Steven Carlstrom

The plaintiffs brought a motion for Certificates of Pending Litigation (CPLs) on two properties and a Mareva injunction over the proceeds of a third property sale, arising from a home renovation dispute.

The defendants failed to comply with a prior court order to produce an account reconciliation, which prejudiced the plaintiffs' ability to establish their claims.

The court dismissed the requests for CPLs and the Mareva injunction without prejudice, allowing the plaintiffs to renew the motion once the evidentiary record is complete.

The court granted the plaintiffs' request to amend their Statement of Claim and awarded them $5,800 in costs due to the defendants' improper conduct and non-compliance with court orders.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal on the basis that the impugned order was final, meaning an appeal could be brought as of right.

The court set a deadline for any motion to extend the time to appeal and ordered no costs for the leave motion.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for the pre-trial determination of a question of law regarding whether the defendant tort insurer was entitled to deduct long-term disability settlement funds received by the plaintiff from a separate action against her disability carrier.

The court applied the 'silo' approach and found that the settlement was for an income replacement claim.

The court held that the defendant is entitled to deduct the settlement amount from the tort damages for income loss pursuant to s. 267.8(1) of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal concerning a coverage dispute.

The appellants challenged the lower court's finding that Proturf was an essential party to the original application.

The appellate court affirmed that determining the existence of an implied contract between the appellants and Proturf was central to the coverage issue, and procedural fairness necessitated Proturf's inclusion as a party, even without direct relief sought against them.

An appeal concerning the determination of priority between overlapping insurance policies following a motor vehicle collision.

The central issue was the identity of the "lessee" of a rental truck under section 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act.

The application judge found that the driver was the lessee based solely on the face of the rental agreement.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that agency principles must be considered when determining the identity of the lessee, and concluded that the company for which the driver was working was the true lessee based on the surrounding circumstances and the longstanding arrangement with the rental company.

The applicant and respondent insurers disputed priority over a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a rented truck.

The driver, who was delivering furniture for his employer, rented the truck in his own name, though the employer's credit card was used for payment.

The court applied a straightforward contractual analysis to determine the 'lessee' under section 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act, concluding that the driver was the lessee because he signed the rental agreement and was the party the rental company could sue for enforcement.

Consequently, the applicant, as the insurer for the rental company, was declared the first loss insurer.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding liability and damages for a bridge collapse.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in findings of negligence under the Highway Traffic Act, failing to apportion negligence under the Negligence Act, misusing similar fact evidence, and improperly depreciating the cost of new materials used for repairs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings on negligence, noting contributory negligence was not pleaded or argued at trial, and upholding the depreciation figure as appropriate.