Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) v. Park et al., 2025 ONAPE 5

Discipline Committee of the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO)

Date: 2025-10-23 Citation: Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) v. Park et al, 2025 ONAPE 5 Indexed as: The Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) v Park et al, 2025 ONAPE 5

IN THE MATTER OF a hearing under the Professional Engineers Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.28;

AND IN THE MATTER OF a complaint regarding the conduct of Jae J Park, P.Eng., a member of the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario and McCormick Rankin Corporation (now WSP Group Limited), a holder of a Certificate of Authorization.

BETWEEN:

The Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO)

-and-

Jae J Park, P.ENG., and McCormick Rankin Corp. (now WSP Canada Group LTD.)

PANEL MEMBERS: GEOFFREY POND, P.ENG. CHAIR PHILIPPE GIGUÈRE, J.D. MEMBER GARY THOMPSON, P.ENG MEMBER

Hearing Dates: 2025-10-23 Decision Date: 2025-11-27 Release of Written Reasons: 2025-11-27

Counsel: Andrew Faith, Ryan Lapensee, and Yuliya Mykhaylychenko, Counsel for the Association (PEO) Jae J Park, Self-represented Jennifer Roberts, Counsel for McCormick Rankin Corp. (Now WSP Canada Group LTD.) Jordan Stone, Independent Legal Counsel to the Panel

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1This matter was heard by a Panel of the Discipline Committee of Professional Engineers Ontario (“PEO”) on October 23, 2025, by videoconference, in accordance with the Committee’s Rules of Procedure, the Professional Engineers Act, and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

2At its core, this case is about what happens when verification and oversight fail on a major piece of public infrastructure. The allegations relate to the failed design and verification of a critical structural component of a new four-lane cable-stayed bridge forming part of the Trans-Canada Highway over the Nipigon River, a major interprovincial transportation and trade corridor. Shortly after the bridge opened, the northwest bearing assembly failed, forcing the Trans-Canada Highway, one of Canada’s busiest and most essential routes, to close for approximately 17 hours. The failure rendered the new bridge impassable, required significant public resources, years of further work, and substantial public expenditures to repair, and most importantly, created a risk to public safety.

3At the time of the events, the holder of a Certificate of Authorization, McCormick Rankin Corporation (“MRC”), now WSP Canada Inc. (“WSP”) by virtue of acquisition, was responsible for the bridge’s design. The member, Mr. Jae Joon Park, P.Eng. (“Mr. Park”), was the engineer at MRC responsible for the design of certain critical components, including the connection between the bridge’s bearings and the steel girder.

4Both Respondents admitted the facts set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts and acknowledged that they were guilty of professional conduct, including that they were negligent, failed to make reasonable provision for the safeguarding of the life, health and property of persons, and engaged in unprofessional conduct, particularly with respect to verification of critical design assumptions and effective oversight of engineering work.

5For the reasons that follow, the Panel finds that each of the Respondents committed professional misconduct contrary to sections 72(2)(a), (b), and (j) of Regulation 941.

6Following its findings, the Panel considered the Joint Submission on Penalty negotiated by the parties. Recognizing that joint submissions must be accepted unless doing so would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or be otherwise contrary to the public interest, the Panel is satisfied that the proposed penalty meaningfully addresses public protection, professional accountability, and both specific and general deterrence. The Panel therefore accepts the Joint Submission on Penalty in its entirety.

Agreed Statement of Facts

7Counsel for the PEO advised the Panel that agreement had been reached on the facts and introduced an Agreed Statement of Facts as Exhibit 4 which provided as follows, with drawings, tables and schedules omitted:

Background

1. In or around 2010, the Ontario Ministry of Transportation (the “MTO”) initiated a project to replace the Nipigon River bridge, a two-lane bridge located on the Trans-Canada Highway outside of Nipigon, Ontario, with a new four-lane cable-stayed bridge (the “Bridge”).

2. The Bridge’s construction was separated into two phases. In Phase 1, only half of the Bridge’s four lane roadway deck would be constructed. In Phase 2, the previous bridge would be removed, and the final two lanes of the Bridge would be constructed. On or around November 29, 2015, Phase 1 of construction was completed, and the first two lanes of the Bridge were opened to traffic.

3. Just over a month after the completion of Phase 1, on January 10, 2016, the Northwest bearing assembly failed (the “Bearing”), leading the Northwest corner of the Bridge to lift approximately 600 mm, rendering it impassable (the “Bridge Failure”).

