Sandra Caponecchia

The accused, charged with possessing and making available child exploitation materials, brought a motion alleging his s. 8 Charter rights were violated when police obtained his IP address and downloaded files he was sharing on a peer-to-peer network.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the accused had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address or files made publicly available on a peer-to-peer network.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

An oral application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) was also dismissed.

Darren Pennock pleaded guilty to fraud, breach of trust, and uttering forged documents involving the misappropriation of $327,045 from the John Howard Society of Peel over seven years while serving as CEO.

The court considered aggravating factors including the breach of trust, repeated and calculated deceit, and significant impact on a vulnerable community served by the charity.

Mitigating factors included Pennock’s guilty plea and restitution made by a second mortgage on his home.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing the need for denunciation and general deterrence, and sentenced Pennock to 12 months’ jail plus three years’ probation with specific conditions.

The defendants jointly applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 618 days, exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown argued for a reduction in delay due to defence actions and inactions.

The court found that a joint prosecution was justified and that the defence acted as a collective.

Specific periods of delay were attributed to the defence, including 44 days due to one counsel's unavailability for a JPT, 11 days due to a change in counsel, and 95.5 days due to the collective defence's delay in raising s. 11(b) concerns and not utilizing backlog initiatives.

Alternatively, one defendant was found solely responsible for 306 days of delay due to counsel's unavailability for an earlier trial date, which was then communally shared.

In both scenarios, the net delay fell below the Jordan ceiling.

The court also found that the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it should have.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

This decision concerns an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating a total delay of 569 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court attributed 16.5 days of delay to the defence due to unavailability for a continuation date, resulting in a net delay of 552.5 days, still above the ceiling.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

Even if the net delay fell below the ceiling, the court found the delay of 536 days (if all 33 days were attributed to defence) was "markedly longer than it should have" for a simple one-day domestic trial, given the Crown's failure to expedite disclosure and issues with court resources.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was granted.

The applicant, Amarjeet Chouhan, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 999 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found 282 days of defence-caused delay and 368 days of waived delay (explicit waiver and failure to bring a timely s. 11(b) application).

Additionally, 70 days were deducted as exceptional circumstances due to the assigned Crown's illness.

After deductions, the net delay was 279 days, which is below the 18-month ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant, Robert Gordon, sought a stay of proceedings for sexual assault under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to a 25-month and 1-day delay.

The Crown requested summary dismissal due to the applicant's late service of application materials.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable explanation for the late filing, prejudice to the Crown, inconsistency with the Rules' objectives, and a promotion of complacency contrary to the principles of R. v. Jordan.

The court also noted that the trial could have been conducted within Jordan guidelines had both parties maintained their initial positions regarding pre-trial motions.

The defendant, Mikal Richards, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 15 months and 26 days for a 5-day in-custody trial, which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the defence did not demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings, citing repeated postponements of the bail hearing and delays in scheduling judicial pre-trials.

While acknowledging the Crown's unreasonable delay in disclosure, particularly the ITO, the court concluded that the case did not take "markedly longer than it reasonably should have" when viewed holistically, considering the actions of both parties and local conditions.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, Harneil Dhillon, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The Crown sought summary dismissal for non-compliance with court rules regarding timely filing and service.

The court exercised its discretion to hear the application on its merits despite the procedural non-compliance.

Applying the Jordan framework, the court calculated the total delay, attributed significant portions to defence conduct (211 days), and then considered exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court deducted 63 days for pandemic-related delays (53 days for social distancing impacts on intake processes and 10 days for the second court shutdown's ripple effects).

This reduced the net delay below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for the Ontario Court of Justice.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

Anthony Ha pleaded guilty to assault and distributing intimate images.

The victim, his former intimate partner, suffered physical and psychological harm.

The Crown sought five months jail and probation, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the calculated nature of distributing intimate images for revenge, breach of trust, and significant victim impact.

Mitigating factors included a guilty plea, no prior record, and counselling.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing the need for denunciation and general deterrence for such serious offences, particularly those involving intimate partner violence and non-consensual distribution of intimate images.

The defendants, Richard Jakovac and Emilia Gruyters, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The net delay was calculated at 17 months and 10 days, which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found that the defence took meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings.

Despite the COVID-19 backlog, the court concluded that this simple 2-day case took "markedly longer" than it reasonably should have due to institutional delay, specifically a lack of judicial resources.

A stay of proceedings was ordered.

Victor Alvarado pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the fatal stabbing of his friend, Orlando Donaldson.

The court considered aggravating factors including the use of a knife, the significant victim impact, and the offender's criminal record, which included prior violent offences involving a knife.

Mitigating factors included the genuine guilty plea, remorse, the triable issue of self-defence, the causal link between his paranoid schizophrenia and his actions, and the harsh pre-trial detention conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court emphasized denunciation and individual deterrence, noting that general deterrence is less significant when mental illness drives behaviour.

A sentence of six years incarceration was imposed, with credit for pre-trial custody.

