SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Gloria Amenaghawon Odigie, Applicant
AND:
Emmanuel Egharevba, Respondent
BEFORE: M.T. Doi J.
COUNSEL: Mark Rush and Dylan Vermeulan (student-at-law), for the Applicant
Emmanuel Egharevba, self-represented Respondent
HEARD: October 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 29, 30, 31, and December 1, 2 and 3, 2025
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Overview
1On this application, the applicant mother seeks retroactive and prospective child support for the children, V. (born in November 2001) and M. (born in August 2003), along with other relief to preserve the respondent’s property in Brampton and secure his child support obligations. V. and M. reside with the mother in Dublin, Republic of Ireland. Both children live with sickle cell anaemia and have severe health conditions. The respondent has never paid support to the children.
2The respondent submits that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the mother’s child support claim as the appropriate forum is the Republic of Ireland. Alternatively, after accepting that DNA tests results show that he is the biological father to V. and M. to a statistical probability of over 99.99999%, he now submits that the test results are unreliable due to chain of custody issues. In any event, he submits that V. and M. cannot be his children as the only ones he ever fathered were born in Israel and not in Nigeria as the mother asserts. In the further alternative, he submits that the Dublin Metropolitan District Court’s order dated February 20, 2020 directing him to pay €80 per week in child support as of March 13, 2020 (i.e., that he never paid and ignored) is the appropriate order governing support of the children for which this court should defer.
3For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that: a) this court in Ontario has jurisdiction to decide the child support claims in this application; b) the mother has established the respondent’s parentage of both children; c) this court should not defer to the child support order of the Dublin Metropolitan District Court as it cannot be enforced against the father in Ontario; d) the father should pay retroactive and prospective child support as set out below; and e) orders to preserve the father’s property and secure child support for V. and M. should be granted.
Jurisdiction and Forum Conveniens
4I am satisfied that the court has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the mother’s application for child support in this proceeding.
5The parties to a proceeding are free to select or accept the jurisdiction for determining their dispute: Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72 at para 37; Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 at para 79; Sanis Health Inc. v. British Columbia, 2024 SCC 40 at para 91.
6A party that voluntarily attorns to a court’s jurisdiction consents to having the issues in dispute being heard and decided by that court. Where jurisdiction is established through consent in this fashion, it is unnecessary to consider whether there are other grounds for recognizing or challenging the jurisdiction of the court, such as whether the parties had a real and substantial connection with the jurisdiction in question: Mehralian v. Dunmore, 2023 ONCA 806 at para 30, affirmed 2025 SCC 20; Wolfe v. Pickar, 2011 ONCA 347 at paras 43-44; Santoro v Shpak, 2024 MBCA 63 at para 29.
7While represented by counsel, the respondent filed an answer in this case. Thereafter, he filed an amended answer as a self-represented party. Both answers pleaded substantive responses to the application on its merits. By delivering the answers, the respondent took voluntary steps and attorned to the jurisdiction of the Ontario court: Tacora Resources Inc. v. 1128349 B.C. Ltd., 2026 ONCA 306 at para 49, citing Van Damme v. Gelber, 2013 ONCA 388 at para 22, leave to appeal refused [2013] SCCA No 342; Trop v. Trop, 2024 ONCA 855 at para 7, citing Sakab Saudi Holding Company v. Al Jabri, 2021 ONCA 548 at para 34. At the outset of the litigation, he did not oppose this court exercising its jurisdiction by invoking the forum non conveniens doctrine or otherwise identify a more appropriate alternative forum when served with the application in June 2022 (i.e., over three years ago). Instead, he substantively responded to the child support claim on its merits, moved unsuccessfully to set side a temporary preservation order, moved unsuccessfully for security for costs, and only sought to challenge the court’s jurisdiction for the first time at trial. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the respondent attorned to the court’s jurisdiction in Ontario by taking steps beyond merely contesting the jurisdiction of the court: C.C. v. J.B., 2021 ONCA 363 at para 9, citing Lilydale Cooperative Limited v. Meyn Canada Inc., 2019 ONCA 761 at para 52, Kunuthur v. Govindareddigari, 2018 ONCA 730 at para 18, leave to appeal refused, [2018] SCCA No 449; Tacora at para 49. In my view, this is sufficient to dispose of the jurisdictional issue: Mehralian at para 30; Wolfe at para 44.
8In any event, I would find that the real and substantial connection inquiry allows this court to exercise its jurisdiction in Ontario. The Supreme Court in Van Breda at para 110 set out the following factors to consider under the forum conveniens analysis: a) the location of parties and witnesses; b) the cost of transferring the case to another jurisdiction or declining the stay; c) the impact of a transfer on the conduct of the litigation or on related or parallel proceedings; d) the possibility of conflicting judgments; e) problems related to the recognition and enforcement of judgments; and f) the relative strengths of the connections of the two parties. In Li v. Li, 2021 ONCA 669 at para 42, leave to appeal refused 2022 38782 (SCC), the Court of Appeal summarized the factors applicable when considering the forum conveniens doctrine:
[42] In essence, the doctrine focuses on the circumstances of the case, and its purpose is to ensure that both parties are treated fairly and that the process for resolving their litigation is efficient: Van Breda, at para. 105. The factors that come into play in considering the question of forum non conveniens depend on the context and may include the locations of parties and witnesses, the cost of transferring the case to another place, the impact of a transfer on the case or a related case, the possibility of conflicting judgments, problems relating to recognition or enforcement of judgments, and the relative strengths of the connections of the parties: Van Breda, at para. 110.
See also Kininsberg c. Meerapfel, 2026 ONCA 373 at paras 37-38; Lachance v Campbell, 2026 ONSC 2280 at para 56; Rubio v. Joslin, 2018 ONCJ 167 at paras 40-41.
9In this case, the respondent has resided and worked in Ontario over a lengthy period after separation and acquired a property on Zelda Road in Brampton that he continues to own. Having regard to his place of residence and employment, and the mother’s claim for child support and corollary relief to secure the claim, I would find that a real and substantial connection to this jurisdiction is met on the particular facts of this case: Van Breda at paras 79, 110; Li at para 42. In addition, Diana Isokpehi, a witness who testified at trial, resides in Canada. Given the respondent’s voluntary attornment to the jurisdiction of the court in Ontario, and his late challenge to the court’s jurisdiction for the first time at trial, I am satisfied that the mother would suffer unfairness if the court were to decline jurisdiction given the delay and costs in transferring the case to another jurisdiction, and the unnecessary duplication of effort and increased costs to both parties. In any event, I see no unfairness to the respondent by the court in Ontario assuming jurisdiction as he is already involved in the family application. Importantly, the mother cannot enforce the Dublin Metropolitan District Court’s child support order against the father in Ontario because Ireland is not a reciprocating jurisdiction under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002, SO 2002, c.13 (the “ISOA”). The normal state of affairs is for a court with jurisdiction to exercise that jurisdiction: Van Breda at para 109; Haaretz.com v. Goldhar, 2018 SCC 28 at para 47; Matiko John v. Barrick Gold Corporation, 2026 ONCA 248 at para 25. The standard to displace a chosen forum is high: Young v. Tyco International of Canada Ltd., 2008 ONCA 709 at para 28. In the circumstances,
10Having determined that Ontario has jurisdiction in this case, I find that this court should not decline to exercise its jurisdiction. After jurisdiction simpliciter is established, the court may apply the forum conveniens doctrine to decline jurisdiction in favour of another clearly more appropriate forum by undertaking a flexible case-specific analysis with a focus on fairness and efficiency: Goldhar at paras 27-28, 31; Van Breda at para 109. The natural forum for a child support claim is the payor’s jurisdiction given the nature of the income and payment-related issues. In my view, the mother is not engaged in forum shopping as the respondent, the proposed payor, has lived and worked in Ontario for years. As noted earlier, the mother cannot enforce the Irish child support order against a payor in Ontario as Ireland is not a reciprocating ISOA jurisdiction. In view of this, I find that the Irish court is not a clearly more appropriate forum for deciding the child support claims in this case: Ibid. In addition, I find that neither Nigeria nor Israel would be a convenient forum for the child support claim as the parties and the children are not meaningfully connected to either jurisdiction. Taking this all into account, I find that the respondent has not met his burden to show that Ireland, Nigeria, or Israel would be a clearly more appropriate jurisdiction than Ontario in the circumstances of this case.
