CITATION
La France v. Saroli, 2026 ONSC 1783
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Louise Lenore La France
Applicant
– and –
Robert Anthony Saroli
Respondent
Martha McCarthy, Crystal Heidari, and Ella Benedetti, for the applicant
Geoffrey Wells, Isabel Brisson (Student-at-law), for the respondent
HEARD: February 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, and 20, 2026
Robert CentA J.
Table of Contents
Overview.. 2
The parties and their witnesses. 2
Assessing the evidence. 4
Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli cohabited beginning on January 1, 2019. 10
Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli stopped cohabiting on August 23, 2023. 30
Ms. La France is entitled to non-compensatory spousal support 37
Quantum and duration of spousal support 43
The spousal support should be paid as a lump sum.. 50
Ms. La France is not entitled to recover for unjust enrichment 52
A restraining order is not appropriate. 54
Order and costs. 55
- Overview
1Louise La France brings this application seeking an order for spousal support and a monetary award for unjust enrichment against Robert Saroli. Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli each describe their relationship very differently. In general, I believe the evidence of Ms. La France and disbelieve the evidence of Mr. Saroli. Ms. La France’s testimony was clear, internally consistent, and corroborated by a significant number of contemporaneous documents. The evidence of Mr. Saroli was neither reliable nor credible and appeared to be the product of hindsight generated by the hard feelings caused by this litigation.
2I find that Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli were spouses for the purposes of Part III of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, because they cohabited in a conjugal relationship from January 1, 2019, until August 23, 2024.
3I find that Ms. La France is entitled to spousal support on a non-compensatory basis but not on a compensatory basis. Ms. La France is entitled to support primarily because of the significant drop in her standard of living at the end of the spousal relationship. As I will explain, Mr. Saroli is enormously wealthy and provided Ms. La France with a truly luxurious standard of living. I have determined that Mr. Saroli’s annual income for spousal support purposes should be set at $63.69 million. Considering the purposes of a support order set out in s. 33(8) of the Family Law Act, and the circumstances of this case, including the factors set out in s. 33(9) of the Family Law Act, Ms. La France is entitled to an award of approximately $200,000 per month for three years. However, in the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to convert that figure to a lump sum of $3 million.
4I find that Ms. La France has not proven that she is entitled to a monetary award for unjust enrichment. Even assuming she could prove an enrichment of Mr. Saroli, a corresponding detriment to herself, and the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment, I would not award her a remedy once the benefits she received from the relationship are considered.
5Finally, I do not think it is appropriate to issue a mutual no-contact or non-harassment order in the circumstances of this case.
2. The parties and their witnesses
A. Ms. La France and her witnesses
6The applicant is Louise La France. She is 55 years old and was previously married with no children. Ms. Lafrance practised family, real estate, and estates law until she retired in 2014, following the murder of one of her family law clients. Ms. La France testified that the murder of her client was devastating. She started seeing a psychiatrist and was on a series of medications to help her. Since 2014, she has received disability payments from her insurer as she is currently unable to return to work due to her mental health. She describes her current condition as symptomatic but functional. Ms. La France called four witnesses to testify at trial.
7Norma La France is the 81-year-old mother of Ms. La France. She testified about her observations of the relationship between Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli, her recollection of a telephone call with her daughter on January 1, 2019, and her recollection of an argument that she overheard between Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli.
8Lidia Hoshowatiuk is a friend of Ms. La France. Ms. Hoshowatiuk testified about the time she spent in the summer of 2023 helping Ms. La France pack her belongings to move out the home she shared with Mr. Saroli, including some things that Mr. Saroli said to her.
9Dr. Paul Morris is a private psychiatrist who has provided care to Ms. La France approximately every other week since April 1, 2024. He testified as a participant expert about his observations of Ms. La France and the opinions he formed during his care for her, including information gleaned from the review of her file. He testified that Ms. La France experienced symptoms of depression and anxiety dating back to her teenage years. He testified that Ms. La France presents with depressive symptoms with features of an obsessive compulsive personality (but not an obsessive compulsive disorder). Dr. Morris did not observe any signs of alcohol abuse by Ms. La France. In 2025, he submitted two reports about Ms. La France to her disability insurer. He testified that he had not seen any significant changes in Ms. La France during the time he was providing health care to her and stated that the stress of the litigation appeared to be affecting Ms. La France.
10Paula White is a chartered accountant and chartered business valuator. I qualified Ms. White as an expert in calculating income for the purposes of support. Ms. White prepared a report that assessed Mr. Saroli’s income based on his investible asset portfolio.
B. Mr. Saroli and his witnesses
11The respondent is Robert Saroli. Mr. Saroli is 74 years old. Although he separated from his second wife Patricia in 2009, they are still legally married.1 Mr. Saroli has two sons, Stephen and Ryan.
12Mr. Saroli is justifiably proud of his achievements in business. Born in Europe to parents displaced by the Second World War, Mr. Saroli moved to Canada when he was very young. His parents moved several times in search of work and Mr. Saroli’s family had very little money as he grew up. Mr. Saroli worked his way through engineering school and built a series of successful businesses. In 2016, he sold his aluminum extrusion company for about $380 million. He continues to hold commercial real estate assets and a private mortgage lending business. Mr. Saroli called four witnesses at trial.
13Ryan Saroli is Mr. Saroli’s son from his first marriage. He 39 years old and currently lives in Charlotte, North Carolina. He testified about his interactions with Ms. La France.
14Steven Uttley is a friend of, first, Ms. La France and, later, Mr. Saroli.2 He testified about his observations of the relationship between Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli at the homes in Oakville and on a vacation in Las Vegas.
15John Kouzoukas is a friend of Mr. Saroli’s. He testified about the night Mr. Saroli won some money at a casino and his observations about what he described as a heated conversation between Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France.
16Finally, Mr. Saroli called a person to testify about a brief sexual relationship the witness had with Ms. La France in early 2023.
3. Assessing the evidence
17It is necessary to approach the evidence at trial in sequence. Although I can only discuss one portion of the evidence at a time, I considered all the evidence before making my findings of fact.
A. Reliability and credibility of witnesses
18There are many significant factual disputes in this case. Resolving those disputes will require me to assess the reliability and credibility of the witnesses at trial.
19It is important to recall that credibility and reliability are different. Credibility has to do with the honesty, sincerity, or veracity of a witness. Reliability describes the other factors that can influence the accuracy of testimony, such as the witness’s ability to observe, recall, and recount events in issue.3
20Witnesses can sincerely believe their evidence is true, but that does not mean that what they are saying is reliable. Memory is fallible and becomes increasingly frail over time. I must consider the witness’s capacity to remember and the accuracy of her or his statements.4 Even an apparently convincing, confident, and credible witness may not be an accurate or reliable reporter. There is significant risk in placing too much emphasis on demeanour or the confidence with which a witness speaks where there are contradictions and inconsistencies inherent in their evidence or where that testimony is inconsistent with contemporaneous records.5 I must assess whether the witness is honestly trying to tell the truth, whether the witness is sincere and frank or biased, reticent, and evasive.6
21One of the leading decisions on assessing credibility is Faryna v. Chorny, where the court explained that:
[t]he credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the personal demeanour of the particular witness carried conviction of the truth. The test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions.7
22I may accept some, none, or all of the evidence of a witness.8 Considering my assessment of reliability and credibility, I will assess the evidence before me according to many factors, including the following:
a. if the evidence makes sense by being logical or plausible;
b. if there are inconsistencies or weaknesses in the evidence of the witness, such as internal inconsistencies, prior inconsistent statements, or inconsistencies with the evidence of other witnesses;
c. if there is independent or documentary evidence to confirm or contradict the witness’s evidence, or a lack of such evidence;
d. the witness’s demeanour, including their sincerity and use of language, although this must be considered with caution; and
e. if the witness, particularly one that is a party in a case, may have a motive to fabricate.9
23At the end of the day, believing the testimony of one witness and not another is a matter of judgment.10
24I will also draw inferences from the facts that I find. An inference must be reasonably and logically drawn from a fact or a group of facts established by evidence. The first step in the inference-drawing process is to prove in evidence the primary facts that provide the basis for the inference.11 I may then draw factual inferences from the evidence, but only those that can be reasonably and logically drawn from the primary facts.12 As Doherty J.A. cautioned, an “inference which does not flow logically and reasonably from established facts cannot be made and is condemned as conjecture and speculation.”13
25I will explain my credibility findings on specific points as I work my way through the evidence. I have not considered the evidence in silos, and I have considered the totality of the evidence before reaching any conclusions.14 However, I will briefly describe my overall impressions here.
26This case turns almost entirely on the evidence of Ms. La France, Mr. Saroli, and the contemporaneous documents tendered into evidence.
27I found Ms. La France to be a credible and reliable witness. She has a very good memory for dates and had a habit of taking notes and photographs that corroborated her evidence. Her evidence was internally consistent and plausible. It made sense. She accepted that her behaviour was not perfect throughout the relationship and did not attempt to minimize those situations or suggest that she was blameless. On balance, her evidence was consistent with contemporaneous documents and, importantly, neutral third-party records such as hospital records, recordings of conversations Mr. Saroli’s health care team, and phone bills. She testified in a sincere, careful manner.
28Skilful cross-examination of Ms. La France revealed no major inconsistencies in her evidence. Mr. Saroli attempted to discredit her evidence by suggesting that she did tell her disability insurer soon enough that she was living with Mr. Saroli, and that she was not as ill as she and her physicians reported to the insurer, or, when it suited him, that she was very ill and incapable of providing care to him. None of these suggestions undermined Ms. La France’s evidence in a significant way. Mr. Saroli did not establish that Ms. La France ever made a positive misrepresentation to her disability insurer. The medical evidence establishing her longstanding and serious disability, and its symptoms, stands unchallenged and I accept it. If Mr. Saroli was suggesting that Ms. La France should not be believed because of her anxiety, depression, or other mental health issues, I do not accept that submission. It is an impermissible stereotype that persons having or being medicated for mental illness are likely to be unreliable witnesses.15 There is no evidence to suggest that Ms. La France’s memory was in any way affected by her mental health. To the contrary, all the evidence suggests that Ms. La France has a remarkably good memory for details and dates.
29In contrast, Mr. Saroli’s evidence was neither reliable nor credible. Even allowing for his age, Mr. Saroli was not a reliable narrator. He gave confident evidence that was subsequently disproven with objective, contemporaneous evidence. For example, he was certain that a particular and important incident took place at the Vibo restaurant, on Bloor Street West, in 2023. When confronted with contemporaneous documents, he admitted that the incident took place at Grappa restaurant, on The Queensway, in April 2022.
30In addition, I had significant concerns about Mr. Saroli’s credibility. For example, I do not think that he had trouble remembering the amount of care Ms. La France provided to him during his cancer treatment; I believe he was deliberately minimizing the help that he knew she provided. To take another example, he testified at trial that he stood by his evidence at questioning that Ms. La France was “the worst person that he ever met in his life,” and that he did not regret saying those words. Counsel for Ms. La France pointed out that there were contemporaneous text messages and recordings from the very end of his relationship with Ms. La France where he stated that he knew she was a good person and that he loved her. For example, on November 22, 2023, well after Ms. La France moved out, Mr. Saroli texted her “We were together for 5 years and it was a journey of highs and lows throughout which I always loved you. I continue to care deeply for you and wish we could just be friends.” Mr. Saroli conceded that he said those earlier things, but that “his mind would be different today.”
31The only material difference between then and now is Ms. La France’s application for spousal support and other relief. Putting my conclusion charitably, Mr. Saroli frequently allowed hindsight to affect his testimony.
32In some cases, Mr. Saroli tended to adopt an idiosyncratic view of the world that is inconsistent with the objectively discerned facts. For example, during his evidence he testified “I lead a very modest life” and “I do not have the lifestyle of a wealthy guy.” However, the evidence is uncontested that Mr Saroli:
a. paid $18 million cash for a home for the parties on Lakeshore Road in 2021;
b. owned a second home in the Cayman Islands that he valued at over $5 million;
c. lost $60 million playing poker and baccarat in the first three months of 2024;
d. enjoyed travel on a private jet, to and from the Napa Valley and Las Vegas, courtesy of a casino; and
e. hosted an annual Halloween party in Las Vegas for hundreds of guests.
33For whatever reason, it was very important for Mr. Saroli to tell himself and the court that he still lived a modest life. That self-image, however, is objectively and profoundly inaccurate and it causes me to have serious doubts about the accuracy of much of his evidence.
34There are no contemporaneous documents that confirm Mr. Saroli’s version of events. He attempted to overcome this problem by suggesting that the reason why Ms. La France had documents that corresponded to her version of events was because she was using her experience as a family lawyer to “set him up” to bring a claim for spousal support. Respectfully, there is no evidence to support Mr. Saroli’s theory, which I reject.
35Mr. Saroli went out of his way to denigrate Ms. La France. He accused her of abusing alcohol, staying out until all hours, scratching his cars, stealing his things including money from a safe, faking injuries, and taking alcohol from the house. Ms. La France denied all of these allegations. Mr. Saroli presented not a single piece of documentary or contemporaneous evidence to corroborate any of these allegations. His evidence about these allegations is entirely inconsistent with his contemporaneous text messages, his recorded comments, and other records. These allegations appear to be nothing more than Mr. Saroli’s attempt to disparage Ms. La France to win this case. I do not believe them.
36Where the evidence of Ms. La France conflicts with the evidence of Mr. Saroli, I almost always prefer the evidence of Ms. La France.
B. Surreptitious recordings
37Ms. La France recorded four conversations with Mr. Saroli without his knowledge. The conversations took place on March 12, 2023, April 25, 2023, July 11, 2023, and August 10, 2023. Ms. La France sought to introduce those recordings into evidence at trial. Initially, Mr. Saroli indicated that he was objecting to the admissibility of those recordings. After discussions among counsel, Mr. Saroli withdrew his objections to the admissibility of the recordings. The recordings themselves were marked as exhibits and transcripts of those conversations were marked as lettered exhibits.
38In his closing submission, Mr. Saroli submitted that I should give no weight to the recordings, because they were surreptitious. I disagree. As I will explain, even if Mr. Saroli had maintained his objection to the admissibility of the recordings, I would have admitted them because their probative value significantly exceeds the prejudicial effects of admitting the recordings. Having reached that conclusion, I will give the recordings appropriate weight.
39Mr. Saroli knew that Ms. La France frequently recorded conversations with health care providers to permit her to make notes after the fact. I also accept Ms. La France’s evidence that during the relationship she would record Mr. Saroli during arguments and play those recordings back to him the next day, when he denied saying some of the horrible things that the recordings proved he had said to her in the heat of the argument. Nevertheless, I accept Mr. Saroli’s evidence and submissions that these four conversations were recorded without his knowledge.
40The admissibility of surreptitiously obtained evidence is to be determined using general evidentiary principles:
a. Is the evidence relevant to a matter at issue?
b. Is the evidence it subject to an exclusionary rule?
c. Should the evidence be excluded because the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value?16
41I am satisfied that the recordings contain relevant and material evidence. I do not understand Mr. Saroli to suggest otherwise. The tapes contain statements by Mr. Saroli regarding whether he believed the parties were still in a relationship at the times of the recordings, whether he hoped the parties could continue their relationship, whether the parties were still engaged in sexual activities, whether Ms. La France provided significant support to him during his illness, whether he blamed Ms. La France for a break-in at the Lakeshore house, his beliefs about Ms. La France, the type of names he would call Ms. La France during their verbal altercations, and whether he meant those things. If believed, this evidence could make facts in dispute in this case more or less likely to be true.
42Mr. Saroli did not suggest that the evidence was subject to an exclusionary rule. I agree.
