J. Murray Davison

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims of substantial interference with an easement and nuisance against the respondents, while granting a permanent injunction preventing parking in the right-of-way tunnel.

The respondents cross-appealed the scope of the parking injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation of the easement, application of the substantial interference test, or the tailored scope of the parking injunction.

The trial judge's costs award was also upheld.

This decision addresses costs following a trial concerning easement rights and property interference.

The plaintiffs' (Paiva) claims against the Town of Newmarket were dismissed, and their claims against the Buckley defendants were largely dismissed, except for a limited injunction.

The Buckley defendants' counterclaim for an injunction was granted.

The court, applying the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, awarded costs to the Town of Newmarket and the Buckley defendants as the overall successful parties, while reducing their claimed amounts due to excessive hours billed and, for the Buckley defendants, instances of breaching court orders.

This trial concerned a long-standing dispute over an easement (right-of-way) through a tunnel between adjacent commercial properties at 247, 253, and 255 Main Street South, Newmarket.

The plaintiffs, owners of 255 Main Street, alleged that the defendants, owners of 247 and 253 Main Street, substantially interfered with their easement rights through increased use, physical alterations, and parking.

The plaintiffs also sued the Town of Newmarket for enabling the interference.

The defendants counterclaimed, asserting the plaintiffs illegally parked on their property.

The court found that while increased use and minor alterations did not constitute substantial interference, the defendants' parking in the tunnel did.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for damages and against the Town of Newmarket, but granted an injunction preventing parking in the tunnel.

The court also granted the defendants' counterclaim, enjoining the plaintiffs from parking on the 253 Main Street parking pad, finding no ancillary right or prescriptive easement for parking.

The respondent was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident after losing control of her vehicle on a snow and ice-covered municipal road.

The trial judge found the appellant municipalities liable for failing to maintain the road, apportioned liability 50/50 due to the respondent's contributory negligence, and rejected the municipalities' defence under the Minimum Maintenance Standards (MMS).

On appeal, the municipalities argued the MMS provided a complete defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the specific MMS provisions for snow accumulation and icy roadways did not apply to the municipalities' failure to monitor weather and deploy resources before the road became icy.

The respondent's cross-appeal on the 50/50 apportionment of liability was also dismissed.

The deceased driver was killed in a single-car accident after losing control of his vehicle at a transition point between freshly paved asphalt and a foam surface treatment.

The trial judge apportioned liability 50% to the driver, 25% to the paving contractor, and 25% to the municipality.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision, finding that the sole cause of the accident was the driver's reckless driving at excessive speeds, which absolved the appellants of liability under both statutory and common law duties of care.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting there was no legal relationship between the appellant and the respondent contractor to support a claim.

Furthermore, the respondent municipality was statutorily authorized to add the contractor's bill to the appellant's tax bill, and the appellant failed to provide more than a bald statement to challenge the amount.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a 62-year-old long-term employee, was summarily dismissed and arrested for theft after being confused with another employee by a private investigation firm retained by his employer.

The plaintiff sued the employer, its parent company, the investigation firm, and the police for various torts including negligent investigation and intentional infliction of mental distress.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing several claims.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reinstated the negligent investigation claim against the private investigation firm, recognizing that private investigators may owe a duty of care to suspects.

The court also reinstated the intentional infliction of mental distress claims against the investigation firm, the parent company, and the human resources manager.

The dismissal of the claims for inducing breach of contract and intentional interference with economic relations was upheld.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim regarding an alleged misrepresentation by the respondent's employees.

The trial judge found that there was no real intention on the part of the prospective purchasers and the appellants to enter into an agreement to purchase the properties.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, noting it was consistent with the parties' conduct and not unreasonable.

The Court also rejected the argument that missing portions of the trial transcript prejudiced the appellants' ability to challenge the factual finding, as the missing evidence did not relate to the issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of a negligence action arising from a single-vehicle accident in which the driver was seriously injured after leaving a municipal roadway.

They argued the trial judge erred in describing the accident location, in finding the roadway warning signage adequate, and in concluding causation had not been proven.

The Court of Appeal held the location was well understood by the trial judge, the warning sign sufficiently communicated the sequence of curves and advisory speed, and the causation finding was entitled to appellate deference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a matter concerning the R. F. MacLennan Municipal Drain in the Township of Lochiel.

After an initial hearing that was adjourned on consent, the appellant's counsel requested that the appeal be withdrawn.

The respondent had no objection.

The Ontario Drainage Tribunal ordered the appeal withdrawn with no order as to costs.

The appellant was an exclusive distributor of the respondent's products.

The respondent terminated the distributorship agreement with immediate effect pursuant to a clause allowing termination 'at any time' with or without cause.

The appellant sued for breach of contract, arguing that the clause impliedly required reasonable notice because another clause explicitly stated termination would be effective 'upon the giving of such notice'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the difference in wording created an ambiguity.

Applying the contra proferentem rule, the Court resolved the ambiguity against the respondent (the drafter) and held that reasonable notice of termination was required.

The applicant union referred a grievance to the Board alleging the respondent employer failed to pay travel allowances to carpenters from Essex County working on a project in Chatham, contrary to the provincial agreement.

The employer argued it was not required to pay the allowances because a union official had previously assured the employer that local Chatham carpenters would be referred to the project, leading the employer to omit travel allowances from its project costing.

The Board found that the doctrine of estoppel applied, as the employer had reasonably relied on the union official's assurance to its detriment.

The grievance was dismissed.