Genevieve Durigon

The defendant, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance, moved for an order requiring the plaintiff, Mario Parravano, to post security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(c) and (e).

The motion was based on Parravano's failure to pay over $310,000 in costs from two previous unsuccessful lawsuits against the same insurer, and the defendant's contention that the current action, claiming $60 million for bad faith, was frivolous and vexatious and statute-barred.

The court found the action could not succeed because the insurer's prior denials of claims had been determined meritorious by the Court of Appeal, precluding a bad faith finding.

Furthermore, the action was barred by both the two-year discoverability limitation period and the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the plaintiff, having had legal counsel, ought to have known of the claim earlier.

The court granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to post $220,000 in security for costs in installments and pay the defendant's motion costs.

This endorsement addresses a dispute regarding trial readiness in a personal injury action.

The plaintiffs sought to set a trial date, but the defendant objected, citing outstanding productions, unanswered undertakings, and refusals from discovery.

The court, in a case conference, found the case was not "trial ready" due to these unresolved interlocutory matters, including unquantified loss of income claims, unobtained employment files, and unserved expert reports.

Despite the four-year period since discoveries, counsel had not completed necessary steps.

The court emphasized the scarcity of trial dates and declined to book a date for an unprepared case, striking it from the trial list.

An appeal concerning the determination of priority between overlapping insurance policies following a motor vehicle collision.

The central issue was the identity of the "lessee" of a rental truck under section 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act.

The application judge found that the driver was the lessee based solely on the face of the rental agreement.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that agency principles must be considered when determining the identity of the lessee, and concluded that the company for which the driver was working was the true lessee based on the surrounding circumstances and the longstanding arrangement with the rental company.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim on a Rule 21 motion, the successful defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The self-represented plaintiff failed to deliver costs submissions despite extensions granted by the court.

The court held that there was no basis for substantial indemnity costs and exercised its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Balancing fairness, compensation, and access to justice, the court reduced the defendants’ requested costs and fixed partial indemnity costs payable by the plaintiff.

The defendants moved under Rule 21.01 to strike the plaintiff’s claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and alternatively sought a stay of the action, also alleging violations of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing pleadings.

The plaintiff alleged that lawyers representing her insurer caused financial loss and mental distress by failing to provide settlement funds following a settlement agreement with the insurer.

The court held that opposing counsel owe no duty of care to an adverse party and therefore cannot be liable to that party for negligence, misrepresentation, or alleged misconduct arising from their representation of a client.

As the only pleaded connection between the plaintiff and the defendants was their role as counsel for the insurer, the claim disclosed no viable cause of action.

The court concluded that the deficiency could not be remedied by amendment and struck the claim.