Paul Warren Cooper

The respondent father brought a motion to change a final child support order made in October 2015, seeking to reduce ongoing child support to zero and to rescind accumulated arrears of approximately $91,000.

The applicant mother sought to dismiss the motion and strike the father's pleadings due to his failure to comply with financial disclosure orders.

The court found that while the father had established a change in circumstances following an Achilles tendon injury in July 2015, he had failed to provide adequate financial disclosure to support his claims.

The court declined to strike the pleadings due to the high threshold in family law cases involving access issues, but proceeded on the documentary record.

The court found the father capable of earning minimum wage income from his painting business and imputed income accordingly.

The court fixed total arrears at $48,862 and ordered ongoing child support of $604 per month for three biological children, with arrears to be paid at $250 per month.

The Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert in fingerprint and palm print analysis and comparison using the ACE-V method.

The defence opposed the qualification, arguing that fingerprint analysis is not a science and that the ACE-V method is susceptible to confirmation bias and lacks fixed standards.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey frameworks for the admissibility of expert evidence.

The court found that the officer's extensive training and experience met the threshold requirements and that the evidence was sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant admission, noting that defence concerns could be addressed in cross-examination.

During a trial for importing cocaine, the Crown sought to introduce expert evidence from a detective regarding drug paraphernalia and cash seized from the accused's residence.

The defence objected, arguing the evidence was irrelevant and constituted prejudicial bad character evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice ruled the evidence admissible, finding that tools of the drug trade are logically relevant to the charge of importing large quantities of cocaine, as importers typically do so for distribution.

The court concluded the evidence was highly probative and its admission would not lead to improper propensity reasoning.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused was arrested in his vehicle in his driveway after police observed him attend a residence believed to be a drug stash house.

A search incident to arrest yielded 0.2 grams of cocaine.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe the accused was in possession of a controlled substance, rendering the arrest unlawful and the search unauthorized.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with conspiracy and importation offences relating to a shipment of automotive tire-changing machines from Panama containing 50 kg of cocaine.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on the accused's involvement in arranging the shipment, intercepted communications, and his presence at the warehouse during the controlled delivery.

The accused testified that he was duped by his co-accused and had no knowledge of the cocaine.

The court found the Crown's circumstantial evidence did not eliminate reasonable doubt regarding the accused's knowledge of the illicit contents, despite credibility concerns about the accused's testimony.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused to police during a voluntariness voir dire.

The accused opposed admission, arguing the statements resulted from improper inducements or oppressive circumstances.

The court found no oppression, characterized certain inducements as minor, and determined the accused maintained meaningful choice throughout the interviews.

The court ruled the statements were voluntary and admissible, finding the accused understood the seriousness of the situation and was selective in his responses to police questioning.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The trial commenced in January 2015 and evidence was completed in June 2016, with final submissions heard in November 2016.

The accused's application was brought following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Jordan, which established new presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the net delay exceeded the 18-month ceiling, it was justified by exceptional circumstances and the transitional exceptional circumstance applicable to cases substantially completed before Jordan was released.

The applicants, Greg Guthrie and Delon Griffith, sought an order for severance of charges in a multi-count indictment related to cocaine importation and conspiracy.

Guthrie applied to be tried separately on counts one and four from counts two and three, while Griffith sought to sever counts two and three from counts one and four.

The court considered the legal and factual nexus between the counts, the applicants' intention to testify on some counts but not others, and potential prejudice.

The court found a sufficient factual and legal nexus, concluding that the Crown's theory of an ongoing enterprise was reasonable.

It dismissed concerns about testimonial intention and prejudice, emphasizing that a properly instructed jury could consider each count separately.

Both severance applications were dismissed.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) travel history documents relating to the accused Drago Jankovic, which showed his arrival at Pearson International Airport on August 23, 2013, from Amsterdam.

The Crown relied on the common law business records exception to the hearsay rule, as it did not comply with the Canada Evidence Act.

The accused challenged admissibility on Charter grounds, probative value, and personal knowledge grounds.

The court admitted the documents as business records, finding they were created in the ordinary course of business, were necessary and reliable, and that the testifying CBSA officers had sufficient knowledge of the systems and procedures involved.

The accused Jankovic and Formusa applied for directed verdicts of acquittal following a trial on charges of importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, involving a shipment of tire changing machines from Panama containing approximately 50 kg of cocaine.

Formusa was observed at the warehouse receiving the shipment and was arrested while unloading it.

Jankovic arrived in Canada shortly before the delivery and had communications with Formusa and Avanes.

The court allowed Jankovic's application for directed verdict, finding insufficient evidence to establish his participation in the conspiracy or knowledge of the controlled substance.

The court dismissed Formusa's application, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a conviction on all counts.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and mischief to private property relating to an altercation with the victim, as well as two counts of breach of probation.

The trial involved a three-day hearing with evidence from the victim, the accused, and a third party witness.

The court found the accused guilty on all charges after rejecting the accused's self-defence claim.

The court determined that the accused had armed himself with a kitchen knife in anticipation of the victim's return to the house and used it disproportionately against an unarmed opponent.

