Brian McCallion

The court delivered reasons for sentence for Bradley Screen, who pleaded guilty to an offence carrying a maximum 10-year imprisonment.

Aggravating factors included a criminal record dating back to 2009 and a considerable amount of money obtained.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility.

The court accepted a joint submission from Crown and defence, sentencing Mr. Screen to eight months in jail, consecutive to his current sentence, followed by 12 months of probation with specific conditions, a DNA order, and a $200 victim fine surcharge with 24 months to pay.

The defendant pleaded guilty to driving with excess alcohol (160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood) and operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from doing so, both offences occurring on March 7, 2017.

The defendant had an extensive criminal record including four previous drinking and driving convictions between 1995 and 2003, and seven previous driving while disqualified or prohibited offences between 1998 and 2013.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months imprisonment (concurrent on both charges), a lifetime driving prohibition, and 36 months probation with conditions including mandatory alcohol treatment and counselling.

The defendant was charged with failure to provide a sample of breath (ASD refusal) following a motor vehicle accident.

The Crown sought conviction on the charge.

The defendant raised Charter applications challenging the validity of the ASD demand and alleging breaches of sections 7, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the ASD demand was valid based on reasonable suspicion of alcohol consumption.

While finding a technical breach of section 10(b) rights regarding access to counsel, the court determined no Charter relief was warranted under the Grant factors.

The court also rejected arguments of section 7 and 9 breaches, finding the detention and handcuffing, though uncomfortable, did not rise to the level of constitutional violation.

The defendant was found guilty of the ASD refusal charge.

The defendant was convicted after trial of impaired (by drug) driving causing bodily harm contrary to s. 255(2) of the Criminal Code and failure to comply with a demand for a urine sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found stopped in a driveway while impaired and, when police arrived, his vehicle backed up slowly and struck a police officer, causing bodily harm to the officer's knee.

The defendant refused a lawful demand to provide a urine sample.

At sentencing, the Crown sought 7 months imprisonment and a 3-year driving prohibition, while the defendant sought a suspended sentence with a fine and increased licence suspension.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 60 days for the impaired driving causing bodily harm and 30 days for the failure to provide a urine sample, to run consecutively, plus a 2-year driving prohibition.

The defendant was charged with driving while impaired and with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 ml following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample results obtained following an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The defence challenged the validity of the ASD demand, arguing the officer lacked proper grounds and that the officer's failure to activate his in-car camera system breached the Charter.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding grounds for the demand was unreliable, established a breach of section 8 of the Charter, and excluded the breath results under section 24(2).

Both charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving by drug causing bodily harm and refusal to provide a bodily substance sample.

The defendant drove his vehicle into a stranger's driveway and fell asleep at the wheel.

When police attended, the defendant's vehicle rolled backward, pinning an officer between the two vehicles and causing injury to the officer's knee.

A drug recognition expert concluded the defendant was impaired by cannabis and a central nervous system depressant.

The defendant was found guilty of impaired driving causing bodily harm and refusal to comply with a demand for a bodily substance sample.

The court rejected the defendant's Charter s. 10(b) application, finding his rights to counsel were properly upheld and that no second consultation with counsel was required before the bodily substance demand.

The applicant sought production of third-party records relating to an approved screening device (ASD) used during his investigation for impaired driving and driving over 80.

The Crown and York Regional Police opposed production on the basis that the applicant failed to establish that the records were "likely relevant" under the O'Connor framework.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant provided no evidentiary foundation to establish that the ASD was not working properly or that there was any error in its operation.

The court held that historical ASD records could not advance a claim that the investigating officer knew or ought to have known that the device was unreliable, and that the application amounted to an impermissible fishing expedition.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, instructed his counsel to disseminate Crown disclosure to the media, alleging his video statement was altered.

Defence counsel sought directions on whether he was bound by an undertaking not to disclose the materials.

The court held that whether or not Crown disclosure is subject to a written undertaking, a deemed undertaking applies restricting its use solely to making full answer and defence in the criminal proceedings.

The application to remove the undertaking was dismissed.

The accused was charged with murder after his grandmother was found dead.

He had presented at a hospital with cuts and a bite mark, claiming his grandmother attacked him.

He made statements to police at the hospital while being treated as a victim, and later gave a video statement at the police station after being arrested and speaking to duty counsel.

On a voir dire, the court found that the statements at the hospital were voluntary and reliable, and that the video statement was voluntary, not the result of oppression or inducements, and not tainted by the earlier statements.

All statements were ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with blood alcohol over 80 mg/100ml.

Police found the accused asleep behind the wheel in a shopping mall parking lot at 3:30 a.m.

The officer made a breath demand and obtained readings of 97 and 93 mg/100ml.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the breath demand, arguing the officer lacked both subjective and objective reasonable grounds.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding observations of impairment was unreliable and inconsistent with in-car video evidence and the breath technician's observations.

The court concluded neither the subjective nor objective component of the reasonable grounds standard was established, constituting a serious Charter breach.