4. The Bridge Failure forced the TransCanada Highway, one of Canada’s largest and most travelled highways, to close for approximately 17 hours. The Bridge required significant resources, years of additional work, and significant amounts of public funds to fully repair. Most importantly, the Bridge Failure put the safety of the public at risk.

5. McCormick Rankin Corporation (“MRC”) (now the respondent, WSP Canada Inc. by virtue of an acquisition) was responsible for designing the Bridge. The respondent Jae Joon Park, P. Eng., was the engineer responsible for designing certain critical elements of the Bridge, including the connection between the Bridge’s bearings and steel girder. MRC and Park’s conduct contributed to (or failed to prevent) the Bridge Failure.

The respondents

6. At all material times, Park was a licensed professional engineer with Professional Engineers Ontario (“PEO”). Park obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Waterloo. Park graduated in 2008 and was first licensed by PEO on or around June 13, 2011.

7. Park was at all material times employed by MRC, a former Canadian engineering company focused on the transportation sector. In September 2008, MMM Group Limited (“MMM”) acquired MRC. In or around August 2015, MMM was acquired by WSP Canada Inc. (“WSP”). As such, WSP is a successor to MRC and is therefore responsible for its errors and omissions. Prior to its acquisition of MMM, WSP was not involved in the design of the Bridge. During the material time, Park was practicing under the Certificate of Authorization of MRC.

Park’s role in the Bridge design

8. Park was the engineer at MRC responsible for designing the connection between the Bridge’s bearings and the girders. Park prepared two contract drawings as a part of this design, titled “Bearing Plan and Design Data” (the “Contract Drawings”).

9. The Contract Drawings provided a design for the connection between the bearings and each of the Bridge’s abutments. As shown in the diagram below, the Contract Drawings specified that the bearings would connect to the Bridge’s structural steel girder via a “bevelled shoe plate,” which was also detailed in the Contract Drawings [omitted].

10. The Contract Drawings specified that the Bridge’s bearings had to rotate and provided specific rotational requirements for each bearing. The Contract Drawings also specified that the Bridge would be subject to significant uplift forces (indicated as negative loads) in serviceability and ultimate states at the West Abutment, as indicated in the “Axial Load” values in the table.

11. In MRC’s design, the rotational bearings contemplated for the West Abutment would be required to rotate while resisting the significant serviceability and ultimate uplift tension at that location. Such bearings had never been used in Ontario and were not specified in the MTO’s Designated Sources for Materials, a list of pre-approved products and vendors for Ontario infrastructure design. As such, the West Abutment bearings involved a highly unusual and complex design. This required additional review of the design, beyond that provided in the Ontario Provincial Standard Specifications for bearings.

12. MRC and Park received design assistance in the preparation of the Contract Drawings from Buckland & Taylor (now COWI North America Ltd., another respondent), a firm with experience in the design of cable-stayed bridges. Park signed and sealed the Contract Drawings.

13. The Contract Drawings provided for a “shoe plate” as part of the connection between the rotational bearings and the steel girder. Although the “shoe plate” was specified in the Contract Drawings, the Contract Drawings delegated the responsibility for designing the “shoe plate” to the bearing designer in Note 4 of the Contract Drawings, which provided: “The top and base plates shall be designed to suit the rotational bearings.”

14. Although not specified, the “top plate” referenced in Note 4 was the “shoe plate,” which sat on top of the bearings. Note 4 did not provide any further specifics about how the “top and base 5 plates” should be designed to “suit” the bearings. The Contract Drawings assumed, without verification, that the bolts connecting the shoe plate to the girder (the “Bolts”) would be subject to uniform tension. In fact, the Bolts were ultimately subject to “prying effects”, as described below, in the final design.

15. RJ Watson, a US-based bearing manufacturer and supplier, supplied the rotational bearings for the Bridge. RJ Watson retained Wojciech Remisz, P. Eng., and Remisz Consulting Engineers Ltd. (“RCEL”) to review the design and calculations for the bearings. As bearing designer, Remisz reviewed, signed and sealed the final (and as-built) shop drawings for the Bridge’s bearings (the “Shop Drawings”). In addition to signing and sealing the Shop Drawings, Remisz was also the Quality Verification Engineer (“QVE”) for all the bearing assemblies including the Bearing.