11Accordingly, I find that the court in Ontario should hear and decide this matter.
The Child Support Order of the Dublin Metropolitan District Court
12I do not accept the respondent’s alternative submission that the Ontario court should defer to the existing Irish child support order as it cannot be enforced against the father in Ontario.
13The Ontario courts may validly order child support pursuant to s. 33 of the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c. F.3 (“FLA”) where a foreign court issued an existing child support order in a jurisdiction that is not a reciprocating jurisdiction under the ISOA: Taimish v. Al-Kadhimi, 2023 ONSC 378 at para 26(c)(ii), affirmed 2023 ONCA 661, leave to appeal refused 2024 20242 (SCC); Rubio v. Joslin, 2018 ONCJ 167 at paras 43-49, 70, 77. Were it otherwise, a claimant would lack a meaningful remedy to enforce a child support order against a payor in Ontario.
14As Ireland is not a reciprocating jurisdiction under the ISOA, the Irish order essentially has no practical effect as it cannot be enforced against the respondent in Ontario, as clearly shown by his ongoing noncompliance. All of this further supports this court’s exercise of jurisdiction to decide the child support claim: Taimish at para 26(c)(iii). Having regard to the mother’s inability to enforce the Irish order in Ontario, there is no real possibility of double-recovery if this court were to grant her child support claim. Instead, there is a real potential for both children to realize no child support whatsoever if the Ontario court were to decline jurisdiction in this case. In any event, the Irish court awarded child support by imputing only nominal income to the respondent as it had no knowledge of his actual income (i.e., as he did not appear when summonsed or give any financial disclosure). Taking this all into account, I find that deferring to the unenforceable Irish order would be wholly unjust to the children on the particular facts of this case.
15Accordingly, I am not persuaded by the respondent’s submission that the Ontario court should decline jurisdiction and defer to the Irish order for child support to avoid inconsistent judgments or unfairness. In my view, it is appropriate for the Ontario court to exercise jurisdiction to decide the issue of support for both children, including any retroactive obligations, and corollary relief to secure the support obligation.
16Out of an abundance of caution, I find that the mother should file a written undertaking to not seek to enforce the existing order for child support by the Dublin Metropolitan District Court as a term of any child support order by this court to rule out the potential for double-recovery.
Legal Principles for Child Support
17As the parties were never married, the obligation to pay child support arises under s. 31 of the FLA as follows:
Obligation of parent to support child
31 (1) Every parent has an obligation to provide support, to the extent that the
parent is capable of doing so, for his or her unmarried child who,
(a) is a minor;
(b) is enrolled in a full-time program of education; or
(c) is unable by reason of illness, disability or other cause to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents.
18Subsection 33(1) of the FLA provides:
33(1) A court may, on application, order a person to provide support for his or her dependants and determine the amount of support.
19Section 29 under Part III (Support obligations) of the FLA defines “dependent” as follows:
“dependant” means a person to whom another has an obligation to provide support under this Part.
20The jurisdiction to award retroactive or retrospective child support is set out at s. 34(1)(f) of the FLA as follows:
34(1) In an application under section 33, the court may make an interim or final order,
(f) requiring that support be paid in respect of any period before the date of the order’
21The Supreme Court in D.B.S. v. S.R.G, 2006 SCC 37 at para 38 restated the core principles of the contemporary approach to child support as follows:
The contemporary approach to child support was delineated by Kelly J.A. in Paras v. Paras, [1971] 1 O.R. 130. In that case, the Ontario Court of Appeal established a set of core principles that has been endorsed by this Court in the past and continues to apply to the child support regime today: see Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857; Willick v. Willick, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670. These core principles animate the support obligations that parents have towards their children. They include: child support is the right of the child; the right to support survives the breakdown of a child’s parents’ marriage; child support should, as much as possible, provide children with the same standard of living they enjoyed when their parents were together; and finally, the specific amounts of child support owed will vary based upon the income of the payor parent.
22It is well-established that the D.B.S. principles apply to child support claims brought under the FLA: see e.g., Kocabas v. Polat, 2025 ONSC 1237 at paras 51-55.
23The purpose and promise of child support is to protect the financial entitlements owed to children by their parents: Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24 at para 38. Child support is the right of the child, not of the parent seeking support on the child’s behalf, and the basic amount of child support under the FLA depends on the payor’s income and not on a highly discretionary balancing of means and needs; Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 at para 208. The parental obligation to pay child support, like the children’s concomitant right to support, exists independently of any statute or court order, D.B.S. at para 54.
24A disabled child’s receipt of social assistance benefits should not in and of itself lead to any disentitlement to child support unless the court finds it inappropriate to award the presumptive table amount, in which case the court may decide the amount of child support it finds appropriate having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each parent or spouse to contribute to the support of the child: Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97, s. 3(2)(b); Senos v. Karcz, 2014 ONCA 459 at paras 42-43; Fatima v. Akhtar Agha, 2024 ONSC 7040 at para 33 et seq.
25In awarding retroactive child support where there is no child support order or agreement in place, the court must consider all relevant circumstances including the following four (4) factors to achieve a fair award that balances the child’s interests in a fair standard of support with the payor’s circumstances and the need for fairness and flexibility:
a. whether the recipient has an understandable reason for the delay in seeking relief;
b. the payor’s conduct;
c. the children’s circumstances;
d. whether a retroactive award would result in hardship
D.B.S. at para 133; Michel at para 1.
26None of the above-mentioned factors is decisive. At all times, the court should strive for a holistic view and decide each case on the basis of its particular factual matrix: D.B.S. at para 99.
27Retroactive child support awards are not truly “retroactive” as they merely hold payors to the legal obligations they always had to pay child support commensurate with their income, and such awards are a recognized way to enforce pre-existing, free-standing child support obligations to recover monies owed by a payor but yet unpaid: D.B.S. at para 2; Michel at paras 10, 41. A retroactive award of child support is not exceptional as it cannot be the exception to give children the support they were rightly due in the first place: D.B.S. at paras 5, 97; Michel at para 10.
28In deciding this matter, I am guided by the best interests of the children: D.B.S. at para 119.
Paternity of the Children
29Having regard to all of the evidence at trial, I am satisfied that the mother has shown that the respondent is the biological father to both children.
a. DNA Paternity Testing
30As set out earlier, the respondent voluntarily agreed to undergo DNA paternity testing that shows him to be the children’s biological father to a statistical probability of over 99.99999%.
31On June 14, 2022, the mother obtained a temporary preservation order without notice under s. 40 (Restraining orders) of the FLA to restrain the respondent from depleting his property and to preserve her ability to realize her child support claim.1 After being served, the respondent moved to set aside the temporary preservation order.2 When the motion to set aside returned on August 15, 2022, the parties agreed to adjourn the motion sine die to conduct DNA tests to confirm the parentage of the children. Through counsel, the parties jointly agreed to engage Bureau Veritas, a qualified DNA testing lab in Guelph, Ontario, to perform DNA testing after the mother, a) gave the respondent information about the lab and its DNA testing procedure, including its method for ensuring continuity of evidence, and b) agreed to fund the DNA tests on behalf of both parties.3 In turn, Amanda Kaster MSc, a forensic biologist at Bureau Veritas, signed the DNA report dated February 2, 2023 to confirm the DNA test results. Given the parties’ agreement to undertake DNA testing to establish the children’s parentage, and their cooperative actions to conduct the required testing, I find that Ms. Kaster at Bureau Veritas in effect served as a joint litigation expert to give opinion evidence of the children’s parentage on behalf of both parties to this litigation: r. 20.2(1) and (3) of the Family Law Rules, O Reg 114/99.
