Tara Vasdani

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Jennifer Stride’s motion for security for costs against Syra Group Holdings in relation to Syra’s appeal of a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The court found that the requirements for security for costs under Rules 61.06(1)(b) and (c) were not met, as Stride was not a defendant or respondent in the original action and there was insufficient evidence that Syra was liquidating assets to avoid payment.

The court also noted that the strength of the appeal was not weak and that more compelling proof of evasion was required.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs for the motion.

The Bank of Nova Scotia brought a motion for security for costs against Brian Flight in his appeal seeking reinstatement of his action.

The Bank argued the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that Flight lacked sufficient assets.

The court found the appeal appeared to have no merit, Flight admitted insufficient assets, and it was just to order security given his history of advancing similar arguments in multiple proceedings and his conduct in the appeal.

The motion was granted, ordering Flight to post $25,000 as security for costs.

The appellant, Mr. Flight, appealed two orders from a motion judge concerning three issues: whether the transfer of a "Trustee Action" to him required the Trustee's consent, the Trustee's production of documents, and the motion judge's costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusions regarding document production or the costs award.

The court also noted that the issue of Trustee consent for the action transfer had been previously addressed in a prior decision and was currently under reserve by another motion judge, thus requiring no further comment from the Court of Appeal.

This case concerns an action for wrongful dismissal, breaches of human rights legislation, and claims for moral and punitive damages.

The plaintiff, a former superintendent, alleged harassment and assault by tenants, leading to mental health issues and subsequent termination.

The court found the employer wrongfully dismissed the plaintiff, that the termination clause was unenforceable, and that the employer's defense of frustration of contract failed.

The employer was found to have breached its statutory obligations by failing to protect the employee from third-party harassment.

Damages were awarded for wrongful dismissal, human rights violations, and moral damages for the bad faith manner of termination.

Claims for intentional infliction of mental suffering and punitive damages were dismissed.

This case concerns the dismissal of an individual action against LifeLabs Inc. following a criminal cyber-attack that exposed customer data.

The plaintiff, Asif Rahman, had commenced an individual action, which was held in abeyance while a class action, Carter v. LifeLabs Inc., proceeded.

The class action was certified for settlement purposes, and the settlement was subsequently approved, binding all class members who did not opt out, including the plaintiff.

LifeLabs sought to dismiss the individual action.

The court, by consent, ordered the dismissal of the plaintiff's action without costs, noting that while the plaintiff's delay in consenting to dismissal caused some unnecessary expense, the circumstances did not warrant a costs award against him.

The defendant Bank of Nova Scotia and third party Julie Leblanc brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim and third party claim for disclosing no cause of action, being frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rules 21.01(b), 21.01(3)(b), and 25.11.

The court granted the motion, finding the claim to be a collateral attack on an earlier court order regarding the limitations period and time-barred independently.

The plaintiff's claims, including those related to the bank's alleged failure to revoke a power of attorney, investigate fraud, or breach fiduciary duties, were found to be based on events discovered more than two years before the action was commenced.

The court struck the claims without leave to amend and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the Bank of Nova Scotia.

This endorsement concerns a costs decision following a motion brought by the bankrupt, Brian Wayne Flight, against the respondent trustee, Adamson & Associates Inc. The bankrupt sought document production and the examination of the trustee regarding his fourth bankruptcy.

The court found that while document verification was facilitated, the request for the trustee's examination was denied as it was for the bankrupt's personal benefit, not the creditors', and outside the core statutory purposes of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Considering the divided success and the acrimonious context of related litigation, the court determined that the respondent trustee was largely successful in resisting the examination request.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for summary judgment, which the motion judge found to be a nullity because it was commenced by an undischarged bankrupt and was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the action was a nullity as the bankrupt lacked capacity to sue and the claim was time-barred.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the postponement of the limitation period and apprehension of bias, noting the appellant's counsel had waived any conflict.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal and allowed an appeal concerning the interpretation of section 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The motion judge had erred in finding that permission was not required to sue a trustee in bankruptcy, holding that actions against trustees in a personal capacity or alleging omissions fell outside the scope of s. 215.

The Court clarified that s. 215 applies when the alleged wrongdoing is predicated on the individual having the powers and responsibilities of a trustee, regardless of whether the claim asserts a "personal capacity." Furthermore, s. 215 applies to actions alleging omissions unless the omission relates to something specifically and expressly mandated by the BIA.

The matter was remitted to the bankruptcy court to determine whether permission to sue the trustee should be granted.

The trustee in bankruptcy sought an order for vacant possession and leave to issue a writ of possession for the bankrupt's property due to an increase in realizable equity since the bankruptcy date.

The bankrupt opposed, arguing misrepresentations by a debt consultant and alleged trustee negligence, and asserting his wife's beneficial interest in the property.

The court found that the increased equity vested in the trustee, dismissed the bankrupt's arguments regarding misrepresentation and trustee conduct, and rejected the wife's alleged interest as unsubstantiated.

The motion was granted, allowing the trustee to take possession after 60 days, and costs were awarded to the trustee.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, alleging misappropriation of funds.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action as statute-barred.

The court found that the plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt when the action was commenced, meaning the cause of action had vested in the trustee in bankruptcy and the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue.

The action was therefore a nullity.

Furthermore, the limitation period had expired, precluding any curative order.

The defendant's cross-motion was granted, the action was dismissed, and the plaintiffs' motion was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement regarding a motion for leave to amend a notice of appeal in a bankruptcy matter.

The moving parties had sought to add an alternative request for leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the BIA.

Due to the moving parties' lengthy delay in applying for the amendment without reasonable explanation, and the court's need to address concerns about the material filed by both parties (ultimately striking portions), the court ordered that both the moving parties and the responding party bear their own costs of the motion.

The appellants, Adamson & Associates Inc. and John Adamson, brought a motion to amend their notice of appeal to add an alternative request for leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The original appeal relied on sections that did not require leave.

The motion judge granted the amendment despite the appellants' lack of a reasonable explanation for the delay, finding no prejudice to the respondent, Brian Wayne Flight, and noting the merits of the proposed leave request.

The decision also addressed the striking of inadmissible and non-compliant affidavit material filed by the responding party, emphasizing strict compliance with evidentiary rules for serious allegations.

The court determined costs following a motion where it was held the plaintiffs did not require leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to bring an action against the defendant.

Both parties sought excessive costs and made submissions exceeding the court's page limits, focusing improperly on the merits of the action rather than the procedural motion.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that the costs decision was stayed pending appeal under s. 195 of the Act.

Costs were fixed at $10,000 payable in the cause.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for direction on whether they required leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to continue an action against their former trustee in bankruptcy.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty against the trustee in his personal capacity for failing to detect a bookkeeper's fraud.

The court held that leave was not required because the claims were against the trustee in his personal capacity and involved alleged acts of omission, which do not fall under the s. 215 leave requirement.

Jereemy Tan, the moving party, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a Superior Court decision that authorized a Receiver to disclaim an agreement of purchase and sale for a property.

The moving party's counsel inadvertently missed the 10-day appeal deadline, believing it was 30 days.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding the delay was short and excusable, prejudice to respondents negligible, and the proposed appeal met the low threshold for merit.

The court also determined the appeal was "as of right" under sections 193(b) and (c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as the decision could affect other similar cases and involved property exceeding $10,000 in value.