Paul A. Renwick

The appellant sought to withdraw guilty pleas to one count of threatening and two counts of failing to comply with bail, alleging that the evidence was fabricated, that he was set up, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and that he was coerced into pleading guilty due to threats and abuse by inmates at Maplehurst Correctional Complex.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the guilty pleas were voluntary and unequivocal, that the appellant had ample opportunity to voice complaints during the judicial proceedings but did not, and that the appellant's account was neither plausible nor credible.

The court found no merit to the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant, Karanjot Parhar, appealed his eight-month custodial sentence for offences related to a car theft ring, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to consider credit for time spent on restrictive pretrial bail (Downes credit).

The court found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by not addressing Downes credit, and that this error impacted the sentence.

After reviewing the facts and the length and restrictiveness of the appellant’s pretrial bail, the court reduced the sentence to five months in custody, dismissing the Crown’s cross-appeal for a longer sentence.

Jarnail Randhawa pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of his wife.

The court determined the parole ineligibility period, which is statutorily set at a minimum of 10 years, considering aggravating factors such as the brutality of the attack, gratuitous violence, abuse of trust, and leaving the victim to die, as well as mitigating factors including the guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior criminal record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 13 years, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence, including an imitation firearm and a construction vest, arguing his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter were violated during his arrest for a home invasion.

The court found the detention and searches were lawful, but the police breached the implementational component of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel by unreasonably delaying his access to a lawyer due to an internal policy.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that despite the serious s. 10(b) breach, the evidence should not be excluded because the impact on the accused's protected interests was minimal and society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits favoured admission.

The Crown sought to commit three defendants for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Jordan Henry.

The incident occurred outside a New Year's Eve party following an altercation.

The court, after a preliminary inquiry, found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit two defendants (Mohamed Shokri and Zakaria Hassan Adam) for first-degree murder, and one defendant (Abdikadir Abdi) for second-degree murder.

The decision analyzed the test for committal, treatment of circumstantial evidence, distinction between inference and speculation, and the elements of planned and deliberate first-degree murder and party liability.

The applicant, charged with offences related to a home invasion, brought an application alleging that the arresting officer used excessive force by smashing his head into the ground five times, in breach of his rights under ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings or a reduction in sentence.

The court found that the applicant embellished his injuries and the degree of force used, and that the medical evidence did not support his claims.

The court concluded that the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable in the exigent circumstances of the arrest.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, P.G., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the imposed suspended sentence with probation.

The trial judge had found P.G. sexually assaulted a Walmart employee, relying significantly on after-the-fact conduct evidence (following other women and masturbating in the store shortly after the incident) to establish sexual intent.

P.G. argued the trial judge erred in admitting this evidence, failed to consider alternative inferences, and imposed an overly harsh sentence.

The appeal court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the after-the-fact conduct evidence was properly admitted as probative of intent, the alternative inferences proposed by the appellant were speculative and not reasonable possibilities, and the suspended sentence was not demonstrably unfit or based on an error in principle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting certain text messages from the complainant as *res gestae* statements and improperly using them in the reasons for judgment.

The court found no error in admitting the texts as relevant to the complainant's state of mind immediately after the alleged assault, and as *res gestae* statements for their truth, given that the timing and situation negated the possibility of concoction.

The court also determined that the trial judge did not improperly use the texts to bolster the complainant's credibility, but rather considered them appropriately in the context of chronology and emotional state.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown sought a bail review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the accused, A.K., on a $1,500 surety release with conditions, following a charge of uttering threats to cause death.

The Crown argued that the Justice of the Peace erred by denying cross-examination of the proposed surety and that the release decision was clearly inappropriate, particularly given A.K.'s criminal record for violent offences and the reverse onus situation.

The reviewing judge found no error in denying cross-examination, affirming that leave is required and was not arbitrarily denied.

The judge also found the release decision not clearly inappropriate, but varied the security amount from $1,500 to $3,500 due to A.K.'s past violent convictions.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The application was dismissed on two grounds: first, for failure to comply with the Ontario Court of Justice Rules requiring section 11(b) applications to be heard 60 days in advance of trial; and second, on the merits, as the net delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice trials and the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The court found that the defence was responsible for significant delay between February and September 2018 by repeatedly declining to set a trial date despite the Crown and court being ready to proceed.

The accused, Justine Ordonio, sought to adduce expert evidence from Todd Barron regarding the tendency of certain interview techniques to produce unreliable or false information, personal characteristics increasing suggestibility, and the implications of techniques used in this case for reliability.