32The DNA report from Bureau Veritas dated February 2, 2023 confirmed the father’s paternity for V. and M. to a statistical probability of 99.999991% and 99.999993%, respectively. The DNA report was filed on the motion to set aside and its test results were not controversial as both parties, through counsel, agreed with the results in the DNA report and accepted its findings.4 On June 19, 2023, I dismissed the father’s motion to set side the temporary preservation order after considering the results in the DNA report as filed.5
33Having jointly engaged Ms. Kaster as a joint litigation expert, it was open for either party to call or examine her at trial: r. 20.2(3). However, neither party did so. During the trial, the mother relied on the DNA report dated February 2, 2023 and testified that Bureau Veritas sent DNA collection kits directly to a medical lab in Dublin where she and the children went with government identification to confirm their identities before DNA samples were collected from each child. The lab in Dublin sent the children’s DNA samples directly to Bureau Veritas by courier, as recorded by an invoice. The mother understood that Bureau Veritas used a comparable method for obtaining DNA samples from the father. Once all the DNA samples were received, Bureau Veritas analysed the samples and developed DNA profiles for each sample before comparing the profiles. The DNA report dated February 2, 2023 determined that the respondent was “practically proven” to be the biological father to V. and M. to a probability of over 99.999999% for each child.
34Taking everything into account, I see no basis to doubt the DNA test results in the Bureau Veritas report dated February 2, 2023. Despite previously accepting the DNA report as filed on the motion to set aside, the father argued at trial that Bureau Veritas’ methodology to collect the DNA samples resulted in flawed chain of custody but without offering any meaningful evidence or particulars to explain the basis for this claim. There is no evidence to suggest that the father or his counsel had any concerns with Bureau Veritas’ protocols for collecting the DNA samples from V., M., or himself at any time prior to trial. At trial, the father did not cross-examine Ms. Kaster or anyone at Bureau Veritas on any chain of custody issues, including how the DNA test samples were collected, after previously accepting the DNA results on the motion to set aside. As the father previously accepted the findings in the DNA report that was filed on his motion, I find that his attempt to resile from the same paternity findings at trial without any evidence or other apparent basis to support his changed position was improper and amounted to an abuse of process.
35On balance, I am satisfied that the paternity results in the DNA report of February 2, 2023 establish that the respondent is the biological father to both V. and M., respectively.
b. The Birth of the Children
36Despite the DNA test results that effectively show the father’s parentage of both children to a statistical certainty of over 99.99999%, he argued at trial that: a) two children with the name V. and two with the name M. purportedly exist; b) he is the biological father of the child named V. who was conceived and born in Israel, and the biological father of a second child named M. who was conceived in Israel and born elsewhere; and c) therefore, he cannot be the biological father of the V. said to have been conceived and born in Nigeria, or otherwise be the biological father of the M. said to have been conceived in Nigeria and born in Ireland. In effect, the father argued that the DNA test results somehow do not relate to his children who were born or conceived in Israel, but instead relate to other children notwithstanding that the results confirm his paternity for V. and M. to a statistical certainty of over 99.99999%. The respondent could not explain why the “other” children named V. and M. (i.e., born or conceived in Nigeria, respectively) would have DNA profiles showing him to be their biological father to this level of statistical certainty. As set out below, I am not persuaded by his submissions that seek to refute his paternity of the children.
37The parties led considerable evidence to explain where and under what circumstances the children were born. Much of this evidence was conflicting if not irreconcilable as each party gave very different accounts to explain where and how V. and M. were conceived and born.
38The mother testified that she trained and worked as a nurse at the University of Benin Teaching Hospital in Benin City, Nigeria. She testified that she met the father in 2000 at a coffee shop in Benin City near a copy centre where he worked. She testified that they were living together by January 2001 at a residence on Obegasa Lane in Benin City and that she became pregnant with V., their first child, who was born on November 29, 2001 in Benin City, Nigeria.
39At a very young age, V. was diagnosed with sickle cell anemia. The mother testified that the diagnosis strained her relationship with the father who blamed her for V.’s disease and made it clear that he did not wish to be responsible for raising an ill or sickly child.
40By late 2002, the mother was pregnant with M. She testified that the father grew enraged upon learning of the pregnancy and was physically and emotionally abusive to her. To escape the abuse, the mother testified that she and V. left the family home on January 12, 2003 to reside at the maternal family home in Benin City. She testified that the father never called her after separation and made no effort to speak with V. or inquire about the child.
41Upon learning that better publicly-funded health care was available for V. in Ireland, the mother immigrated with the child to Ireland and settled in Dublin. She gave birth to M. on August 29, 2003. When M. was five days old, medical tests showed that he, like V., was afflicted with sickle cell disease.
42The mother did not notify the father before leaving Nigeria for Ireland as he made it clear that he wanted nothing to do with V. and was not providing any financial or other support. She testified that she called the father after arriving in Dubin but he did not want to speak with her and ended the call.
43The father testified that he fathered a child by the name of V. born in November 2001 in Eilat, Israel with a woman he met there named Edna Masok whom he variously and inconsistently claimed is the same person as Gloria Amenaghawon Odigie, the applicant mother. The father testified that he had immigrated to Israel from Gambia after leaving Nigeria to pursue work opportunities. He testified that the mother was visiting Eilat with another man when she met him and chose to stay after the parties struck up a relationship. He testified that they conceived a child named V. who was born in Israel. He claims that this child is completely different from the V. who was conceived and born in Nigeria as the mother claims. Among other things, the father claim that each child named V. is distinguishable as the one born in Israel has a middle name spelled slightly differently (i.e., with just one “n” in the name) from the one born in Nigeria, although both share the same date of birth. His amended answer pleads that the V. born in Israel has a younger brother who also was conceived in Israel and born in Ireland.6 It follows that the father’s position on the children’s paternity may be distilled as follows: a) he is the biological father to a child named V. born in Israel and to V.’s younger brother M. who was conceived in Israel and born in Ireland; b) he fathered both children with Edna Masok whom he now claims is one and the same as Gloria Amenaghawon Odigie, the applicant mother; c) there are two children named V. and two named M.; and d) the father is not the biological father to the V. born in Nigeria or the M. conceived in Nigeria and born in Ireland.
44From their evidence at trial, I am satisfied that the parties had a sexual relationship together. More specifically, I find that the father had a sexual relationship with a woman who, by his own admission, is the same person as the mother, and that they last saw each other around December 2002 or January 2003. I also find that their relationship produced sons named V. and M. who were born about twenty-one months apart.
45The father produced what he claims is a copy of an Israeli birth certificate in Hebrew for the child V. born in Isreal. The mother claims that the birth certificate is forged or inauthentic. The certificate is printed on plain white paper, has a blue or purple stamp that is not embossed, and is not certified as being true or authentic. The accompanying certificate from an Ontario lawyer who translated the certificate from Hebrew to English certifies only the translation of the record and expressly cautioned, “[t]his translation does not constitute any legal opinion regarding the validity of the above captioned document or any other legal aspects related to this document and the use thereof.” Apart from this particular record that spells V.’s middle name as “O*******”, all other documents for the child that the mother produced, including a Nigerian birth certificate and passport, consistently spell V.’s middle name with one more “n” as “O*n”.
46The mother is educated. She earned a nursing degree and practised nursing for several years at the University of Benin Teaching Hospital, as her former colleague, Ms. Isokpenhi, testified at trial. I accept that the mother would likely know how to correctly spell V.’s middle name after caring for the child throughout his entire life, in contrast to the father who disowned V. when he was just one year of age and never saw or spoke with the child thereafter.
47As discussed below, I am not persuaded that the decision by the Nigerian Population Commission (the “Commission”) to withdraw V.’s replacement Nigerian birth certificate issued in 2012 should be given any weight in deciding parentage for the children in this case.
