Rameshwar v. Rameshwar, 2026 ONSC 3625

CITATION: Rameshwar v. Rameshwar, 2026 ONSC 3625

COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-7185

DATE: 2026 08 04

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Patricia Patima Rameshwar, Plaintiff

AND:

Gary Thakoor Rameshwar and Trisha Geeta Rameshwar, Defendants

BEFORE: M.T. Doi J.

COUNSEL: Paul Portman, agent for the Moving Defendant Trisha Geeta Rameshwar

Antal Bakaity, for the Plaintiff

HEARD: April 24, 2026

Endorsement

Overview

1On this motion, the moving defendant Trisha Geeta Rameshwar (“Trisha”) seeks to strike or dismiss the statement of claim in this action (CV-25-7185-00) by arguing that it duplicates the relief sought in a family proceeding (FS-24-10646-00) already before the court. In the alternative, Trisha seeks to stay the within action pending the completion of the family litigation.

2As discussed below, I find that this action should not be dismissed or stayed but instead heard with the family matter so that both proceedings are tried together or one after the other.

The Record

3In her record for the motion, Trisha sets out content including her settlement conference brief and offers to settle in the family proceeding. The conference brief and offers to settle were clearly intended to further settlement discussions and, therefore, are inadmissible: Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., 2013 SCC 3 at para 14. Accordingly, I did not consider any of this privileged content in deciding this motion.

Background

4The defendants are former spouses who are currently in family litigation to resolve issues from their marital separation. The plaintiff, Patricia Patima Rameshwar (“Patricia”) claims that she gave Trisha, her estranged daughter-in-law, and her son, the co-defendant Gary Thakoor Rameshwar (“Gary”), a $250,000.00 loan or mortgage to buy their matrimonial home.

5Patricia lived with Trisha and Gary in a multi-generational household in Brampton, initially in the matrimonial home on Jacobs Square before they moved to Finlayson Crescent. When Trisha and Gary bought the matrimonial home on Jacobs Square, Patricia claims that she gave them $25,000.00 so they could buy the home for the family as a whole. While living with the defendants, Patricia claims that she cared for her grandchildren and helped with other household duties without any compensation.

6In the early part of 2021, Patricia came to understand that Gary’s relationship with Trisha was falling apart. Around that time, she purportedly advised the defendants that she wanted the return of her financial contribution for the Jacobs Square home and other household expenses. The defendants apparently convinced her that they were restoring their relationship and wished to buy their dream home on Finlayson Crescent by using the sale proceeds for the home on Jacobs Square plus whatever other financial help she could offer. Patricia claims that she helped the defendants by contributing her share of the sale proceeds for Jacobs Square plus a further $40,000.00 towards the purchase of the Finlayson Crescent home on the understanding that her contributions would be secured by a $250,000.00 mortgage on title. Patricia attests that all parties obtained independent legal advice for the deal, given that she retained counsel to prepare and register her security interest on the Finlayson Crescent property and the co-defendants retained counsel to close the purchase transaction for the property. Patricia claims that all parties were well aware of what they were getting themselves into by agreeing to her $250,000.00 mortgage and instructing their respective lawyers to register the mortgage on title to the Finlayson Crescent property.

7Trisha categorically denies that Patricia ever gave any funds to her or Gary for the alleged loan or mortgage and attests that she was coerced into signing documents without independent legal advice. Trisha claims that there are no records, such as bank statements or repayment notes, to establish a genuine loan apart from the mortgage on title that she claims is a false encumbrance meant to improperly impact the equalization of the co-defendants’ marital property. Although duly served and notified, Gary did not swear an affidavit or otherwise respond to the motion.

8Trisha submits that the statement of claim in this action should be struck or stayed as it duplicates claims already raised in the family application that she brought in the Fall 2024 in which family property and equalization claims are being litigated. She claims that the civil action was brought to exert strategic pressure by increasing her costs instead of raising a legitimate claim.

