect and allowed the arbitration to proceed, provided the estate trustee confirmed his involvement.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits.

After the insurer terminated benefits, an application for arbitration was filed on his behalf.

However, the applicant had died prior to the application being issued, and an estate trustee had not yet been appointed.

The insurer argued the application was a nullity.

The arbitrator held that the doctrine of relation back applied to contractual claims for insurance benefits, allowing the subsequently appointed estate trustee to validate the application.

Alternatively, Rule 9.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applied to save the proceeding.

The preliminary issue was resolved in favour of the estate, allowing the arbitration to proceed.

The plaintiffs brought actions for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident against the driver, owner, lessee, and two taverns (unprotected defendants).

One of the taverns brought a motion to determine whether, as an unprotected defendant, it was liable for the whole amount of the statutory deductibles applied to protected defendants under the Insurance Act.

The trial judge held that unprotected defendants were responsible for 100 percent of the deductibles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Insurance Act restricts the application of the Negligence Act, and unprotected defendants are only liable for the amount by which their contribution under the Negligence Act exceeds their joint and several liability with protected defendants.

The appellants appealed a fact-driven trial decision.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent cross-appealed the disposition of costs, seeking full solicitor and client costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the cross-appeal, finding that special circumstances, including the small proportion of the mortgage collection claim relative to the overall litigation, justified the refusal to award full costs.