43In Ontario, surreptitiously obtained evidence is presumptively inadmissible in family law trials because the case-specific and systemic prejudicial effects almost always outweigh the evidence’s probative value.17 However, where the probative value of the recordings outweighs the prejudicial effects, the court will admit the recordings into evidence.18
44In my view, the probative value of the recording of Mr. Saroli’s statements is very high. I am satisfied that the conversations were recorded accurately and that they are representative of Mr. Saroli’s views at the time. I must determine whether the parties subjectively intended to live in a conjugal relationship, whether an objective view of the facts suggests that the parties were living in a conjugal relationship, and when that relationship ended. In any family law case, there is the danger that the parties’ evidence at trial will not accurately reflect their views at the time. It is common for hindsight and hard feelings to affect the parties’ testimony. Indeed, in his testimony Mr. Saroli acknowledged that “I believe I said those things, but I think my mind would be different today.” I have grave concerns that much of Mr. Saroli’s testimony did not reflect his feelings at the time and, rather, reflect positions that he adopted in the litigation to advance his interests.
45The recordings provide contemporaneous evidence of how Mr. Saroli said he really felt at the times the recordings were made. One of the recordings is of an argument. In the other three recordings, however, Mr. Saroli is calm, thoughtful, and candid. Mr. Saroli’s recorded statements are the best evidence of how he really felt at the time. There is an obvious difference between his recorded comments and his pleading, his answers on questioning, and his sworn evidence. In my view, the recorded conversations are highly probative, and it would do a disservice to the court’s truth-seeking function to exclude the evidence.19 I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s submission that Ms. La France was shaping the conversations because I see no evidence of that in the recordings. I do accept that I should give little weight to what Ms. La France says on the recordings, as she knew she was being recorded and could have been trying to present herself in the best possible light.20
46In this case, the prejudicial effects are very low. The court is to consider both case-specific prejudice (harm to parties, children, the trial process, trial length and fairness) and systemic prejudice to the goals of the family law system).
47I find there is no case-specific prejudice. This is not a case involving children or where children were recorded. The court will always be reluctant to admit surreptitious evidence of children or professionals.21 Because Mr. Saroli did not maintain his objection to the admissibility of the recordings when they were tendered, there was no prejudice to the length of the trial. The recordings themselves were neither lengthy nor numerous. They did not prolong the trial or take us down distracting rabbit holes. They were provided to Mr. Saroli in advance of his testimony and counsel for Ms. La France asked him to listen to the recordings before he testified. He was not ambushed by the recordings, and he had the opportunity to consider them before he gave his evidence. There is no danger that these recordings could inflict any emotional trauma on Mr. Saroli.22 In this case, excluding the recordings would have been far more damaging to the fairness of the trial than admitting them.
48There is a sound public policy of trying to discourage the use of secretly recorded conversations in family law cases, but I find there is only modest systemic harm from admitting these recordings.23 There is no ongoing relationship between Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli. Admitting surreptitious recordings will often undermine constructive post-separation relationships. Unlike many family law cases, this is not a case where the courts work with the family to rebuild trust so that parties can learn to act together in the best interests of a child of the marriage.24
49In all the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the recordings have a high probative value, which outweighs the modest systemic prejudice and the absence of case-specific prejudice. If Mr. Saroli had maintained his objection, I would have admitted the recordings. Given my conclusion on this point, I reject Mr. Saroli’s submission that I should give no weight to these recordings.
4. Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli cohabited beginning on January 1, 2019
50Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli never married and had no children together. Therefore, Ms. La France is only eligible to claim spousal support from Mr. Saroli under Part III of the Family Law Act if she was his spouse within the meaning of s. 29 of the Family Law Act. Section 29 defines a spouse to include “either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited…continuously for a period of not less than three years….” The Family Law Act defines “cohabit” to mean “to live together in a conjugal relationship, whether inside or outside marriage.” Reading the two provisions together, Ms. La France must prove that she and Mr. Saroli lived together in a conjugal relationship for a period of not less than three years in order to have standing to claim spousal support.25 This will require me to determine the dates the parties started and stopped cohabiting.26
51The Supreme Court of Canada and the Court of Appeal for Ontario have accepted that Molodowich sets out the generally accepted characteristics of a conjugal relationship as including shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support, children, and the societal perception of the couple.27 The Court recognized that these elements may be present in varying degrees and that not all are necessary for the relationship to be found to be conjugal. Molodowich is not a checklist.28 A couple is not required to fit precisely the traditional marital model to demonstrate that a relationship is conjugal. The court is to take a contextual and flexible approach when determining whether the parties were spouses.29 For example, Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France were 67 and 47, respectively, when they started dating. There is no evidence that they ever discussed having children together. In this case, the parties’ views on children are not relevant to assessing whether they were living together in a conjugal relationship.
52I will first describe the early dating relationship between Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli and then turn to the Molodowich factors.
A. Early dating life
53Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli connected on Tinder on June 21, 2018. At the time, she lived in Pembroke, and he lived in a house on Chartwell Road, Oakville. Two days later, Mr. Saroli flew his airplane out to Pembroke to meet Ms. La France. He stayed two or three nights at Ms. La France’s house and they had sexual intercourse during that visit. Mr. Saroli flew back to Pembroke on July 3 and stayed until July 6, 2018.
54Mr. Saroli testified that he was just looking for a girlfriend and not for anything particularly serious. Regardless, the relationship developed quickly. Ms. La France recalls that Mr. Saroli first told her that he loved her no later than a voicemail he left her on July 11, 2018, although it may have been earlier. Mr. Saroli left for a pre-planned trip to Italy on July 18, 2018. On July 18, 2018, Mr. Saroli sent Ms. La France a text message from his trip to Italy in which he told her he loved her. He also sent her a naked picture of himself. During this trip, Mr. Saroli tried to contact Ms. La France very frequently by telephone and they were speaking daily.
55Ms. La France testified that she disclosed her medical history, records, and the reasons for her retirement from law to Mr. Saroli during their second visit. She explained that the relationship was progressing rapidly and that she wanted Mr. Saroli to be aware of her circumstances. She testified that she told him that she had been diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and PTSD. She testified that she showed Mr. Saroli her medical records and that they spent about an hour going through them together. She testified that Mr. Saroli told her that he had prostate issues and had undergone a procedure called a “uro-lift.”
56In contrast, Mr. Saroli testified that Ms. La France told her nothing about her mental health and that he did not see any of Ms. La France’s medical reports until September 2020, after she sold her house in Pembroke. Mr. Saroli testified that he was “shocked by the severity” of what was described in the reports, and he wondered “who is this woman?” He testified that he did not even know that Ms. La France was seeing a psychiatrist before she moved in with him.
57I accept Ms. La France’s version of events and reject Mr. Saroli’s version of events. Ms. La France’s testimony was clear and precise. It makes sense that she would have disclosed her health issues promptly, particularly because (as I will explain below) the relationship was developing quickly. Mr. Saroli’s evidence, in contrast, makes little sense. Ms. La France was 47 and retired as a lawyer. It is difficult to believe that the parties did not discuss the reasons for her retirement, how she supported herself, and her ongoing mental health issues for the first two years of their relationship. In particular, I reject his evidence that he did not know that Ms. La France was seeing a psychiatrist until late 2020. As I will describe below, Mr. Saroli’s evidence is not credible given how much time they were spending together. I reject his evidence and accept Ms. La France’s version of events.
58Ms. La France testified that after the trip to Italy, she estimates that the parties were spending about 75% of their time together. The parties also began to travel frequently together.
59In late October, Mr. Saroli invited Ms. La France to join him on pre-planned trips to Napa Valley, California, and Las Vegas, Nevada. Mr. Saroli was a very significant gambler. He testified that he played poker and baccarat, including in tournaments. At least one casino, but almost certainly more than one, treated him as a very important client. Mr. Saroli bet enough money that the casino arranged for a private jet to pick up Ms. La France in Pembroke and fly her to Toronto, where they picked up Mr. Saroli and flew them both to San Francisco. From there, the casino shuttled them to the Napa Valley, where they stayed in luxury accommodations and visited exclusive wineries such as Opus One, Caymus Vineyards, and Cakebread Cellars. After a few days in Napa, the casino flew them by private jet to Las Vegas where they stayed in a complimentary suite. While in Las Vegas, Mr. Saroli threw his annual Halloween party.
60On December 18, 2018, Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France flew to his vacation home on Grand Cayman Island. They spent four weeks on Grand Cayman, returning to Toronto on or about January 18, 2019. What happened during this trip is relevant to the question of when the parties began to cohabit.
B. Shelter
61The first group of Molodowich components relate to shelter and ask:
a. Did the parties live under the same roof?
b. What were the sleeping arrangements?
c. Did anyone else occupy or share the available accommodation?
62To meet the definition of statutory cohabiting, there needs to be some element of the two people living together under the same roof.30 The fact that one party continues to maintain a separate residence does not preclude a finding that the parties are cohabiting.31
63Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli agree that they lived under the same roof for some time. Mr. Saroli says they lived under the same roof beginning in September 2020, after Ms. La France sold her house in Pembroke. Ms. La France submits that they started living under the same roof on December 18, 2018, when they travelled to Grand Cayman. I do not accept the start date proposed by either party.
64I do not accept Ms. La France’s proposed date of December 18, 2018. Ms. La France did not testify that the purpose of their trip was to begin living together or that they even discussed living together before they went on vacation together. Mr. Saroli’s uncontradicted testimony was that this was a pre-planned trip and he invited Ms. La France to join him. Simply starting a vacation together, even if you will be staying at a home owned by your partner, does not meet the test for living together under the same roof.
65I also do not accept Mr. Saroli’s proposed start date of September 2020. As I will explain, this start date is inconsistent with mountains of objective evidence and does not, at all, reflect the life that Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli lived together starting well before September 2020.
66Ms. La France testified that on January 1, 2019, Mr. Saroli asked her to move in with him. She described her excitement at the invitation, which she accepted. She testified that they immediately began discussing details, including Mr. Saroli’s recommendation that she list her Pembroke house for sale through his nephew, even though he did not live in eastern Ontario. She testified that she called her mother to tell her the good news.
67Norma La France testified that Ms. La France called her on January 1, 2019, and said that she was moving in with Mr. Saroli. In my view, Norma La France’s evidence is not admissible for the truth of its contents. Norma La France did not observe the conversation between Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli. Norma’s evidence simply repeats what Ms. La France said to her. In my view, Norma’s evidence was essentially a prior consistent statement made by Ms. La France. Prior consistent statements are prima facie inadmissible.32 The fact that a prior consistent statement was made is irrelevant because it is redundant to the testimony with which it is consistent.33 Repetition of the same claim is neither independent corroboration of that claim (as it comes from the same source) nor an indication that the claim is accurate (because a lie or mistake does not become true merely through its repetition).34
68However, I do think Norma La France’s evidence is admissible to rebut Mr. Saroli’s allegation that Ms. La France recently fabricated her version of events to advance her claim for spousal support. Norma La France’s evidence of what Ms. La France said to her is admissible to rebut the allegation of recent fabrication because:
a. The prior consistent statement is consistent with the testimony it is offered to support;
b. Ms. La France made the statement to Norma after the event she is testifying about, in this case Mr. Saroli’s invitation to Ms. La France to move in with him; and
c. The statement by Ms. La France to Norma predates the point in time when Mr. Saroli claims Ms. La France first adopted the version of events to which testified.35
69I will use Norma La France’s evidence only for this permissible purpose and not for the truth of its contents.
70Mr. Saroli testified that on January 1, 2019, he did not invite Ms. La France to move in with him. He testified that he had no interest in a permanent relationship with Ms. La France as their relationship was casual, they did not share many interests, and the relationship was primarily sexual. He testified that there was no discussion of co-habitation on January 1, 2019. Mr. Saroli testified that he already had started to get indications that his health might be a problem and that, therefore, the thought of cohabitation did not even cross his mind in January 2019. Mr. Saroli testified that he and Ms. La France did not even discuss co-habitation until July 2020.
71I have concern about the reliability of Mr. Saroli’s evidence on what happened on January 1, 2019. He was adamant in his evidence that he and Ms. La France stayed in on December 31, 2018, and did not do anything special. However, once he was confronted with Ms. La France’s detailed recollection that the two of them went to a party at the Grand Old House with a live band, dancing, and midnight fireworks at which they ran into two specific people, he conceded that his recollection was incorrect and that they did go out to that party. However, I do not put too much weight on his erroneous testimony about December 31 when deciding what happened the next day. There is a meaningful difference about remembering whether you went to a particular New Year’s Eve party and whether you invited someone to move in with you. The failure to remember the former does not tell me very much about the latter.
72I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s testimony that he was not thinking about cohabitation because he had received indications that he may have serious issues with his prostate. Indeed, it seems just as likely that a 67 year-old man who lived alone might be very interested in exploring cohabitation with a woman that he said he loved if he was on the cusp of a health crisis. Such a man might have strong incentives to advance a promising relationship before he needed significant support and care provided to him. As it turns out, and as described below, that is exactly what Mr. Saroli received from Ms. La France.
73But the main reason that I accept Ms. La France’s version of events is that it is perfectly consistent with the overwhelming weight of the evidence, including contemporaneous and objective records. This includes the following:
a. Mr. Saroli admitted that he gave Ms. La France a set of keys to his house on or before January 1, 2019;
b. On January 28, 2019, Ms. La France filled out a Canada Post form to have her mail re-routed from her Pembroke house to Mr. Saroli’s house in Oakville; and
c. On April 24, 2019, Mr. Saroli told a nurse at Princess Margaret Cancer Centre that he and Ms. La France were “living together.”
74In addition, starting in January 2019, Ms. La France spent almost all her time with Mr. Saroli at one of his two homes. Ms. La France provided a day-by-day breakdown of where she and Mr. Saroli were at all material times. Ms. La France provided documentary back-up for her evidence. This included her cellular telephone bills that showed when she was using roaming data and from what city she accessed the network, her passport, metadata and pictures taken on her smart phone, and receipts from various stores and service providers. Mr. Saroli did not challenge this evidence in any way.
75There are 151 days from January 1 and May 31, 2019. According to my rough count, Ms. La France spent:
a. 77 days with Mr. Saroli at the Chartwell home;
b. 43 days with Mr. Saroli at his home in Grand Cayman;
c. 6 days with Mr. Saroli in Las Vegas;
d. 2 days with Mr. Saroli visiting his son in Quebec;
e. 7 days with Mr. Saroli at her house in Pembroke;
f. 15 days alone in her house in Pembroke; and
g. 1 day is unaccounted for.
76In the five months after January 1, Ms. La France spent about 10% of her time alone at her house in Pembroke and 81% of her time with Mr. Saroli at one of his two homes (and that does not count the time they spent together in other places). Mr. Saroli agreed that in 2019 Ms. La France took up more than four closets at the Chartwell home and an additional two or three drawers in the bathroom. This demonstrates that Ms. La France moved many of her personal items to the Chartwell home.
77Mr. Saroli did not challenge any of the calendar entries or suggest that they were incorrect. Instead, Mr. Saroli submits that there is no evidence in her disability benefits file that Ms. La France advised her insurer in 2019 that she had moved to Oakville and moved in with him. He also points to the fact that Ms. La France’s 2019 tax return listed her mailing address as her house in Pembroke and that she did not produce information related to when she changed her address on her driver’s licence. In my view, whether Ms. La France ought to have reported more or different information to the insurer or the government, or to have done so sooner, is not determinative.36 It does not change the fact that Ms. La France moved in with Mr. Saroli in January 2019. Mr. Saroli is not the insurer or the government. He knew exactly where Ms. La France was living in 2019: she was living with him.