9Patricia is not a party to the family litigation in which Trisha pleaded that the $250,000.00 mortgage on title to the matrimonial home was meant to reduce her equity by increasing her debt on marriage breakdown. Trisha claims that the alleged loan from Patricia is not real and that she has no way of knowing whether Patricia ever transferred funds to Gary or herself, or where any such funds actually went. For her part, Patricia attests that only when the Finlayson Crescent home was being sold did Tricia’s lawyer advise that the defendants would seek an order to hold the claimed mortgage amount separately from the rest of the sale proceeds if she did not consent to this arrangement, even though no such order was ever pursued. Patricia claims that she responded by asking for the amount of her mortgage claim to be held separately in an interest bearing account pending a resolution of her claim, and to be added as a party in the family matter. However, for reasons that are unclear, the mortgage amount was not held in an interest bearing account, Patricia was not added as a party in the family matter, and her lawyer’s communications went unanswered.

10In answering Trisha’s family law application, Gary pleaded that they had mutually agreed to Patricia’s request to document and register her mortgage after Trisha previously left him on November 18, 2021. Gary also pleaded that Trisha was not pressured or coerced into documenting Patricia’s mortgage, which was done as a mutual decision.

11Patricia produced a discharge statement from the sale of the Finlayson Crescent property to confirm that purchase funds were paid and are being held in trust by the real estate lawyer on the transaction, although there is an ongoing refusal to hold the funds in an interest bearing account.

12Patricia attests that she brought this action to disgorge funds from the real estate lawyer’s trust account and recover her mortgage after the co-defendants ignored letters from her lawyer about her mortgage claim that was registered on title to the Finlayson Crescent property with their consent. Patricia is willing to be added as a party in the family proceeding but did not bring a motion for this relief after Trisha indicated through counsel that adding her as a party would be unnecessary while also asserting that the mortgage should be extinguished.

13Had Trisha not brought this motion, Patricia attests that she would have sought joinder of this civil action with the family litigation so both matters could be heard together or one after the other in order for her mortgage claim to be determined.

Analysis

a. Motion to Strike or Stay

14As set out below, I am not persuaded that Patricia’s claim should be struck or dismissed on the basis that it duplicates issues already before the family court.

15A permanent stay of proceedings may be granted pursuant to s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, or under r. 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

16Section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act provides as follows:

106 A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.

17A defendant may move before a judge under r. 21.01(3)(c) or (d) to have an action stayed or dismissed on the grounds that …

(c) another proceeding is pending in Ontario or another jurisdiction between the same parties in respect of the same subject matter; or

(d) the action is frivolous or vexatious or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court,

and the judge may make an order or grant judgment accordingly.

18The provisions at s. 106 and r. 21.01(3) invoke the abuse of process doctrine that is applied to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings or the re-litigation of an issue, such as when another proceeding against some or all of the same parties replicates the same or similar issues. As the Court of Appeal explained in Cashin Mortgages Inc. (Verico Cashin Mortgages) v. 2511311 Ontario Ltd. (Mortgages Alliance – Main Street Mortgages), 2024 ONCA 103 at para 17:

17Both r. 21.01(3)(c) and (d) invoke the doctrine of abuse of process. The doctrine of abuse of process has been applied to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings or the re-litigation of an issue, such as in the commencement of another proceeding that replicates the same or similar issues and is against some or all the same parties. Various policy grounds are cited in the application of the doctrine of abuse of process: to ensure that no one should be “twice vexed by the same cause”, to “uphold the integrity of the legal system in order to avoid inconsistent results, and to protect the principle of finality so crucial to the proper administration of justice”: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, at para. 38 citing Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Markham: Butterworths, 2000). It is a flexible doctrine that “evokes the ‘public interest in a fair and just trial process and the proper administration of justice’”, and, as a result, “engages the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party to the litigation before it or would in some other way bring the administration of justice into disrepute”: Behn Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 227, at paras. 39 and 40, citing R. v. Scott, 1990 CanLII 27 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 979, at p. 1007, per McLachlin J. (dissenting) and Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles, (2000), 2000 CanLII 8514 (ON CA), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), at para. 55, per Goudge J.A. (dissenting).

19The abuse of process doctrine serves to bar litigation that would violate principles such as judicial economy, consistency, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice: Winter v. Sherman Estate, 2018 ONCA 703 at para 7, leave to appeal refused 2020 CanLII 22065 (SCC); Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 at para 37.

