Maureen Louise Whelton

The court determined that the applicants were not entitled to extend their subleasehold interest in commercial premises for a further five years because they had committed at least three defaults, constituting "habitual default" under the sublease.

The court found that the applicants failed to meet the conditions for extension, including defaults related to unauthorized physiotherapy services, late rent payments, fire code deficiencies, and nonpayment of rent during COVID-19 closures.

The court also held that the equitable remedy of relief from forfeiture did not apply, as the applicants' defaults were not due to circumstances beyond their control.

The application was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The moving party sought an extension of time to perfect her appeal from a trial judgment awarding her former legal counsel approximately $481,000 in unpaid legal fees.

The responding party opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the moving party met the criteria for continuing intention to appeal, explanation for delay, and lack of prejudice, the putative appeal had virtually no chance of success as it primarily attacked the trial judge's factual findings without demonstrating palpable and overriding error.

The appellant, Anna Marlena Butryn, appealed a summary judgment order enforcing minutes of settlement in mortgage enforcement proceedings.

She argued she signed the minutes under undue influence and duress from her husband, John Chetti, and without independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no evidence the respondent had knowledge of the alleged undue influence/duress, that the minutes of settlement provided significant benefits to the appellant, and that she was represented by experienced litigation counsel, making independent legal advice from a separate lawyer unnecessary.

The court reiterated that a spousal relationship does not automatically create a presumption of undue influence requiring third-party inquiry unless coupled with a manifestly disadvantageous transaction.

This appeal arose from two actions tried together concerning breaches of a license agreement and fiduciary duties related to powder-coating business ventures.

The trial judge found that Robert Langlois breached a License Agreement and fiduciary duties to the "ACS plaintiffs" (7868073 Canada Ltd. et al.), with Jeffrey Sugar and Gary Sugar knowingly assisting.

Profits were disgorged to the ACS plaintiffs, and a separate action by Gary Sugar was dismissed as moot.

The appellants (Gary Sugar and the "Langlois appellants") challenged the trial judge's findings on the License Agreement's validity and termination, the existence and continuation of fiduciary duties, and the misappropriation of corporate opportunities.

The ACS plaintiffs cross-appealed the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals and denied leave to cross-appeal costs, affirming the trial judge's conclusions that the License Agreement was valid and not terminated, that fiduciary duties continued, and that corporate opportunities were misappropriated.

The Applicant condominium sought an order appointing an arbitrator and confirming the arbitrator's jurisdiction over issues in its Fresh as Amended Notice of Arbitration.

The Respondent developer sought to quash the notice, arguing repudiation of a prior agreement to appoint a specific arbitrator and that a third party (Gooderham) should be involved due to new matters.

The court granted the Applicant's request to appoint the agreed-upon arbitrator, finding no repudiation.

However, the court deferred the determination of the arbitrator's jurisdiction, mandate, and whether the third party should be joined to the arbitrator himself, consistent with the principle that arbitrators can rule on their own jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, a former executive at a property development company, claimed a 5% interest in the profit from the sale of a real estate development project.

The defendant argued the oral agreement was too uncertain to be enforceable and that any such interest was extinguished by a full and final release signed upon the plaintiff's termination.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the agreement was sufficiently certain and that the release, when read with the incorporated settlement correspondence, preserved the plaintiff's 5% interest.

The court awarded the plaintiff $1,372,992 in damages based on his expert's calculation of the profit from the sale of the lands.

The plaintiffs and the defendant Robert Langlois entered into a joint venture to operate a powder-coating business, ACS.

Mr. Langlois licensed his powder-coating know-how and expertise to ACS.

Before ACS generated any revenue, Mr. Langlois secretly formed a competing business, PCS, with the defendants Jeffrey Sugar and Gary Sugar.

Mr. Langlois diverted corporate opportunities, including a lucrative powder-coating contract, to PCS and later to VML.

The plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and knowing assistance.

The court found that Mr. Langlois breached the Licence Agreement and his fiduciary duties by misappropriating corporate opportunities.

The court also found that Jeffrey Sugar and Gary Sugar knowingly assisted in these breaches.

The court ordered disgorgement of profits and repayment of loans and expenses, holding the defendants jointly and severally liable.

Roger Poirier (appellant) sued multiple defendants for fraud and misrepresentation related to a failed business investment.

He settled his claim with one defendant, Jerry Friedberg, but failed to disclose this settlement to the other defendants for six months.

The motion judge stayed the action against the remaining defendants, finding the non-disclosure to be an abuse of process.

Poirier appealed, arguing the motion judge applied an incorrect legal test and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that immediate disclosure of settlement agreements that fundamentally alter the litigation landscape is mandatory, and failure to do so constitutes an abuse of process warranting a stay of proceedings, regardless of prejudice to the non-settling parties.

The defendant moved for a third adjournment of a five-year-old civil trial, citing the childcare responsibilities of counsel during the third wave COVID-19 lockdown.

The plaintiff opposed further delay, noting the defendant had also served a late expert report during the interregnum.

The court granted a short adjournment to June 2021 to accommodate counsel's family responsibilities, making the new date peremptory to the defendant, but declined to delay the trial until September to accommodate counsel's competing arbitration commitments.

