Peter S. Carlisi

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board pursuant to s. 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appellant argued she was denied procedural fairness at the hearing because she may not have understood her role and failed to fully participate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Vice Chair accorded the appellant a full opportunity to present evidence and examine witnesses, and that she was assisted at the hearing.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent tenants.

The applicant sought a non-earner benefit and medical benefits for taxi expenses after the rear doors of a TTC bus closed on her.

The insurer denied the claims, arguing her impairments were due to long-standing pre-existing conditions, including severe heart disease and diabetes, rather than the minor bus incident.

The arbitrator found that the applicant failed to prove the accident continuously prevented her from engaging in substantially all of her pre-accident activities.

The medical evidence and surveillance video demonstrated she remained capable of performing her normal activities, and her post-accident decline was more likely attributable to her pre-existing health issues and the death of her husband.

The application was dismissed, and the insurer was awarded its expenses.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's decision finding that he had entered into a binding full and final settlement of his statutory accident benefits claim.

The arbitrator had held that the appellant's failure to personally sign the release did not invalidate the settlement.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate found that the arbitrator erred in law by applying the wrong regulation.

Under the applicable Settlement Regulation for Settlements Made on or After March 1, 2002, the cooling-off period for rescinding a settlement does not commence until the insured person personally signs the release.

Because the appellant never signed the release, the settlement was not binding and the cooling-off period had not expired.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to arbitration.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for arbitration of statutory accident benefits claims.

The arbitrator previously dismissed the claims, finding the applicant had entered into a binding full and final settlement prior to retaining his current representative.

In this decision on expenses, the arbitrator considered the criteria under the Expense Regulation of the Insurance Act.

Finding that the insurer was completely successful and that no novel issues were raised, the arbitrator concluded the insurer was entitled to its expenses.

However, the arbitrator reduced the assessed fees by 40% to reflect the applicant's good faith in exploring the validity of the settlement, ultimately awarding the insurer $5,597.93 inclusive of GST.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits.

He retained a paralegal who negotiated a full and final settlement with the insurer.

The applicant later retained new counsel and sought to arbitrate further claims, arguing he did not understand the settlement or sign all the documents, and that the paralegal mistakenly signed the release.

The arbitrator found that the paralegal had ostensible and actual authority to settle the claim, and the insurer reasonably relied on that authority.

The applicant signed the statutorily required Settlement Disclosure Notice and did not rescind the settlement within the two-day cooling-off period.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant entered into a binding full and final settlement and is precluded from further arbitrating claims arising from the accident.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received caregiver benefits, which the insurer terminated after 104 weeks.

The applicant attended a scheduled DAC assessment but insisted on videotaping it.

The DAC refused to proceed and charged a cancellation fee.

The insurer argued the applicant failed to make himself reasonably available for the assessment under section 50 of the Schedule and sought reimbursement of the fee.

The arbitrator found that the applicant made himself reasonably available by attending the assessment, and it was the DAC that refused to proceed without providing reasons.

The applicant was permitted to proceed to arbitration and was not required to pay the cancellation fee.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding a real estate transaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decisions to permit an amendment to the claim for GST, to interpret the Agreement of Purchase and Sale as not requiring formal tender since the respondent was ready, willing, and able to close, and to award costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her medical malpractice action against the respondent doctor, who had prescribed Garasone for ear infections, allegedly causing ototoxicity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on credibility, standard of care, and causation, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and varied the trial costs award to disbursements only, reflecting the respondent's change in evidence from discovery to trial and conduct that attracted negative comment.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought ongoing income replacement benefits and supplementary medical benefits for prescriptions after the insurer terminated them.

The arbitrator found that the applicant was not physically disabled from returning to her pre-accident employment as a hairstyling instructor.

However, the arbitrator concluded that the applicant suffered from accident-related panic attacks that substantially disabled her from working during an acute phase between December 1996 and August 1997.

Income replacement benefits were awarded for this limited period.

The arbitrator also awarded the cost of most claimed prescriptions, finding them reasonable and necessary for treating her accident-related psychological condition.

The appellant, a self-employed gas station owner, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly income benefits.

He appealed an arbitration decision denying his claim for reimbursement of costs incurred to hire replacement labour to run his business while he was disabled.

