Lyndsay K. Jeanes

The Crown brought an application seeking to quash a decision by the Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ) that granted a preliminary inquiry to the respondent, William Stengel.

Stengel was charged with sexual assault and related offences committed between 2010 and 2012, which at the time carried a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment.

The Crown argued that under the amended s. 535 of the Criminal Code, preliminary inquiries are only available for offences punishable by 14 years or more, and that the relevant maximum punishment is determined at the time of the offence's commission, not the current maximum.

The court, applying s. 43 of the Interpretation Act and Supreme Court precedent, agreed with the Crown, finding that the OCJ lacked jurisdiction to hold a preliminary inquiry.

The decision of the application judge was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the OCJ for trial election without a preliminary hearing.

This ruling addresses the relevance of evidence concerning a sexual assault complainant's lack of avoidant behaviour towards the accused.

During a trial for sexual assault and exploitation, defence counsel sought to argue that the complainant's continued association with the accused undermined his credibility.

The Crown objected, asserting this argument relied on impermissible myths and stereotypes about how sexual assault victims should behave.

The court upheld the Crown's objection, ruling that such a submission was based on a generalized, stereotypical notion of victim behaviour and was irrelevant in this specific case, particularly given the complainant's intellectual disability and suggestibility.

The court ruled on the admissibility of the defendant's prior consistent statement, a denial made when first confronted with sexual assault allegations.

The Crown objected, arguing the statement was not spontaneous and lacked a reliable record.

The court found the statement admissible under the `Edgar` exception, emphasizing its spontaneity upon initial confrontation, and also for trial fairness to complete the narrative initiated by the Crown.

The jury will be instructed on its limited use for credibility and circumstantial evidence, not for the truth of its contents.

The defendant, D.M., faced charges of sexual exploitation of a person with a disability, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault.

At the close of the Crown's case, defence counsel applied for directed verdicts of acquittal on the two sexual exploitation charges.

The court applied the Shephard test, which requires determining if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a guilty verdict.

The core issue was whether the Crown had adduced sufficient evidence to establish a relationship of trust, dependency, or an exploitative relationship between D.M. and the complainant (W.C.), an intellectually disabled young man.

The court found ample evidence in the record to support a jury's conclusion that such a relationship existed, given W.C.'s significant intellectual disability, vulnerability, and the power imbalance in the relationship.

Consequently, the application for directed verdicts was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident during a work retreat where he entered a colleague’s bedroom through a balcony and engaged in non-consensual sexual touching.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in credibility findings, misdirected himself regarding honest but mistaken belief in consent, and improperly rejected unchallenged evidence.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge properly applied the W.D. framework, made credibility findings grounded in the record, and did not materially misapprehend evidence.

The court further held that the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent lacked an evidentiary foundation because there was no conduct from the complainant capable of conveying consent.

The appeal was dismissed.