Paul Warren Cooper

During a joint trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder, the jury reported that a juror's spouse had been attending the proceedings and texting the juror information about the case, which was then shared with other jurors.

Two of the accused brought an application for a mistrial.

The court conducted an inquiry, questioning each juror individually, and determined that the information imparted was innocuous, primarily concerning scheduling delays and a witness's appearance.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the improper contact did not cause actual prejudice or irreparably taint the appearance of justice and fairness.

During jury selection for a complex, six-month murder trial, the applicant sought to discharge the sworn jurors and increase juror compensation, arguing that the high rate of excusals for financial hardship violated her Charter right to a representative jury panel.

The court acknowledged the inadequacy of current juror compensation but found that the remaining panel, after hardship excusals, was still sufficiently representative of the community.

The court held that the characteristic of being paid by an employer for jury service is not material to juror competence or impartiality, and dismissed the application.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempt murder contrary to s. 239 of the Criminal Code.

The court considered the circumstances of the offence, the victim's impact statement, the accused's prior criminal record (two robbery convictions), and mitigating factors including the guilty plea, early resolution, and personal circumstances involving substance abuse.

The court applied enhanced credit for pre-trial custody on a 1.5 to 1 basis and imposed a sentence within the range jointly submitted by counsel.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the stabbing death of her intimate partner.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted to a sentence of six years imprisonment.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it appropriate given the circumstances.

The offence occurred in a domestic context, which was significantly aggravating.

However, the accused's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, substantial rehabilitation efforts including four years of sobriety, and strong family support were mitigating factors.

The court imposed a six-year sentence with credit for time served on a 1.5:1 basis, resulting in approximately five years and one month remaining to be served.

The Applicants appealed a decision by Tarion Warranty Corporation denying their warranty claim on the basis that the Added Party, Olympia Ventures, was not a 'builder' under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The Applicants argued they hired the Added Party to build their custom home.

The Tribunal found that the Applicants retained control over the construction, directly hired and paid the architect, tradespersons, and site supervisor, and acted as their own general contractor.

The Added Party acted only as a project manager and consultant.

As there was no 'builder' within the meaning of the Act, the Applicants were not entitled to warranty coverage, and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains by dismemberment, relating to the death of his common-law partner.

The victim's body was discovered three years later in plastic pails hidden under a cottage where the accused worked.

The court considered the egregious nature of the murder, the subsequent dismemberment, and the domestic context as significant aggravating factors.

The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 17 years for the murder, and a concurrent 5-year sentence for the indignity to human remains.

The accused brought a defence motion seeking to exclude proposed Crown evidence relating to a necklace fragment and a mark on a carport floor at a property where the accused had previously worked.

The Crown argued the evidence could support an inference connecting the homicide victim to the property and thereby implicate the accused.

The court held that there was no evidentiary foundation linking the necklace fragment or the unidentified mark to the victim.

Without proof connecting the items to the victim or the alleged crime scene, the evidence lacked relevance and probative value.

The court further held that allowing the jury to speculate about ownership of the necklace or the nature of the mark would be unfairly prejudicial to the accused.

The proposed evidence was therefore excluded.

During a jury trial for homicide, the defence brought a motion for a mistrial after the Crown’s opening address referenced conduct allegedly prohibited by a prior ruling on discreditable conduct evidence.

The defence argued that references to the disposal and sale of the deceased’s clothing improperly introduced prejudicial material.

The court held that the earlier ruling primarily addressed illicit drug use and trafficking evidence, and that the Crown’s reference to the clothing described post‑disappearance conduct that could reasonably be interpreted in different ways by the jury.

The court found the opening address was not inflammatory and did not breach the prior evidentiary ruling.

The defence motion for a mistrial was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking admission of discreditable conduct evidence in a murder prosecution involving allegations that the accused killed and dismembered his partner.

The Crown argued that various incidents involving drug activity, relationship conflict, and theft of tools were necessary to provide narrative context, establish motive, and demonstrate access to tools capable of dismemberment.

The court applied the governing principles for admission of discreditable conduct evidence, including the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The court admitted evidence from one witness concerning the accused’s theft and pawning of a chainsaw, finding it relevant to access to tools and disposal methods potentially linked to the alleged dismemberment.

Evidence from other witnesses relating primarily to drug use, drug sales, and minor incidents of conflict was excluded as irrelevant to the issues of identity, motive, or the alleged offences and as posing significant risk of moral and reasoning prejudice.

The Crown applied to introduce several pre-death statements made by the deceased victim in a homicide trial.

The statements were sought to be admitted for their truth, as part of the narrative, or to demonstrate the deceased's state of mind.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, assessing the necessity and reliability of each statement.

Necessity was established due to the declarant's death.

The court admitted statements that were specific, reliable, and relevant to the deceased's state of mind, while excluding others that lacked detail, were too remote in time, or carried prejudicial effects outweighing their probative value.

The accused applied to introduce evidence of three alleged alternate suspects in a homicide trial, including an unidentified stalker, an acquaintance from Alcoholics Anonymous, and a contractor connected to a property where the victim’s remains were found.

The court reviewed the governing principles for third‑party suspect evidence, requiring a sufficient evidentiary nexus between the proposed suspect and the crime and an “air of reality” capable of supporting a reasonable doubt.

After examining the proffered evidence, the court concluded that none of the proposed suspects had a demonstrable connection to the homicide, motive, or opportunity sufficient to meet the admissibility threshold.

The proposed evidence would invite speculation and risk sending the jury on a “wild goose chase.” The application to introduce alternate suspect evidence was therefore dismissed.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 523 of the Criminal Code seeking release from custody on charges of second degree murder and committing an indignity to a human body.

The defence argued that 19 new Centre of Forensic Sciences reports showing no DNA linking the accused to the offence constituted a material change in circumstances since the original bail hearing.

The court held that the absence of DNA evidence had already been recognized in the original decision and therefore did not amount to a material change.

The proposed release plan relied on the same sureties previously rejected and did not address prior concerns about their ability to control the accused.

The application for release was dismissed.

In a pre-trial motion during a murder prosecution, the Crown sought to introduce intercepted private communications obtained under a Part VI authorization.

The defence argued the intercepts were prejudicial, lacked probative value, and included privileged solicitor-client communications.

The court held that most of the intercepted calls were admissible as relevant to issues including motive, animus, identity of the perpetrator, and consciousness of guilt.

The court found solicitor-client privilege had been waived where the accused voluntarily disclosed legal advice to third parties.

Some intercepts relating to propensity to violence were deferred pending whether the accused placed his character in issue or raised a third-party suspect defence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that substituted a conviction for aggravated assault in place of an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that defence of property under s. 41 of the Criminal Code alone could not justify the alleged aggravated assault.

However, the Court found that the trial judge's findings were insufficient to ground a conviction, as there was no finding of an intentional stabbing and the trial judge had reservations about the evidence's reliability.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, resisted extradition to the United States on charges of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud.

The extradition judge had granted a stay of proceedings based on statements made by an American judge and prosecutor, which the Court of Appeal subsequently set aside.

Relying on the reasons given in the companion case of United States of America v. Cobb, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the order staying the extradition proceedings.