48The mother testified that she lost V.’s original birth certificate issued in 2001 or 2002, and obtained a replacement by calling the Commission in 2012 and asking her sister to attend a Commission office in Nigeria to apply in person for the replacement that was mailed to her in Dublin and certified at the Nigerian embassy there. After the mother brought this child support application in Ontario, the father applied to have the Commission withdraw the Nigerian birth certificate by arguing that V. was born in Israel and not in Nigeria. He did not serve V. or the mother with his application to withdraw the birth certificate, or otherwise give them notice of the application, and the Commission did not give V. or the mother an opportunity to respond to the application even though contact information for the mother’s lawyer of record was on her Ontario application for child support that the father’s lawyer in Nigeria filed with his application to the Commission. Egbe Okojie, a senior official at the Commission, testified that the Commission mailed notice of the father’s application to the mother’s last-known place of residence in Benin City (i.e., based on records from about ten years earlier) but not to her current residence in Dublin or her email address as set out in the Ontario application as filed with the father’s materials. As a result, neither V. nor the mother knew about the father’s application. Ms. Okojie testified that Commission staff called the mother twice but did not reach her or otherwise leave a voice message for reasons that are unclear. Ms. Okojie stated that the Commission does not call or email parties as applications are processed in person or in writing. She also testified that Commission staff made calls to the mother’s sister who applied for V.’s replacement birth certificate in 2012, but apparently without reaching her either.
49The Commission, which handles about 10 million birth certificates at any given time, did not have a file copy of V.’s original Nigerian birth certificate that staff likely prepared by hand on a paper document. At one point, Ms. Okojie seemed to suggest that the mother was not entitled to notice of the father’s application as she was not the applicant for the replacement birth certificate nor the person to whom the replacement was issued. By this logic, it would seem to follow that the Commission should have notified V. at the mother’s address in Dublin or through her lawyer as set out in the record for the application. Ms. Okojie also testified that notifying V. somehow went beyond the Commission’s mandate. Evidently, the application to withdraw the Nigerian birth certificate relied on the purported Israeli birth certificate as Ms. Okojie essentially confirmed in her testimony. When asked whether the Commission asked the Israeli government to authenticate the purported Israeli birth certificate (i.e., that spelled V.’s middle name differently from the Nigerian birth certificate), she testified that Nigerian law did not allow the Commission to make any such inquiries. In effect, the Commission withdrew the replacement birth certificate by, at least in part, considering the purported Israeli birth certificate that had not been authenticated.
50On August 8, 2023, the Commission withdrew the replacement birth certificate for V. after finding his country of birth was not Nigeria but Israel, along with other apparent irregularities (i.e., that included an omission as to the actual location in Benin City where V. was born) with the replacement. After learning that the replacement had been withdrawn, the mother’s lawyer wrote to the Commission twice to inquire about the withdrawal. The Commission apparently misplaced both letters and never responded. At trial, Ms. Okojie initially apologized for the apparent lapse, said that the letters may have been misplaced after intake staff retired, and suggested resubmitting the letters for the Commission’s consideration before denying that the letters were missing.
51The Commission effectively withdrew V.’s replacement birth certificate based in part on an unauthenticated Israeli birth certificate (i.e., that spelled his name inconsistently from the Nigerian birth certificate) without notice or a meaningful opportunity to respond. Given the lack of due process, I respectfully decline to rely on the Commission’s withdrawal of the replacement birth certificate in deciding V.’s parentage for child support purposes to avoid unfairness.
52Several witnesses testified at trial to explain the circumstances in which V. and M. were conceived and born. In assessing their credibility and reliability, I am guided by the factors summarized in La France v. Saroli, 2026 ONSC 1783 at para 18 et seq.
53After considering all the evidence at trial, I am not persuaded by the father’s evidence about the period when he was lived and worked in Eilat, Israel. Among other things, the father did not recall: a) the address or street name of his residence while living in Eilat; b) the address or street name of the hotel where he claimed to work when he met the mother in Eilat; c) where the mother resided while living in Eilat; d) the address of the hotel in Eilat where he claims the mother was working; e) the name of the rabbi that he claims performed V.’s circumcision; or f) the name of the church official who he claims performed V.’s baptism. I find that these details are of the sort that the father should reasonably have been expected to recall, at least to some extent or to some level of detail, if his account indeed were true. The mother submits that the father, in constructing his story, failed to anticipate that he might be asked these details.
54Similarly, neither Kenneth Idemudia nor Solomon Okoro, who testified as witnesses for the father at trial, could recall the names of the streets in Eilat where the father or mother are said to have lived or worked, even though Mr. Idemudia and Mr. Okoro testified that they regularly saw both parties there. In addition, Mr. Idemudia could not name any of the father’s flatmates in Eilat, or where the mother worked in Israel or for whom. Mr. Idemudia also did not know the street name of his own residence in Eilat, the name of the restaurant in Eilat where he had worked, the name of the street where the restaurant was located, or the street name of the hotel where he also worked. Notably, Mr. Idemudia testified that the parties had resided together while he was in Eilat, and that he had never known the parties to be separated (i.e., although the father testified that the parties separated from early in the pregnancy until 6 or 7 months later, which he claims was broadly known within the Nigerian expat community in Eilat) while stating that the mother had confided in him about her relationship problems with the father. V. was born on November **, 2001, meaning the pregnancy began around mid-February 2001. If the father is believed, it follows that Mr. Idemudia should have known about the separation that he actually was unaware of despite claiming to have been a “close friend” to the mother. Further, Mr. Idemudia was unaware of the mother’s profession before she came to Israel. In my view, Mr. Idemudia lacked the sort of particulars that he should reasonably have known, at least to some extent, if his account of the events in Israel were true.
55Mr. Okoro testified that the father worked as a housekeeping cleaner at the Isrotel and the Royal Beach Hotel in Eilat. However, the father testified that he had been privileged to do other work at Beit Isrotel, a hotel for student workers, where he oversaw hotel operations and checked student workers in and out. This was a troubling inconsistency that raised credibility and reliability concerns. In addition, Mr. Okoro did not remember the address or street name of the hotel in Eilat where he worked for a number of years, that raised further concerns with his credibility and reliability given the length of time that he purportedly had worked in Eilat.
56Mr. Idemudia testified that he was in Israel for a little over a year, from October 2000 until November 2001, and was certain of these dates. The father claimed that Mr. Idemudia attended V.’s “naming ceremony” in Israel that did not occur before November 30, 2001. Mr. Idemudia testified that he was at V.’s “christening ceremony”. However, the father testified that the christening ceremony took place in March or April 2022, being about four or five months after Mr. Idemudia has left Israel. These timelines do not add up.
57Mr. Okoro was shown two photos that the father claims were taken outside the hospital in Eilat where V. was born.7 Although the father identified the mother as “Edna Masok” on the right side in the first photograph, Mr. Okoro identified none of the three women in the photograph as being the mother (i.e., by identifying “Enneke” as the one on the left, “Florence” as the one in the middle, and “Filomena” as the one on the right). Mr. Okoro then identified the women with the father in the second photograph as being “Florence” and “Enneke” (i.e., women other than the mother, whether known as Edna Masok or Gloria Amenaghawon Odigie). These inconsistencies raise obvious if not troubling concerns with their testimony about the mother being in Eilat.
58In another photo of three women standing outside the hospital in Eilat where the father claims V. was born, he identified the mother as the woman standing in the middle.8 However, Mr. Idemudia testified that the mother is the woman on the left of the photo.9 I agree that each of these women in the photographs seem to be strikingly different in appearance.
59The father’s older brother, Timothy Egharevba, testified that the father told him that he had fathered two children with the mother in Israel but not in Nigeria. Timothy Egharevba testified that he knew the father had been in Israel because he took calls from father that had an Israeli area code, but he did not recall the actual area code number. In addition, he testified that there had been no gathering at the late paternal grandfather’s home following his burial on April 28, 2019, but Mr. Okoro testified that he personally attended a gathering at the paternal grandfather’s home after the burial. I did not find Timothy Egharevba’s testimony to be credible or reliable.
60The father testified that the mother left Israel with V. to abduct the child. However, he never reported the purported abduction to police.