The court found the accused's post-offence conduct—breaking the knife and hiding the blade in a toilet tank—demonstrated consciousness of guilt and knowledge that his actions were unlawful.

The applicant father sought temporary custody of twin children born in March 2015, with the respondent mother's access to be supervised.

The respondent sought to transfer the proceedings to Welland, Ontario, arguing the children's habitual residence was Crystal Beach where they had been moved with both parents.

The court found the mother consented to the father having care of the children and returning to Toronto, and that on a balance of convenience, the best evidence regarding the children was available in Ontario.

The court granted temporary custody to the father, with the mother having supervised day access in Toronto only, pending further evidence and a case conference.

The accused brought an application to exclude evidence under ss. 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10 following her arrest for impaired driving after a single-vehicle accident.

The accused argued her statements at the scene were statutorily compelled, her arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and she was arbitrarily detained without being advised of her right to counsel.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence that the statements were compelled, that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the constellation of facts, and that the brief investigative detention prior to arrest did not engage s. 10 Charter rights.

The accused pleaded guilty to pointing a realistic-looking pellet gun at a police officer and threatening death to that officer.

The sentencing judge imposed a conditional discharge with two years probation, finding that while the offences were serious, the accused's mental health issues, substance abuse disorder, youth, lack of criminal record, and significant progress in rehabilitation and employment since arrest warranted a non-custodial sentence.

The court emphasized that the incident represented a failed mental health intervention rather than a purely criminal act.

A ruling on the admissibility of data extracted from Blackberry devices seized from the accused during a drug importation investigation.

The Crown sought to introduce a DVD containing photographs, contact lists, call logs, SMS text messages, and Blackberry PIN messages extracted from two Blackberries in the possession of one accused.

The defence challenged admissibility on grounds that the Crown failed to authenticate the contents, failed to comply with the electronic documents provisions of the Canada Evidence Act, and that prejudicial value outweighed probative value.

The court found that the electronic documents provisions applied, that authentication was established through circumstantial evidence and chain of continuity, and that the presumption of integrity under the Act was satisfied.

The evidence was admitted as real evidence, documents in possession, circumstantial evidence of conspiracy, and admissions.

A temporary motion for custody and access following separation of parties with four children.

The applicant mother sought custody with the respondent father seeking primary residence.

The mother alleged the father had a long-standing alcohol problem and raised concerns about the father's family tactics.

The father alleged the mother's health problems made it difficult for her to meet the children's needs.

The court found both parents were capable caregivers, rejected the father's characterization of the mother's health limitations, and awarded custody to the mother with a shared parenting schedule favoring the mother.

The court imputed income to the father for child support purposes and established detailed communication and decision-making protocols.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, the Crown brought a motion asking the court to reconsider a prior evidentiary ruling admitting a hearsay statement from a former girlfriend of an alleged alternate suspect.

The Crown argued new evidence from two witnesses and digital communications demonstrated a strong motive for the declarant to fabricate the statement.

The court held that the new evidence constituted a material change in circumstances permitting reconsideration of the earlier ruling.

However, applying the relaxed threshold reliability standard applicable to defence evidence, the judge concluded the statement retained some reliability and should remain admissible.

The Crown was permitted to call reply evidence from the new witnesses to challenge the credibility and reliability of the hearsay statement.

In a multi‑accused murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce a PowerPoint presentation prepared by an Ontario Provincial Police analyst summarizing extensive cell phone records already entered in evidence.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the presentation was redundant, prejudicial, and effectively allowed the Crown to present its theory of the case twice.

The court held that the PowerPoint itself was not evidence but an illustrative aid reorganizing evidence already admitted.

Although useful and reliable, its probative value was outweighed by prejudice arising from duplication, significant trial time, and the unfair advantage of allowing the Crown to present its theory through a witness before closing submissions.

The court excluded the presentation from evidence but permitted the Crown to use it in closing argument and ordered the Crown to disclose the presentation to defence counsel in editable PowerPoint format.

During a joint first‑degree murder trial, concerns arose that the spouse of a juror had attended court proceedings and communicated limited information about the case to the juror via text messages and made comments in the courthouse hallway supportive of a police witness.

Following two judicial inquiries, the accused sought either a mistrial or the discharge of the juror on the basis of juror contamination and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that although the spouse’s conduct demonstrated poor judgment, there was no evidence that the juror discussed the case with the spouse or was influenced by her views.

Applying the presumption of juror impartiality and the reasonable apprehension of bias test, the court found no basis to conclude the juror could not remain independent and impartial.

The mistrial application and request to discharge the juror were denied, though the spouse was excluded from further attendance at the trial.

During a criminal jury trial, information emerged that the spouse of a juror had attended the proceedings and made comments supportive of a police witness, including remarks to the investigating officer.

The court had previously conducted an inquiry after learning the juror had received text messages from the spouse about events occurring in the courtroom.

Following new evidence from a detective about additional comments by the spouse, the court considered whether further inquiry of the jury was necessary.

Applying appellate guidance on allegations of improper juror contact, the court held that the potential taint of prejudice required a supplementary inquiry.

The judge directed that limited additional questions be put to the implicated juror to determine whether the spouse’s opinions had been communicated and whether they affected impartiality.