E. Kruzick

The applicant sought to reduce spousal and child support obligations established in a separation agreement, alleging a material change in financial circumstances and asserting that income originally imputed for support purposes was overstated.

The respondent opposed the variation, sought enforcement of the agreement, claimed arrears for special and extraordinary expenses under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, and requested conversion of periodic spousal support into a lump sum.

Applying the framework from Miglin v. Miglin and subsequent Supreme Court authorities, the court held the separation agreement was fairly negotiated and continued to reflect the parties’ intentions.

The court found the applicant’s income disclosure unreliable and maintained the imputed income used in the agreement.

Spousal support was not reduced, child support for an adult child was terminated when he ceased full‑time studies, and retroactive s.7 expenses were partially awarded.

The moving party sought leave under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to pursue personal costs claims against opposing counsel in litigation concerning a guardianship and related estate disputes.

The proceeding had already been set down for a costs trial, and a prior order imposed strict timelines requiring notice and particulars before such motions could be pursued.

The court found the moving party failed to comply with those timelines and had not demonstrated the substantial or unexpected change in circumstances required to obtain leave once a matter is set down for trial under Rule 48.04.

The allegations of professional misconduct, negligence, and perjury against counsel were vague, speculative, and unsupported by evidence establishing bad faith or abuse of process.

The court concluded the claims had no reasonable chance of success and granting leave would further delay already protracted proceedings.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to treatment and renewing a Community Treatment Order under the Mental Health Act.

The appeal raised issues concerning whether the Board applied the correct statutory test for capacity and whether its decision was unreasonable.

Applying the framework from Starson v. Swayze, the court examined whether the appellant could understand information relevant to treatment and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her decision.

The court held that while the appellant understood the information provided, the Board reasonably relied on expert medical evidence that she could not appreciate the consequences of refusing medication.

Given the deferential reasonableness standard applicable to the specialized tribunal, the court declined to interfere with the Board’s findings.

Multiple motions arose in estate-related litigation involving allegations of undue influence over an elderly party.

Respondents sought leave to pursue costs against solicitors under Rule 57.07 and to consolidate related actions.

Counsel appointed under s.3 of the Substitute Decisions Act brought a preliminary motion after being unable to meet with the elderly party whose representation was in question.

Evidence suggested possible obstruction and undue influence affecting her ability to obtain independent legal advice.

The court held that the circumstances justified consideration of appointing a litigation guardian and granted leave for the motion to proceed, adjourning all related motions to allow a meeting between the party and s.3 counsel.