61The mother denies being in any of the photos taken in Eilat, denies ever visiting Eilat or Israel or otherwise residing or working there, testified that she and the father lived together at 3 Obegasa Lane, off Sapele Road, in Benin City, Nigeria, and stated that V. was born in Benin City and baptized by a minister, Pastor Osahom, in a church in Nigeria.
62The maternal uncle, Lambert Odigie, gave clear and fairly straight-forward testimony that corroborated the mother’s evidence by explaining that: a) the parties had lived together in a home off Sapele Road in Benin City; b) he had seen the parties together in Nigeria; c) he had seen V. on the day of his birth in Benin City and afterwards; d) he had helped the mother and V. to relocate from the family home off Sapele Road to the maternal grandparent’s home to escape the father’s abuse; e) the father never saw V. at the grandparents’ home after separation; f) the mother had never lived in Israel to his knowledge; g) he had dropped off the maternal grandmother for V.’s naming ceremony at Gospel Church in Benin City; h) the mother and V. left for Ireland in April 2003; and i) he knew the father after meeting him on multiple occasions in Nigeria. Under cross-examination, Lambert Odigie’s testimony remained consistent and unwavering.
63The mother’s former nursing colleague, Diana Isokpenhi, testified in a clear and forthright manner. Ms. Isokpenhi explained that she and the mother met while both worked as nurses at a hospital in Benin City, Nigeria. She testified that she knew the mother for about three to four years (i.e., before Ms. Isokpenhi left Nigeria) and knew that the mother was pregnant with V. when both were still working at the same hospital at that time. Ms. Isokpenhi testified that she saw V. as a young baby when the mother brought the child to the hospital for a visit with her work colleagues. During the visit, the mother was accompanied by the father and pointed him out to her but without formally introducing him. I find that Ms. Isokpenhi’s was a credible and reliable witness.
64The mother’s friend, Orobosa Vivienne Igbide, testified that she met the mother when both were nursing students before Ms. Igbide left Nigeria in 1990 (i.e., almost 10 years before the parties met). Over the years, Ms. Igbide stayed in touch with the mother, who disclosed her pregnancy with V. and his sickle cell anaemia diagnosis early on. Ms. Igbide helped the mother to make plans to migrate from Nigeria to another country with better health care for the child. Ms. Igbide sent funds to help the mother and V. immigrate to Ireland, and also send funds to her in Ireland. Ms. Igbide had no knowledge of the mother ever living in Israel. About six years ago, Ms. Igbide began to call the father on his cell phone. They had several conversations before he eventually blocked her calls. When they spoke, he referred to the mother as “Amen” (i.e., an abbreviation of “Amenaghawon”, her middle name). I found that Ms. Igbide’s evidence was credible and reliable.
65During his evidence in chief, the father described meeting and forming an intimate relationship with a woman in Israel who later adopted the name “Edna Masok”. In cross-examination, he admitted that he first knew this woman by the name “Amenaghawon” (i.e., being the mother’s middle name) or “Amen” (i.e., an abbreviation of “Amenaghawon” that the mother went by, and used in a text to the father in June 2019), and further stated that he knew her surname to be “Odigie” from around the start of their relationship before she assumed the name “Edna Masok” for work and immigration-related purposes within days of first meeting her in Eilat. In effect, the father acknowledged knowing the mother as “Gloria Odigie” within days of first meeting her in Eilat. However, at para 9 to a prior affidavit sworn August 14, 2022 he attested to not knowing anyone by the name “Gloria Amenaghawon Odigie” after conducting an Internet search of the name to ostensibly learn who she was. When cross-examined on this at trial, he stated that he did not know anyone named “Gloria Amenaghawon Odigie” who lived with him in Nigeria, despite swearing absolutely in his August 14, 2022 affidavit that he did not know anyone by that name. In effect, he tried to distinguish the mother from Edna Masok in para 5 of the August 14, 2022 affidavit by attesting that “Edna Masok” was the only woman with whom he had a brief encounter in Israel when the mother claimed they cohabited in Nigeria, only to later assert that “Gloria Amenaghawon Odigie” and “Edna Masok” are one and the same person.
66The father denied ever using the name “Uyi”, but Mr. Okoro testified that people in Eilat often called the father “Uyi”. The father denied having a brother named “Uyi”, but Mr. Idemudia testified that the father had a younger brother named “Uyi”. For her part, the mother testified that no one ever called the father “Uyi”, but that the father had told her about his younger brother Uyi, whom she never met, who left Nigeria due to legal issues and lived abroad in the Middle East for some time, likely by assuming the father’s identity. The mother believes that the father is now using Uyi’s old travel documents from that period to bolster his fabricated story about living in Israel as a tactic to avoid his child support obligations. The mother testified that the man in the photograph for the Nigerian passport the father produced as his own to show his purported entry into Israel is not actually the father but likely is his brother, Uyi, as they bear a family resemblance.
67Overall, I had real concerns with the father’s evidence. He was well aware of what issues were contentious, gave evasive answers when confronted with discrepancies in his evidence, and offered theories with strained logic. All of this cast doubt on his credibility and reliability.
68Taking everything into account, I am satisfied that the mother has shown that V. and M. are the father’s biological children. The DNA test results persuasively establish that the respondent is the children’s biological father. I do not find that the evidence, taken as a whole, shows that V. or M. are somehow not the father’s biological children based on his purported theory that the children were born and conceived in Israel as he claims, instead of in Nigeria as the mother asserts.
The Circumstances of the Children
69Regrettably, both children have struggled with serious health issues throughout their lives.
70V. and M. suffer from sickle cell anaemia, a very serious blood disorder, that has caused them to suffer and endure significant illness and health-related complications for most of their lives. Their ongoing medical struggles are well-established in the record for this proceeding.
71As discussed earlier, V.’s diagnosis of sickle cell anaemia led the mother to immigrate with him to Ireland to access better publicly-available health care from what would otherwise have been available in Nigeria. Shortly after arriving in Ireland, V. was admitted to hospital for a lengthy stay due to a life-threatening allergic reaction after drinking some milk. Following his discharge, V. lived with the mother in a one-bedroom apartment in Dublin.
72On August 29, 2003 (i.e., about four months after arriving in Ireland), the mother gave birth to M. who, like V., was diagnosed with sickle cell anaemia.
73For a period of time, the children were able to manage their sickle cell disease by following a restricted diet and taking medication.
74As a toddler, M. suffered two strokes that caused him to lose the ability to talk or walk, and also lose grip strength and fine motor skills. Over a lengthy recovery period, he received occupational therapy and re-learned how to walk and talk. He also began a life-long regimen of therapeutic blood transfusions to manage his sickle cell disease.
75Once in Ireland, the mother trained to obtain the required qualifications to practice nursing. However, her goal to resume her nursing career in Ireland was derailed when M. suffered the first of two strokes. As a single-parent raising both children, she cared for M. as he re-learned how to walk and talk, all while managing the medical care, restricted diets, medications, and overall fragile health of both children. She did all this while raising V. and M. by herself on public assistance with charity from friends and her church congregation.
76By the time V. was 10 years old, diet restrictions no longer effectively managed his sickle cell disease. He grew chronically lethargic. Chemotherapy treatment did not successfully address his debilitating health. Thereafter, V. began receiving therapeutic blood transfusions that were and will always be critical to managing his sickle cell disease for the rest of his life.
77V. and M. received blood transfusion care at a children’s hospital until they turned 21 years of age, whereupon their care was taken up by non-pediatric medical teams. Both children will likely continue to receive therapeutic blood transfusions and undergo related testing for the remainder of their lives. Each blood transfusion appointment involves a full-day admission and is preceded by one or two days of blood, brain, and heart testing. They tend to feel strong immediately after receiving a blood transfusion (i.e., due to excess iron received with each transfusion) before growing increasingly lethargic until their next transfusion. Both take various medication to control their sickle cell disease, prevent disease-related complications, and manage the risk of infection.