Park’s design fell short of the standard of a reasonable and prudent professional

16. As described above, the Bridge Failure occurred on January 10, 2016.

17. After the Bridge Failure, the MTO conducted a technical investigation to understand its cause. In or around September 2016, the MTO published an investigation report to describe its findings. In its report, the MTO concluded that three factors caused the failure:

a. Prying effects caused by the flexible shoe plate led to higher forces in the exterior line of the Bolts;

b. The Bearing’s inability to accommodate rotation led to higher forces in the end rows of the Bolts;

c. A lack of pre-tensioning of the Bolts and lack of beveled washers that led to high fatigue stresses and a high-stress, low-cycle fatigue failure.

18. The Association retained Gregory Shafer, P.Eng., PE, SE at Parsons Corporation to provide an independent expert opinion on the engineering work performed by Park and others. Shafer was a Bridge Technical Manager, Vice President, and Fellow at Parsons, who specializes in bridges and cable-stayed bridges.

19. Shafer prepared four independent reports on MRC and Park’s actions and conduct which are attached as Schedule “A”. Shafer concluded that there were three primary factors which contributed to the Bridge Failure:

a. Inadequate rotational capacity: the Bearing at the Northwest abutment could not accommodate longitudinal rotation of the superstructure edge girder. Although the Contract Drawings clearly indicated that the bearings for the Northwest abutment would be subject to significant uplift forces in any state (serviceability or ultimate), Remisz signed and sealed the Shop Drawings despite the Bearing’s total lack of rotational capability in the “uplift condition” (i.e., when subjected to negative load). Because the Bearing could not rotate in uplift, the Bearing “locked up and bottomed out” under service loads, which was a significant factor in the Bridge Failure

b. Inadequate connection of the shoe plate to the girder: “prying effects”— a phenomenon caused by the deformation of a fitting between bolts which increases bolt tension—significantly reduced the capacity of the shoe plate to girder connection. In the case of the Bridge, the “prying” effects were exacerbated by the shoe plate’s flexibility and the wrong (weaker) material that was used for the shoe plate; and

c. The bolts were not prestressed: the bolts used to connect the shoe plate to the girder were not “prestressed,” as required in the Contract, resulting in a reduced capacity.

20. Shafer concluded that MRC’s and Park’s conduct contributed to (or failed to prevent) each of the factors which caused the Bridge Failure as follows:

a. Failure to verify Bearing: MRC and Park failed to provide for an adequate process to verify that the Bearing design was adequate and did not violate the design intent. The highly unusual and complex requirements of the Bearing, including that it was a fracture critical element that had to rotate under significant serviceability tension, required a higher level of design verification than MRC and Park had specified.

b. Failure to verify the shoe plate to girder connection: MRC and Park also failed to provide a process to verify that the Bolts connecting the shoe plate to the steel girder were adequate and did not violate the design intent. The design in the Contact Drawings assumed that the Bolts would carry uniform loads and would not be subject to prying 7 forces. Since MRC and Park did not show this assumption by way of a “Note” in the Contract Drawings, it was incumbent upon them to verify that the design of the Bearing would not subject the Bolts to prying effects. Park and MRC failed to do this. As it happened, RCEL and Remisz’s design of the Bearing did cause prying effects on the Bolts, which resulted in an inadequate connection. These prying effects contributed to the Bridge Failure.

21. Park as a junior engineer at the time he signed and sealed the Contract Drawings, having been licensed for only three years. Despite his relative lack of experience, MRC assigned Park to design critically important connections of the Bridge without adequately supervising him or providing him with sufficient training or support.

22. For the purposes of this proceeding, the respondents accept as correct the findings, opinions and conclusions contained in the four Shafer reports. The respondents admit that they failed to maintain the standards that a reasonable and prudent practitioner would maintain in the circumstances, and that they failed to make reasonable provision for the safeguarding of the public.

23. The Parties agree that the respondents are guilty of professional misconduct under section 72(2) R.R.O 1990, Regulation 941 as follows:

a. The respondents committed professional misconduct as defined in section 72(2)(a) of Regulation 941, in that they were negligent in failing to provide an adequate system to verify the Bearing design and the connection between the Bearing and girder, which were omissions that would not be expected of a reasonable and prudent practitioner. These omissions contributed to (or failed to prevent) the Bridge’s failure and put the safety of the public and the structural integrity of the Bridge at significant risk.

b. The respondents committed professional misconduct as defined in section 72(2)(b) of Regulation 941, in failing to make reasonable provision for the safeguarding of the life, health and property of persons. Bridges are a cornerstone of Ontario’s infrastructure, and the public assumes that professional engineers are taking the proper precautions to ensure that their bridges are designed to protect their safety. The Respondents’ conduct put the safety of the many people who would subsequently use the Bridge at risk.

c. The respondents committed professional misconduct within section 72(2)(j) of Regulation 941, as their conduct was unprofessional.