Jereemy Tan, the moving party, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a Superior Court decision that authorized a Receiver to disclaim an agreement of purchase and sale for a property.

The moving party's counsel inadvertently missed the 10-day appeal deadline, believing it was 30 days.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding the delay was short and excusable, prejudice to respondents negligible, and the proposed appeal met the low threshold for merit.

The court also determined the appeal was "as of right" under sections 193(b) and (c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as the decision could affect other similar cases and involved property exceeding $10,000 in value.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision granting specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a Toronto property.

The respondent sought to purchase the property for $4.5 million but the transaction failed to close on the scheduled date.

The central issue was whether the appellant's conduct in providing an altered estoppel certificate and delivering the correct certificate only one hour before the 6:00 p.m. closing deadline precluded it from relying on the time-of-the-essence clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellant's misconduct prevented it from enforcing the strict closing deadline and that specific performance was an appropriate remedy.

The defendants brought motions for security for costs against the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs (as defendants by counterclaim) brought a cross-motion for security for costs against the plaintiffs by counterclaim.

The court granted the Langlois defendants' motion against the corporate plaintiffs, finding good reason to believe they had insufficient assets in Ontario.

The court dismissed the motion by a self-represented lawyer defendant, finding no evidence of opportunity cost to justify an award of security for costs in his favour.

The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' cross-motion, as the counterclaim was largely equivalent to a defence to the main action.

The plaintiff underwent cataract surgery performed by the defendant ophthalmologist.

Prior to surgery, the defendant measured the plaintiff's eyes using an older A-scan method, which produced highly variable results.

The defendant failed to inform the plaintiff of these variable results and the increased risk of not achieving her expected visual outcome, nor did he recommend the more accurate IOL Master method at that time.

The surgery resulted in significant under-correction (hyperopia).

To correct this, the plaintiff underwent a piggyback lens surgery, which subsequently caused severe dysphotopsia.

The court found the defendant breached the standard of care regarding informed consent by failing to disclose the material risks associated with the variable A-scan results.

The court established causation and awarded damages for pain and suffering, past income loss, future care costs, and a Family Law Act claim for the plaintiff's son.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief, including constructive trust, and permitting the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decision on a matter of principle and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision that the plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts to support their equitable claims.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay the outstanding balance on a second mortgage.

They argued the mortgage action should be considered alongside a construction dispute involving the respondent, claiming duress, bad faith, and equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that the appellants were sophisticated parties with independent legal advice, the construction project was completed within budget, and there was no bad faith or fraud.

The appeal was dismissed, and the refusal to consolidate or stay the proceedings was upheld.

Following the dismissal of Unimac's motion seeking the recusal of the Master on grounds of racial bias, the responding parties sought costs.

Unimac argued costs should be deferred to the Divisional Court pending judicial review.

The Master determined it was appropriate to fix costs immediately.

Finding that Unimac's motion was an abuse of process, involved scurrilous and unsubstantiated attacks on the integrity of the judicial officer, caused unnecessary delay, and that Unimac failed to accept a reasonable offer to settle, the Master awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

Unimac was ordered to pay $52,810.37 to the Lead Respondents and $6,728.30 to St. Clare's.

The defendants brought motions seeking to strike or dismiss the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion and for security for costs in a commercial dispute arising from an alleged breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for resort property.

The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, slander of title, and conspiracy relating to a failed $16 million transaction.

The court held that the action involved complex factual issues and significant credibility disputes, making it unsuitable for determination by summary judgment at an early stage.

The court further found that the corporate plaintiff failed to establish impecuniosity with sufficient evidentiary detail and that there was no proven causal link between the defendants’ conduct and the plaintiff’s financial distress.

Security for costs was therefore ordered while the summary judgment motion was stayed pending further steps in the litigation.

Several defendants brought a motion seeking removal of the plaintiff’s law firm on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest.

A partner in the firm was both a potential witness and had a substantial financial interest in the plaintiff company through share ownership and mortgage financing.

The court considered the governing principles for disqualification of counsel, including the framework in MacDonald Estate v. Martin and the discretionary factors relating to a lawyer-witness scenario set out in Essa (Township) v. Guergis.

While the partner was likely to be a material witness and had a financial stake aligned with the plaintiff, the court concluded there was no real risk to the proper administration of justice and that the plaintiff’s right to counsel of choice should prevail.

The motions to remove counsel were dismissed.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash a motion for leave to appeal from a decision of the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court had previously set aside an order finding a violation of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The Court of Appeal held that under sections 11(2) and 15 of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, the decision of the Divisional Court is final and there is no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The motion for leave to appeal was quashed.

The applicant landlord sought leave to appeal an arbitrator's decision which found that the respondent tenant was justified in terminating its commercial lease and ceasing rent payments due to a fundamental breach by the landlord regarding a dangerous sub-ceiling.

The Superior Court of Justice granted leave to appeal, finding that the arbitrator's failure to interpret the lease agreement to determine the allocation of repair responsibilities and failure to apply the established legal test for fundamental breach constituted errors of law.

The court set aside the arbitrator's decision and remitted the matter to a new arbitrator for a rehearing.