78Complications from his sickle cell disease and treatment wore V. down to the point where he did not perform well in the 2022-2023 academic year. By September 2023, he took a leave from his studies to work on his health. More recently, V. applied to return to school and expects to resume classes in September 2026, subject to being re-admitted to his program of study at the National College of Ireland. V. will need to repeat his previous academic year before he may complete his final year. He intends to graduate with his degree in September 2028, about two years after M.’s graduation.
79After starting his therapeutic blood transfusions, M. began wearing a Perma-Cath device affied to his chest to facilitate his blood transfusions. Having to wear this catheter device prevented him from bathing, showering, swimming, or engaging in physical activities with other children. M. must bathe by using a wash cloth.
80M. diligently pursued university studies to complete a post-secondary degree and received a BSc in computer sciences in September 2025. He had not found employment by the end of trial.
81From birth, V. and M. were raised in economically-disadvantaged circumstances. They lived on public assistance in a state of near-persistent material deprivation due to their limited financial means. Purchases were strictly budgeted. Their household relied on charity from friends and church members for food and other essentials. Growing up, they always wore bargain clothing. They had no extra-curricular activities as the costs were prohibitive. Apart from a trip in 2016 to see family in Nigeria, they never went away on vacation. Holiday gifts were discount items on sale. As a sole caregiver, the mother faced never-ending challenges as she managed their serious health issues while struggling to make ends meet. V. and M. never had extras or luxuries.
Retroactive Child Support
82As explained below, I find that support for the children should be awarded retroactively to August 1, 2016.
83After separation, the mother unsuccessfully tried to reach the father to arrange financial support for the children. She called him once from Dublin but he hung up and effectively became untraceable. Given her limited means, I accept that she could not retain an investigator to perform an international skip trace to locate him. Instead, the mother asked family members in Nigeria and friends in North America for help in tracking down the father.
84Between 2003 and 2016, the mother unsuccessfully tried to locate the father by searching social media and the Internet. During this period, she also asked family members and friends to help her find him via social media platforms. At one point, Ms. Isokpenhi found two telephone numbers for the father, including one in the City of Toronto, but one number was out of service and the other had been reassigned to a different person when the mother called.
85Until 2016, the mother was unable to return to Nigeria as V. and M. were having ongoing medical treatments and procedures in Ireland. After M.’s intravenous treatment line was removed in 2016, the mother took the children to see their family in Nigeria as they were well-enough to travel. While in Nigeria, the mother and her brother, Lambert Odigie, visited the paternal grandfather to ask for the father’s location and contact information, and to leave her contact information (i.e., including her email address that she never changed after separation) for the father. However, the grandfather did not share the father’s whereabouts or offer any help in finding him. The mother did not return to Nigeria after 2016.
86After the mother visited the paternal grandfather in 2016, the maternal grandmother and Lambert Odigie regularly went to see the paternal grandfather to ask for the father’s location and contact information to help the mother pursue child support for V. and M.. In July 2018, the paternal grandfather gave the maternal grandmother a phone number for the father’s younger brother who advised the mother that the father was somewhere in Canada when she called. Later, in August 2018, the younger brother gave the mother a phone number for one of the father’s other brothers in Lagos, Nigeria. After calling the brother in Lagos, the mother did not learn more about the father’s location after telling him that the father did not care about the children and was not giving them any financial support.
87On March 10, 2019, the maternal grandmother learned that the paternal grandfather had passed away. Knowing that members of the paternal family, including the father, would likely attend the paternal grandfather’s funeral in April 2019, the maternal grandmother attended the funeral to watch for the father. During a funeral gathering on April 28, 2019, the maternal grandmother and Lambert Odigie confronted the father about not supporting the children that embarrassed the father and perhaps other members of the paternal family who were present and overheard the confrontation.
88Thereafter, a member of the paternal family gave the father’s Brampton address and phone number to the maternal grandmother who passed it on to the mother. On June 19, 2019, the mother wrote to the father by registered mail to be reacquainted. Around the same day, she messaged him to suggest the children should learn about their family roots. The mother also called the father who hung up after she identified herself to him, and her further calls to him went directly to voice-mail.
89I am satisfied that the mother has reasonably explained that the child support claim for V. and M. was not brought earlier because she could not locate the father. Having regard to her limited financial means as a single mother raising two children on social assistance, and her priority to manage the children’s serious illnesses, I accept that she pursued reasonable means at her disposal to find the father by enlisting family and friends for help in doing so. I accept that the mother acted with reasonable diligence by trying to track down the father through social media, and then visiting the paternal grandfather in Nigeria in July 2016 to ask for the father’s location and contact information while sharing hers in order to reach him. Given her limited means and child care priorities, and after balancing the children’s interests against those of the father, I find that her efforts to find him to arrange child support were reasonable and did not result in the sort of undue delay that would otherwise militate against awarding any retroactive child support.
90I am not persuaded that the father tried to reach the mother, as he claims, and find that his purported efforts to contact her were unconvincing at best. The mother maintained the same email address since separation. In addition, members of the maternal family in Nigeria persistently asked the paternal grandfather and others in the paternal family for the father’s whereabouts and contact information. In the circumstances, I do not believe the father’s claim that he tried to contact the mother to discuss the children or to arrange support for them. In my view, the father essentially ghosted the mother in an ill-conceived effort to ignore her and evade his child support obligations. Given the collective efforts of the mother and other members of the maternal family to reach the father, including at the late paternal grandfather’s funeral, I find it inconceivable that the father did not know of the mother’s wish for child support by then. In turn, I am satisfied that his efforts to ignore her and avoid his child support obligations reflected blameworthy conduct that merits retroactive child support being swarded: D.B.S. at paras 105-109.
91I am satisfied that the children’s circumstances merit a retroactive award of child support. They endured financial hardship from being deprived of child support throughout their childhood when they needed it most. They were raised on social assistance and relied on their friends and church for food and necessities while coping with serious illness. Taking everything into account, I am satisfied awarding retroactive child support is justified in the particular circumstances of this case: D.B.S. at paras 110-113.
92I am mindful that a sizable retroactive child support award may cause financial challenge or hardship to the payor father who claims to now be unemployed. However, the circumstances of his dismissal and subsequent job search efforts are less than clear given the limited evidence about any of this at trial. Furthermore, the hardship considerations in this analysis are not limited to just the payor as a retroactive award will always disrupt the payor’s management of their financial affairs in ways that a prospective award will not: D.B.S. at para 115. In this case, the father bought a single-detached home and realized equity by, at least in part, not otherwise paying support for V. and M.. I am satisfied that the father would have understood his moral obligation, as a parent, to support his children. Although the mother kept the same email address, the father never tried to reach her to arrange for child support or to ask about the children. In addition, he did not respond to her letters, hung up when she called, and obstinately refused to acknowledge fathering the children despite the DNA test results confirming his paternity.
93At trial, the father testified that he arrived in Canada in 2004 and settled in Ontario where he continues to reside. It follows that he has been subject to the child support provisions of the FLA since his arrival in Canada in 2004.