Plea by member and holder:

8Mr. Park and WSP each admitted the allegations of professional misconduct set out in paragraph 13 of the Statement of Allegations and reproduced in paragraph 23 of the ASF. The panel conducted a plea inquiry of Mr. Park and a representative on behalf of WSP. The Panel is satisfied that Mr. Park’s and WSP’s admissions were voluntary, informed and unequivocal.

Decision:

9The Panel finds that Mr. Park and WSP committed acts of professional misconduct as defined by sections 72(2)(a), (b), and (j) of Regulation 941 under the Professional Engineers Act. With respect to section 72(2)(j), the Panel finds that the conduct of Mr. Park and WSP would reasonably be regarded by the engineering profession as unprofessional.

Reasons for decision:

10Both Respondents engaged in professional misconduct as defined in sections 72(2)(a), (b) and (j) of Regulation 941 arising from their roles in the design and verification of a fracture-critical bearing assembly for a major piece of public infrastructure.

11Mr. Park, then a junior engineer, sealed drawings without verifying key assumptions or ensuring that the final design met essential uplift and rotational requirements.

12WSP, as the Certificate of Authorization holder, failed to provide adequate oversight, assigned a junior engineer to a role requiring a senior engineer, and lacked the quality-assurance systems necessary to detect or prevent the design deficiencies.

13These collective failures ultimately contributed to (or failed to prevent) the Nipigon River Bridge failure, an important and essential piece of public transportation and trade infrastructure. The Respondents’ actions and inactions put the safety of the public and the structural integrity of the bridge at significant risk. Bridges are a cornerstone of Ontario’s infrastructure, and the public assumes that professional engineers are taking proper precautions to ensure that their bridges are designed to protect their safety.

14The Respondents’ conduct thus fell below the standards that a reasonable and prudent practitioner would maintain, exposed the public to unacceptable and significant safety risks, and would reasonably be regarded as unprofessional.

Joint Submission on Penalty and Costs

15Counsel for PEO advised the Panel that a Joint Submission on Penalty had been agreed upon. The Joint Submission on Penalty, with schedules excluded, provides as follows:

a. WSP and Park admit the facts contained in the Agreed Statement of Fact attached as Schedule “A” to this Joint Submission on Penalty;

b. WSP and Park admit that, based on the agreed statement of facts, they committed professional misconduct under sections 72(2)(a), (b) and unprofessional conduct under section 72(2)(j) of Regulation 941 of the Professional Engineers Act (the “Act”);

Orders in respect of WSP

c. The Panel’s findings as to the allegations of professional misconduct shall be published forthwith in accordance with s. 28(4)(i) of the Act, with names;

d. The Panel shall direct that the following information be placed on the Register forthwith in accordance with s. 21(1)5 of the Act:

WSP has been found guilty of professional misconduct under 72(2)(a) and (b), and unprofessional conduct under 72(2)(j) of Regulation 941 under the Act. WSP has undertaken to prepare and implement a Quality Assurance Plan that aligns with good industry practice and is acceptable to the Registrar within twelve months. Accordingly, no suspension is sought at this time. However, if WSP fails to comply with its undertaking, it has agreed that its Certificate of Authorization shall be suspended for one month. Further, WSP has undertaken to pay the Association’s costs of the investigation and hearing in the amount of $200,000.