The breath results were excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter, and both charges were dismissed.

The accused were charged with possessing marihuana, cocaine, methamphetamine and ketamine for the purpose of trafficking.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the court discharged both accused on all four counts.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence.

While the court found sufficient evidence that the accused had resided at the premises where the drugs were discovered, the Crown failed to establish sufficient evidence that the accused had knowledge of and control over the controlled substances on or about the date of the search.

The absence of evidence regarding the accused's whereabouts in the days preceding the search, combined with the presence of identification documents belonging to unknown persons and evidence of other criminal activity at the premises, created reasonable alternative explanations for the presence of the drugs that did not involve the accused.

The accused applied to stay proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter to remedy an alleged breach of his s. 11(b) rights (right to trial within a reasonable time).

The information was sworn on July 22, 2015, and the trial date was September 1, 2016, representing 408 days of delay.

After accounting for defence-requested adjournments, the net delay was 380 days, falling below the presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found that while the case took longer than it should have, it did not take markedly longer such that a stay was appropriate.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded that the ASD demand was lawful.

The sole issue was whether the accused had a reasonable excuse for failing to provide an adequate sample.

The accused did not outright refuse but failed to provide a suitable sample after multiple attempts.

The defence argued that language difficulties and the accused's request for an interpreter, which was difficult to hear and not understood by the officer, reasonably explained the confusion and failure to follow instructions.

The court found that the evidence disclosed a reasonable excuse due to language difficulties and dismissed the charge.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of fraud over $5,000.

Between May 2014 and June 2015, the accused, a Commodity Manager at a payment systems company, defrauded her employer of $5,467,204.08 through a sophisticated scheme involving fictitious purchases from a shell company.

The accused created a shell company with a name nearly identical to a legitimate vendor, obtained vendor approval through deception, circumvented internal controls including the three-way match system, and personally collected cheques which she deposited into an account she controlled.

Upon discovery, the accused fled to Spain where she was arrested and extradited.

The court imposed a sentence of 6 years imprisonment with credit for pre-trial custody, restitution of $5,476,204.08, a fine of $5,476,204.08 in lieu of forfeiture with 6 years to pay (5 years imprisonment in default), and a DNA order.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following an incident on August 25, 2015.

A civilian witness reported erratic driving behavior including crossing the centre line, driving on and off the road shoulder multiple times, and nearly striking another vehicle.

Police responded and observed the defendant with a smell of alcohol, unsteady gait, and slow movements.

The defendant was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings of 140 and 136 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant testified he consumed only three beers and attributed his driving errors to construction confusion and texting, and his unsteady gait to tiredness.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was impaired by alcohol and exceeded the legal blood alcohol limit.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on evidence from a civilian witness who claimed to have followed the accused's vehicle after observing it speeding, and a police officer who conducted a roadside screening device test that resulted in a fail.

The court found significant credibility issues with the civilian witness, whose observations of the accused's physical impairment were contradicted by in-car video evidence.

The court also found that the evidence of impairment was insufficient to meet the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

While the court identified Charter breaches relating to the delay in administering the roadside demand, it declined to exclude the evidence or stay proceedings.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case relied on evidence from a civilian witness who observed a red Toyota Venza run a red light at high speed, jump a curb, and enter a ditch, and from a police officer who found the accused attempting to change a damaged tire in a parking lot shortly thereafter.

The Crown withdrew the over-80 charge due to procedural defects in the breath sample collection.

The court convicted the accused of impaired operation/care or control based on the totality of evidence establishing both that the accused was the driver of the vehicle and that his ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown called three police officers and a qualified breath technician.

The defence did not call evidence but challenged the reliability of the breath test results, arguing that vomiting shortly before the breath samples were taken could have introduced mouth alcohol into the samples.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges, holding that the Crown had proven impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence, and that the defence had failed to raise a real doubt about the reliability of the breath test results.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of assault and sexual assault against his former romantic partner over a period of approximately one year ending in February 2013.

The Crown alleged that the defendant assaulted the complainant on several occasions, including breaking her nose, choking her, striking her with various objects, and sexually assaulting her.

The defendant testified in his own defence, denying all allegations and providing alternative explanations for the incidents.

The court found significant credibility issues with the complainant's testimony, including multiple contradictions between her police statement and courtroom evidence, inconsistent accounts given to different people, and implausible details regarding the alleged incidents.

The court acquitted the defendant on all counts, finding that the Crown had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code seeking leave to cross‑examine the complainant about prior sexual activity with him and with other individuals.

The proposed questioning arose in the context of numerous text messages between the parties that appeared to reference sexual relations during the period when they lived together.

The court held that cross‑examination regarding alleged prior consensual sexual activity between the complainant and the accused was relevant to credibility and necessary to provide context for the text message evidence.

However, proposed questioning about the complainant’s sexual activity with other individuals was excluded as irrelevant and as improperly engaging the prohibited “twin myths.” Leave was therefore granted only in relation to prior sexual activity between the complainant and the accused.