Shambavi Kumaresan

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the investigating officer had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device test based on the totality of circumstances: the vehicle's position facing the wrong direction in live traffic lanes, the driver sleeping at the wheel with the engine running on New Year's Day morning, and contextual information about the driver's activities the previous evening.

The court rejected arguments that specific indicators such as odour of alcohol or admission of consumption were prerequisites to reasonable suspicion.

All Charter applications were dismissed, the breath samples were admitted, and a conviction was registered.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault after having sexual intercourse with a complainant who was extremely intoxicated and incapable of consent.

The accused failed to take any steps to ascertain consent and the complainant was unaware of the sexual contact until the accused informed her two days later.

The Crown sought a sentence of 2 years less 1 day, while the defence sought 6 months less 1 day, citing potential immigration consequences.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence followed by 2 years of probation, finding that while the offence was opportunistic rather than planned, it required a sentence in the upper reformatory range to address specific and general deterrence and denunciation.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and operation with blood alcohol content over 80 mg/100 ml following a motor vehicle accident at a banquet hall parking lot.

The Crown conceded the accused was impaired and over the legal limit.

The defence raised the necessity defence, arguing the accused drove while impaired to escape an imminent violent assault.

The court found the accused had been violently attacked by another patron through the open window of his vehicle, suffered serious facial injuries, and had no reasonable legal alternative to driving away from the threat.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Latimer and found all elements satisfied: imminent peril existed, no legal alternative was available, and the harm avoided outweighed the property damage caused.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol after being stopped leaving a licensed establishment in Markham in the early morning hours of October 23, 2014.

The accused failed a roadside screening device test and subsequently provided breath samples at the police station showing readings of 153 and 139 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on Charter grounds, arguing breaches of section 10(b) (right to counsel) and section 9 (protection against arbitrary detention).

The court rejected both Charter applications and found the accused guilty of the offence.

The Crown sought to admit a video and audio statement given by the accused to the police following his arrest for aggravated assault.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to oppressive conditions, sleep deprivation, and police trickery, including the use of the Reid Technique and false evidence.

The court found that while the police officer lied to the accused about the evidence against him, the overall circumstances of the interrogation were not oppressive.

The court concluded the Crown met its heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident at a women's basketball tournament in Toronto.

The complainant alleged that after heavy drinking and blacking out, the accused had sexual intercourse with her without consent.

The accused admitted to intercourse but claimed it was consensual, asserting the complainant initiated and insisted on sexual activity.

The central issues were consent and the complainant's capacity to consent.

The court found the accused's testimony regarding the circumstances of the sexual activity not credible, particularly his account of aggressive sexual advances by the complainant on a hotel balcony and in the bedroom.

The court determined that the complainant was extremely intoxicated, had blacked out, and lacked capacity to consent.

The accused knew of her extreme intoxication but took no steps to ascertain consent.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The applicant brought a Charter application under Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with driving with excess alcohol on October 23, 2014, and the trial was not completed until December 11, 2015—a total of 13 months and 19 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin, considering the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

The court found that while the delay exceeded Morin guidelines by approximately 10 months and 19 days (after accounting for neutral intake and preparation time), the actual and inferred prejudice was insufficient to establish a Charter breach.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following observations by a civilian witness of erratic driving on January 26, 2013.

The defendant admitted to the impaired state but claimed it was caused by doubling his prescribed dose of Celexa (citalopram), an antidepressant medication, combined with consuming only a few beers the evening before.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence regarding minimal alcohol consumption, finding that his admissions of being drunk, physical signs of impairment (red eyes, slurred speech, unsteadiness), the consistent smell of alcohol detected by multiple officers, and the nature of his driving were all consistent with alcohol impairment.

The court also rejected the defendant's claim that he lacked mens rea for the refusal charge, finding that his words of refusal were clearly spoken and intentional.

The defendant was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device demand contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 249(1).

The Crown alleged the accused was operating a vehicle at excessive speeds (186 km/h in a 50 km/h zone), veering into oncoming traffic, and had alcohol in his system.

The accused was given 12 opportunities to provide a breath sample but failed to do so.

The trial judge found the Crown proved dangerous driving beyond a reasonable doubt but acquitted the accused on the failure to comply charge due to the absence of a final "last chance" warning and the possibility the accused requested one final opportunity to comply that was not documented or facilitated.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop.