78There is no doubt that Ms. La France continued to own her house in Pembroke until she sold it September 2020. The mere fact that she continued to own that property does not mean that she was not co-habiting with Mr. Saroli in a conjugal relationship.37 I accept Ms. La France’s evidence that immediately after Mr. Saroli asked her to move in with him, they began to discuss selling her home. She testified that the plans to list her home for sale were delayed when they learned of Mr. Saroli’s cancer diagnosis. She then listed her home on August 30, 2019, using Mr. Saroli’s nephew as the listing agent (despite him not working the Pembroke region). The house did not sell at the asking price and Ms. La France eventually took it off the market. Ms. La France listed the house again in 2020 with a new, local real estate agent and the house sold at its listing price and closed on September 18, 2020. I find that the parties decided in January 2019 that Ms. La France would sell her house because she was moving in with Mr. Saroli. The fact that it took Ms. La France some time to list and sell the house does not indicate that the parties were not living together in a committed relationship long before she sold the Pembroke property.
79I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s evidence that he never discussed Ms. La France moving in with him until July 2020 when she listed the house for sale a second time. He did not explain why Ms. La France listed her house on August 30, 2019, if they had not discussed moving in together at that time. Perhaps more importantly, his version of events is entirely inconsistent with the evidence of how the parties lived their lives in 2019.
80I accept Ms. La France’s evidence that on January 1, 2019, Mr. Saroli asked her to move in with him and she accepted. Her recollection of the event was clear and sharp. It is also entirely consistent with where she spent her time in early 2019. Indeed, it would be difficult to understand why Mr. Saroli gave her keys and she spent so much time at the Chartwell home if the parties had not discussed moving in together.
81I also find that they began to live together on January 1, 2019. Mr. Saroli asked Ms. La France to move in with him. At that time, he had two homes: Chartwell and Grand Cayman. He extended the invitation while they were at the Grand Cayman house. The house on Grand Cayman was an important part of his life. Indeed, Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli spent 43 of their first 148 living days together at the house in Grand Cayman, and this total excludes the time they spent in Grand Cayman from December 18 to 31, 2018, which was immediately prior to them starting to live together. It would be entirely artificial, and would not accurately capture this couple’s relationship, to start the clock only when they arrived back at the Chartwell house in Oakville.
82The parties agree that they were sexually active and slept in the same bed every night at the beginning of their relationship. Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli disagree on when this ended, but I will address that below when I consider when their relationship ended.
83Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli agree that they lived together at the Chartwell home, on Grand Cayman, and eventually in the Lakeshore home. While they had overnight guests from time-to-time, that does not change the character of their living arrangements. They lived together, but otherwise alone.
84In conclusion, I find that Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli began to live together under the same roof, sleeping in the same bed, on January 1, 2019.
C. Sexual and personal behaviour
1. Assistance during illness
85As I will explain, very early in 2019, Ms. La France began to provide an enormous amount of critical assistance to Mr. Saroli as he dealt with his cancer diagnosis and surgery. Ms. La France’s care for Mr. Saroli is very important evidence demonstrating that they were cohabiting in a conjugal relationship beginning in January 2019.38
86By mid-December 2018, Mr. Saroli had already received some test results that suggested that he might have a form of prostate cancer. He was waiting for further test results when the parties travelled to Grand Cayman in December 2018. While they were in Grand Caymen, his urologist called him to say that those test results also indicated that he may have cancer.
87On January 30, 2019, Mr. Saroli had a biopsy on his prostate gland and surrounding tissue. Ms. La France did not attend this appointment with him. The biopsy confirmed that Mr. Saroli’s prostate was cancerous. Mr. Saroli was advised of the diagnosis in February, while the parties were back in Grand Cayman. Mr. Saroli understood that his options included surgery or radiation. On March 4, 2019, he signed a consent to surgery, which would take place on May 1, 2019.
88Ms. La France testified that she attended ten medical appointments with Mr. Saroli between March 1, 2019, and the surgery. Mr. Saroli did not agree. Ms. La France’s testimony was corroborated by a stack of contemporaneous notes that she took at the medical appointments. In addition, her evidence was corroborated by recordings that she made with consent of all participants during several of those medical appointments.
89On March 28, 2019, Mr. Saroli signed an authorization and direction to the Princess Margaret Hospital and the Toronto General Hospital to release all his medical information to Ms. La France. In my view, this is clear evidence of the closeness of their relationship and the trust that Mr. Saroli placed in Ms. La France. It is extremely inconsistent with Mr. Saroli’s claim that he was only casually dating Ms. La France in a primarily sexual relationship.
90On April 24, 2019, one week before the surgery, Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France both attended a full-day series of pre-operative meetings at Princess Margaret Hospital. Ms. La France recorded some of these meetings to assist her recall and to ensure that they could follow the medical instructions. One such recording was entered into evidence. During that meeting, Ms. La France stepped out of the room. While she was absent, the nurse asked Mr. Saroli if he had signed a valid power of attorney for personal care. He replied that he did not have one. The nurse asked Mr. Saroli if Ms. La France was his spouse. He replied that they were not married but he said, “we live together.” The nurse advised him that if he did not have a documented power of attorney, Ms. La France would become his substitute decision-maker because she was his live-in partner. Mr. Saroli said that was okay and that “she should do that for me.” Because this meeting took place one week before surgery, it would have been very easy for Mr. Saroli to sign a power of attorney for personal care naming his sons as his attorney before he went in for surgery. He did not do that. Instead, he was perfectly content to have Ms. La France make decisions about his care if he was incapacitated. He was prepared to put his life in her hands. Again, this evidence is inconsistent with Mr. Saroli’s description of his relationship with Ms. La France.39
91On May 1, 2019, surgeons completely removed Mr. Saroli’s prostate gland, lymph nodes, and surrounding tissue. Neither of Mr. Saroli’s sons attended at the hospital the day of his surgery. Ms. La France testified that she kept Mr. Saroli’s sons updated by telephone and text message. Mr. Saroli testified that after his surgery, Ms. La France would not provide his children with information about his condition. Mr. Saroli’s evidence is flatly contradicted by Ms. La France’s contemporaneous text messages with Ryan Saroli and her cellular telephone records that show calls with him. When confronted with these documents, Mr. Saroli changed his evidence and said that it was actually months after his surgery that Ms. La France would not provide medical information to his children. I observe that there is no documentary evidence to corroborate Mr. Saroli’s revised version of events. Mr. Saroli also did not explain why, other than at the time of his surgery, his children were not able to contact him directly. I do not accept any of his evidence on this point and find that Ms. La France provided detailed and frequent updates about his health to his two children, who chose not to be with their father during the surgery.
92On May 2, 2019, Ms. La France attended the discharge meeting with Mr. Saroli. She recorded this meeting, and the recording was entered as an exhibit. During this meeting, Ms. La France asked a series of detailed questions about warning signs to watch for in the days following the surgery, how to change and clean the catheter bags, how to set up Mr. Saroli to shower with the bag, and how to position Mr. Saroli’s body to facilitate changing the bags. Mr. Saroli was then discharged to home for an expected four to six week recovery.
93Ms. La France testified that she provided significant assistance to Mr. Saroli after his surgery. She said that she changed the catheter bags and set an alarm for about 10 to 12 nights to wake up in the middle of the night to check on the status of the bag. On the other hand, Mr. Saroli testified that he dealt with the catheter most of the time and that Ms. La France only changed the bag once and then refused to do so again. He said that it was not something that she “would typically do” and she did not want to do it. He testified that he changed the bag himself, despite the pain, by crawling on his hands and knees to the bathroom, despite being in tremendous pain and discomfort after the surgery. He testified that he set his alarm to wake up in the middle of the night to check the status of the bag.
94I accept Ms. La France’s evidence about changing the bag and I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s evidence. Ms. La France clearly and voluntarily adopted a caregiver role toward Mr. Saroli in his time of need. The May 2 recording shows that she was keenly interested in learning how to change and clean the bag and equipment. I have no doubt that the surgery took a significant toll on Mr. Saroli. I do not accept his evidence that he was crawling on his hands and knees to change his own catheter bag. That evidence is not believable and is entirely inconsistent with the rest of the contemporaneous evidence about their relationship. It would have been very cruel for Ms. La France to opt out of helping Mr. Saroli after changing the catheter bag only one time. As described below, Mr. Saroli expressed his gratitude to Ms. La France for her care and support many times in holiday cards. Mr. Saroli’s contemporaneous expressions of thanks are entirely inconsistent with his version of events at trial. I do not accept that Ms. La France simply watched Mr. Saroli crawl on his hands and knees to change his catheter bag mere days after his surgery. Ms. La France’s version of events is much more likely to be true, and I accept it.
95After a concerning medical test result, Mr. Saroli opted to begin a course of radiation treatments that ran from November to December 2019. Ms. La France testified that she accompanied Mr. Saroli to each of the 34 radiation appointments and provided care to him after the debilitating treatments. Ms. La France filed the weekly appointment schedules as an exhibit. The schedules contained her hand written notes. The notes contained reminders for Mr. Saroli of other medical appointments, recorded his symptoms, and provided warm and romantic encouragement to Mr. Saroli as he completed these treatments. Mr. Saroli denied that Ms. La France attended all his radiation appointments. He did not however, specify which appointments she did not attend, why he remembered that she did not attend those appointments, or explain how he got himself to and from the appointments that she did not attend. He was confronted with a recording from July 11, 2023, during which he told Ms. La France that she “went to every single appointment even when I told you [that] you did not have to.” He admitted that he said those words at that time. His prior inconsistent statement significantly undermines his testimony at trial. While it is possible that Ms. La France did not attend every single appointment, I have no doubt that she attended the overwhelming majority of the radiation sessions. I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s evidence to the contrary.
96In conclusion, Ms. La France’s recollections of the care she provided are specific, detailed, and supported by contemporaneous documents. I accept her evidence that she attended approximately 50 to 65 medical appointments with him at various times. She produced hundreds of pages of notes and recordings that corroborate her evidence.
97In contrast, in his pleading and in his testimony, Mr. Saroli consistently minimized the amount of care and support Ms. La France provided to him. He stated that Ms. La France “overstated her involvement and support” of him and that he had “supportive friends and family members who shared in his care.” I observe that Mr. Saroli called no evidence to support either of these statements. He testified that Ms. La France’s support to him was limited to having “showed sympathy” to him during this time. However, at an earlier time, Mr. Saroli recognized and appreciated her efforts. On June 11, 2021, he wrote an email to a hospital employee stating that Ms. La France “is and has been my primary caregiver since I was diagnosed with prostate cancer a couple of years ago.” During a recorded conversation on August 10, 2023, Mr. Saroli told Ms. La France “And even when I said, you didn’t buy into this, if you want to leave, I understand. And that was four months, five months after we met, and you didn’t do that.”
98Mr. Saroli’s minimization of Ms. La France’s efforts was churlish and mean-spirited. It is difficult to believe that he simply misremembered the amount of care she provided to him at his moment of need. Instead, I find that he tailored his evidence to trivialize her contributions because he believed that doing so would give him an advantage in the litigation.40 Where the evidence of Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli conflict with respect to her role in providing him with care and support care, I prefer and accept the evidence of Ms. La France.
99The care that Ms. La France provided to Mr. Saroli during his battle with cancer epitomizes the traditional Canadian marital vow to take the other “in sickness and in health.” It is strong evidence that the parties were living together in a conjugal relationship starting in January 2019.
2. Feelings toward each other and communications
100The parties entered several greeting cards into evidence. The cards all contain statements expressing the sender’s love and appreciation for the recipient. For example, over the period of their relationship, Mr. Saroli acknowledged sending cards to Ms. La France that contained the following messages:
a. February 2019: “Our very first Valentine’s Day, and how wonderful life has become since you entered my world! I am thankful and grateful for all of you and your love. Love you always.”
b. October 2019: “Love all of you and all you do for me. Thanks forever…”
c. December 2019: “Words do not exist that describe the feelings I have for all that you are and all that you have done for me in the past year. You have left a very permanent impression in my heart. I will always love you. Thank you for being with me this Christmas.”
d. February 2020: “Thanks for being a part of my life and supporting me through tough times period I love the person you are and will try to support you, as you have me.”
e. October 2022: “So happy to be together with my lovely lady on her 51st birthday. Thank you for being with me through these difficult days. I love you always.”
f. December 2022: “Thanks for the fortitude and support through crazy times. Hope next year is memorable and better for us both.”
g. February “2022/3”: “Glad I could be back for part of the day. Love you always.”
101Ms. La France sent cards to Mr. Saroli that contained the following messages:
a. June 1, 2022: “Thank you for being so kind, wonderful and generous to me! I love you with all of my heart. Wishing you my love continued health and happiness.”
b. Christmas 2022: “Thank you for all that you do for us! Love you so much! All my love today and always.”
102These cards are completely inconsistent with paragraph 51 in Mr. Saroli’s amended answer that stated: “From September 18, 2020, onward the Respondent and the Applicant shared a home, but little else. Their relationship continued as largely roommates of each other.” I find that the parties expressed loving, tender, warm, sympathetic, and empathetic feelings toward each other at least into 2023. These expressions are consistent with the parties being in a romantic relationship with each other. I will return to the feelings that Mr. Saroli expressed in text messages to Ms. La France around the time she moved out below, when I assess when the cohabitation ended.
103I accept that Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli also had arguments with each other, including arguments that involved yelling, swearing, and demeaning language. Each of Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli testified that they had verbal disagreements, which were sometimes very intense and involved harsh and foul language. Some of these arguments took place in front of other people.
104For example, Steven Uttley testified that in 2021, he observed Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli have what he described as a “mini argument,” “bickering,” or a “heated discussion”, but one without “yelling or screaming.” John Kouzoukas testified that one time at the Lakeshore house, he observed Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France have an argument before they all had an uneventful dinner. He recalled that Ms. La France accused Mr. Saroli of getting cash from the mob and Mr. Saroli asked her three or four times to go upstairs and leave them alone. He described the argument as heated, but that neither Ms. La France nor Mr. Saroli was yelling or using vulgarities. After this incident, things settled down and Ms. La France had dinner with the two men. Mr. Kouzoukas could not provide a specific date for this dinner.
105Norma LaFrance testified that one evening when she was staying over at the Chartwell house, she was reading in bed when she heard a commotion. She could not remember the date, but if it was at Chartwell, it was likely before July 2022. Norma testified that she heard Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli speaking loudly to each other. She testified that she heard Mr. Saroli call Ms. La France a “cunt,” a “bitch” and a “sorry excuse of a lawyer.” Norma testified this upset her and that she spoke with Ms. La France and told her that the relationship could not go on like this.
106I conclude that the parties’ communications support the conclusion that the parties were cohabiting in a conjugal relationship that was not perfect and was marred by arguments.
3. Gifts
107Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli gave gifts to each other. Commensurate with their economic circumstances, Mr. Saroli’s gifts to Ms. La France were more lavish than her gifts to him.
108The parties agree that in December 2020, Mr. Saroli gave Ms. La France $100,000. Ms. La France testified that this gift was Mr. Saroli’s idea, and he did it because he was grateful to Ms. La France for selling the house, which was a tie back to her old life in Pembroke. Mr. Saroli testified that he gave Ms. La France the money because Ms. La France was unhappy with the sale price of her house and kept talking about that fact. Mr. Saroli testified that this “became a source of aggravation for me” and that he “finally looked at her and said I will give you $100,000 and I want you to shut up about it and I don’t want to hear about it again.”
109I accept Ms. La France’s evidence on this point. I find it extremely unlikely that Mr. Saroli would write a cheque for $100,000 to address a source of “aggravation.” In December 2020, I find it more likely that Mr. Saroli was behaving generously towards his partner and showing thanks to her for her involvement in his life.
