Nyranne Michelle Shilton Martin

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

He argued the Board erred in applying the statutory capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act and failed to consider his understanding of treatment information and concerns about medication side effects.

The court applied a reasonableness standard of review and considered the two‑part capacity test from Starson v. Swayze requiring both understanding of relevant information and appreciation of foreseeable consequences.

The court found the Board reasonably concluded that the appellant’s delusional beliefs prevented him from both understanding and applying treatment information to his own circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic and thyroid medication under the Health Care Consent Act.

She argued the Board overlooked evidence suggesting she had agreed to treatment shortly before the hearing.

The court held that the Board’s determination of incapacity was a question of mixed fact and law subject to a reasonableness standard.

Reviewing the full evidentiary record, the court found overwhelming evidence that the appellant could neither understand relevant treatment information nor appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment.

The Board’s decision was reasonable and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board under the Health Care Consent Act confirming a finding that she was incapable of managing property.

The court reviewed the Board’s decision applying a reasonableness standard for questions of fact, mixed fact and law, and law.

The Board had concluded that due to the appellant’s mental condition she could not understand relevant financial information or appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of property-related decisions.

The court found that the Board properly stated and applied the two‑branch statutory test for financial capacity and that its weighing of the evidence was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to treatment and renewing a Community Treatment Order under the Mental Health Act.

The appeal raised issues concerning whether the Board applied the correct statutory test for capacity and whether its decision was unreasonable.

Applying the framework from Starson v. Swayze, the court examined whether the appellant could understand information relevant to treatment and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her decision.

The court held that while the appellant understood the information provided, the Board reasonably relied on expert medical evidence that she could not appreciate the consequences of refusing medication.

Given the deferential reasonableness standard applicable to the specialized tribunal, the court declined to interfere with the Board’s findings.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board under the Health Care Consent Act confirming that he was incapable of consenting to antipsychotic medication and maintaining his status as an involuntary patient.

The court applied the reasonableness standard of review, emphasizing the Board’s expertise in assessing capacity and mixed questions of fact and law.

The court found the Board provided procedural fairness, appropriately considered the evidence including hearsay, and reasonably relied on the psychiatrist’s testimony.

The Board correctly applied the two‑part statutory test for capacity, finding the patient unable to understand relevant treatment information or apply it to his circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board transferring him to the maximum secure unit of the Oakridge Mental Health Centre.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision representing the least onerous and restrictive disposition was not unreasonable given the extensive evidence of the appellant's assaultive behaviour and the intractable nature of his illness.