The appellant argued that section 12 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule protects a source of income, or alternatively, that the costs were compensable as "economic rehabilitation" under paragraph 6(1)(f).

The Director of Arbitrations dismissed the appeal, holding that section 12 provides limited income loss compensation based on pre-tax earnings, not business revenue or replacement labour costs.

Furthermore, the "basket clause" in paragraph 6(1)(f) covers expenses related to personal rehabilitation, not the financial health of a business.

The appellant, a self-employed house painter, appealed an arbitration decision terminating his weekly income benefits and ordering repayment of interim benefits.

He sought to introduce a new medical report on appeal to address the arbitrator's concerns about his chronic pain syndrome diagnosis.

The Director's Delegate refused to admit the new evidence, finding it would not have affected the result.

The Delegate upheld the arbitrator's conclusion that the appellant was substantially able to perform the essential tasks of his occupation, noting that job flexibility is an appropriate consideration for self-employed individuals.

The Delegate also affirmed the arbitrator's reliance on the mediator's report over the appellant's testimony regarding an alleged agreement to pay benefits during rehabilitation.

The appeal was dismissed, but the appellant was awarded his reasonable appeal expenses due to the merit of the issues raised.

The applicant, a self-employed house painter, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits until July 1993.

He sought ongoing weekly income benefits, claiming he was unable to work due to headaches, dizziness, and musculoskeletal pain.

The arbitrator reviewed extensive medical and functional capacity evidence, concluding that the applicant suffered from soft tissue injuries and physical deconditioning, but was not substantially unable to perform the essential tasks of his employment.

The arbitrator rejected the applicant's claim of chronic pain syndrome, finding it unsupported by the weight of the medical evidence.

Furthermore, the arbitrator held that the insurer was not obligated under section 281(3) of the Insurance Act to pay benefits during a work-hardening program, as the mediator's report did not record a final offer to that effect.

The application for ongoing benefits was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to repay interim benefits, though he was awarded his reasonable arbitration expenses.

The complainant, a tenant in the respondent's apartment building, requested a transfer to a two-bedroom apartment after becoming pregnant.

The respondent landlord denied the request, relying on a 'no-transfer' policy he had implemented after a previous altercation with the complainant.

The Board of Inquiry found no direct discrimination, as the refusal was motivated by personal animosity rather than the complainant's family status.

However, the Board found that the no-transfer policy constituted constructive discrimination under s. 11 of the Human Rights Code, as it had a disproportionate adverse impact on families with children who require more space.

The respondent failed to show that accommodating internal transfers would cause undue hardship.

The Board awarded the complainant $1,000 in general damages and ordered the respondent to cease the discriminatory policy.

The applicant, a self-employed gas station owner, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed statutory accident benefits.

The insurer terminated his weekly income benefits on January 3, 1991.

The applicant sought reimbursement for expenses incurred in hiring replacement workers to run his business while he was disabled, as well as ongoing weekly income benefits.

The arbitrator held that the cost of replacement labour is a business expense and cannot be claimed as a rehabilitation expense under section 6(1)(f) of the Schedule, nor under section 12.

However, the arbitrator found that the applicant was substantially disabled from performing his essential tasks until February 1, 1991, and ordered the insurer to pay weekly income benefits of $211.98 until that date, plus interest and arbitration expenses.

The complainant alleged that the union breached its duty of fair representation under section 68 of the Labour Relations Act by refusing his request to be represented by his own counsel at an arbitration hearing, with the costs to be paid by the union.

The Board found no evidence of ill will, bad faith, or discrimination by the union's executive board or membership in their handling of the grievance.

The union had followed its normal procedures and had appointed experienced labour counsel to represent the complainant.

The Board dismissed the complaint, noting that allowing a complainant to unilaterally select counsel at the union's expense would do violence to the legislative scheme establishing the union as the exclusive bargaining agent.

The complainant requested reconsideration of a previous Board decision that found the union breached its duty of fair representation.

The complainant sought costs, an order that the Board arbitrate the grievance itself or direct it to arbitration, the right to retain independent counsel at the union's expense, and for the Board to remain seized of the matter.

The Board dismissed the request for reconsideration, finding no extraordinary circumstances to award costs, noting the union membership had already voted to refer the grievance to arbitration, and finding no basis to assume the union would not properly represent the complainant at arbitration.