Brady Robertson was sentenced for four counts of dangerous driving causing death, four counts of causing death while having excess THC in his blood, and one count of dangerous driving from an earlier incident.

The Crown sought a 23-year jail sentence, while the defence proposed 7 years.

The court considered aggravating factors including the profound victim impact (four deaths, including three children), the offender's extensive and irresponsible driving record, egregious driving conduct on two separate occasions (including fleeing police and driving with suspended licenses and no insurance), and drug consumption (THC and flubromazolan) while driving.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth (20 years old at the time of offences), lack of an adult criminal record, guilty pleas to some charges, expressed remorse, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions exacerbated by the pandemic.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and parity, and considering Gladue principles due to the offender's Indigenous ancestry, the court imposed a sentence of 17 years imprisonment.

After deducting 34 months for pre-trial custody, the remaining sentence is 14 years and 2 months.

A 34-year driving prohibition and an in-custody DNA order were also imposed.

The court declined to order delayed parole eligibility, finding no demonstrated need for additional punishment beyond the significant penitentiary term.

The accused, Brady Robertson, brought a constitutional challenge against sections 320.14(1)(c) and 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code and section 2 of SOR/2018-148, which establish a per se limit of 5 ng/ml of THC in blood for drivers.

The challenge argued that the per se limit violated section 7 of the Charter by being arbitrary and overbroad, particularly for frequent and chronic cannabis users who might have residual THC levels above the limit without being impaired.

The Crown argued the legislation was a precautionary measure to deter impaired driving.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the legislation's objective was to strengthen impaired driving laws and deter cannabis users from driving when they pose a risk.

The court concluded that the 5 ng/ml per se limit was neither arbitrary nor overbroad, as it was rationally connected to the legislative objectives and did not criminalize harmless conduct in a manner inconsistent with fundamental justice principles.

A youth charged with assault and sexual assault against his former partner sought access to police records from a 2011 sexual assault investigation involving the complainant as a victim when both parties were youths.

The investigation resulted in no charges being laid.

The accused sought access to these records to challenge the complainant's credibility at trial.

The Youth Court judge determined that the records fall within the definition of "records" under the Youth Criminal Justice Act but that Part 6 of the Act does not provide a statutory avenue for access to police records where no charges were laid following an investigation.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with theft from Walmart and possession of heroin and methamphetamine.

A loss prevention officer lawfully arrested the accused under s. 494 of the Criminal Code after observing him leave the store with unpaid merchandise.

Police arrived approximately five hours later.

The court found that the loss prevention officer was not acting as a state agent and therefore the Charter did not apply to his conduct.

However, the court found that the arresting police officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights by: (1) unreasonably delaying informing the accused of his right to counsel by approximately 15-33 minutes; and (2) failing to take adequate steps to ensure the accused understood his rights despite an apparent language barrier.

The court excluded the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the state misconduct and impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in an adjudication on the merits.

The accused was convicted of theft but acquitted of both drug possession charges.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The application was dismissed on two grounds: first, for failure to comply with the Ontario Court of Justice Rules requiring section 11(b) applications to be heard 60 days in advance of trial; and second, on the merits, as the net delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice trials and the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The court found that the defence was responsible for significant delay between February and September 2018 by repeatedly declining to set a trial date despite the Crown and court being ready to proceed.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg per 100 mL of blood).

Officers conducted a RIDE spot check and the defendant failed a roadside screening test.

Two breath samples were provided at the station, registering 160 mg and 150 mg respectively.

The defence raised two Charter-based arguments and two substantive challenges: (1) that the presumption of identity in s. 258 of the Criminal Code does not survive its repeal (the Shaikh issue), and (2) that the Crown failed to establish the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer tests (the Flores-Vigil issue).

The court rejected both defence arguments, finding that the presumption of identity applies to pre-amendment offences and that the Crown established the preconditions for the presumption of accuracy through viva voce evidence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-51, which amended the Criminal Code to establish new procedures for the admissibility of evidence regarding a complainant's prior sexual activity and private records in the possession of the defence in sexual assault proceedings.

The accused argued the legislation violated his rights under sections 7, 11(c), 11(d), and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court rejected all constitutional challenges, finding that the procedural amendments do not infringe the accused's Charter rights and are consistent with the principles established in prior Supreme Court decisions.

The accused was charged with assault on May 6, 2017.

Following a judicial pre-trial in October 2017, a trial date was set for May 2018, but the case was not reached due to insufficient court resources.

A second trial date was set for January 2019.

After the trial concluded on January 8, 2019, the defence filed a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the net delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R v. Jordan, and that the defence had not demonstrated meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The defence's late filing of the application and failure to comply with court rules were significant factors in the dismissal.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault arising from an attack on a vulnerable victim with Asperger Syndrome at a shopping mall.

The Crown applied for a publication ban on the victim's identity pursuant to section 486.5 of the Criminal Code.

The court granted the publication ban, finding that it was in the interest of the proper administration of justice to protect the victim's identity and privacy, balancing the victim's vulnerability and the risk of harm against the principles of open court and freedom of the press.