Jordan Alexander Stone

The court dismissed Mijanur Rahman's application as frivolous under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The application sought orders reinstating and renewing various financial licenses and waiving renewal costs, but the court found that such relief was not available by application to the Superior Court of Justice.

The court held that the application lacked legal merit, was not properly brought under the cited rules or statutes, and would inevitably fail.

The decision clarifies the robust application of Rule 2.1 to prevent clearly unmeritorious proceedings from consuming judicial resources.

The court considered a motion under rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss an application as frivolous and vexatious.

The registrar referred the matter to the judge following a request from counsel for FP Canada.

The court ordered that the applicant be given notice and an opportunity to make submissions before any dismissal, stayed the application pending the written hearing, and directed the registrar regarding service and filings.

The judge remained seized of the matter.

The appellants, Wesley Moore and St. Jacobs Carpenter House Inc., appealed an order requiring them to cease operating an unlicensed retirement home.

The core issues were whether their facility met the statutory definition of a "retirement home" under the Retirement Homes Act, 2010, specifically regarding the provision of "care services" (meals and drug administration), and whether the application judge erred in finding an abuse of process or in ordering the cessation of operations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings, confirming that the facility provided at least two care services, including a broad interpretation of "administration of a drug" to encompass assistance.

The court also rejected the abuse of process argument and affirmed the judge's power to issue a cease and vacate order under the Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of an oral caution imposed by the College of Pharmacists Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee for overbilling at five pharmacies.

The applicant argued the caution was punitive rather than remedial, given his prior discipline for similar conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the decision reasonable because the current conduct involved significantly more money, more pharmacies, and a different time period, thereby posing a greater risk to the public and demonstrating a need for further remediation.

The appellant pharmacist appealed the decisions of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists finding professional misconduct, imposing a penalty, and awarding costs of $190,000.

The misconduct involved billing for medications not prescribed or received, and falsifying records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error or palpable and overriding error of fact in the Committee's decisions regarding misconduct, penalty, or costs.

The moving party sought an extension of time to commence an application for judicial review of two orders made by the Ontario College of Teachers regarding alleged professional misconduct, and a stay of the ongoing disciplinary proceedings.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the application for judicial review premature as the administrative process had not yet run its course and the issues raised could be addressed before the Discipline Committee.

Consequently, the request for a stay was also dismissed.

The Retirement Homes Regulatory Authority (RHRA) brought an application seeking an order for the respondents to cease illegally operating a retirement home and to wind up their business.

The core issue was whether the respondents' facility met the definition of a retirement home under the Retirement Homes Act, specifically concerning the "administration of a drug or other substance." The court found that the respondents did administer drugs based on the ordinary meaning of the term, their own definition, and a purposive interpretation of the Act, which aims to protect vulnerable individuals.

The court also found other care services were provided.

Given the respondents' history of non-compliance and deliberate attempts to avoid regulation, the court granted the RHRA's request to shut down the premises, ordering it to be vacated within six months, and awarded costs to the applicant.

The appellant teacher appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers dismissing his application for reinstatement and revoking his teaching certificate.

The appellant's certificate was automatically revoked following 2020 amendments to the Ontario College of Teachers Act due to a 2009 finding of professional misconduct involving sexual abuse of a student.

The appellant argued the panel erred by giving retrospective effect to the amendments and imposing a more severe penalty than his original two-year suspension.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the presumption against retrospectivity was rebutted by the express language of the amended legislation, which clearly intended for the revocation provision to apply retrospectively.

The appellant architect appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the OAA Discipline Committee.

The Committee found the architect in a conflict of interest under s. 43(1)(f) of the Regulation because he provided millwork drawings for a renovation project while also owning a company that submitted a quote for the work.

The appellant argued the provision only applied to formal tendering processes creating a Contract A/Contract B scenario.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Committee correctly interpreted 'tenders or bids' to include informal competitive bidding processes, consistent with the plain meaning of the words and the public interest purpose of the legislation.

The Retirement Homes Regulatory Authority (RHRA) brought an urgent application seeking an order for In Touch Retirement Living for Vegetarians/Vegans Inc. and Elaine Lindo (the Respondents) to cease operating as an unlicensed retirement home.

The Respondents filed a cross-application challenging the enforcement of the Retirement Homes Act, 2010 on Charter grounds and requesting consideration for a licence.

The court granted the RHRA's application, finding a continuous breach of the Act and dismissing the cross-application due to procedural deficiencies and lack of legal merit for the Charter claims.

Ancillary relief was also granted to ensure the safe transfer of residents.

The appellant, an early childhood educator, appealed a discipline committee's order that he pay $257,353.76 in hearing costs after being found guilty of professional misconduct for sexually abusing a child.

The appellant argued the committee lacked jurisdiction to award costs because it found his conduct during the hearing was not unreasonable, relying on the tribunal's rules and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was reasonable for the committee to interpret its home statute as granting broad discretion to award costs following a finding of misconduct, which prevailed over any conflicting procedural rules.

The accused, charged with three counts of breach of probation, brought an application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The accused failed to attend his trial date, leading the court to conclude he was disinterested in exercising his s. 11(b) rights.

Furthermore, the court calculated the net delay to be below the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan, finding that the pre-arrest delay constituted a discrete event due to the accused's unknown whereabouts and the police's reasonable diligence in attempting to locate him.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with three counts of breach of probation for allegedly contacting his wife and children in violation of probation orders.

The first allegation occurred on July 7, 2014, but the information was not sworn until July 21, 2017.

The accused was arrested on March 11, 2017.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter motion arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the total delay exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, the pre-arrest delay qualified as a discrete event attributable to exceptional circumstances, as the police acted with reasonable diligence in attempting to locate the accused.

Additionally, the accused's failure to appear at trial demonstrated he was not genuinely exercising his 11(b) rights.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown conceded that the impaired operation charge could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt due to lack of identification of the driver.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds existed for the arrest and breath demand.

However, the court found serious breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights relating to the right to counsel in his first language (Punjabi).

The police failed to advise the accused of the availability of Punjabi-speaking duty counsel despite objective evidence of language difficulties.

Under s. 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the evidence of the refusal to provide a breath sample, finding that the serious and well-established Charter breach, combined with the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, outweighed the societal interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The offender pleaded guilty to stealing $777 from his employer, the LCBO, due to severe family financial stress.

The court granted a conditional discharge, finding it was in the offender's best interest and not contrary to the public interest given his lack of prior record and extensive community service.

The offender also challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge under s. 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, holding that the surcharge is a user-fee or general restitution rather than a sentence, and its mandatory imposition does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The offender was ordered to pay a $200 victim surcharge with one year to pay.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the police violated the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant claimed she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise her right to counsel and sought exclusion of the breath sample evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the defendant was properly informed of her right to counsel, understood this right, but failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to retain counsel.

The defendant repeatedly claimed to have a lawyer but could not identify one, refused to pursue duty counsel despite being informed of this option, and engaged in what appeared to be deliberate delay tactics.

The court dismissed the Charter motion and found the defendant guilty.

The appellant appealed a decision striking a statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the only factual allegation pleaded, which was perjury, cannot in law support any of the civil claims advanced against the respondent.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal before the motion judge released his decision regarding the Crown defendants.

No steps were taken to remedy this deficiency for almost two years.

The Court of Appeal refused to extend the time to file a proper notice of appeal, finding no material to justify the extension and no merit to the appeal in light of s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.