20A stay is granted only in the clearest of cases where a continuance of the action would cause an injustice by being oppressive, vexatious, or an abuse of the process of the court: Tewari v. Hantover Canada Inc., 2024 ONSC 5453 at paras 16-18, affirmed 2025 ONCA 261 at para 2, leave to appeal refused 2025 CanLII 119076 (SCC). In considering a stay, the court must consider the risk of multiplicity of proceedings, the avoidance of cost and inconvenience, and the risk of inconsistent results: Bruinsma v. Cresswell, 2013 ONCA 111 at para 76; Penn-Co Construction Canada (2003) Ltd. v. Constance Lake First Nation, 2008 ONCA 768 at para 4. As far as possible, a multiplicity of legal proceedings should be avoided: s. 138 of the Courts of Justice Act.

21Having reviewed Patricia’s statement of claim, I am satisfied that the pleading advances a reasonable claim to recover her purported mortgage on title to the defendants’ matrimonial home. As the pleaded facts are plausible and thereby taken to be true, I find that the statement of claim discloses an arguable claim that has a reasonable prospect of success. In view of this, I find that the claim should proceed to an adjudication on its merits based on evidence presented to a trier of fact: PMC York Properties Inc. v. Siudak, 2022 ONCA 635 at paras 31-32, leave to appeal refused 2023 CanLII 31576 (SCC); R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42 at paras 17, 22; Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19 at paras 87-90.

22I am not persuaded that Patricia’s mortgage claim in this action is duplicative of a claim in the family litigation. Both co-defendants referred to her alleged mortgage in their family pleadings and at the case conference on April 2, 2025 and settlement conference on September 6, 2025 in addressing their interests in the matrimonial home. However, a mere similarity in the pleadings is not necessarily sufficient to constitute an abuse of process: Birdseye Security Inc. v. Milosevic, 2020 ONCA 355 at para 18. Importantly, Patricia is not a party in the family proceeding and has no claim for her alleged mortgage or loan in that litigation. Rather, her claim to the mortgage or loan is pleaded only in the statement of claim in this civil action. It follows that her mortgage claim in this action does not duplicate any claims raised in the family litigation even though the defendants refer to her alleged mortgage or loan in addressing their own property and equalization claims in that matter. I also note that her mortgage or loan claim was not somehow added to the family litigation by the conference judge’s endorsement for the April 2, 2025 conference (i.e., that listed the alleged mortgage or loan among the issues that were conferenced) as she never pleaded the claim in the family litigation for which she was never a party.

23Based on the foregoing, I find that Trisha has not met her onus to stay or strike the statement of claim. As Patricia’s mortgage claim is arguable, I find that it should be heard and adjudicated. In my view, this is not one of those clearest of cases where continuing the claim would be oppressive, vexatious, or an abuse of process, or cause injustice by forcing the defendants to litigate a multiplicity of proceedings: Cashin at para 7; Bruinsma at para 76; Tewari (SCJ) at paras 16-18. Accordingly, I decline to strike or stay this civil action.¹

b. Joinder or Hearing Together

24As set out below, I find that it would be convenient for Patricia’s claim in this action to be heard with co-defendants’ claims in the family proceeding. During submissions on this motion, I raised the prospect of having the civil and family matters joined or heard together or after each other and received oral submissions, and later written submissions, on this point.

25The court has considered the consolidation or trial together of family and civil proceedings by applying r. 6.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure which is more particularized and instructive than r. 12(5) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg 114/99 that, among other things, authorizes the court to order that two or more cases, claims, or issues be heard together if this form of hearing would be more convenient: Cruikshank v. Bastien, 2012 ONSC 7169 at paras 11-12; Malkov v. Stovichek-Malkov, 2015 ONSC 4836 at para 13; Alsous v. Shahin, 2023 ONSC 3995 at para 18.

26Rule 6.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure lists the following criteria for the court to consider when seeking to manage multiple proceedings:

6.01 (1) Where two or more proceedings are pending in the court and it appears to the court that,

(a) they have a question of law or fact in common;

(b) the relief claimed in them arises out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences; or

(c) for any other reason an order ought to be made under this rule,

the court may order that,

(d) the proceedings be consolidated, or heard at the same time or one immediately after the other; or

(e) any of the proceedings be,

(i) stayed until after the determination of any other of them, or

(ii) asserted by way of counterclaim in any other of them.