110The parties also agreed that Mr. Saroli would give Ms. La France thousands of dollars in cash and Las Vegas hotel credits to allow Ms. La France to buy gifts for herself. While there was some dispute between the parties over whether Mr. Saroli himself bought expensive purses and fur coats for Ms. La France, there is no need to resolve that dispute. There is no doubt that, at a minimum, Mr. Saroli gave Ms. La France significant amounts of cash and store credits to buy herself luxurious gifts.
111I am satisfied that the couple routinely gave each other gifts and cards to mark special occasions, holidays, and as expressions of love and affection. Their gift giving practices are evidence that they were living together in a conjugal relationship.
4. Sexual relations and fidelity
112Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli had an active sexual relationship that commenced shortly after they met. They had regular sexual intercourse until May 1, 2019, when Mr. Saroli’s surgery resulted in his inability to maintain an erection. Sexual intercourse is not an essential component in finding that the parties cohabited within the meaning of the Family Law Act.41
113Ms. La France testified that they continued to have a satisfactory sexual relationship well into 2023, even if that did not involve penile penetration. Mr. Saroli testified that they stopped having any sexual relationship in April 2022, after an incident at a restaurant. I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s evidence.
114Mr. Saroli was confronted with an audio recording of a conversation that he had with Ms. La France on April 25, 2023. The parties are in the kitchen of the Lakeshore house discussing, among other things, some missing items. At the end of the conversation, Mr. Saroli initiates sexual activity with Ms. La France. The recording concludes as follows:
Mr. Saroli: Give me a kiss
Ms. La France: Pardon?
Mr. Saroli: Give me a kiss. Can I play? I like playing. Give me kissy.
115Mr. Saroli denied that he began to fondle Ms. La France’s breasts after this exchange. Mr. Saroli testified that he was only trying to make Ms. La France “feel better because she [was] upset.” There is nothing on the recording or in the context of their conversation to suggest that Ms. La France was upset during this conversation. I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s explanation of his conduct. In my view, Mr. Saroli’s reference to “playing” bookended by asking for a kiss is Mr. Saroli asking Ms. La France if she consents to sexual activity. This recording contradicts Mr. Saroli’s evidence and causes me to doubt the reliability and credibility of his evidence that the parties did not engage in sexual activity after April 2022. I find as a fact that the parties maintained a satisfactory sexual relationship with each other until at least April 2023.
116Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli each testified that they expected fidelity from each other. However, the parties did not live up to this expectation.
117Mr. Saroli admitted that he maintained an on-again, off-again, sexual relationship with at least three different women during his relationship with Ms. La France. He admitted that he did not tell Ms. La France about his sexual activity with other women. This suggests that Mr. Saroli did not want theses other sexual relationships to jeopardize the conjugal relationship he had with Ms. La France.42
118Ms. La France also admitted to a period of infidelity with a couple with whom she had become friends. Ms. La France admitted to exchanging suggestive and sexual text messages with the couple and, on one occasion in February 2023, having sex with the male friend in the presence of his wife, who watched the encounter. Ms. La France denied having sex with either friend on more than that one occasion.
119Mr. Saroli called Ms. La France’s male friend as a witness at trial. The friend testified to two more occasions of sexual activity in January and February 2023, at least one of which took place at the Lakeshore house. In my view, nothing turns on whether there were one or three acts of sexual activity over a four-week period or where they took place. Ms. La France admits to the infidelity and acknowledges that she knew that Mr. Saroli would be very upset at the affair. However, having sex outside of the relationship does not prevent a party from demonstrating that they are a spouse for the purpose of the Family Law Act.43
120Mr. Saroli testified that if he knew Ms. La France had been unfaithful to him he would have “kicked her ass to the curb” and that it was “unfathomable that someone could do that to you.” For someone who had maintained multiple sexual partners outside of his relationship with Ms. La France, Mr. Saroli’s double standard is remarkable. Mr. Saroli misled Ms. La France about his fidelity over the entire life of their relationship. If he intended for their relationship to be one of casual dating, he needed to be forthright with Ms. La France about his behaviour. If he had spelled out the rules of the relationship to Ms. La France, I would give more weight to his evidence about its nature.44
121People may be spouses for the purposes of the Family Law Act even though they both had extramarital affairs during their cohabitation.45 The fact that one of the spouses maintained a “playboy-like” lifestyle does not cancel out a spousal relationship otherwise maintained over years.46
122I conclude that the parties maintained active sexual relations with each other throughout the period from January 1, 2019, through at least the end of April 2023. They each maintained to the other that they were in a monogamous relationship, even though that was not always true. In any event, I find that the extramarital sexual relationships are not fatal to finding that the parties were cohabiting in a conjugal relationship.
D. Services
123Molodowich teaches that the court should consider the conduct and the habit of the parties in relation to domestic services such as preparation of meals, washing and mending of clothes, shopping, and household maintenance.
124The parties agree that Mr. Saroli did all the cooking for the two of them. They ate most of their dinners together.
125Ms. La France testified that she did the laundry, took out the garbage and recycling and dropped off clothes at the dry cleaner or tailor when necessary. She also testified that she would do filing and document organization around the house for the two of them. Ms. La France testified that he would both do cleaning around the house and from time to time had cleaners who would come and do housecleaning. Mr. Saroli took care of many household repairs and smaller construction projects.
126I find that they were both very involved in the project to renovate and repair the Lakeshore house. I find that Ms. La France had extensive dealings with the designer and many of the service providers. Mr. Saroli paid for all the contractors, hired and fired many of them, and did some of the work with his own hands.
127While they each had their own spheres of operations, I am satisfied that they both contributed to the operation of their joint household.
E. Social and societal
128There was very little evidence regarding how Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli participated in neighbourhood and community activities. It appears that Ms. La France often accompanied Mr. Saroli to Las Vegas for his annual Halloween party. There is no evidence that either Ms. La France or Mr. Saroli tried to keep the relationship secret from their friends and family.
129There was evidence that Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli were well-integrated into each other’s family life, which is a relevant factor.47 In the summer of 2018, they visited Mr. Saroli’s son and his wife. They would often spend holidays with members of each other’s family and would attend birthday parties and celebrations together. There was evidence that Mr. Saroli and Norma La France had a falling-out at some point, but that does not undermine the fact that they all treated each other as members of a broader extended family community (with all of its inherent ups and downs).
130Mr. Saroli testified that he believed that Ms. La France was leading a “double life” and would talk about her friends, but not in detail. Mr. Saroli did not provide evidence to prove his theory. Ms. La France invited her friends Stephen Uttley and his wife to vacation in Grand Cayman at Mr. Saroli’s house. Mr. Saroli and Mr. Uttley became good friends, and they travelled together to Las Vegas six times, to Niagara on the Lake, and to the Super Bowl. Similarly, in August 2022, Mr. Saroli met friends that Ms. La France had made in the fall of 2021. Thereafter, the couples had drinks and dinner at each others’ homes and played pool at the Lakeshore house. No one gave evidence that they did not know that Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France were in a romantic relationship and lived together.
F. Economic Support
131Molodowich identifies the financial arrangements between the parties as relevant to their status as spouses. The case suggests asking:
a. What were the financial arrangements between the parties regarding the provision of or contribution towards the necessaries of life (food, clothing, shelter, recreation, etc.)?
b. What were the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership of property?
c. Was there any special financial arrangement between them which both agreed would be determinant of their overall relationship?
132Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli agree that they did not share a bank account or a credit card. They did not hold real property together as joint tenants or tenants in common. This is evidence that suggests the parties were not living in a conjugal relationship.48
133However, a partial explanation for this lack of integration is that Mr. Saroli simply paid for everything. Mr. Saroli paid the property taxes, utilities, food, and household expenses at the Chartwell house. He paid for all dinners out. Mr. Saroli purchased the Lakeshore house for $18 million for the two of them to move into together. He did not ask Ms. La France to contribute any money to the purchase. After he purchased the Lakeshore house, Mr. Saroli paid the $160,000 in annual property taxes and all other carrying expenses and utilities without asking Ms. La France to make any contribution. Mr. Saroli paid for all the expenses associated with the house in Grand Cayman. Mr. Saroli paid for their travel, to the extent it was not provided with the compliments of a casino. As Mr. Saroli put it in his evidence, he did not ask or expect Ms. La France to pay for anything. This is not disputed. There was little need for financial integration because Mr. Saroli completely supported Ms. La France.
134Ms. La France only paid for the expenses on her Pembroke house (until she sold it), her cellular telephone bill, her personal grooming expenses, and her clothing. She could easily cover these expenses with her disability payments. The parties did not have a formal or informal arrangement for Mr. Saroli to give Ms. La France a living allowance, although the parties agree that he would give her $5,000 or $10,000 when they were in Las Vegas.
135Starting in September 2020, Mr. Saroli provided Ms. La France with some assistance with her stock portfolio. She authorized her financial institution to give Mr. Saroli access to her trading account. Mr. Saroli testified that he made 3 or 4 trades on Ms. La France’s behalf and always with her knowledge. Ms. La France testified that she was very grateful for Mr. Saroli’s assistance with her stock portfolio.
136Mr. Saroli never made Ms. La France a beneficiary under his will. On February 11, 2022, Ms. La France changed her will to make Mr. Saroli a beneficiary of 50% of the residue of her estate, with her mother being the beneficiary of the other 50%. Ms. La France testified that when she told Mr. Saroli that she had changed her will, he said that was unnecessary and she should leave her entire estate to her mother. He then told her that he would give the money to her mother any way. Ms. La France testified that this made her feel sad and discouraged because she felt it was a big gesture on her part and that Mr. Saroli was not willing to do as she wanted. She changed her will again in March 2022 to replace Mr. Saroli with her nephews.
137Mr. Saroli’s testified that he was “appalled” that Ms. La France included him in her new will. He testified that Ms. La France had a “hidden agenda” and that he was disgusted by it. He testified that it “was obvious to me” that this was part of Ms. La France’s plan to take advantage of him and to have him include her in his will. There is no evidence that he said any of those things to Ms. La France at the time. There is no suggestion that Ms. La France ever asked him to include her in the will.
138I find that Ms. La France made a kind and generous gesture to include Mr. Saroli in her future estate. It is unfortunate that the bitter feelings generated by the litigation have caused Mr. Saroli to have so profoundly misunderstood Ms. La France’s intent. While I accept that he told Ms. La France that he did not want to be included in her will because her mother should have the money that he did not need, I neither accept that Ms. La France’s offer was part of a devious scheme nor that Mr. Saroli believed that to be the case in 2022.
139The parties never signed a cohabitation agreement or any other written document that determined the financial arrangements between them. Mr. Saroli testified that he retained a lawyer to draft a cohabitation agreement and that his lawyer produced a draft dated March 16, 2022, which was marked as an exhibit. This was very different than the evidence he gave under oath during questioning, where he testified that he never consulted with a lawyer about co-habitation agreement and never had one drafted. This is another example of Mr. Saroli giving very different evidence under oath at different times. These prior inconsistent statements undermine the credibility of Mr. Saroli’s evidence and cause me to doubt whether I can accept his evidence as truthful.
140The draft cohabitation agreement, which Mr. Saroli testified that he would have signed in April 2022, states that its purpose is for Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France “to settle in an orderly fashion all of their rights and obligations arising out of their common-law relationship.” In any event, the parties never signed the agreement, and it is irrelevant to the rights and obligations to be determined in this proceeding.
141I conclude that Mr. Saroli willingly supported Ms. La France financially during their time together. He covered almost all her expenses. It is true that they did not have a shared bank account or credit card, but I do not see that as a significant factor given his extensive support for Ms. La France. It is true that they did not hold property together or include each other in their wills. Their economic lives were not completely integrated. However, given the significant amount of financial support Mr. Saroli gave to Ms. La France, this factor strongly suggests that the parties were cohabiting in a conjugal relationship.
G. Conclusion
142As noted above, the Molodowich factors are neither a checklist nor a scorecard. The factors are meant to guide judges as they step back and holistically assess the nature and quality of a relationship to determine whether it was conjugal. I must consider all of the factors in conjunction with one another when determining whether the parties cohabited together in a conjugal relationship.49 The extent to which the different elements of the relationship will be taken into account will vary with the circumstances of each case.50
143The Family Law Act does not define the word “conjugal,” but it is understood to mean “marriage-like.”51 A conjugal relationship involves love, affection, comfort, mutual services, and usually sexual activity.52 The burden is on Ms. La France to prove that she lived in a conjugal relationship with Mr. Saroli.53
144In reaching my decision, I am to emphasize the objective facts that indicate whether there is a conjugal relationship.54 Two people must consent and accept each other as spouses.55 I must draw conclusions about the intentions of Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli not only based on their testimony at trial, but how consistent their testimony was with their objectively assessed actions at the relevant times. I rely on but will not repeat all my findings above.
145For the reasons set out in paragraphs [61] to [84], I conclude the parties started living together on January 1, 2019. As of that date, the parties lived together in a common abode, being Mr. Saroli’s homes on Chartwell and in Grand Cayman. Those were the readily identifiable places where both were ordinarily to be found most of the time when they are at home.56 The mere fact that Ms. La France continued to own her home in Pembroke until September 2020 does not mean that she was not living with Mr. Saroli, especially given how little time she spent there.57 This is not a case where Ms. La France merely stayed overnight frequently at Mr. Saroli’s house but maintained Pembroke as her main base and primary home.58
146One of the most important factors in this case is that Ms. La France provided significant assistance to Mr. Saroli during the pre-operative, post-operative, and post-recovery radiation treatment periods in 2019. As I found in paragraphs [85] to [99], Ms. La France provided significant support and assistance to Mr. Saroli and there is no evidence that any other member of his family or caregiver provided any significant level of assistance to him. I find that Ms. La France assisted Mr. Saroli because she loved him and saw him as her partner and not for any other or ulterior motive. Ms. La France could easily have ended the relationship in January 2019 when she learned that the older man she was living with was very ill with cancer.
147As described in paragraphs [100] to [102], Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France expressed warm feelings of love and affection toward each other as objectively recorded in the holiday cards they exchanged. They exchanged gifts, including very large gifts, as described in paragraphs [107] to [111]. For the reasons set out in paragraphs [112] to [115], I find that they continued to have sexual relations even after Mr. Saroli could no longer maintain an erection due to his prostate surgery. Ms. La France’s sexual infidelity was not fatal to her claim that the parties were spouses.59 Although they each hid their infidelity, I find that their conduct in that regard was not inconsistent with them maintaining a spousal relationship with each other.
148As explained in paragraphs [123] to [130], Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli each contributed to the mundane household tasks at their shared home. They entertained guests together at their homes in Oakville, Grand Cayman, and at restaurants. They attended family gatherings together and held themselves out as a couple to the world.
149Mr. Saroli provided significant financial support to Ms. La France during their relationship. The extent of this support is described in paragraphs [131] to [141]. Although they did not share a bank account or a credit card, that is less important in these circumstances because Mr. Saroli paid for virtually all of Ms. La France’s expenses. This included buying an $18 million home for the two of them to move into without asking Ms. La France to contribute. He paid for all the household expenses, the property taxes, the vacation home in Grand Cayman. He paid for their extravagant travel and when he did not have to pay those expenses, it was because a casino paid for the expenses because of the amount he gambled at their establishments. There was a high degree of economic interdependence between the parties (albeit that Ms. La France was dependent on Mr. Saroli) despite maintaining separate bank accounts.
150Stepping back and considering their relationship as a whole, I have no doubt that Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli were living together in a conjugal relationship as of January 1, 2019. Viewed objectively, they made a mutual, consensual commitment to each other to create a family unit.60
5. Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli stopped cohabiting on August 23, 2023
151For the reasons set out above, I have found that Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli started living together in a conjugal relationship on January 1, 2019. Pursuant to s. 29 of the Family Law Act, Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli meet the definition of spouses only if they cohabited in a conjugal relationship continuously for a period of not less than three years. The next question to be determined is when the parties stopped living in a conjugal relationship.
