Marvin Sazant v. Glennie Mattinson, 2015 ONSC 3709

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO: CV-14-504276
DATE: 20150610

B E T W E E N:

Marvin Sazant

Plaintiff

• and -

Glennie Mattinson

Defendant

Robert H. Karrass,
for the Plaintiff

Valerie A. Edwards,
for the Defendant

HEARD: June 8, 2015

WHITAKER J.

[1]

Introduction

The plaintiff, Sazant, is a retired doctor. He brings this motion under Rule 21.01(1) (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for a determination that the defendant, Mattinson, is in breach of a mutual full and final release, executed by the parties on September 10, 2007.

2Mattinson moves for a determination that he is not in breach of the release, and for an Order dismissing the plaintiff’s action.

[3]

Analysis

The release states on its face that Glennie is barred from making a claim against “any other person or corporation” who made “contribution and indemnity” from Sazant.

4After signing the release, Mattinson made an application to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (the “Board”).

5Under the provisions of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, RSO 1990, c C.24 (the “Act”), the Board can pursue subrogated claims. The Board cannot, however, claim for “contribution and indemnity”.

6Put another way, under their directing legislation, the Board can only pursue subrogated claims and not claims for contribution and indemnity. As indicated, the release provides contribution and indemnity.

7In this case the Board has twice now, by letter, expressly indicated that it will not be pursuing a subrogated claim.

8The plain language of the release precludes contribution and indemnity. In any event, the Board’s right to subrogate crystallizes when funds are paid out of the Board, that point has yet to be reached. The release bars Mattinson from making any claim against any other person or corporation. A claim for criminal injuries compensation is not a claim against the Board, but is rather a claim against a fund managed by the Board.

[9]

Disposition

The plaintiff Sazant’s motion is dismissed. Mattinson’s motion is allowed.

[10]

Costs

The parties made submissions as to costs in the event of their success. Costs orders should reflect the consideration of those factors set out in Rule 57 which underlie the court’s discretion to award costs. I am particularly mindful that costs should be reasonably in the contemplation of the unsuccessful party and reflect a sense of proportionality between the quantum of the award and the circumstances of the adjudication process.

11The defendant is entitled to his costs, fixed at $20,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.