94In crafting an award of retroactive child support, and to avoid undue hardship to the payor father, I find in the particular circumstances of this case that child support should be awarded retroactively to August 1, 2016 when the father had actual or constructive notice of the child support claim when the mother visited the paternal grandfather in Nigeria. By that date, I accept that the father likely would have known of the mother’s child support claim. In my view, the paternal grandfather in all likelihood would have informed the father around July 2016 that the mother had been to his home for information to help her locate the father and pursue child support, and that the maternal grandmother was also persistently asking for the same information to help the children access child support. Despite the father’s abject failure to pay any child support after the separation in late 2002 or early 2003, and the consequential financial hardship that the children endured, I find after balancing the mother’s delay in pursuing child support and hardship the father would face from a retroactive award that support for the children should be ordered retroactively to August 1, 2016. This retroactive child support period goes beyond the 3-year guideline period that generally applies to retroactive support orders: D.B.S. at para 123. However, I am satisfied that this retroactive award is more than justified as the father ignored his support obligations and ghosted the mother when she tried to contact him on several occasions from July 2016 to arrange for child support. To this end, the father should not be rewarded for his neglect or indifference to his child support obligations and his non-disclosure of his whereabouts or contact information that frustrated the mother’s reasonable efforts to pursue her child support claim: D.B.S. at paras 124-125. To otherwise limit retroactive child support to just three years before formal notice of the claim was given, as is often done in other cases, would unjustly allow the father to benefit from his wrongdoing that the court should not allow or condone, particularly on the facts of this case given the financial hardship the children experienced from his abject failure to meet his child support obligations: D.B.S. at para 125. Courts are not to be discouraged from defending the rights of children when they have the opportunity to do so: D.B.S. at para 60; Michel at para 31. That said, I find that awarding retroactive child support earlier than August 1, 2016 would result in undue hardship to the payor father and, therefore, be unfair and inappropriate. Without being critical of the mother’s delay in actively pursuing the child support claim as she understandably prioritized the children’s medical care and health needs, the delay in actively seeking child support remains a factor to consider in making a retroactive award: D.B.S. at para 104. The court must also seek to minimize hardship to the payor parent, although that is not always possible: D.B.S. at para 116. Taking everything into account, I find that awarding retroactive child support to August 1, 2016 is fair and appropriate in all of the circumstances.
Termination of Child Support
95As explained below, I find that child support for M. should terminate as of May 31, 2026, and child support for V. should terminate as of May 31, 2029.
96After graduating from secondary school, V. and M. enrolled in full-time undergraduate programs of education.
97In September 2025, M. completed a BSc degree but was unable to find employment by the conclusion of trial on December 3, 2025. Although M. considered pursuing a graduate degree, he did not enroll in a graduate program and a claim for child support while he pursues a graduate degree has not been raised. That said, a dependent child remains entitled to child support over a “modest transition period” after finishing an education program and while searching for employment: S.P. v. R.P., 2011 ONCA 336 at para 32; Edwards v. Edwards, 2021 ONSC 1550 at para 38. Based on this, and recognizing the challenges that M. likely will face with his job search efforts on account of his serious health issues, I find that a reasonable transition period for him would run until May 31, 2026 (i.e., roughly eight (8) months after completing his degree), by which point his entitlement to receive child support should be terminated.
98V. was forced to pause his undergraduate studies from September 2023 due to the medical leave of absence he had to take to manage his sickle cell disease. Although a dependent child is generally required to attend school to maintain their dependant status for support purposes, an exception is made for illness or other disability as V. experienced in this particular case: Edwards at para 39; Bader-Higgins v. Higgins, 2024 ONSC 3 at para 24. During V.’s medical leave from his undergraduate program, he clearly was unable by reason of illness or disability to withdraw from the charge of his mother, who helped and cared for him over this period. V. is now expected to resume his undergraduate program in September 2026 when he will have to repeat his previous year of study that was disrupted by illness related to the onset of his sickle cell disease. V. expects to graduate from his undergraduate program by September 2028. As I accept that V., like M., likely will have health-related challenges in finding employment after graduation, I find that a reasonable transition period for V. would run until May 31, 2029 (i.e., roughly eight (8) months after his degree is completed), at which time I find that his entitlement to receive child support should terminate: S.P. at para 32; Edwards at para 38.
Amount of Child Support
99The father’s annual income for the years 2016 to 2024 is set out below:
| Year | Income10 |
|---|---|
| 2016 | $46,689.00 |
| 2017 | $47,949.00 |
| 2018 | $48,460.00 |
| 2019 | $59,913.00 |
| 2020 | $65,929.00 |
| 2021 | $71,859.00 |
| 2022 | $67,601.00 |
| 2023 | $60,110.00 |
| 2024 | $55,533.00 |
100The father’s total income for 2025 is unknown. The father testified that he was terminated from employment, but did not produce records to meaningfully show his termination pay, if any, or post-termination job search efforts. In light of this, I find it appropriate to impute an annual income to the father of $61,081.00 based on a 3-year average of his reported total income from 2022 to 2024 (i.e., $67,601.00 + $60,110.00 + $55,533.00 ÷ 3 yrs) for the purpose of determining his income for child support purposes from 2025 to 2029, respectively: s. 19(1) of the Ontario Child Support Guidelines, O.Reg. 391/97; Slongo v. Slongo, 2017 ONCA 272 at para 130; Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200 at paras 108, 123-124.
101Applying the foregoing annual income figures, the father’s support obligation to V. and M. from August 1, 2016 until May 31, 2026 amounts to $107,117.00, as set out below:
| Year | Annual Income | Monthly Child Support for Both Children11 | Child Support Owed for Year |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | $48,689.00 | $691.00 | $3,455.00 (i.e., for 5 months) |
| 2017 | $47,949.00 | $724.00 | $8,688.00 |
| 2018 | $48,460.00 | $731.00 | $8,772.00 |
| 2019 | $59,913.00 | $913.00 | $10,956.00 |
| 2020 | $65,929.00 | $1,005.00 | $12,060.00 |
| 2021 | $71,859.00 | $1,095.00 | $13,140.00 |
| 2022 | $67,601.00 | $1,030.00 | $12,360.00 |
| 2023 | $60,110.00 | $917.00 | $11,004.00 |
| 2024 | $55,533.00 | $847.00 | $10,164.00 |
| 2025 | $61,081.00 | $931.00 | $11,172.00 |
| 2026 | $61,081.00 | $931.00 | $4,655.00 (i.e., until May 31, 2026) |
| Total | $106,426.00 |
102Thereafter, the father’s child support obligation to V. from June 1, 2026 to May 31, 2029 amounts to $20,412.00 based on the following calculations:
| Year | Annual Income | Monthly Child Support for One Child12 | Child Support Owed for Year |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | $61,081.00 | $567.00 | $3,969.00 (i.e., from June 1, 2026 to Dec. 31, 2026) |
| 2027 | $61,081.00 | $567.00 | $6,804.00 |
| 2028 | $61,081.00 | $567.00 | $6,804.00 |
| 2029 | $61,081.00 | $567.00 | $2,835.00 (i.e., until May 31, 2029) |
| Total | $20,412.00 |
103It follows that the father’s total child support obligation from July 1, 2016 to May 31, 2029 amounts to $127,529.00.
Enforcement of Child Support
104As set out below, I am satisfied that orders to preserve and secure child support should be granted: s. 40 and 34(1)(k) of the FLA.
105On June 24, 2022, the court granted a temporary restraining order under s. 40 of the FLA to restrain the father from depleting his property, including his land on Zelda Road in Brampton, to preserve the claim for child support. On June 19, 2023, the father’s motion to set aside the temporary preservation order was dismissed.
106The court may make a final order to restrain the depletion of a spouse’s property that would otherwise impair or defeat a claim under Part III (Support obligations) of the FLA for a support obligation: s. 40 of the FLA. The objective of s. 40 of the FLA is to ensure that assets are available to satisfy the entitlements of a party who successfully obtains support relief: Bandyopadhyay v. Chakraborty, 2019 ONSC 802 at para 44; Aryan-Pour v. Moghadam, 2024 ONSC 4330 at para 23.
107Normally, a temporary preservation order will merge into a final order: Coast to Coast Against Cancer v Sokolowski, 2016 ONSC 170 at para 4; Carter v. Carter, 2024 ONSC 5414 at para 473, affirmed 2026 ONCA 29. In addition, jurisprudence supports the availability of post-judgment preservation orders (i.e., in the form of Mareva injunction orders) in aid of execution, that are more readily made than pre-judgment orders by applying a lower burden of proof on the claimant: First Majestic Silver Corp. v. Davila, 2014 BCCA 11 at para 44.