152The Court of Appeal has held that cohabitation ends when either party’s conduct convincingly demonstrates a settled state of mind that the relationship is at an end:
Without in any way attempting to be detailed or comprehensive, it could be said that such a relationship has come to an end when either party regards it as being at an end and, by his or her conduct, has demonstrated in a convincing manner that this particular state of mind is a settled one. While the physical separation of parties following "a fight" might, in some cases, appear to amount to an ending of cohabitation, the test should be realistic and flexible enough to recognize that a brief cooling-off period does not bring the relationship to an end. Such conduct does not convincingly demonstrate a settled state of mind that the relationship is at an end.61
153The question of when cohabitation ended is largely a question of fact to be determined in all the circumstances. I must determine their true intent, not simply accept what they say about their intent at the time of the trial. One can objectively demonstrate an objective intention to end a spouse-like relationship by delivering a lawyer’s letter advising of the end of the relationship and inviting discussions on an orderly resolution of the situation or by changing the locks on a shared condominium and putting it on the market.62 Equally, parties may cease to cohabit even while they continue to live in the same home.63
154Courts have held that the same Molodowich factors that are relevant to the existence of a conjugal relationship are also relevant to determining when that relationship ended.64 The Court of Appeal has emphasized that it is important to focus on the any changes in the characteristics of the conjugal relationship:
I would add, however, that when it comes to the timing of spousal separation, the element of change should be emphasized. That is, it is the differences or changes in the characteristics of a conjugal relationship at the alleged separation date – changes in shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support, children and societal perception of the couple – that best serve to guide the court in fixing the date of separation or valuation date.
At the same time, where the issue is date of separation or valuation date as opposed to determining the existence of a conjugal relationship as framed in Molodowich, I would add to the list of potentially relevant considerations the formal steps taken to end the relationship, as well as any steps taken to resume cohabitation.65
155I note that the cohabitation did not end when Ms. La France returned to Pembroke in Summer 2020 to oversee the sale of her house. Mr. Saroli came to visit her, and her presence was necessary to prepare the house for sale and closing.
156Ms. La France testified that the parties stopped cohabiting when she moved out of the Lakeshore house on August 23, 2023. She testified that this was the last time the parties lived together and that her moving out demonstrated that the relationship was at an end. Although she admits that she started looking for an apartment in April, she did not reach an agreement to rent an apartment until August 2023, and she spent about five or six weeks packing her boxes before she moved out.
157Mr. Saroli testified that starting as early as 2021, he frequently asked Ms. La France to move out of the house and that this ended the cohabitation. I disagree. I accept that Mr. Saroli threatened to kick Ms. La France out of the house during their fights. However, Ms. La France testified that they always made up after those threats, sometimes shortly afterwards. In my view, Mr. Saroli’s statements were more akin to threatening behaviour to control Ms. La France rather than an effort to end the relationship. As someone heavily invested in private mortgages, Mr. Saroli knew exactly how to provide written notice to a person requiring them to vacate a property. He never provided Ms. La France with any such written notice. I reject Mr. Saroli’s evidence that he did not deliver a written eviction notice because “I am a kind guy.” I find that Mr. Saroli’s threats to Ms. La France were not intended to bring their relationship to an end.
158Mr. Saroli submitted that the relationship ended in April 2022 after an incident at a restaurant. He testified that the parties did not engage in sexual relations after that time and that he viewed that episode as marking the end of their relationship. Ms. La France denies that the incident at the restaurant marked the end of their cohabitation. As I will explain, I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s evidence, which is inconsistent with an objective assessment of his actions and contemporaneous statements after that date.
159Mr. Saroli testified that there was an incident at a restaurant during a dinner with another couple. He testified that Ms. La France drank heavily at the dinner and subjected him to “horrible” verbal abuse in front of his friends. He testified that Ms. La France left the restaurant before him and when he left the restaurant he could not find her. He tried to phone her, finally reached her, and picked her up at a nearby gas station. Mr. Saroli testified that he told Ms. La France after that incident that that “we are done” and told her to get out. After that night, he testified, they started sleeping in separate beds, had no sexual relations, and their relationship was over.
160Mr. Saroli is not a reliable narrator of what happened that night. Mr. Saroli testified that the event took place at a restaurant called Vibo. He admitted on cross-examination that he was wrong, the restaurant was called Grappa. Mr. Saroli testified that the events took place on Bloor St. West. Mr. Saroli admitted on cross-examination that he was wrong, and the incident took place on the Queensway. Mr. Saroli testified that the dinner took place in 2023. After he returned from a break, he stated that he had thought about it over the break and that he was positive that the dinner was in 2023. On cross-examination, when confronted with text messages from the night in question, he admitted he was wrong and agreed that the incident took place after a dinner on April 16, 2022. Mr. Saroli testified that he picked up Ms. La France no more than 30 or 40 minutes after she left the restaurant and not two hours later as Ms. La France had testified. However, the text messages leading to her being picked up were sent at 1:10 am on April 17, 2022. It seems unlikely that four persons in their 50s and 60s had dinner at a local restaurant until 12:30 a.m.
161While I have no doubt that there was an incident at and after a dinner at Grappa, on The Queensway, on April 16, 2022, I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s version of those events. Given that he was wrong about so many of the key elements of the dinner, I do not accept that he is a reliable narrator of the events of that evening. Just because I do not accept his version of events of what happened on that evening does not necessarily mean that he is also incorrect that it marked the end of his conjugal relationship with Ms. La France. However, as I will explain, his version of events is markedly inconsistent with the objective evidence that nothing meaningfully changed about the relationship between Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli between April 16, 2022, and August 23, 2023.
162First, Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France moved into the $18 million house on Lakeshore in July 2022. Mr. Saroli offered no evidence that explains why they moved together to their dream house three months after he states the relationship was over for good. The parties moved in to Lakeshore immediately after the house was robbed on July 15, 2022, and just before a pre-planned trip taken by Mr. Saroli. The text messages exchanged between Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France soon after the move are inconsistent with Mr. Saroli’s version of events:
Mr. Saroli: On board now. Settling into my bed. Tired but ok. Love you and thinking of you. 😘😘Don’t worry darling, that house is no longer a target….sleep well, I will too. ❤️😘
Ms. La France: Love You more than you know! Miss you already. ❤️❤️❤️😘😘😘
163I do not accept that Mr. Saroli’s evidence about the end of their conjugal relationship is consistent with his decision to invite Ms. La France to move into the Lakeshore home with him or with his contemporaneous communications with her.
164Second, I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s evidence that he stopped having sexual relations with Ms. La France in April 2022. As I explained in paragraphs [113] to [115], I find that Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France continued to engage in sexual activity until at least April 25, 2023. As late as July 11, 2023, Mr. Saroli commented on an audio recording that he saw that Ms. La France “maintained a nice figure” and told her “That’s why I approach you as much as I do. I was always attracted to you physically.” Mr. Saroli’s use of the present tense in the second to last sentence undermines his evidence at trial about their sexual activity.
165Third, Mr. Saroli continued to pay for all expenses for Ms. La France except for her personal expenses. This included all the increased expenses associated with the Lakeshore house as compared to the Chartwell house. There is no evidence Mr. Saroli ever asked Ms. La France to begin to pay her share of any expenses. In fact, there is evidence that Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France became more integrated financially in 2022. In November 2022, Mr. Saroli (through a corporation he controlled), Ms. La France, and Mr. Saroli’s son Ryan, pooled $1.183 million to provide a one-year private mortgage on an Oakville property. Ms. La France provided 36.77% of the funds advanced, which carried an annual interest rate of 9.99%. The charges were listed as tenants in common on the charge. There is no explanation for why he entered into a business deal with Ms. La France in November 2022 if their relationship ended in April 2022.
166Fourth, the parties continued to present themselves to and interact with each other’s families as they had before. They spent Mother’s Day 2022 at Mr. Saroli’s son’s house and Ms. La France’s mother was present. They took a trip in October 2022 to Niagara on the Lake with Ms. La France’s aunt and uncle. They had Christmas dinner at Mr. Saroli’s son’s house in December 2022.
167Fifth, they continued to go out to dinner, take smiling selfies together and sending each other warm and loving holiday cards:
a. Mr. Saroli sent cards to Ms. La France as follows:
i. October 2022: “So happy to be together with my lovely lady on her 51st birthday. Thank you for being with me through these difficult days. I love you always.”
ii. December 2022: “Thanks for the fortitude and support through crazy times. Hope next year is memorable and better for us both.”
iii. February “2022/3”: “Glad I could be back for part of the day. Love you always.”
b. Ms. La France sent cards to Mr. Saroli as follows:
i. June 2022: “Thank you for being so kind, wonderful and generous to me! I love you with all of my heart. Wishing you my love continued health and happiness.”
ii. Christmas 2022: “Thank you for all that you do for us! Love you so much! All my love today and always.”
168Sixth, they continued to travel together. Between October 19 and November 5, 2022, the parties went to Napa Valley and then to Las Vegas, where they attended Mr. Saroli’s annual Halloween party. On November 25, 2022, they travelled to the Bahamas for a vacation.
169I accept Mr. Saroli’s evidence that after April 2022, he went on some vacations with his male friends and did not invite Ms. La France to accompany him. I do not accept the rationale he offered. In his evidence he stated that he travelled without Ms. La France because Ms. La France’s drinking had increased, and he did not want his friends exposed to her bad behaviour. However, when he was confronted with the fact that they had still travelled extensively together in 2022 and 2023, he said that he took Ms. La France on those trips because he did not want to leave her alone in the house because he was afraid she might damage the house. Mr. Saroli had no credible explanation for why one rationale was operative when he travelled alone but another, completely inconsistent rationale was present when they travelled together. Mr. Saroli’s evidence struck me as after the fact rationalizations, not explanations for his decisions.
170I have additional concerns about Mr. Saroli’s evidence about how he felt about Ms. La France in 2023. On cross-examination, counsel suggested to Mr. Saroli that he still wanted to spend time with Ms. La France on vacation and that, in March 2023, he had invited Ms. La France to join him in Grand Cayman after she visited her dying aunt in Florida. Mr. Saroli responded by testifying “Not a chance. I would not have done [that].” He was then confronted with a text message sent to Ms. La France on March 31, 2023, when he was in Grand Cayman and she was in Florida. The message read “Why don’t you come here instead of going to Oakville?” Not only was this exchange devastating to the reliability of Mr. Saroli’s recollection, but it also left me with the very serious concern that he was deliberately tailoring his evidence to support his position in the litigation instead of attempting to recall facts to the best of his ability.
171Seventh, Mr. Saroli’s contemporaneous text messages to Ms. La France around the time she moved out in August 2023 are completely inconsistent with Mr. Saroli’s evidence that the relationship was over as of April 2022.66 Mr. Saroli admitted that he sent over 200 text messages to Ms. La France after August 23, 2023. Although he deleted those messages from his phone sometime before he produced documents in the litigation, Ms. La France had them on her phone. Mr. Saroli sent the following text messages to Ms. La France on the dates indicated in 2023:
August 21: Louise, I see that you have not returned home yet. I am at the airport waiting to board my flight to Madrid. I have thought about you us all day today and I feel so empty traveling to Spain without you. I sincerely wish you were with me, but I know you have turned that page. I always loved you and still do. We were unable to conquer the challenges we faced and those challenges were the death of our relationship. It's really not our fault. We just never had a great hand dealt to us. I always loved my weasel and still do. My door is open if you ever need to come through it. I hope your medical procedure produces great results for you. I choose to remember the lovely lady and beautiful lover that you were. The other stuff was just noise. I will love you always.
August 23: Louise, thank you for your message. It is painful for me to read as a piece of my heart has been ripped apart as I believe has yours.... your departure is ripping me apart. I will never stop loving you and wondering why. I know you are also in pain and I share that with you. Not knowing where or how you are is devastating for me. I can't bring myself to say goodbye... it's not in me. Please let me know about your recent test results. I care for you just as you did for me. Please don't shut me out of your life. I will never get over you. I need to get out of that house. I can't continue living there without you. I bought it for us to be together and share a life but it destroyed us. I am not normally one to cry. My thoughts and tears are with and for you.
August 25: Louise, I think of you constantly. Please let me know how you are doing and if I can help in any way. I am far away in body but right beside you in mind and soul
August 27: It's 6:25 PM here on a perfect Sunday afternoon. I lay in a tropical Oasis in the South of Spain and all that I can think of is how much I want you beside me. I truly do love you Louise. I have never felt like this before. You are the most beautiful woman I see before me. Your absence is heartbreaking when I am in such a beautiful place without my love.
September 1 I have never cried like this before but I cry tears of love for you. I'm in the air watching a star is born. I'm crying for you. I love you darling and I miss you more than you know. I travel back to a house. An empty house. It was once a home.
172Relatedly, in an audio recording made by Ms. La France on July 11, 2023, Mr. Saroli left open the door to reconciling with Ms. La France. He stated,
That's I guess one of the reasons why I'd like to be able to stay in touch with you because if a year goes by and your life doesn't go in the direction that you wanted to go in and I don't think mine will either. You know I'm not opposed to saying let's try this again because maybe that time apart will make both of us realize that Jesus you know this is pretty good and let's just like I can't like when I think about what caused all this none of it makes sense none of it makes sense because when I told you I love you so much like I'm so attracted to you and like.
173He went on to say that maybe in three or four months, they might meet for dinner, and he might say “I missed you like crazy, let’s put this back together.” When discussing his future move to Grand Caymen he said to Ms. La France “Maybe, maybe you’re going to be with me. Just give it a maybe…I don’t want to close the door Louise. I don’t want to close the door.”
174Mr. Saroli went on in that conversation to say to Ms. La France, “I love you” and “I have very very deep feelings for you” and “I’m romantically still attached to you” and “it would be nice if we could go away”
175Even allowing for the complexity of human emotions, these email messages are fundamentally and irreconcilably at odds with Mr. Saroli’s evidence about the end of his cohabitation with Ms. La France, when it ended, and the reasons it ended.
176I accept the evidence of Ms. Hoshowatiuk, the friend of Ms. La France who helped Ms. La France back her boxes in preparation for moving out of the house. Ms. Hoshowatiuk testified that one day, while she was helping Ms. La France pack, Mr. Saroli said to them in the dining room, “I think this is a mistake. This could be undone. All these boxes don’t need to be here.” The ambivalence and regret Mr. Saroli expressed about the end of the relationship in his July and August 2023 text messages is completely consistent with Ms. Hoshowatiuk’s evidence.
177None of this is to suggest that Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli had a perfect relationship in 2022 or thereafter. They argued and did so viciously at times. They each said things to the other that were designed to hurt, demean, threaten, or embarrass. From time to time Mr. Saroli made threats to kick Ms. La France out of the house (although he never took any action on these threats). Each of them engaged in infidelity without telling the other. Ms. La France may have engaged in socially inappropriate behaviour around Mr. Saroli’s son, Ryan. Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli did not have a perfect relationship.
178I am satisfied, however, that none of this conduct convincingly demonstrated a settled state of mind to end the relationship.67 I am satisfied that Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli were locked in a cycle where they argued and then made up. I am satisfied that each of them said things they did not mean. As Mr. Saroli admitted to Ms. La France in a recorded conversation on August 10, 2023, “And I can tell you that anything that I said negative about you, I don’t mean. I only said it to try and win the argument or try to hit back. That’s what you do when you’re angry and you’re in a domestic dispute like that.”