The court dismissed the application, finding the evidence not necessary to assist the jury, as common sense and judicial instructions were sufficient.

Furthermore, the proposed expert lacked the required objectivity and did not fully review the evidence.

The accused, Justine Ordonio, sought to adduce ante mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased, Teresa Hsin, regarding a third-party suspect, Tim Chiu, to establish motive and disposition.

The court examined three categories of statements, considering their admissibility under the state of mind exception or the principled approach to hearsay.

While necessity was established due to the deceased's unavailability, the court found the statements lacked threshold reliability.

This was attributed to the confrontational and strategic nature of one conversation, the deceased's compromised state in hospital during another, and the ambiguity and lack of specific fear of violence in statements relayed by the deceased's mother.

The motion to admit the hearsay evidence was dismissed.

The appellant, Balwinderpal Mann, appealed a trial judge's finding that he was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) for threatening his father and nephew.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge applied the correct legal test under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, specifically regarding the "appreciating the nature and quality of the act" and "knowing the conduct was wrong" criteria.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by incorporating the emotional impact on victims into the "nature and quality" assessment and by relying on the appellant's impaired ability to make rational choices for the "knowing wrongfulness" test, rather than assessing his capacity to know society's moral standards.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial on all issues was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of impaired care or control after the trial judge, on his own initiative, considered this included offence without inviting submissions from counsel.

The appeal court found this constituted procedural unfairness, as the Crown had focused solely on impaired driving and the defence had not had an opportunity to address the care or control theory or rebut the presumption.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, a registered massage therapist, was charged with sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant alleged that during a massage treatment, the accused placed his hand under her underwear and touched her vagina with his fingers, then attempted to kiss her.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming he performed a legitimate orthopaedic test with the complainant's verbal consent.

The trial judge found the accused not credible, noting inconsistencies between his testimony and his post-incident conduct, including his apology and settlement offer.

The complainant's evidence was found credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies regarding details such as the number of fingers used and the nature of the attempted kiss.

The court rejected the defence theory that the complainant and her husband conspired to extort money from the accused.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, one count of assault with a weapon, and one count of mischief.

The charges arose from an incident at the accused's family home where he allegedly attacked his son with a machete and a metal bat following a dispute over a basketball net.

The accused claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the accused guilty of assault with a weapon and two counts of possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, but acquitted him of mischief.

The court rejected the self-defence claim, finding that the accused's response was disproportionate to any perceived threat.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 ml) following a traffic stop on Highway 401.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer breath test results showing readings of 104 and 99 mg/100 ml.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that while the accused's right to silence under section 7 was breached when the breath technician misinformed him about the scope of that right, the breach did not warrant exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2).

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to make the breath demand based on the accused's erratic driving and physical signs of impairment.

The court rejected arguments regarding the reliability of the Intoxilyzer machine and the alcohol standard solution used for calibration.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

He applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay was seventeen months, below the presumptive ceiling of eighteen months.

The critical issue was whether a five-month period of delay, during which the applicant pursued resolution discussions rather than setting a trial date, constituted unreasonable delay.

The court found that the applicant's decision to adjourn the matter repeatedly while awaiting a Crown resolution position, rather than setting a trial date, constituted defence delay or an implicit waiver of Charter rights.

The court also found the applicant failed to demonstrate the defence initiative required under the Jordan framework for transitional cases below the presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility by using his post-arrest silence regarding post-driving alcohol consumption and by misapplying the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by drawing an adverse inference from the appellant's silence, which violated his constitutional right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter.

The court also found an error in the application of the Browne v. Dunn rule.

Given that credibility was central to the trial's outcome, these errors were deemed serious and not harmless.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

Other grounds of appeal, including alleged Milne/Coutts/Orbanski error, lack of privacy during counsel call, and insufficient grounds for arrest/breath demand, were dismissed.

The appellant, Winsome Hurditt, appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) for criminal harassment and mischief, following a trial where she was found guilty.

The trial judge, after ordering an NCR assessment, made an NCR finding but provided insufficient reasons, which the appellant argued prevented meaningful appellate review.

The respondent conceded the deficiency but sought to apply the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice, Summary Conviction Appeal Court, allowed the appeal, ruling that the absence of comprehensible reasons for an NCR finding constituted a substantial wrong, making the proviso inapplicable.

The court set aside the NCR finding and convictions and ordered a new trial before a different judge.