108In Lamont v. Ken [1999] OJ No 277 (Gen Div), Sachs J. cited Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. v. Hind (1981), 132 OR (2d) 591 (HC) at 594 where Grange J. set out the following factors to consider in deciding whether to continue a Mareva injunction post-judgment in aid of execution:
a) the plaintiff must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts within his/her knowledge;
b) the plaintiff must give particulars of the claim against the defendant, stating the grounds of the claim and the amount thereof, and the points that could be fairly made against it by the defendant;
c) the plaintiff must give grounds for believing that the defendant has assets in the jurisdiction;
d) the plaintiff must give grounds for believing that there is a real risk of the assets being removed out of the jurisdiction, or disposed of within the jurisdiction, or otherwise dealt with so that the plaintiff will be unable to satisfy a judgment; and
e) the plaintiff must give an undertaking as to damages.
See also: Coast at para 6; American Environmental Container Corp. v. Kennedy, 2014 ONSC 4438 at para 3; Tabrizi v. Majesty Development Group Inc., 2022 ONSC 2665 at para 20;
109In this case, the mother satisfied the requirements for a Mareva injunction by obtaining a temporary preservation order on June 24, 2022 to preserve her child support claim by restraining the father from depleting his property. By endorsement dated June 19, 2023, I made the following findings in dismissing the father’s motion to set aside the temporary preservation order:
I accept that the [mother] has shown a real risk that the [father] may dissipate or divest his assets to frustrate her child support claim: Taus v. Henry, 2016 ONSC 219 at para 35; McArthur v. Le, 2022 ONSC 2110 at para 95. On balance, I accept the [mother] would suffer greater harm if the [temporary preservation order] was set aside pending a decision on the child support claim on its merits; Accordingly, I accept that the [temporary preservation order] is necessary and should continue to prevent the child support claim from being impaired or defeated: Price v. Price, 2016 ONSC 728 at para 6; Fraser v. Fraser, 2017 ONSC 3774 at par 59; Cummings v. Cumings, 2020 ONSC 3093 at para 82.
110There are other grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the father may dissipate or dispose of his assets in the jurisdiction to defeat the mother’s ability to realize her judgment for child support, particularly his residential home on Zelda Road in Brampton. Among other things, the father belatedly claimed to not be the real owner of the property on Zelda Road by saying that he held it in trust for other persons, but produced no records or any meaningful evidence to support this claim. I find that his claim that he is holding the subject property in trust for others is just a disingenuous attempt to avoid his support obligations to the children. In addition, the father has, a) resisted paying any child support, b) refused to accept V. and M. as his children despite consent DNA tests confirming his parentage to a statistical probability of over 99.99999%, and c) failed to pay costs awarded against him in this litigation. Taking everything into account, I find too much risk that the father will not voluntarily pay the child support as ordered, that would leave the mother without the ability to enforce child support without a preservation order in place.
111I am satisfied that a final order to secure child support by a charge on the father’s property should be granted.
112Section 34(1)(k) of the FLA provides:
Powers of court
34 (1) In an application under section 33, the court may make an interim or final order,
(k) requiring the securing of payment under the order, by a charge on property or otherwise.
113After taking everything into account, I am satisfied that the mother should have a final order for security under s. 34(1)(k) of the FLA in light of the father’s conduct that afforded grounds for granting the preservation order, as described earlier: Sadlier v. Carey, 2015 ONSC 3537 at paras 62-63; Hawas v. Ibrahim, 2021 ONSC 3713 at para 150. Among other things, the father was uncooperative with the mother, ignored his obligation to support the children, has not paid costs orders against him in this proceeding, claims to now face poor re-employment prospects without any meaningful evidence to establish this, and has given the court little if any reason to trust him to pay a final order for child support. The only meaningful form of security to protect the mother’s interests is his home in Brampton. In the circumstances of this case, I accept that she should have security against his home so that she may realize on the final order for child support: Sadlier at paras 63-64. In my view, granting a final order for security will achieve the primary objective of dealing with the case justly: r. 2(2)-(4) of the Family Law Rules, O.Reg. 114/99.
Outcome
114Accordingly, the following is ordered pursuant to the FLA on a final basis:
a. the father shall pay the mother retroactive child support for the children, V. (born in November 2001) and M. (born in August 2003), for the period from August 1, 2016 until May 31, 2026 in the amount of $106,426.00, that shall be paid at a rate of $1,000.00 per month until such time as this amount is retired;
b. from June 1, 2026 until May 31, 2029, the father shall pay child support for V. (born in November 2001) in the amount of $567.00 per month (i.e., on an imputed income of $61,081.00 per year), payable on the first day of each month;
c. the mother shall have pre and post judgment interest in the ordinary course in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, with post judgment interest accruing from the date of this final order, or from the date that any periodic payment of child support falls due, and until such payment is made;
d. the court’s preservation order dated June 24, 2022 shall continue until after the court disposes of costs for the trial and the proceeding, and until any amounts ordered by the court for the proceeding, including any costs of the trial as ordered, are paid in full;
e. the parties may cooperate to lift the preservation order dated June 24, 2022 for the purpose of enabling the father to pay any amounts owed to the mother, including but not limited to retroactive or prospective child support, any costs orders, any pre or post judgment interest as ordered;
f. any amounts of child support, costs, and pre and post-judgment interest in this proceeding shall be charged against the father’s interest in his property located on Zelda Road in Brampton until all such amounts have been paid in full;
g. a support deduction order shall issue;
h. the final order to be entered shall contain the usual clause for the payment of child support through the Family Responsibility Office;
i. a copy of the final order may be registered by the mother or the director, Family Responsibility Office against the father’s interest in his property located on Zelda Road in Brampton;
j. once all amounts owed by the father to the mother are paid in full as ordered, the preservation order may be discharged from title to the father’s interest in his property located on Zelda Road in Brampton; and
k. as a condition for obtaining the relief as herein ordered, the mother shall filed a written undertaking that she will not seek to enforce the existing child support order by the Dublin Metropolitan District Court dated February 20, 2020.
115Should the parties not agree on costs, the mother may deliver written submissions on costs of up to 8 pages (excluding her bill of costs and any offer(s) to settle) within 15 days, and the father may deliver his costs submissions on the same terms within a further 15 days. Reply submissions shall not be delivered without leave.13
116The mother may file a draft final order for my consideration, along with her pre-judgment interest calculations, and the father’s consent or written approval as to the form and content of the draft final order is dispensed with.
Date: June 2, 2026 M.T. Doi J.
CITATION: Odigie v. Egharevba, 2026 ONSC 3024
COURT FILE NO.: FS-21-42
DATE: 2026 06 02
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: Gloria Amenaghawon Odigie, Applicant
AND:
Emmanuel Egharevba, Respondent
BEFORE: M.T. Doi J.
COUNSEL: Mark Rush and Dylan Vermeulan (student-at-law), for the Applicant
Emmanuel Egharevba, self-represented Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
M.T. Doi J.
DATE: June 2, 2026
Footnotes
- See endorsements dated January 27, 2022 and June 14, 2022, and the temporary order dated June 14, 2022: Case Center G1, G2-G6, and G16-G17.
- See endorsement dated August 15, 2022: Case Center G18.
- See endorsement dated August 14, 2022 at para 3; Case Center G18.
- See endorsement dated June 19, 2023 at p. 2; G20.
- On June 19, 2023, I dismissed the motion to set aside by finding: a) that the mother had established a prima facie if not strong case for her child support claim for both children based in part on the results of the DNA paternity tests; b) a risk of irreparable harm based on the father’s efforts to ghost the mother to evade her child support claim while ignoring his support obligations to the children; and c) a real risk that he would dissipate or divest his assets to frustrate the child support claim: see endorsement dated June 19, 2023: Case Center G19-G22.
- Amended answer dated July 17 2025 at para 28: Case Center A1434.
- Exhibit 47, Case Center B395.
- Exhibit 61 ,Case Center B 397.
- Ibid.
- See the father’s Notices of Assessment for 2016 to 2024: Case Center A1346 to A1358; A1524; A1523.
- See DivorceMate Calculations for 2016 to 2024: Case Center A1376 to A1396.
- See DivorceMate Calculation for 2025 onwards: Case Center A1398.
- Should either party wish to raise any mathematical issues with my support calculations, I may be spoken to.