Maureen Louise Whelton

The court determined that the applicants were not entitled to extend their subleasehold interest in commercial premises for a further five years because they had committed at least three defaults, constituting "habitual default" under the sublease.

The court found that the applicants failed to meet the conditions for extension, including defaults related to unauthorized physiotherapy services, late rent payments, fire code deficiencies, and nonpayment of rent during COVID-19 closures.

The court also held that the equitable remedy of relief from forfeiture did not apply, as the applicants' defaults were not due to circumstances beyond their control.

The application was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, Anna Marlena Butryn, appealed a summary judgment order enforcing minutes of settlement in mortgage enforcement proceedings.

She argued she signed the minutes under undue influence and duress from her husband, John Chetti, and without independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no evidence the respondent had knowledge of the alleged undue influence/duress, that the minutes of settlement provided significant benefits to the appellant, and that she was represented by experienced litigation counsel, making independent legal advice from a separate lawyer unnecessary.

The court reiterated that a spousal relationship does not automatically create a presumption of undue influence requiring third-party inquiry unless coupled with a manifestly disadvantageous transaction.

This appeal arose from two actions tried together concerning breaches of a license agreement and fiduciary duties related to powder-coating business ventures.

The trial judge found that Robert Langlois breached a License Agreement and fiduciary duties to the "ACS plaintiffs" (7868073 Canada Ltd. et al.), with Jeffrey Sugar and Gary Sugar knowingly assisting.

Profits were disgorged to the ACS plaintiffs, and a separate action by Gary Sugar was dismissed as moot.

The appellants (Gary Sugar and the "Langlois appellants") challenged the trial judge's findings on the License Agreement's validity and termination, the existence and continuation of fiduciary duties, and the misappropriation of corporate opportunities.

The ACS plaintiffs cross-appealed the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals and denied leave to cross-appeal costs, affirming the trial judge's conclusions that the License Agreement was valid and not terminated, that fiduciary duties continued, and that corporate opportunities were misappropriated.

The Applicant condominium sought an order appointing an arbitrator and confirming the arbitrator's jurisdiction over issues in its Fresh as Amended Notice of Arbitration.

The Respondent developer sought to quash the notice, arguing repudiation of a prior agreement to appoint a specific arbitrator and that a third party (Gooderham) should be involved due to new matters.

The court granted the Applicant's request to appoint the agreed-upon arbitrator, finding no repudiation.

However, the court deferred the determination of the arbitrator's jurisdiction, mandate, and whether the third party should be joined to the arbitrator himself, consistent with the principle that arbitrators can rule on their own jurisdiction.

Roger Poirier (appellant) sued multiple defendants for fraud and misrepresentation related to a failed business investment.

He settled his claim with one defendant, Jerry Friedberg, but failed to disclose this settlement to the other defendants for six months.

The motion judge stayed the action against the remaining defendants, finding the non-disclosure to be an abuse of process.

Poirier appealed, arguing the motion judge applied an incorrect legal test and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that immediate disclosure of settlement agreements that fundamentally alter the litigation landscape is mandatory, and failure to do so constitutes an abuse of process warranting a stay of proceedings, regardless of prejudice to the non-settling parties.

Jereemy Tan, the moving party, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a Superior Court decision that authorized a Receiver to disclaim an agreement of purchase and sale for a property.

The moving party's counsel inadvertently missed the 10-day appeal deadline, believing it was 30 days.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding the delay was short and excusable, prejudice to respondents negligible, and the proposed appeal met the low threshold for merit.

The court also determined the appeal was "as of right" under sections 193(b) and (c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as the decision could affect other similar cases and involved property exceeding $10,000 in value.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision granting specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a Toronto property.

The respondent sought to purchase the property for $4.5 million but the transaction failed to close on the scheduled date.

The central issue was whether the appellant's conduct in providing an altered estoppel certificate and delivering the correct certificate only one hour before the 6:00 p.m. closing deadline precluded it from relying on the time-of-the-essence clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellant's misconduct prevented it from enforcing the strict closing deadline and that specific performance was an appropriate remedy.

The defendants brought motions seeking to strike or dismiss the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion and for security for costs in a commercial dispute arising from an alleged breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for resort property.

The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, slander of title, and conspiracy relating to a failed $16 million transaction.

The court held that the action involved complex factual issues and significant credibility disputes, making it unsuitable for determination by summary judgment at an early stage.

The court further found that the corporate plaintiff failed to establish impecuniosity with sufficient evidentiary detail and that there was no proven causal link between the defendants’ conduct and the plaintiff’s financial distress.

Security for costs was therefore ordered while the summary judgment motion was stayed pending further steps in the litigation.

Several defendants brought a motion seeking removal of the plaintiff’s law firm on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest.

A partner in the firm was both a potential witness and had a substantial financial interest in the plaintiff company through share ownership and mortgage financing.

The court considered the governing principles for disqualification of counsel, including the framework in MacDonald Estate v. Martin and the discretionary factors relating to a lawyer-witness scenario set out in Essa (Township) v. Guergis.

While the partner was likely to be a material witness and had a financial stake aligned with the plaintiff, the court concluded there was no real risk to the proper administration of justice and that the plaintiff’s right to counsel of choice should prevail.

The motions to remove counsel were dismissed.