The defendant challenged the arrest on the grounds that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds and that his Charter rights to counsel were breached due to his status as a non-native English speaker.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of observations including erratic driving, signs of impairment, and admission of alcohol consumption.

The court also found no breach of the right to counsel, determining that the defendant had adequate English proficiency and was properly informed of his options.

The defendant was convicted of both offences.

The accused was charged with Dangerous Driving and Driving while Over 80mgs following a high-speed flight from police and a failed Approved Screening Device test.

The Crown proved dangerous driving based on the accused's objectively dangerous conduct during the pursuit, which constituted a marked departure from the standard of care a reasonable driver would observe.

The defence raised Charter breaches regarding delayed right to counsel advice and the breath demand due to language difficulties.

The court found no Charter breaches, as the officer acted appropriately in obtaining translation assistance when language barriers were identified, and the right to counsel advice was provided without delay in the circumstances.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision concerning four accused charged with multiple offences under the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown sought committal on various counts including possession of firearms, ammunition, and cocaine.

The court considered whether there was sufficient evidence for each accused on contested counts.

The court committed some accused on certain counts while discharging them on others, applying the test that an accused will be committed if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could convict.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation, operation over 80, and dangerous driving arising from an incident on April 9, 2013.

The central issue was the admissibility of medical information and a blood sample obtained via search warrant and production order.

The court found that while a technical breach of Section 8 of the Charter occurred regarding the manner in which information was obtained from hospital staff, the warrants could have issued based on the remaining information.

The court applied the Grant analysis and admitted the evidence, finding the breach was technical in nature and that society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood on September 15, 2013.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results showing readings of 190 mg and 200 mg at 2:34 a.m. and 2:56 a.m., and expert toxicology evidence.

The accused claimed he had consumed five beers after backing his vehicle into a ditch while waiting for assistance, arguing this post-incident consumption explained the elevated readings.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as inconsistent with his statements to police at the scene and found his explanation lacked logical sense.

The court convicted the accused, finding that even accepting the post-incident consumption evidence, the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving would have exceeded 80 mg.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration on June 23, 2014.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol based on the evidence presented.

Additionally, the trial judge found that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, rendering the breath analysis results inadmissible.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following observations of erratic driving on Highway 400.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results taken approximately 113 minutes after the alleged offence.

The court addressed three key issues: whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired driving; whether the first breath test was taken within two hours of the offence; and whether the Crown proved impaired driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds existed, the two-hour requirement was satisfied, and the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on civilian witness observations of repeated lane weaving, officer observations of physical signs of impairment, and breath test results.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application seeking to exclude statements made by the defendant to the investigating officer at the roadside, arguing they were compelled under the statutory accident reporting provisions of the Highway Traffic Act and therefore violated the right against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Charter.

The Crown argued the defendant was not compelled to make statements and was properly cautioned.

The court held that the defendant's statements were not made pursuant to statutory compulsion and therefore were admissible.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a).

The Crown conceded that impaired driving had not been established, and the accused was acquitted of that charge.

The trial proceeded on the dangerous driving charge.

The Crown alleged that the accused was engaged in a high-speed race with three other vehicles on Highway 7 at approximately midnight on April 6, 2013, and that he lost control while attempting to pass, resulting in a head-on collision with an oncoming vehicle.

The accused testified that he was following another vehicle that suddenly braked, causing him to lose control.

The trial judge found that while the Crown's theory was plausible, the evidence fell short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in the key Crown witness's testimony, limitations in his observational ability, and the absence of expert accident reconstruction evidence.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 120 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant raised two Charter issues: (1) that his section 8 and 9 rights were violated when the officer stopped his vehicle without requisite authority, and (2) that a video recording of him using the toilet in the police station cell breached his section 8 rights.

The court found the initial stop was lawful based on reasonable grounds for speeding and that the subsequent investigation was conducted lawfully.

However, the court found that the video recording of the defendant using the toilet constituted a breach of his section 8 right to privacy.

Despite this breach, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings as it did not meet the "clearest of cases" threshold, and would not exclude the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with four counts of assault and one count of uttering a threat to cause death in relation to his former wife.

The court dismissed all assault counts by agreement of counsel.

The court also dismissed the uttering a threat charge, finding that the complainant's evidence was vague and lacked essential detail regarding the exact wording of the alleged threat.

The court noted the accused was highly intoxicated at the time and found the complainant had a potential motive to exaggerate her account in order to have the accused removed from the house.

All charges were dismissed as not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.