179Based on the evidence before me, I am satisfied that the parties did not end their conjugal relationship until August 23, 2023, when Ms. La France moved out of Lakeshore. I find that, viewed objectively, the parties intended to remain cohabiting and remained cohabiting until August 23, 2023.68
6. Ms. La France is entitled to non-compensatory spousal support
180I have concluded that Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli cohabited in conjugal relationship from January 1, 2019, to August 23, 2023. Because they cohabited for more than three years, Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli were spouses within the meaning of s. 29 of the Family Law Act. Subsection 33(1) of the Family Law Act provides the jurisdiction for the court to order one spouse to pay support to another. Pursuant to s. 30 of the Family Law Act, every spouse has an obligation to provide support for himself or herself and for the other spouse, in accordance with need, to the extent that he or she is capable of doing so. Based on the evidence at trial, I am satisfied that Mr. Saroli can pay almost any spousal support order that I might make. There is, however, no presumptive entitlement to spousal support.69
181Pursuant to s. 33(8) of the Family Law Act, an order for the support of a spouse should
a. recognize the spouse’s contribution to the relationship and the economic consequences of the relationship for the spouse;
b. share the economic burden of child support equitably;
c. make fair provision to assist the spouse to become able to contribute to his or her own support; and
d. relieve financial hardship, if this has not been done by orders under Parts I (Family Property) and II (Matrimonial Home).
182These objectives are to be considered together, cumulatively not alternatively, in establishing the economic consequences of the dissolution of the spousal relationship.70
183The mere fact that one spouse has a higher income than the other does not automatically entitle the spouse with the lower income to an order for spousal support.71 Entitlement to spousal support can be based on compensatory, non-compensatory, or contractual grounds.72 However, where there is a significant income disparity, a claimant may establish an entitlement to support on a compensatory or non-compensatory basis despite having a relatively high income such that the claimant could be seen by some as “self-sufficient.”73
184Ms. La France seeks spousal support based on a compensatory and a non-compensatory basis. She concedes that there is no contractual basis for spousal support.
185Mr. Saroli submits that Ms. La France is not entitled to support on either a compensatory basis or a non-compensatory basis. He submits that Ms. La France has no demonstrated need and any support order would be an impermissible wealth transfer from Mr. Saroli to Ms. La France.
A. There is no compensatory basis for spousal support
186Compensatory claims for spousal support are based either on the recipient’s economic loss or disadvantage because of the roles adopted during the spousal relationship or on the recipient’s conferral of an economic benefit on the payor without adequate compensation. Its purpose is to share equitably the economic advantages and disadvantages that accrued because of the spousal relationship and its subsequent breakdown.74 Sometimes, spouses sacrifice their own employment opportunities or advancements for the sake of the relationship and family unit. Sometimes, these sacrifices may enhance the earning potential of the other spouse.75
187According to the SSAG Revised User Guide, common markers of a compensatory claim include: being home with children full-time or part-time, being a secondary earner, having primary care of children after separation, moving for the payor’s career, supporting the payor’s education or training, and working in a family business.76
188In my view, Ms. La France has not made out a compensatory claim for support.
189At the time the parties met in 2018, Ms. La France was a retired lawyer. She had not worked since 2014, due to her disability arising from the murder of her client in 2011. From the time she met Mr. Saroli until the relationship ended, she was not capable of returning to work as a lawyer. Indeed, in January 2025, her treating psychiatrist reported to her insurer that she was “totally disabled” and “would be unable to cope with work related demands.”
190In my view, there was nothing about Ms. La France’s role during the common-law relationship that caused an economic loss or disadvantage to her.77 Ms. La France was unable to participate in the workforce, to seek out or obtain educational or career advancement opportunities, or to pursue economic goals because of her disability, not because of her role in the common-law relationship. Put differently, there is nothing about the roles adopted during the spousal relationship that contributed to the income disparity between Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli.
191I find that Ms. La France did not make any economic sacrifices for the sake of domestic considerations. She and Mr. Saroli had no children. She did not move or sacrifice for the sake of Mr. Saroli’s career, who himself was largely retired when they met. Mr. Saroli does not owe his economic success, or a part thereof, to Ms. La France’s role in the relationship. Even if I accept Ms. La France’s evidence that she spent two hours a week filing for Mr. Saroli, that did not come as a result of her sacrificing her economic interests. I find that Ms. La France did not make economic sacrifices for the sake of domestic considerations. The nature and structure of the relationship with Mr. Saroli did not impair Ms. La France’s ability to maximize her earning potential or enhance the earning potential of Mr. Saroli.78
192Ms. La France also submits that she conferred economic benefits on Mr. Saroli without adequate compensation by contributing to the upkeep and renovations of the Lakeshore house. I disagree.
193I accept Ms. La France’s evidence that she was deeply involved with the service providers and contractors who worked on the Lakeshore house. She took lead responsibility for contacting and screening the service providers that had previously performed work on the house and that she wrote up summary memos of her conversations with them. On the other hand, she was working from a list of providers (including contact information) that was provided to her by the prior owners. I also accept Ms. La France’s evidence that she was the primary contact person with the designer the couple hired to work on the Lakeshore project and that Mr. Saroli left a lot of the design choices to Ms. La France. Her evidence is corroborated by over 400 pages of text messages Ms. La France exchanged with the designer. I accept her evidence that she spent many hours on issues related to the Lakeshore house, including problems with the Crestron control systems, the floors, leaks and water damage, and landscapers, among others.
194I accept that Ms. La France is not on title to the Lakeshore house and that she is not advancing a claim of ownership of the house in this proceeding. On the other hand, Mr. Saroli paid $18 million for the house and did not ask her to contribute toward the purchase price, the property taxes, utilities, or renovation and repair expenses. I accept Ms. La France’s evidence that Mr. Saroli told her that he bought the house for her, not as a gift, but as the home they would share as a couple. With that arrangement, it is understandable that Ms. La France would spend a significant amount of time making their home livable and to their tastes. I do not accept the submission that the standard of living she enjoyed did not compensate her adequately for her contributions to the running of the Lakeshore house.
195I find that Ms. La France did not prove a compensatory basis for support.
B. There is a non-compensatory or needs based basis for spousal support
196Non-compensatory support (sometimes called needs based support) is based upon economic interdependency and a post-relationship loss of standard of living. Need alone, unconnected to any disadvantage arising from the spousal relationship, may be sufficient to require spouses to contribute to the needs of their former partners when they have the capacity to pay.79
197While an inability to achieve a subsistence existence needs certainly qualifies, the concept of need must be understood in broad, relative terms. In determining need, the court “ought to be guided in part by the principle that the spouse receiving support is entitled to maintain the standard of living to which they were accustomed at the time the cohabitation ceased.”80 A significant income disparity will often give rise to a non-compensatory claim based on a loss of the spousal standard of living.81 In such cases, the recipient spouse is entitled to “a degree of comfort well beyond ‘basic needs’.”82 The health of a disabled claimant is relevant to the assessment of the claimant’s needs.83
198Common markers of non-compensatory claims include the length of the relationship, the drop in standard of living experienced by the claimant after separation, and the economic hardship experienced by the claimant.84
199The merger of the parties’ economic lifestyles creates a joint standard of living which must be considered in the spousal support analysis.85 The length of the spousal relationship then determines the extent of the claim to be protected against this loss of standard of living achieved during the spousal relationship.86
200A recipient spouse may be disadvantaged by the breakdown of the spousal relationship, having lost to some degree the standard of living they enjoyed, given the length of the relationship and the lifestyle the parties maintained.87 Non-compensatory support may arise from the fact that a person who formerly enjoyed inter-spousal support now finds themselves without it and a party’s accustomed standard of living is an appropriate part of the context in which to assess need.88
201I am satisfied that Ms. La France has a non-compensatory entitlement to spousal support for four reasons.
202First, there is an enormous income disparity between Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli. Ms. La France currently receives $162,000 annually tax free from her disability insurer. In 2024, Mr. Saroli declared a line 15000 total income of $333,032,142. While I recognize that this income number is anomalous in the sense that it arose from a disposition of assets when Mr. Saroli ceased to be a resident of Canada for income tax purposes, it sheds light on the gulf in income and resources between the parties. While Mr. Saroli’s income is lower in other years, as he testified, his income is an abstraction: it is what he decides it will be. I have no doubt that there remains a significant gulf between the income of Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli.
203Second, I have no doubt that Ms. La France has suffered a significant drop in the standard of living she enjoyed during the spousal relationship. Even with her receipt of disability benefits, it is impossible for her to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed during the spousal relationship. I will not repeat all of the evidence set out above about the lifestyle the parties’ maintained during the spousal relationship, but I rely on all of it. To provide only two examples, Ms. La France can no longer afford to live in an $18 million house and have a second home in Grand Cayman. In addition, she can no longer enjoy frequent private jet flights to Napa Valley and Las Vegas, ultra-luxury accommodations, and trips to the most exclusive wineries, as she did during the spousal relationship. Mr. Saroli submitted that those trips were paid for by casino and not by him. I do not accept that submission. The casino provided him with such extravagant perks because of the amount he gambled and lost at those casinos, not out of friendship or its sense of generosity. It was Mr. Saroli’s willingness to gamble and lose his own money that indirectly purchased those ultra-luxury items.
204Despite the difference in the length of the relationship at issue, I find the reasoning of Shore J. in Climans (ONSC) applicable to this case:
I find that Ms. Climans is entitled to non-compensatory support, based on the difference between the needs and means of the parties. The circumstances of this relationship clearly created a pattern of economic dependency. Ms. Climans has a need for support. Currently, Ms. Climans' only source of income is from teaching yoga. She continues to rely on the interim without prejudice support payments from Mr. Latner to meet her day to day needs. There is no dispute that Mr. Latner has significant means. Mr. Latner's position during the trial was that his ability to pay support was not relevant. There is a huge difference in the parties' incomes. For 14 years, Mr. Latner provided Ms. Climans with a lavish lifestyle, one that she cannot maintain on her own income. Ms. Climans will be unable to maintain a lifestyle even close to that which she enjoyed during the relationship.89
205Third, as of the date of separation, and indeed, the date of trial, Ms. La France is not capable of working. Fortunately, Ms. La France receives benefit payments from her disability insurer. However, those payments will terminate at age 71 and are always subject to review by the insurer.
206While I am not suggesting that Mr. Saroli caused Ms. La France’s disability (he did not), it is the consequence of her disability that grounds a claim to spousal support. Non-compensatory support arises where there is economic dependency due disability and the disability need not necessarily be connected to the spousal relationship.90 In Gray, the Court of Appeal held that a recipient’s inability to work is relevant to need:
In the case before us, Ms. Gray's health prevents her from working. This is relevant to the assessment of her needs.91
207In Bracklow, the Supreme Court of Canada explained the rationale and policy considerations underpinning an order for support for disabled recipients:
To permit the award of support to a spouse disabled by illness is but to acknowledge the goal of equitably dealing with the economic consequences of marital breakdown that this Court in Moge, supra, recognized as lying at the heart of the Divorce Act. It also may well accord, in my belief, with society’s sense of what is just. The Report of the Scottish Law Commission, Family Law: Report on Aliment and Financial Provision (1981), at pp. 111-12, a thoughtful analysis of the rationale and policy considerations of spousal support and illness, states:
Financial provision on divorce is not . . . simply a matter of abstract principle. It is essential that any system should be acceptable to public opinion and it is clear from the comments we have received that many people would find it hard to accept a system which cut off, say, an elderly or disabled spouse with no more than a three-year allowance after divorce, no matter how wealthy the other party might be.
Divorce ends the marriage. Yet in some circumstances the law may require that a healthy party continue to support a disabled party, absent contractual or compensatory entitlement. Justice and considerations of fairness may demand no less.92
208In this case, Ms. La France is not able to re-enter to the workforce to earn income to try and approximate the standard of living she enjoyed with Mr. Saroli. Her disability creates a need, even if her disability was not caused by the spousal relationship.
209I am satisfied that this is a case where a non-compensatory spousal support order is required to address and cushion the effect of the end of the spousal relationship. Such an order will fulfill the purposes of a support order set out in s. 33(8) of the Family Law Act.
7. Quantum and duration of spousal support
210I have found that Ms. La France has standing to seek an order for spousal support and that she has an entitlement to spousal support on non-compensatory basis. I must now determine the amount and duration of the support order.
211In considering the quantum and duration of the support order, it is helpful to start with an assessment of the range of support outcomes generated by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines. I accept that the SSAG formulas are not presumptive because Mr. Saroli’s income exceeds the $350,000 ceiling. It is also true that the ceiling is not a cap, and spousal support usually increases for payor incomes above $350,000. Therefore, I am not to apply the formula automatically in this case. I am to take an individualized, fact-specific analysis, which may result in a spousal support amount in the SSAG range.93 It is, therefore, critical that I consider the support payments generated by the application of the SSAG formulae.
A. The SSAG ranges based on the parties’ incomes
212The first step is to determine the income of Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France for periodic support purposes.
213The parties agree that Ms. La France she has an annual income of $473,645, including her disability payments, interest and investment income, and pension income. This amount is grossed up for taxes.
214Determining Mr. Saroli’s income for support purposes is more complicated. Ms. La France called Paula White as an expert witness. I qualified Ms. White as an expert in calculating income for the purposes of support. She prepared an expert report that calculated Mr. Saroli’s potential imputed investment income based on a range of rates of return applied to his investible assets. Using Mr. Saroli’s Form 13 Financial Statement dated March 6, 2025, Ms. White calculated that Mr. Saroli’s investible assets totaled approximately $592 million.94 Mr. Saroli did not challenge this calculation, which excluded the value of the Lakeshore and Grand Cayman homes.
215Ms. White then calculated Mr. Saroli’s annual investment income on his investible assets if he earned a rate of return of 5% ($29.596 million), 6% ($35.515 million), and 7% ($41.434 million), net of an estimated investment fee of 0.75%. She selected these numbers based on her experience and expertise. Ms. White admitted these figures are illustrative and not based on actual returns earned by Mr. Saroli. She did not allow for a deduction for any personal expenses. Ms. White then grossed these numbers up for taxes to generate an estimated annual income for periodic support purposes of $63.69 million (5%), $76.43 million (6%), or $89.16 million (7%). This reflects the amount of income Mr. Saroli would have to earn as a Canadian resident to net the potential investment income amounts calculated by Ms. White. Mr. Saroli did not challenge these calculations. I accept Ms. White’s methodology. Mr. Saroli led no evidence to suggest that he actually earned a lower rate of return on his assets because of his investing risk tolerance, asset allocation, or overall investment strategy.
216Mr. Saroli’s evidence was that his income is not relevant because he can make his income whatever he wants it to be. As noted, his 2024 line 15000 total income was $333,032,142. In my view, it would not be appropriate to use Mr. Saroli’s 2024 income for support purposes because it was an atypical year. As noted above, that income number resulted from a one-time disposition of his securities portfolio when he stopped being a Canadian resident for tax purposes, and it significantly overstates his income for spousal support purposes. Equally, I do not accept that Mr. Saroli’s declared income in other years accurately reflects his income for spousal support purposes. As he testified, he alone decides what his income will be in any given year. That type of subjective approach has the potential to understate his income significantly for spousal support purposes.
217I accept Ms. White’s uncontradicted expert opinion that assessing Mr. Saroli’s income based on his investible assets is an appropriate way to determine his income. She testified that using this approach was fairly common where income history may not be a good indicator of true or future income or one does not have good information on a payor’s income. In this case, Mr. Saroli declined to provide his corporate financial statements when Ms. White requested them and she prepared her report. He eventually produced those documents and an updated financial statement. Ms. White reviewed the documents provided and concluded that she did not need to update her numbers.
