Brian McCallion

The accused was charged with criminal harassment under section 264(3) of the Criminal Code for repeatedly communicating with the complainant through voicemail messages over several days in July 2013, following an encounter at church where the complainant made clear she wanted no further contact.

The Crown sought to prove that the conduct caused the complainant to reasonably fear for her personal safety.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence brought an application for a directed verdict.

The court found that while the complainant was clearly upset and wanted the contact to cease, she did not testify that she feared for her safety.

The court granted the directed verdict and acquitted the accused, finding that the essential element of fear for safety required by section 264 had not been established by the Crown's evidence.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon contrary to s. 267(a) of the Criminal Code for allegedly throwing a block of hard cheese at his wife during a domestic dispute, causing bruising.

The complainant testified she felt a blow to her side while cooking and saw the cheese on the floor.

The accused claimed his wife fell backward into the island counter and the cheese fell to the floor.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and internally consistent, while the accused's account was illogical, internally contradictory, and inconsistent with the physical evidence.

The court rejected the defence assertion that the complainant fabricated the complaint for marital advantage.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop in the early morning hours.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 110-118 mg/100 ml of alcohol.

The court found a Charter breach under section 8 because the arresting officer failed to adequately address the issue of mouth alcohol before administering the approved screening device test.

Although the officer was aware of the strong odour of alcohol and recent consumption, he incorrectly believed a 10-minute waiting period was sufficient and did not make further inquiries.

The court excluded the breath evidence as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, resulting in an acquittal.

The Crown applied to admit two out‑of‑court statements made by the shooting victim to police officers in hospital under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, or alternatively as original evidence of identification.

The witness testified at trial but claimed no memory of speaking to police and denied seeing the shooter.

The court held that necessity was not established because the Crown failed to follow the procedure under s. 9 of the Canada Evidence Act and the framework from B.(K.G.) for prior inconsistent statements.

The court further held that threshold reliability was not demonstrated because the statements were not sworn, recorded, or verified, and the circumstances of the interview and inconsistencies in the statements undermined reliability.

The court also rejected reliance on the Langille identification principle because the case did not involve identification of a stranger.

The defendant was charged with three counts of assault—one against his stepson and two against his wife.

The Crown alleged that during the five or six days the defendant and his newly arrived wife (sponsored through an arranged marriage) lived together in Canada, he engaged in abusive behavior including pushing, grabbing, and verbal abuse.

The defendant denied all allegations, asserting that he had invested significant funds to bring his wife and stepson to Canada and had no motive to harm them.

The court found the complainant's evidence concerning but problematic, particularly regarding her motives for reporting to police.

The stepson's evidence was deemed unreliable due to inconsistencies with his police statement and concerns about potential coaching.

The defendant's evidence, corroborated by his cousin's testimony, was not seriously shaken on cross-examination.

The court acquitted the defendant on all remaining charges.

The applicant sought to exclude a loaded handgun seized during the execution of a search warrant at his residence, alleging multiple Charter breaches under sections 8 and 10(b).

The court found that while the police breached the applicant's right to counsel by delaying access for 4.5 hours, and overstepped the warrant by seizing excluded items and searching a cell phone without a warrant, the telewarrant itself was validly issued and executed.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the breaches were at the less serious end of the continuum, did not produce the firearm, and that society's interest in adjudicating serious gun charges on their merits outweighed the impact of the breaches.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

Sentencing followed a guilty plea to careless storage of a firearm after more serious possession charges were not pursued.

The court reviewed denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, proportionality, and parity principles under the Criminal Code, with detailed analysis of custodial and conditional sentence authorities.

While recognizing the seriousness of loaded firearms offences, the court distinguished authorities involving more serious companion offences and found the offender's first-offender status, guilty plea, compliance on bail, and community safety assessment supported a community-based disposition.

A conditional sentence was imposed with strict curfew, community service, abstinence, weapons restrictions, and ancillary prohibition and forfeiture orders.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop at an intersection.

The Crown's evidence established that the accused was found slumped over the steering wheel of a running vehicle at a red light, displaying signs of impairment including red glassy eyes, slurred speech, and an odour of alcohol.

The accused was arrested and subjected to breathalyzer testing, which yielded readings of 160 and 180 mgs of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breathalyzer evidence on Charter grounds, alleging that he was not properly informed of his right to counsel due to language comprehension difficulties.

The court found that the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) were infringed and excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired driving based on the officers' observations at the roadside, and not guilty of driving with excess alcohol due to the exclusion of the breathalyzer results.

The appellant appealed a conviction for care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the appellant had rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing that he occupied the driver’s seat for a purpose other than setting the vehicle in motion.

Evidence indicated that the appellant had surrendered his keys and that alternative plans existed for transportation home, including being driven by another person or waiting for a ride from a third party.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to properly consider this evidence and may have improperly relied on a negative inference arising from the absence of corroborating testimony.

The court held that the evidence, assessed in accordance with the framework in W.(D), could not reasonably support a conviction.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings under section 24 of the Charter, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) was infringed.

The total delay from the charge to the anticipated trial date was approximately 28 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the Morin framework, attributing portions to inherent time, Crown delay, and institutional delay.

The court found the total attributable delay was modestly above the guidelines for a two-stage process.

However, balancing the delay against the lack of significant prejudice to the applicant and the seriousness of the firearms charges, the court dismissed the application.