e. The penalty hearing shall be adjourned (only with respect to WSP) for a period of up to twelve (12) months after the date that the Discipline Committee accepts this joint submission to permit WSP to complete its undertakings referred to herein (provided that the Association may agree, acting reasonably, to extend the period of the adjournment where WSP has made reasonable efforts to comply with this agreement) (the “Adjournment Period”);

f. During the Adjournment Period:

i. WSP undertakes to pay costs to the Association in the amount of $200,000within 30 days of the commencement of the Adjournment Period;

ii. WSP undertakes to submit to the Registrar a Quality Assurance Plan (“QAP”)that aligns with good industry practice and is acceptable to the Registrar within four months of the date that this joint submission is accepted by the Discipline Committee. The QAP shall be implemented by WSP’s Ontario Transportation & Infrastructure business sector within four months thereafter, regarding the engineering practice of WSP. The QAP shall address, but shall not be limited to, steps to be taken to ensure that junior engineers are properly trained and supervised, and that the design of any structural elements subcontracted to another engineering firm is appropriately reviewed by the WSP structural project manager; and

iii. The Registrar shall confirm to WSP that the QAP is acceptable. If the Registrar does not accept the QAP, they shall advise WSP and provide reasonable time to address any concerns before the matter is returned to the Panel;

g. Upon the return of the penalty hearing, the Panel shall confirm whether the undertakings given by WSP above have been carried out. If they have not, WSP will agree to an Order that its Certification of Authorization will be suspended for one month;

Order in respect of Park

h. Pursuant to s. 28(4)(b) of the Act, Park's license shall be suspended for a period of four (4) weeks, to be served in periods of no fewer than five (5) contiguous business days on at least one week’s prior notice to the Registrar, which suspension shall be fully completed within one year after the date the Discipline Committee accepts this joint submission; and

i. Pursuant to s. 28(5) of the Act, the finding and the order of the Discipline Committee shall be published in detail with names in the official publication of the Association.

Penalty Submissions

16In considering the appropriateness of the proposed penalty, PEO noted that the primary aggravating factors arise from the seriousness and context of the misconduct. The Respondents’ failures occurred in relation to a major and critical piece of public transportation and trade infrastructure: the Nipigon River Bridge on the Trans-Canada Highway.

17As PEO emphasized, the failure caused a significant disruption to a vital national transportation link and placed the safety of the travelling public at risk. The incident generated media coverage and public attention, which eroded confidence in the engineering profession and raised questions about the safety of bridges designed in Ontario.

18PEO highlighted that with respect to Mr. Park, an engineer who seals and signs a design without ensuring proper verification of critical assumptions, particularly on a project of this magnitude, presents a serious aggravating factor.

19PEO also highlighted that with respect to WSP, it assigned highly complex and novel design responsibilities to a very junior engineer, Mr. Park, whose three years of licensure and limited experience were not commensurate with the demands of a first-of-its-kind in Ontario cable-stayed bridge. PEO submitted that this lack of appropriate supervision and oversight constituted a significant aggravating factor, given the complexity and fracture-critical nature of the design elements involved.

20PEO also identified several mitigating considerations. First, neither Respondent has any prior disciplinary history, which PEO acknowledged as a meaningful mitigating factor.

21With respect to Mr. Park, PEO recognized that his relative inexperience and reliance on inadequate supervision from senior engineers were relevant mitigating circumstances. While Mr. Park ultimately sealed the drawings, the underlying facts demonstrate that responsibility for the design was not his alone, particularly in a project of this scale where a robust system of redundancy, verification, and senior oversight was expected. PEO noted that responsibility for the bearing design and its verification was shared among several engineers and firms. PEO also submitted that Mr. Park has demonstrated learning, insight, and accountability through the lengthy regulatory process that has followed.

22With respect to WSP, PEO noted that the entity before the Panel is not the same corporate entity (MRC) that originally held the Certificate of Authorization during the design phase. While WSP is responsible as a successor, many of the individuals involved in the design are no longer with the organization. Furthermore, it noted that WSP has undertaken to develop and implement a Quality Assurance Plan, demonstrating a willingness to improve its internal governance, supervision, and quality-control systems. PEO submitted that these undertakings support rehabilitation and demonstrate WSP’s commitment to preventing a similar failure in the future.

23PEO also made detailed submissions regarding the penalty principles adopted by the Discipline Committee from criminal sentencing jurisprudence, as reaffirmed in the Committee’s recent decision in Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) v. Feng et al., 2025. It submitted that, given the facts of this case, the matter is fundamentally about general deterrence, more so than specific deterrence and rehabilitation. It argued that general deterrence is the dominant consideration given the national importance of the infrastructure and the public impact and attention generated by the incident. To maintain the public’s confidence, it held that the decision should communicate clearly to the profession the centrality of verification, oversight, and rigour when designing critical public infrastructure.

24PEO further submitted that the Panel must apply the test for assessing joint submissions as set out in Divisional Court’s decision in Bradley v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2021 ONSC 2303. That decision affirmed the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43 and held that joint submissions are to be accepted unless the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest, which is a very high bar.

