Kirsten A. Thoreson

The applicant brought a motion for a partial stay of a Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) disciplinary panel's sanctions decision pending a review application.

The applicant sought to stay his suspension as a registered representative and executive.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Capital Markets Tribunal found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish that he would suffer irreparable harm if the stay was refused.

The applicant's evidence of potential financial loss and loss of clients was deemed speculative and unconvincing.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant, Internet Sciences Inc., failed to attend a case management hearing and refused to participate in the proceeding unless its demands, including the removal of the adjudicator for alleged bias, were met.

The adjudicator proceeded in the applicant's absence, dismissing its motion to remove the Ontario Securities Commission as a party and its motion for the adjudicator's recusal, finding no factual basis for the bias allegations.

Ultimately, the adjudicator dismissed the application in its entirety on the basis that it had been abandoned due to the applicant's refusal to participate and cooperate with the Tribunal's process.

The applicant, a self-represented reporting issuer, brought a motion seeking the recusal of the adjudicator for a reasonable apprehension of bias, and a motion to vary the adjudicator's prior reasons for decision under s. 144.1 of the Securities Act.

The bias allegations stemmed from the adjudicator's conduct during a case management hearing, including cautioning the applicant about citing non-existent rules and the potential for artificial intelligence hallucinations.

The adjudicator dismissed the bias motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The adjudicator also dismissed the motion to vary, concluding that the requested variations were merely attempts to tinker with the language of the reasons and were not in the public interest.

An alternative request for a permanent confidentiality order over the reasons was also dismissed.

The applicant, a self-represented corporate entity, sought a review of a decision denying its application for listing on the Canadian Securities Exchange.

At a case management hearing, the applicant requested a highly compressed timeline for hearing its interlocutory motions and the merits application.

The Tribunal rejected the compressed timeline, noting the need for amended materials, proper disclosure, and adequate preparation time.

The Tribunal set a schedule for the exchange of materials and scheduled oral hearings by videoconference for the motions and the application.

The Tribunal also relieved the self-represented applicant from strict compliance with Rule 21, allowing it to file a list of documents instead of a formal motion record.

The applicants applied to vary an enforcement order made against them by the Capital Markets Tribunal, seeking to remove financial sanctions including a $13.5 million disgorgement order, a $600,000 administrative penalty, and a $166,000 cost award.

They argued that the sanctions prevented them from securing financing to renovate and reopen the Buffalo Grand Hotel, which was the only way investors could recover their funds.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the applicants' financing plan was speculative, incomplete, and subject to numerous uncertainties.

The Tribunal concluded that the applicants failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances or that removing the sanctions would not be prejudicial to the public interest, noting that doing so would undermine specific and general deterrence.

The court dismissed Mijanur Rahman's application as frivolous under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The application sought orders reinstating and renewing various financial licenses and waiving renewal costs, but the court found that such relief was not available by application to the Superior Court of Justice.

The court held that the application lacked legal merit, was not properly brought under the cited rules or statutes, and would inevitably fail.

The decision clarifies the robust application of Rule 2.1 to prevent clearly unmeritorious proceedings from consuming judicial resources.

The court considered a motion under rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss an application as frivolous and vexatious.

The registrar referred the matter to the judge following a request from counsel for FP Canada.

The court ordered that the applicant be given notice and an opportunity to make submissions before any dismissal, stayed the application pending the written hearing, and directed the registrar regarding service and filings.

The judge remained seized of the matter.

Aimia Inc. brought an application under s. 104 of the Securities Act alleging that Mithaq Capital SPC's acquisition of shares a year prior constituted a deemed take-over bid because Mithaq acted jointly with others to exceed the 20% threshold.

Mithaq brought a motion to dismiss the application on a preliminary basis.

The Capital Markets Tribunal found that while Aimia had standing to bring the application, the application was an abuse of process.

The Tribunal dismissed the application because Aimia's long delay in seeking relief, combined with significant intervening events, made the application a misuse of the Tribunal's procedure.

Following a prior summary judgment finding liability for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff requested that the court address punitive damages that had been omitted from the earlier endorsement.

Relying on Rule 59.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court amended the order to address the outstanding issue.

The court held that the defendant’s fraudulent misappropriation of funds from a charitable organization constituted malicious and high‑handed conduct warranting punitive damages.

Punitive damages of $50,000 were awarded, and costs of the action and motion were fixed at $150,000 pursuant to the parties’ agreement.

The court deferred its decision on whether to further extend an existing Mareva injunction pending submissions from the defendant.

A charitable organization brought a motion for summary judgment alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duty by a founding director who managed its day‑to‑day operations.

The evidence showed a scheme involving fabricated invoices, unauthorized expense reimbursements, and payments to related parties and vendors for personal benefit.

Applying the summary judgment framework articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and that the evidentiary record permitted a fair determination.

The defendant’s admissions and documentary evidence demonstrated extensive misappropriation of funds through multiple categories of false expenses.

The court granted summary judgment and ordered repayment of $697,237 plus pre‑judgment interest.

The moving party sought to set aside a default judgment arising from an action alleging fraudulent conversion, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract in connection with the deposit of employer cheques into a personal bank account.

Applying the three-part test for setting aside a properly obtained default judgment, the court held that although the motion was brought without delay, the moving party did not adequately explain the default and failed to establish any arguable defence on the merits.

The court emphasized repeated admissions of wrongdoing and found the greater prejudice would fall on the responding party if the judgment were set aside.

The motion was dismissed and substantial indemnity costs were awarded.

The defendant travel company brought a motion for summary judgment in a certified class proceeding alleging breach of contract relating to hotel reservation charges.

The representative plaintiff claimed that the defendant mischaracterized and inadequately disclosed its “Tax Recovery Charge” and “Service Fees,” including allegedly charging taxes based on a wholesale rate and embedding undisclosed profits within service fees.

The court held that the website Terms of Use formed part of the reservation contract but, properly interpreted, did not contain promises requiring disclosure of the calculation methodology, a breakdown of the combined fees, or the absence of a profit element.

The language merely described the nature of the charges and did not create contractual obligations consistent with the plaintiff’s interpretation.

Finding no breach of the express contractual terms, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Following a refusals motion in a certified class action under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the plaintiff sought costs of $14,696.25 on a partial indemnity basis.

The underlying refusals motion arose during discovery in advance of the defendant’s pending summary judgment motion and concerned questions about the calculation of a services fee and production of sample contracts.

Although the plaintiff had succeeded on the refusals motion, the defendant argued that costs should be limited and made costs in the cause pending the outcome of the summary judgment motion.

The court held that the claimed costs were excessive for the nature of the motion and accepted that costs should await the disposition of the summary judgment motion.

Costs were therefore fixed at $8,000 on a partial indemnity basis, payable in the cause.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order finding that Ontario had jurisdiction over the action and was the more convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's application of the real and substantial connection test from Muscutt v. Courcelles.

The Court also found no error in the motion judge's weighing of factors, including the location of witnesses and avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings, to conclude that Ontario was the more convenient forum.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.