218In assessing a spouse’s means, it is appropriate to consider all financial resources, capital assets, income earned from those assets and all other sources of income.95
219In all of the circumstances of this case, and working with the evidence before me, I think it is fair and reasonable to select a 5% return, being the low end of the illustrative rates of return selected by Ms. White. This generates an estimated income for Mr. Saroli for periodic support of $63,690,000.
220Using the without child support formula, the SSAG formula results in a range for monthly spousal support from $355,592 (low), to $414,857 (mid), to $474,123 (high).
B. The circumstances of this case
221As I noted above, the formulas and amounts in the SSAG are no longer presumptively applicable once the payor’s annual income rises above the ceiling of $350,000. With income above the ceiling, spousal support requires an individualized, fact-specific analysis, having regard to the legislative framework set out in s. 33(9) of the Family Law Act.96 The court has full discretion to depart from the SSAG in high income cases. I recognize that because Mr. Saroli’s income is far above the ceiling, the amount of support to be awarded will usually be below the low end of the SSAG range. Nevertheless, it is always appropriate to calculate the SSAG ranges and sometimes the outcome will fall within the SSAG ranges.97
222Subsection 33(9) of the Family Law Act requires the court to consider all the circumstances of the parties in determining the amount and duration of a spousal support order including an itemized list of considerations. I will also consider the purposes of a spousal support order set out in s. 33(8) of the Family Law Act. I will consider the factors that are relevant in this case in turn.98
223First, I am to compare the assets and means of Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli both presently and those they are likely to have in the future.99
224In addition to the income numbers discussed above, Ms. La France has non-registered investments of approximately $3.29 million, cash savings of $376,978.07, registered investments of $820,309.58. These amounts do not account for disposition costs, including taxes. Ms. La France’s disability payments will stop at age 71. In contrast, Mr. Saroli has $591 million in investible assets, plus his house in Grand Cayman and the Lakeshore house (which he purchased for $18 million). I assume that the assets of each party will continue to grow through their investments. Ms. La France’s annual income and asset base is obviously much smaller than Mr. Saroli’s.
225By many standards, Ms. La France has a healthy collection of assets to support her needs. Equally, those assets are not capable of generating income sufficient to bridge the gap to the lifestyle she lived with Mr. Saroli.
226Second, I am to consider each party’s capacity to contribute to the support of Ms. La France.100 Ms. La France has the capacity to contribute to her own support, but she clearly does not have the ability to maintain the standard of living that she enjoyed during the spousal relationship. It is that inability that grounds her non-compensatory entitlement to spousal support. Mr. Saroli has the capacity to provide support to meet Ms. La France’s needs, and I did not understand him to suggest otherwise. This factor supports a generous award to address the significant reduction in Ms. La France’s standard of living following the end of the relationship.
227Third, I am to consider the parties’ ages and physical and mental health.101 Ms. La France is 54 years old. As set out above, she is completely disabled from employment and has been since 2014. Her mental health is poor, and it is the disability that keeps her from working. Her health is linked to the non-compensatory basis of support, even though her disability was not caused by the spousal relationship. Mr. Saroli is about to turn 75. As discussed at length above, he has suffered from a serious cancer episode, among other physical ailments. In my view, his health concerns will not interfere with his ability to pay spousal support, given the assets under his control.
228Fourth, I am to look at Ms. La France’s needs with regard to the accustomed standard of living while the parties resided together.102 As explained above in paragraphs [202] and [203], Ms. La France has experienced a sharp and steep decline in her standard of living. There is simply no comparison between the lavish lifestyle Mr. Saroli provided her with during their spousal relationship and her current circumstances. In his submissions, Mr. Saroli focused on the proposed budget filed by Ms. La France. While I accept that the proposed budget is a useful check on the reality of any spousal support award, I do not think that it drives the analysis and should not be given undue weight.
229Fifth, I am to consider the measures available for Ms. La France to become able to provide for her own support and the length of time and cost involved to enable her to take these steps.103 Again, Ms. La France is currently totally disabled and unable to work. There is no evidence that she is able to work or that there are any measures that she could take to assist her to meet her needs and ameliorate the drop in her standard of living. On the other hand, her disability payments provide her with a solid base to support her, even recognizing that they are subject to review and will terminate at age 71.
230Sixth, I am to consider the length of time Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli cohabited.104 As I found above, Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli cohabited in a conjugal relationship from January 1, 2019, to August 23, 2023, which amounts to 4 years, 7 months, and 23 days. This was a short term relationship. This factor strongly suggests that, regardless of the drop in the standard of living experienced by Ms. La France, the duration of the spousal should be on the shorter end, and likely shorter than the duration of the conjugal relationship. Moreover, there is an obligation on Ms. La France to adjust her standard of living over time to reflect the reality that her relationship with Mr. Saroli has ended.
231Seventh, I am to consider any domestic services performed by Ms. La France for the family as if the time was spent in remunerative employment.105 I would give this factor very little weight. While there is no doubt that Ms. La France performed domestic services and worked hard on the design and maintenance of the Lakeshore house, the value of those services would not have made a material contribution to the family’s standard of living, given its luxuriousness.
232Eighth, I am to consider any other legal right of Ms. La France to support, other than out of public money.106 I have already considered above the payments Ms. La France receives as disability benefits. I do not think those benefits, which are time limited and subject to review by the insurer, should be considered again under this heading. To do so runs the risk of giving them too much weight in the analysis.
233Subsection 33(10) of the Family Law Act provides that the court may, in determining the amount of support, have regard to a course of conduct that is so unconscionable as to constitute an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship. I find that Ms. La France did not do anything that could be described as a course of unconscionable conduct that constituted an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship.
234Ms. La France engaged in a brief period of infidelity. Viewed objectively, even if I were to accept the evidence of the witness who engaged in the sexual relationship in preference to the evidence of Ms. La France (and I need not make the finding), that conduct would not amount to an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship. Moreover, I give little weight to Mr. Saroli’s evidence at trial regarding how he viewed Ms. La France’s infidelity. Where Ms. La France had sex with the witness is immaterial. Moreover, Mr. Saroli himself maintained a sexual relationship with at least three other women during his relationship with Ms. La France. He never told Ms. La France about those relationships. To find that Ms. La France’s conduct amounted to an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship given Mr. Saroli’s behaviour would be to adopt a sexist double standard.
235I do not accept Ryan Saroli’s evidence that Ms. La France attempted to come on to him or flashed her breasts at him. Ms. La France denied the conduct. Moreover, while he testified that one of the events took place at a Christmas dinner in December 2022, his text message to Ms. La France the next day makes no mention of any untoward events. The inconsistency between his text message and his evidence at trial causes me to conclude that he is not a credible witness. Even if I were to accept his evidence, and I do not, I would still not find that the conduct of Ms. La France that he described amounted to an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship.
C. Conclusion
236The assessment of duration and position within or around the range go hand in hand.
237With respect to duration, Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli lived together in a conjugal relationship for about 4.5 years, from January 1, 2019, to August 23, 2023. She is entitled to spousal support, in part, to assist her to adjust to the significantly lower standard of living she will enjoy after the relationship. While the fact that she is disabled would in many cases suggest that the duration of support should be longer, I am satisfied that the short length of the relationship is a more important factor in this case.
238Under the SSAG, a relationship of 4.5 years will often result in an order for spousal support to be paid for a duration of 2.25 to 4.5 years. In my view, taking into account all of the factors listed above, an award of spousal support with a duration of three years is appropriate in the circumstances. An award of three years’ duration will allow Ms. La France to continue to enjoy the lifestyle she enjoyed during the relationship but will also require her to adjust her spending over a reasonable period of time.
239I would not default to the middle of the range for monthly spousal support. This is particularly important in this case, given how by how much Mr. Saroli’s income exceeds the ceiling. The low range generated by the SSAG is $355,592 per month, and I will begin work from this point.
240I would not adjust this figure based on the compensatory exception in short marriages without children. In my view, Ms. La France does not have a compensatory claim and no adjustment is required. Similarly, I have considered the SSAG exception for illness and disability and considered whether it would be appropriate to extend the duration of the award. Ultimately, I am satisfied that given the income numbers that are generating the award, an extension of the duration or an increase in the amount is not necessary to make a proper award in this case.
241In my view, the application of the SSAG formulas in this case generates too large a monthly payment. This is a function of how far Mr. Saroli’s income is above the $350,000 ceiling. The RUG points out that for incomes far above the ceiling, the majority of outcomes wind up below the SSAG ranges and, sometimes, well below the SSAG range.107 I am strengthened in my conclusion by Ms. La France’s position in this litigation.
242First, Ms. La France seeks an order of $3 million in satisfaction of all spousal support claims. That would represent less than nine months of spousal support at the rate of $355,592 per month. Ms. La France’s submission implicitly recognizes that the low end of the SSAG ranges generate a monthly support award that is inappropriately high.
243Second, Ms. La France’s proposed budget does not suggest that she requires $355,592 per month in support. This also persuades me that an award at the low end of the SSAG range is too high.
244However, I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s submission that Ms. La France’s entitlement to spousal support is somehow limited by or conditioned on her proposed budget. The non-compensatory support order is required to recognize that Ms. La France will no longer enjoy the luxurious standard of living she enjoyed with her spouse Mr. Saroli. As noted, that standard of living included living in a home worth $18 million, spending significant amounts of time at the house on Grand Cayman, which Mr. Saroli estimated to be worth over $5 million, private jet travel to California and Las Vegas multiple times each year, and luxurious vacation accommodations that may not even be available on the market.
245Equally, I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s proposed (downward) revisions to Ms. La France’s budget. Ms. La France has not received any interim support payments since the parties separated in 2023. She testified that her standard of living dropped precipitously following the separation. I accept her evidence. It is the delta between her standard of living before and after the separation that drives the spousal support award, not how that award might be allocated among lines on a budget. Ms. La France will receive only one award. How she chooses to spend that award, and over how many years, is her decision.
246In all of the circumstances of the case, if I were to award periodic support to Ms. La France, I would order approximately $200,000 a month for three years. This would still leave Mr. Saroli with 95.4% of the net disposable income. However, for the reasons set out below, I think it is just and appropriate to make a support order as requested by Ms. La France: a lump sum award of $3,000,000.
8. The spousal support should be paid as a lump sum
247Pursuant to s. 34(1)(b) of the Family Law Act, the court has jurisdiction to order that a lump sum be paid in an application for spousal support under s. 33. The court has a broad discretion to make lump sum orders after weighing their advantages and disadvantages.108 The Court of Appeal has clarified that lump sum spousal support awards must not, as a matter of principle, be limited to very unusual circumstances.109 It is undisputed that lump sum awards should not be made in the guise of support for the purpose of redistributing assets.110 Here, I am considering a lump sum for the purpose of the fair and efficient implementation of a spousal support award, not redistributing assets.
248The Court of Appeal confirmed that under the Family Law Act, the court must consider the ability of the payor to pay a lump sum award.111 Here, I have no doubt that Mr. Saroli could pay a lump sum award without any difficulty whatsoever.
249In Davis, the Court of Appeal outlined a number of advantages and disadvantages to be weighed by the court when considering making a lump sum award:
The advantages of making such an award will be highly variable and case-specific. They can include but are not limited to terminating ongoing contact or ties between the spouses for any number of reasons (for example, short-term marriage; domestic violence; second marriage with no children, etc.); providing capital to meet an immediate need on the part of a dependant spouse; ensuring adequate support will be paid in circumstances where there is a real risk of non-payment of periodic support, a lack of proper financial disclosure or where the payor has the ability to pay lump sum but not periodic support; and satisfying immediately an award of retroactive spousal support.
Similarly, the disadvantages of such an award can include the real possibility that the means and needs of the parties will change over time, leading to the need for a variation; the fact that the parties will be effectively deprived of the right to apply for a variation of the lump sum award; and the difficulties inherent in calculating an appropriate award of lump sum spousal support where lump sum support is awarded in place of ongoing indefinite periodic support.112
250Here, I think it is very important to limit or terminate the ongoing contact or ties between Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli. Theirs was a short-term relationship without children. There is no need for them to have any ongoing contact. I am also concerned about the evidence of intimate partner violence. Each party accused the other of verbal abuse and threatening behaviour. Ms. La France accused Mr. Saroli of abandoning her for hours on a roadside. Mr. Saroli accused Ms. La France of threatening him with scissors. Ms. La France accused Mr. Saroli of threatening to throw her out of the house, but then never carrying out those threats. Ms. La France accused Mr. Saroli of threatening her disability payments. It is not necessary for me to adjudicate each and every one of these allegations. However, the high level of animosity between the parties is a factor supporting a lump sum award.113
251Ms. La France has been without any interim spousal support since the parties separated in August 2023. This case does not involve a true case of retroactive support. Mr. Saroli is not being held to a legal standard that did not exist at the relevant time. He is merely being required to pay what, in hindsight, should have been paid before.114 If I were to award periodic support for a duration of three years commencing from the date of separation, Mr. Saroli would be required to make all payments owing as of that time, plus go-forward payment within the next five months. From a cash-flow perspective, there is very little difference between ordering payment as a lump-sum as compared to periodic support. A lump-sum payment will also avoid the need to re-file any personal tax returns for 2023, 2024, or 2025. Also, providing a lump-sum to Ms. La France to meet her immediate needs or to acquire suitable accommodation is appropriate in these circumstances.
252I am concerned that there is a meaningful risk of Mr. Saroli not paying periodic spousal support. As of 2024, Mr. Saroli is no longer a resident of Canada for tax purposes. This fact alone significantly increases the risk of non-payment. I am also concerned by how he has conducted this litigation and some of the threatening statements he has made to Ms. La France. I am concerned that Ms. La France is at a significant risk of non-payment of ongoing periodic support.
253I do not see a significant risk of the need for the parties to seek a variation of support in the future. This was a short term spousal relationship, and I have awarded support over a fairly short term. It is unlikely that circumstances could arise to justify a variation in support. Similarly, I see no difficulty in calculating an appropriate lump-sum order given the nature of the award I have made.
254Mr. Saroli testified that if he was required to pay spousal support, he would prefer to make period support so that the payments were tax deductible to him.
255Using the income numbers for each party and spousal support of $200,000 per month for three years, Mr. Saroli would pay $7,200,000 in spousal support. Those payments would be deductible by him and taxable in the hands of Ms. La France. In contrast, a lump sum payment is neither deductible for Mr. Saroli nor taxable for Ms. La France. However, as long as the amount of the lump sum is reduced to reflect the different tax treatment of that award, Mr. Saroli should be indifferent to the tax treatment.115 I have used the income numbers set out above and the Divorce Mate lump sum calculator to discount the amount of the lump sum to reflect Mr. Saroli and Ms. La France’s tax rates. Having done so, I do not think Mr. Saroli’s preference outweighs all the other benefits of a lump sum payment that are set out above.
256I have also used a discount rate of 1.81% to reflect the time value of money, even though the duration of the spousal support payments is quite short. I have not otherwise discounted the value of the lump sum payment for any other contingencies as I do not believe that to be necessary or appropriate in the circumstances of this case.
257Using the Divorce Mate lump sum calculator, and the inputs listed above, the lump sum value of my spousal support award of $200,000 per month for three years would be $3.254 million. I would round this number down to $3.0 million, because that is the maximum amount sought by Ms. La France. I order Mr. Saroli to make this payment to Ms. La France’s lawyers, in trust, by wire transfer, certified cheque, or bank draft within 30 days of the release of these reasons for decision.