25In addition, PEO referred to three prior decisions of the Discipline Committee as a basis for their submission that the penalty proposed in the joint submission falls within a reasonable range of outcomes based on reasonable comparator cases. These cases include Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) v Colas, 2018 ONAPE 6; Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) v Feng, 2025 ONAPE 2; and Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) v Taha and Gad Technology 2019 ONAPE 14.

26Neither Mr. Park nor WSP made submissions with respect to the joint submission on penalty.

Reasons for Penalty Decision and Order

27Having found Mr. Park and WSP to have contravened sections 72(2)(a), (b) and (j) of Regulation 941, the Panel must determine what penalty to impose. In this case, the Panel is presented with a joint submission on penalty.

28The overarching purpose of disciplinary proceedings is protecting the public interest. In pursuing this objective, any penalty of the Panel must achieve specific deterrence and general deterrence. Moreover, a penalty must also seek to uphold the broader public interest and public confidence in the profession. The penalty must also consider and weigh aggravating factors and mitigating factors.

29Special considerations also apply where the Panel is presented a joint submission on penalty. While a joint submission does not bind the discipline committee, case law dictates that the panel should not interfere with a joint submission on penalty, except where the panel is of the view that to accept the joint submission would bring the administration of the disciplinary process into disrepute or otherwise be contrary to the public interest.

30In this case, the Panel accepts the Joint Submission on Penalty. In reaching this conclusion, the Panel carefully considered both the proportionality and reasonableness of the proposed penalty given the misconduct and circumstances of this case.

31The primary aggravating factors are that the Respondents’ misconduct concerned work on a major and critical piece of public transportation and trade infrastructure, which caused disruption, put the public’s safety at risk, and generated media coverage that eroded public confidence in the engineering profession.

32With respect to Mr. Park, he sealed and signed a design without ensuring proper verification of critical assumptions. Moreover, with respect to WSP, it permitted a very junior engineer (Mr. Park) to undertake design responsibilities that should have been reserved for a more senior engineer. These are both serious aggravating factors.

33The primary mitigating factors are that there is no prior discipline history for either Respondent.

34With respect to Mr. Park, his relative inexperience and reliance on inadequate supervision from his superiors and mentors is another mitigating factor. While Mr. Park was ultimately the one who sealed and signed the design, the underlying facts suggest that that responsibility was not all his. As PEO emphasized, responsibility in a project of this scale and importance cannot be sloughed off onto a single engineer; there must be a system of redundancy, particularly when dealing with critical public infrastructure as significant as the Nipigon River Bridge located on the Trans-Canada highway. At the same time, any engineer who affixes their seal to a drawing bears responsibility for its design. These factors need to be balanced in this case.

35This case underscores the essential role of rigorous verification and oversight processes when designing critical pieces of public infrastructure. In addition, as noted by PEO, Mr. Park has shown that he has learned from this difficult experience and the very extensive regulatory process that followed and has weighed down on him and his career. This goes to governance and rehabilitation.

36With respect to WSP, as noted by PEO, it is not the same entity, MRC, that held the certificate of authorization at the time of the design of the bridge. While it still bears responsibility having acquired MRC, the corporation and people are different than they were at the time of misconduct. Moreover, by undertaking to complete the quality assurance plan, WSP has shown willingness to ensure continued improvement to quality assurance within the organization.

37With that said, this matter also raises another mitigating factor which was raised by the Panel at the hearing. Although a contested hearing had previously proceeded at length before a different panel, both the member and the holder ultimately admitted the misconduct and accepted responsibility before this Panel. This reflects cooperation, acknowledgment, and accountability for their actions.

38While timing of an admission may go to weight, in that earlier resolution can conserve resources, members and holders have a right to test the case against them and to require PEO to prove its allegations. Contesting allegations is never an aggravating factor, though it can be the absence of a mitigating factor. The Panel’s focus is thus on the fact that ultimately responsibility was accepted which supports governability and rehabilitation. The Panel therefore treats this as a mitigating factor, even though the plea came later in the hearing process.

39Having considered all these factors, the Panel is satisfied that the proposed penalty is appropriate and in the public interest. In coming to its decision, the Panel also considered the appropriateness of the proposed penalty in accordance with the principles of general and specific deterrence, rehabilitation and maintenance of the public’s confidence in the profession.

