Jordan Alexander Stone

The appellant, an early childhood educator, appealed a discipline committee's order that he pay $257,353.76 in hearing costs after being found guilty of professional misconduct for sexually abusing a child.

The appellant argued the committee lacked jurisdiction to award costs because it found his conduct during the hearing was not unreasonable, relying on the tribunal's rules and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was reasonable for the committee to interpret its home statute as granting broad discretion to award costs following a finding of misconduct, which prevailed over any conflicting procedural rules.

The accused, charged with three counts of breach of probation, brought an application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The accused failed to attend his trial date, leading the court to conclude he was disinterested in exercising his s. 11(b) rights.

Furthermore, the court calculated the net delay to be below the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan, finding that the pre-arrest delay constituted a discrete event due to the accused's unknown whereabouts and the police's reasonable diligence in attempting to locate him.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with three counts of breach of probation for allegedly contacting his wife and children in violation of probation orders.

The first allegation occurred on July 7, 2014, but the information was not sworn until July 21, 2017.

The accused was arrested on March 11, 2017.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter motion arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the total delay exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, the pre-arrest delay qualified as a discrete event attributable to exceptional circumstances, as the police acted with reasonable diligence in attempting to locate the accused.

Additionally, the accused's failure to appear at trial demonstrated he was not genuinely exercising his 11(b) rights.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown conceded that the impaired operation charge could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt due to lack of identification of the driver.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds existed for the arrest and breath demand.

However, the court found serious breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights relating to the right to counsel in his first language (Punjabi).

The police failed to advise the accused of the availability of Punjabi-speaking duty counsel despite objective evidence of language difficulties.

Under s. 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the evidence of the refusal to provide a breath sample, finding that the serious and well-established Charter breach, combined with the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, outweighed the societal interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The offender pleaded guilty to stealing $777 from his employer, the LCBO, due to severe family financial stress.

The court granted a conditional discharge, finding it was in the offender's best interest and not contrary to the public interest given his lack of prior record and extensive community service.

The offender also challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge under s. 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, holding that the surcharge is a user-fee or general restitution rather than a sentence, and its mandatory imposition does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The offender was ordered to pay a $200 victim surcharge with one year to pay.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the police violated the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant claimed she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise her right to counsel and sought exclusion of the breath sample evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the defendant was properly informed of her right to counsel, understood this right, but failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to retain counsel.

The defendant repeatedly claimed to have a lawyer but could not identify one, refused to pursue duty counsel despite being informed of this option, and engaged in what appeared to be deliberate delay tactics.

The court dismissed the Charter motion and found the defendant guilty.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal before the motion judge released his decision regarding the Crown defendants.

No steps were taken to remedy this deficiency for almost two years.

The Court of Appeal refused to extend the time to file a proper notice of appeal, finding no material to justify the extension and no merit to the appeal in light of s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed a decision striking a statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the only factual allegation pleaded, which was perjury, cannot in law support any of the civil claims advanced against the respondent.