Paul A. Renwick

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against a seven-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the offences occurred within the six-month limitation period, alleging a failure to resolve reliability concerns with the child's evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility and reliability analysis was sufficient and revealed no palpable and overriding error.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for refusing to comply with a roadside breath demand.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the demand was made 'forthwith' and with reasonable suspicion.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, holding the 8-9 minute delay was reasonably necessary for the officer to run a query, wait for the screening device, and explain the consequences of refusal.

The court also found the objective component of reasonable suspicion was satisfied by the appellant's speed, failure to signal, departure from a licensed establishment, and odour of alcohol.

The applicant sought to exclude firearms found in his residence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, following a prior ruling that the search warrant violated his s. 8 rights due to insufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court applied the Grant framework and found the police conduct was serious, as the ITO contained misleading and unsupported statements regarding the suspects' movements between residences.

Given the serious impact on the applicant's privacy interests in his home, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite the seriousness of the firearms offences.

The evidence was excluded and acquittals were entered.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a Section 8 Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at his residence.

The police had obtained warrants for three residences based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied on confidential informant information and police observations following a shooting.

The court reviewed the ITO under the Garofoli framework and found that the evidence connecting the applicant's specific residence to the shooting was insufficient and largely based on conclusory statements by the affiant.

The court concluded that the warrant could not have validly issued for that address, resulting in a breach of Section 8 of the Charter, with the Section 24(2) analysis to follow.

The applicant, charged with offences related to a home invasion, brought an application alleging that the arresting officer used excessive force by smashing his head into the ground five times, in breach of his rights under ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings or a reduction in sentence.

The court found that the applicant embellished his injuries and the degree of force used, and that the medical evidence did not support his claims.

The court concluded that the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable in the exigent circumstances of the arrest.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, P.G., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the imposed suspended sentence with probation.

The trial judge had found P.G. sexually assaulted a Walmart employee, relying significantly on after-the-fact conduct evidence (following other women and masturbating in the store shortly after the incident) to establish sexual intent.

P.G. argued the trial judge erred in admitting this evidence, failed to consider alternative inferences, and imposed an overly harsh sentence.

The appeal court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the after-the-fact conduct evidence was properly admitted as probative of intent, the alternative inferences proposed by the appellant were speculative and not reasonable possibilities, and the suspended sentence was not demonstrably unfit or based on an error in principle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting certain text messages from the complainant as *res gestae* statements and improperly using them in the reasons for judgment.

The court found no error in admitting the texts as relevant to the complainant's state of mind immediately after the alleged assault, and as *res gestae* statements for their truth, given that the timing and situation negated the possibility of concoction.

The court also determined that the trial judge did not improperly use the texts to bolster the complainant's credibility, but rather considered them appropriately in the context of chronology and emotional state.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown sought a bail review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the accused, A.K., on a $1,500 surety release with conditions, following a charge of uttering threats to cause death.

The Crown argued that the Justice of the Peace erred by denying cross-examination of the proposed surety and that the release decision was clearly inappropriate, particularly given A.K.'s criminal record for violent offences and the reverse onus situation.

The reviewing judge found no error in denying cross-examination, affirming that leave is required and was not arbitrarily denied.

The judge also found the release decision not clearly inappropriate, but varied the security amount from $1,500 to $3,500 due to A.K.'s past violent convictions.

The applicant, one of four co-accused charged with a home invasion, brought an application to sever his trial from his co-accused.

The joint trial was scheduled for a date when the applicant's counsel of choice was unavailable, largely due to the court's efforts to schedule the trial within the Jordan ceiling.

The applicant agreed to waive his s. 11(b) Charter rights if severance was granted.

The court granted the severance, finding that forcing the applicant to proceed without his counsel of choice, when he was not responsible for the scheduling conflict, would violate principles of fairness and the interests of justice.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The application was dismissed on two grounds: first, for failure to comply with the Ontario Court of Justice Rules requiring section 11(b) applications to be heard 60 days in advance of trial; and second, on the merits, as the net delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice trials and the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The court found that the defence was responsible for significant delay between February and September 2018 by repeatedly declining to set a trial date despite the Crown and court being ready to proceed.