27The criteria under r. 6.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure also appear in s. 107(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43.

28In applying r. 6.01(1), the court follows a two-step analysis by considering: a) whether the criteria defined by the rule have been satisfied; and b) whether the balance of convenience favours such an order: CNR v. Holmes, 2011 ONSC 4837 at para 43; Alsous at para 21.

29In assessing whether there is a question of fact or law that is common to both proceedings, the r. 6.01(1) analysis focusses on whether the proposed common issue has sufficient importance in relation to the other facts or issues to justify having them consolidated or heard at the same time or after each other: CNR at para 43. The oft-cited purpose of r. 6.01(1) is to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings to prevent inconsistent dispositions, to protect the court’s scarce resources, and to save expense to the parties: Ibid.

30The following factors are relevant in considering whether to consolidate proceedings under r. 6.01(1):

a. The extent to which the issues in each action are interwoven;

b. Whether there is a risk of inconsistent findings or judgments if the actions are not joined;

c. Whether the issues in one action are relatively straightforward compared to the complexity of the other action;

d. Whether a decision in one action, if kept separate and tried first, would likely put an end to the other actions or significantly narrow the issues for the actions or significantly increase the likelihood of settlement;

e. The litigation status of each action; and

f. Whether any of the parties will save costs, or alternatively have their costs increased, if the actions are tried together.

Malkov at para 14; Bledin v. Bledin, 2021 ONSC 2674 at para 23; Alsous at para 22.

31Under the first arm of the r .6.01(1) analysis, I am satisfied that there are questions of fact and law related to Patricia’s mortgage claim that are common to both proceedings and sufficiently important to make it desirable for both matters to be heard at the same time or after each other. The civil and family proceedings clearly share common questions of fact and law in respect of Patricia’s claim to the loan or mortgage on title to the matrimonial home, that Tricia flatly disputes. The outcome of this claim will clearly impact each co-defendant’s equity claims in the matrimonial home and, in turn, affect their net family property, equalization, and other financial claims in the family proceeding, as Patricia and Trisha have acknowledged. The family application has more issues and, therefore, is more complex that the civil action, although both share the common issue as to whether Patricia loaned the defendants funds to buy their matrimonial home. It follows that a central legal and factual issue in both proceedings is whether Patricia actually gave the mortgage that is registered on title to the matrimonial home. Given the nature and quantum of her mortgage claim, I find that the questions of fact and law that are common to both proceedings are of sufficient importance to justify having the matters heard together or after each other: CNR at para 43.

32Under the second arm of the analysis, I find that the balance of convenience justifies an order for both proceedings to be heard together or after each other. First, the issues relating to the mortgage claim are interwoven. The parties’ evidence about the mortgage will likely be the same in each proceeding, will explain the mortgage-related dealing that Patricia had with Trisha and Gary, and will explain whether or how Patricia contributed funds to buy the Jacobs Square home and later the Finlayson Crescent property. Trisha attests that she did not receive independent legal advice when she signed transaction documents. In turn, Patricia attests that Trisha and Gary knew that her financial contributions towards the purchase of the matrimonial homes were loans, and that each had independent legal advice. Gary will likely testify at trial about Patricia’s purported loan or mortgage in relation to both proceedings, as will Patricia and Trisha in all likelihood.

33There would be a clear and obvious risk of inconsistent findings if the civil action were to be heard and adjudicated separately from the family proceeding.

34In my view, having the family matter proceed while holding the civil action in abeyance is not practical as this approach would effectively prevent both cases from being fully heard and decided in timely fashion: Malkov at para 15d; Bledin at para 36.

35Given the overlapping legal and factual issues related to the mortgage claim, I find that the parties and the court would best realize time and costs savings if the civil and family matters were heard together, or one after the other. In my view, this approach would best promote the primary objective of dealing with cases justly to achieve a just, most expeditious, and least expensive determination on the merits: Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 1.04(1); Family Law Rules, r. 2(2).