40With respect to both parties, the joint submission provides that the Panel’s decision shall be published in detail with names in the official publication of the association. Publication of a decision with names is a specific deterrent to Mr. Park and WSP as it holds them accountable for their actions. Moreover, it serves the purpose of general deterrence as it is instructive to the public and other members and licence holders of PEO that professional misconduct will have serious consequences. It ensures the transparency of the discipline process and reassures the public that PEO acts decisively and does not shield its members when matters of this nature are brought to its attention.

41With respect to Mr. Park, the joint submission proposes a suspension of the member’s licence for a period of 4 weeks. A suspension of the member expresses the Panel’s denunciation of his conduct and serves the aim of specific and general deterrence. A suspension is certainly appropriate in this instance.

42With respect to WSP, the joint submission proposes that the Panel direct that information be entered on the Register stating that WSP has been found guilty of professional misconduct under sections 72(2)(a), (b), and unprofessional conduct under 72(2)(j) of Regulation 941. The entry will also record that WSP has undertaken to implement a Quality Assurance Plan acceptable to the Registrar within twelve months, failing which its Certificate of Authorization will be suspended for one month, and that WSP has agreed to pay $200,000 in costs. Lastly, it provides that the penalty hearing will be adjourned for up to twelve months to allow WSP to fulfill its undertakings.

43Placing this information on the Register promotes transparency and protects the public, while WSP’s commitments to develop a robust Quality Assurance Plan directly advances the public-interest objectives of ensuring safer engineering practices, improving future compliance, and reinforcing both specific and general deterrence. If WSP does not adequately complete and implement a Quality Assurance Plan, its Certificate of Authorization will be suspended, which serves as a specific and general deterrent.

44Lastly, the Panel considered the previous cases that were presented by PEO. The Panel is aware that no two cases are exactly alike, however, reviewing earlier cases can help determine the appropriate level of penalty. Having reviewed those cases, the Panel is satisfied that the penalty proposed by the parties is also within a reasonable range of penalties.

45Overall, the Panel accepts that the terms of the joint submission represent an appropriate and proportional penalty for the misconduct committed. The Panel is satisfied that the penalty protects the public and serves the principles of general and specific deterrence, rehabilitation and maintenance of the public’s confidence in the profession.

46With respect to WSP, the Panel accordingly orders the following:

a. The Panel’s findings as to the allegations of professional misconduct shall be published forthwith in accordance with s. 28(4)(i) of the Act, with names;

b. The following information shall be placed on the Register forthwith in accordance with s. 21(1)5 of the Act:

WSP has been found guilty of professional misconduct under 72(2)(a) and (b), and unprofessional conduct under 72(2)(j) of Regulation 941 under the Act. WSP has undertaken to prepare and implement a Quality Assurance Plan that aligns with good industry practice and is acceptable to the Registrar within twelve months. Accordingly, no suspension is sought at this time. However, if WSP fails to comply with its undertaking, it has agreed that its Certificate of Authorization shall be suspended for one month. Further, WSP has undertaken to pay the Association’s costs of the investigation and hearing in the amount of $200,000.

c. With respect to WSP, the penalty hearing shall be adjourned for a period of up to twelve (12) months after October 23, 2025, to permit WSP to complete the undertakings it has agreed to with the Association (provided that the Association may agree, acting reasonably, to extend the period of the adjournment where WSP has made reasonable efforts to comply with this agreement).

47With respect to Mr. Park the Panel orders the following:

a. Pursuant to s. 28(4)(b) of the Act, Park's licence shall be suspended for a period of four (4) weeks, to be served in periods of no fewer than five (5) contiguous business days on at least one week’s prior notice to the Registrar, which suspension shall be fully completed within one year after the date of this decision; and

b. Pursuant to s. 28(5) of the Act, the finding and the order of the Discipline Committee shall be published in detail with names in the official publication of the Association.

48With respect to the resumption of the penalty hearing for WSP, the parties (WSP and PEO) can contact the tribunal office to schedule a date for the continuation of the hearing, which shall occur within 12 months. If PEO agrees to an extension of time for the adjournment, it shall notify the tribunal office of the extension and the length of the extension. Upon resumption of the penalty hearing, the Panel will confirm whether the undertakings given by WSP and contained within the Joint Submission on Penalty have been carried out. If they have not, WSP’s Certificate of Authorization will be suspended for one month.