The accused, Justine Ordonio, sought to adduce expert evidence from Todd Barron regarding the tendency of certain interview techniques to produce unreliable or false information, personal characteristics increasing suggestibility, and the implications of techniques used in this case for reliability.

The court dismissed the application, finding the evidence not necessary to assist the jury, as common sense and judicial instructions were sufficient.

Furthermore, the proposed expert lacked the required objectivity and did not fully review the evidence.

The accused, Justine Ordonio, sought to adduce ante mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased, Teresa Hsin, regarding a third-party suspect, Tim Chiu, to establish motive and disposition.

The court examined three categories of statements, considering their admissibility under the state of mind exception or the principled approach to hearsay.

While necessity was established due to the deceased's unavailability, the court found the statements lacked threshold reliability.

This was attributed to the confrontational and strategic nature of one conversation, the deceased's compromised state in hospital during another, and the ambiguity and lack of specific fear of violence in statements relayed by the deceased's mother.

The motion to admit the hearsay evidence was dismissed.

The appellant, Balwinderpal Mann, appealed a trial judge's finding that he was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) for threatening his father and nephew.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge applied the correct legal test under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, specifically regarding the "appreciating the nature and quality of the act" and "knowing the conduct was wrong" criteria.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by incorporating the emotional impact on victims into the "nature and quality" assessment and by relying on the appellant's impaired ability to make rational choices for the "knowing wrongfulness" test, rather than assessing his capacity to know society's moral standards.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial on all issues was ordered.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to exclude his post-arrest statement to police, alleging breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter and arguing the statement was involuntary.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach occurred when an officer questioned the accused en route to the station before he spoke to counsel, but admitted the subsequent 13-hour interview statement under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the remaining Charter claims and found the statement voluntary, concluding the accused was not overborne by the length of the interview or the officer's use of the Reid technique, but rather chose to speak after being confronted with overwhelming incriminating evidence.

The youthful offender pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm after crossing the center line and striking an oncoming vehicle head-on, causing significant injuries to two elderly passengers.

The Crown sought six to nine months of incarceration, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of prolonged dangerous driving and severe victim impact against the mitigating factors of a guilty plea, lack of prior record, and the offender's mental health struggles.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent jail sentence and a four-year driving prohibition.

The appellant was convicted of impaired care or control after the trial judge, on his own initiative, considered this included offence without inviting submissions from counsel.

The appeal court found this constituted procedural unfairness, as the Crown had focused solely on impaired driving and the defence had not had an opportunity to address the care or control theory or rebut the presumption.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, a registered massage therapist, was charged with sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant alleged that during a massage treatment, the accused placed his hand under her underwear and touched her vagina with his fingers, then attempted to kiss her.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming he performed a legitimate orthopaedic test with the complainant's verbal consent.

The trial judge found the accused not credible, noting inconsistencies between his testimony and his post-incident conduct, including his apology and settlement offer.

The complainant's evidence was found credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies regarding details such as the number of fingers used and the nature of the attempted kiss.

The court rejected the defence theory that the complainant and her husband conspired to extort money from the accused.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, one count of assault with a weapon, and one count of mischief.

The charges arose from an incident at the accused's family home where he allegedly attacked his son with a machete and a metal bat following a dispute over a basketball net.

The accused claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the accused guilty of assault with a weapon and two counts of possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, but acquitted him of mischief.

The court rejected the self-defence claim, finding that the accused's response was disproportionate to any perceived threat.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and mischief, as well as a restitution order, arising from a road rage incident on a busy highway.

The trial judge found the appellant intentionally stopped his vehicle in front of the complainant's, causing a collision and subsequent altercation where the appellant damaged the complainant's vehicle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and met the legal tests for dangerous driving and mischief.

However, the court varied the restitution order, reducing it to exclude the cost of windshield repair, as the trial judge had not been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant caused that specific damage.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

He applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay was seventeen months, below the presumptive ceiling of eighteen months.

The critical issue was whether a five-month period of delay, during which the applicant pursued resolution discussions rather than setting a trial date, constituted unreasonable delay.

The court found that the applicant's decision to adjourn the matter repeatedly while awaiting a Crown resolution position, rather than setting a trial date, constituted defence delay or an implicit waiver of Charter rights.

The court also found the applicant failed to demonstrate the defence initiative required under the Jordan framework for transitional cases below the presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.