36I am mindful that there may be valid reasons for not ordering a consolidation or hearing together of the civil and family matters, such as the potential for delay in going to trial: Heldmann v. Parlee, 2021 ONSC 4904 at para 37; Dore v. Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 2025 ONSC 1018 at para 34. In this case, the family proceeding is at a somewhat more advanced stage than the civil action. That said, it would seem that the disclosure or pre-trial discovery required to ready the mortgage claim for trial will be relatively modest based on the motion materials as filed. As such, I find that the parties will not need extensive pre-trial discovery and may be ready to proceed to trial in a relatively short period. Moreover, having the claims tried together or after each other would allow both claims to be fully addressed at trial with a fulsome opportunity to address the circumstances giving rise to the mortgage claim with a single unfolding narrative and without the risk of inconsistent findings.

37The facts in Malkov and Bledin were similar to those in this case. In both cases, a husband and wife jointly acquired a matrimonial home for which a grandparent purportedly advanced funds towards its purchase and registered a charge on title that was contested. The court in Malkov joined the civil and family matters, whereas the court in Bledin directed the matters to be heard together.

38Taking everything into account, I find it convenient and just to have the civil action heard with the family proceeding, or one after the other, subject to the discretion of the trial judge: CN at para 44; Klassen v. Klassen, 2020 ONSC 4836 at para 40; Bledin at paras 21 et seq.

39Based on all of the foregoing, I find that the preconditions for having the civil and family proceedings tried together or one after the other are satisfied.

40In my view, the parties through their respective counsel should be able to resolve the mechanics for having the civil and family proceedings tried together or one after the other. If they cannot do so, they are to book a conference with a dispute resolution officer to work out any procedural issues, including those related to pleadings or pre-trial discovery, including disclosure or questioning, to ready both proceedings for trial before attending assignment court to schedule a trial management conference and trial date.

Outcome

41Accordingly, I make the following orders:

a. the claim in CV-25-7185 shall be heard with the family proceeding in FS-24-110646 before the Superior Court of Justice in Brampton, either at the same time or one after the other in the discretion of the trial judge;

b. if required, the parties shall schedule a conference with a dispute resolution officer for the purpose of addressing any procedural issues related to pleadings, or pre-trial discovery, including any disclosure or questioning, to ready the matters for trial before attending assignment court to set dates for a trial management conference and the trial of the proceedings; and

c. the motion to stay or strike the statement of claim is dismissed.

42Should the parties be unable to agree on costs for the motion, Patricia may deliver written submissions on costs of up to 2 pages (excluding her costs outline and any offer(s) to settle) within 10 days from the release of this decision, and Trisha may deliver responding submissions on the same terms within a further 10 days. Reply submissions shall not be delivered without leave.

Date: August 4, 2026 M.T. Doi J.

CITATION: Rameshwar v. Rameshwar, 2026 ONSC 3625

Footnotes

1. 1In written submissions dated July 7, 2026 and filed pursuant to the direction in my endorsement dated June 22, 2026, Trisha purported to raise a further ground to support her motion to strike or dismiss Patricia’s civil action by referring to the Limitations Act, 2002, SO 2002, c. 24 Sched. B, and ostensibly the basic limitation period under s. 4 of the act. However, as Patricia noted in her written reply submissions dated July 9, 2026, Trisha did not raise any limitation grounds in the notice of motion dated February 11, 2026 and first sought to raise the limitation argument extemporise in her July 7, 2026 submission (i.e., after being directed to address just the matter of whether the civil and family proceedings should be consolidated or heard together or after each other on June 22, 2026) filed after the motion was heard on April 24, 2026. The defendants never served or filed a statement of defence in the civil action, and no limitation defence was previously raised or asserted in the action. In light of this, I agree with Patricia’s submission that the limitation argument first raised in Trisha’s post-hearing written submission was not properly before the court. Accordingly, I have declined to consider her limitation-related submissions in deciding the motion. In any event, it would seem that the appropriate limitation period for Patricia’s claim on the purported mortgage would be 10 years under s. 43(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act, RSO 1990, c.L.15, that sets a 10-year limitation period for actions on mortgage covenants: Hilson v. 1336365 Alberta Ltd., 2019 ONCA 1000 at para 30.