258The preservation order of Shin Doi J., dated August 23, 2024, shall remain in force until this payment is made. The relevant portion of this order provides that:
On an interim and without prejudice basis, pending further written agreement of the parties and/or Court Order, the Respondent, Robert Saroli, shall preserve and is restrained from disposing of, selling, transferring, alienating, encumbering, pledging, refinancing and/or otherwise depleting and/or dissipating the value and/or otherwise dealing with the property municipally known as 428 Jutras Drive South, Windsor, Ontario, legally known as:
PIN: 75007-0075 LT
Description: PT LT 6 CON EAST OF RIVER PECHE MAIDSTONE PT 32, 33, 34, 55 TO 60, 81, 82, 83 12R17121; S/T R1455769, R1456183, R1457260, R1457271; LAKESHORE
9. Ms. La France is not entitled to recover for unjust enrichment
259Ms. La France also submitted that she was entitled to an award for her unjust enrichment of Mr. Saroli. She did not assert that the parties were engaged in a joint family venture. I do not accept Ms. La France’s submission.
260To make out a claim for unjust enrichment, Ms. La France must prove that Mr. Saroli received an enrichment, that she suffered a corresponding deprivation, and that there is no juristic reason for the enrichment of Mr. Saroli.116 Domestic services are capable of forming the basis of a claim in unjust enrichment.117
261As described in paragraphs [123] to [127] and [192] to [194], Ms. La France did provide domestic services to Mr. Saroli and was deeply involved in the design and renovation plans for the house. Ms. La France called no evidence to establish a value for her services to Lakeshore project or her domestic services.
262The fact that Ms. La France conferred a benefit on Mr. Saroli is necessary but not sufficient to establish unjust enrichment.118 Accepting that Ms. La France provided services to Mr. Saroli, and assuming that that those services make out an enrichment and a corresponding deprivation, any deprivation was counterbalanced by benefits flowing to Ms. La France from Mr. Saroli. This factor is relevant to determine the parties’ reasonable expectations at the “absence of a juristic reason” stage of the analysis.119
263In my view, the benefits flowing from Mr. Saroli to Ms. La France demonstrate that it was the parties’ reasonable expectations that Ms. La France was conferring these benefits on Mr. Saroli as a gift, which provides a juristic reason for his enrichment. I am not satisfied that Ms. La France prejudiced herself in the reasonable expectation of receiving an interest in the property or that Mr. Saroli accepted the benefits conferred by Ms. La France in circumstance where he knew or ought to have known of that reasonable expectation.
264Moreover, even if Ms. La France had satisfied the test for unjust enrichment, I would not grant a remedy to her.120
265First, Ms. La France did not provide any evidence to quantify the value of the services she provided to Mr. Saroli. This poses very significant problems for her claim to a monetary award based on a fee for services provided approach.121 I would be very reluctant to quantify the value of her services absent any evidence to assist me.122
266Second, it is appropriate to consider and balance the benefits conferred and received by the parties at the remedy stage.123 While I accept that Mr. Saroli benefitted from the services provided by Ms. La France, it is clear that she, too, benefitted significantly from the relationship.124 As noted above, Ms. La France did not contribute any money to the purchase price, cost of renovations, property taxes or utilities at the Lakeshore house. As described above, Ms. La France enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle far beyond that which she had enjoyed previously. Indeed, the gap between the luxurious nature of the lifestyle Ms. La France enjoyed during the spousal relationship and her lifestyle after the relationship ended is one of the primary reasons for the non-compensatory award of spousal support.
267During the relationship, Ms. La France paid for nothing except her personal grooming expenses, her phone bill, the expenses associated with her house in Pembroke, and a few other personal incidental expenses. Because Ms. La France provided no evidence about the value of the services she provided, it is difficult to assign a precise value to them. However, I have no doubt that they did not exceed the value of the benefits she obtained during the relationship, and it would not have been particularly close. When considered in context of the benefits she enjoyed during the relationship, I do not accept that Ms. La France’s contributions entitle her to a remedy in the particular circumstances of this case.
268I dismiss Ms. La France’s claim in unjust enrichment.
10. A restraining order is not appropriate
269Ms. La France seeks the following order in the nature of a restraining order:
A mutual no-contact and non-harassment order shall issue, such that:
a. With the exception of communication through counsel, the parties shall have no direct or indirect contact or communication with each other, including but not limited to in-person, by telephone, by text message or other communication platform, social media, or e-mail.
b. The parties are restrained from harassing one another.
270Section 46 of the Family Law Act permits the court to make a final restraining order against a spouse or former spouse where the applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for his or her own safety. Pursuant to s. 46(3), the order may restrain the respondent from directly or indirectly contacting the applicant.
271I decline to issue the order sought by Ms. La France. I have considered legal principles related to the issuance of restraining orders and no contact orders.125 In this case, I am not satisfied that Ms. La France has made out a clear case for an order. Restraining orders are serious and carry significant consequences if they are breached. Ms. La France’s submission that there will be no harm in granting an order is insufficient to meet the statutory test for granting such an order.
272Almost three years have passed since the parties separated. Ms. La France alleged verbal abuse during the relationship with Mr. Saroli but did not suggest that he caused physical harm to her. While I am concerned about some of the comments attributed to Mr. Saroli during the litigation, now that the litigation has concluded there should be no reason for the parties to continue to interact. I also observe that Ms. La France did not bring a motion for an interim restraining order. The need for such an order in the future seems less acute than in the immediate aftermath of the parties’ separation. Ms. La France conceded that the parties have not spoken in two years and that the last time Mr. Saroli sent an email to her was in 2024. In all the circumstances, I decline to make a restraining or non-contact order.
273However, I wish to provide some guidance to Mr. Saroli. He testified at trial that he would agree not to contact Ms. La France if she agreed not to contact him. Given the evidence he heard at trial, Mr. Saroli subjectively knows that Ms. La France does not want him to contact her, that she would not welcome him contacting her, and that she would consider any attempt by him to contact her to be harassment. Mr. Saroli knows all of this. I expect that he will abide by his agreement not to contact Ms. La France, and he should expect the court to deal firmly with any future incidents that are inconsistent with his stated intention.
11. Order and costs
274For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Family Law Act, I order that:
The respondent, Robert Saroli, shall pay to the applicant, Louise La France, a lump sum spousal support payment of $3,000,000 within 30 days of the date of this order. This payment shall not be included in the calculation of the applicant’s income in 2026 and shall not be deducted by the respondent against income earned by him in 2026.
The payment required by paragraph 1 shall be made by certified cheque, wire transfer, or bank draft payable to the applicant’s lawyers, in trust, at coordinates to be provided by the lawyers.
The preservation order of Shin Doi J., dated August 23, 2024, shall continue until the payment required by paragraph 1 is made.
275Pursuant to the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 31, I order that:
Unless the support order is withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced the Director and amounts owing under the order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed.
A support deduction order (“SDO”) shall be issued. The applicant shall be entitled to redact her address on the SDO and enforcement materials.
276I invite the parties to make submissions regarding whether Ms. La France is entitled to prejudgment interest on the spousal support award and, if so, the appropriate calculation of that award. Unless the parties are able to resolve this issue, Ms. La France shall deliver her submissions of no more than two double spaced pages on or before March 31, 2026, and Mr. Saroli shall deliver his responding submission of no more than two double spaced pages on or before April 7, 2026. No reply submissions are to be delivered without leave.
277The parties have agreed that the applicant’s claim for damages for intentional infliction of mental distress is withdrawn without costs. I urge the parties to attempt to resolve this issue of costs. If the parties are not able to resolve costs of this action, Ms. La France may email her costs submission of no more than three double-spaced pages (not including a bill of costs and offers to settle, if any) to my judicial assistant on or before March 31, 2026. Mr. Saroli may deliver his responding submission of no more than three double-spaced pages on or before April 7, 2026. No reply submissions are to be delivered without leave.
Robert Centa J.
Released: March 24, 2026
CITATION
La France v. Saroli, 2026 ONSC 1783
COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00039701-0000
DATE: 20260324
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Louise Lenore La France
Applicant
– and –
Robert Anthony Saroli
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Robert Centa J.
Released: March 24, 2026
Footnotes
- The Family Law Act definition of “spouse” does not exclude a cohabiting spouse who is still legally married to another person: Matteau v. Johnson, 2012 ONSC 1179, at para. 16.
- Steven Uttley also acted as Ms. La France’s family doctor for a number of years. Ms. La France did not consent to the sharing of any of her private health information and I directed Mr. Uttley not to testify about any of Ms. La France’s personal health information or any information he had received from her in his treating capacity.
- R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, 241 C.C.C. (3d) 45, at para. 41, citing R. v. Morrissey (1995), 1995 CanLII 3498 (ON CA), 22 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.), 97 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at p. 526; R. v. Sanichar, 2012 ONCA 117, 280 C.C.C. (3d) 500, at paras. 36, 69-70, rev’d, 2013 SCC 4, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 54; and Fitzpatrick v. Orwin, 2012 ONSC 3492, at paras. 62-68.
- R. v. White, 1947 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1947] S.C.R. 268, at p. 272; A.M. v. C.H., 2018 ONSC 6472, at para. 87.
- Sanichar, at para. 35; R. v. McGrath, [2000] O.J. No. 5735 (S.C.), at paras. 10-14; R. v. Stewart (1994), 1994 CanLII 7208 (ON CA), 18 O.R. (3d) 509 (C.A.), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 242, at pp. 517; R. v. Norman (1993), 1993 CanLII 3387 (ON CA), 16 O.R. (3d) 295 (C.A.), at pp. 313-14.
- White, at p. 272.
- Phillips et al. v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. et al., 1971 CanLII 389 (ON CA), [1971] 2 O.R. 637 (C.A.), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 641, at p. 645, citing Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA), [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.), at p. 357.
- R. v. D.M., 2012 ONCA 894, 295 C.C.C. (3d) 159, at para. 59; Misiuda v. Misiuda, 2021 ONSC 5258, at para. 29.
- R. v. A.M., 2014 ONCA 769, 123 O.R. (3d) 536, at paras. 12-14; Caroti v. Vuletic, 2022 ONSC 4695, 38 B.L.R. (6th) 1, at para. 436; 1088558 Ontario Inc. v. Musial, 2022 ONSC 5239, 38 C.L.R. (5th) 199, at para. 83; McBennett v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610, 57 R.F.L. (8th) 1, at paras. 40-41; and Virc v. Blair, 2016 ONSC 49, 80 R.F.L. (7th) 124, at para. 40.
- F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41, at para. 76.
- The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. Moyse, 2016 ONSC 5271, 35 C.C.E.L. (4th) 242, at para. 74, aff’d 2018 ONCA 283, 130 O.R. (3d) 675, leave to appeal refused, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 295.
- Morrissey, at p. 530.
- Morrissey, at p. 530.
- McDougall, at paras. 58-59.
- R. v. J.D., 2024 ONCA 286, at para. 16.
- R. v. Schneider, 2022 SCC 34, [2022] 2 S.C.R. 619, at paras. 36-45; Sordi v. Sordi, 2011 ONCA 665, 13 R.F.L. (7th) 197, at para. 12; Fiorito v. Wiggins, 2015 ONCA 729, 69 R.F.L. (7th) 5, at para. 22.
- Van Ruyven v. Van Ruyven, 2021 ONSC 5963, 62 R.F.L. (8th) 451, at paras. 30-43; Sadikali v. Sadikali, 2023 ONSC 4639, at paras. 9-10; Kidd v. Mokrenko, 2024 ONSC 4002, at para. 36.
- Scarlett v. Farrell, 2014 ONCJ 517, at para. 31.
- Fiorito, at para. 22.
- Wilson v. Sinclair, 2022 ONSC 820, at para. 21.
- Sordi, at paras. 10-11; Paftali v. Paftali, 2020 ONSC 5325, 46 R.F.L. (8th) 1, at para. 60.
- Wilson, at para. 17.
- Sordi, at paras. 11-12.
- Van Ruyven, at para. 32, citing Hameed v. Hameed, 2006 ONCJ 274, at para. 11.
- Family Law Act, ss. 1(1) and 29.
- Kassabian v. Marcarian, 2025 ONCA 239, 16 R.F.L. (9th) 33, at para. 14.
- Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 1980 CanLII 1537 (ON HCJ), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.); cited with approval in M. v. H., 1999 CanLII 686 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 59, and Climans v. Latner, 2019 ONSC 1311, 144 O.R. (3d) 743 (“Climans (ONSC)”), at paras. 117-20, var’d on other grounds, 2020 ONCA 554, 152 O.R. (3d) 369 (“Climans (ONCA)”); Kassabian, at paras. 20 to 24.
- Kassabian, at para. 31(f).
- Moya v. Georgilis, 2021 ONCJ 439, at para. 112; Climans (ONSC), at para. 118.
- Climans (ONSC), at para. 128.
- Obahiagbon v. Nhau, 2026 ONSC 410, at para. 29.
- R. v. Stirling, 2008 SCC 10, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 272, at para. 5.
- R. v. J.W., 2025 ONCA 637, 178 O.R. (3d) 358, at para. 57.
- J.W., at para. 57, citing R. v. Khan, 2017 ONCA 114, 136 O.R. (3d) 520, at paras. 25-26, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 139.
- R. v. Picard, 2025 ONCA 417, 449 C.C.C. (3d) 56, at para. 65, citing R. v. S.K., 2019 ONCA 776, 148 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 152.
- Russell v. Volanska, 2026 ONSC 388, at para. 49.
- Jensen v. Schevelik, 2010 MBQB 144, 254 Man. R. (2d) 122, at para. 60; Stephen v. Stawecki (2005), 2005 CanLII 25118 (ON SC), 32 R.F.L. (6th) 273 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 27.
- Su v. Lam, 2011 ONSC 1086, 68 E.T.R. (3d) 210, at paras. 37-38.
- In his evidence, Mr. Saroli took issue with a subsequent power of attorney for personal care that Ms. La France prepared for him and that he signed on April 6, 2021. I do not accept his submissions on this point. If Mr. Saroli wanted to appoint one of his sons as his attorney for personal care, he had two years after his discussion with the nurse to do so. He didn’t. Mr. Saroli took objection to the inclusion of the phrase “I appoint my common law spouse” to describe Ms. LaFrance. Given the definitions under the Substitute Decision Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, s. 1, and the prohibition on certain persons receiving compensation for providing health care and support services contained in that Act, I find the inclusion of that phrase to be understandable. This power of attorney for personal care does not provide any support for Mr. Saroli’s theory that Ms. La France was “out to get him.”
- Muir v. Schaaf, 2023 ONSC 4105, at para. 47.
- Aldridge v. Bulko, 2006 CanLII 39028 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 26, aff’d 2008 ONCA 541, citing Molodowich, at paras. 10-14.
- Cassan v. Giroux, 2024 ONSC 4785, 5 R.F.L. (9th) 305, at para. 69.
- Conde v. Ripley, 2009 ONCA 480, at para. 4.
- Thauvette v. Malyon (1996), 1996 CanLII 8090 (ON CTGD), 23 R.F.L. (4th) 217, at paras. 42-44 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
- Letford v. Letford (2000), 2000 CanLII 22453 (ON SC), 12 R.F.L. (5th) 169 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 3-5.
- Paul v. Barrett, 2016 ONSC 7933, at paras. 9-11, 16.
- Bosrock v. Hutchison, 2024 ONSC 6782, at paras. 57-61, aff’d 2025 ONCA 472.
- Moya, at para. 113.
- Climans (ONCA), at para. 59.
- Warwick v. Ontario Minister of Community and Social Services, (1978), 1978 CanLII 1300 (ON CA), 21 O.R. (2d) 528 (C.A.), at p. 537.
- Sanderson v. Russell (1979), 1979 CanLII 2048 (ON CA), 24 O.R. (2d) 429 (C.A.)
- Pearce v. Shipton, 2001 CarswellOnt 1235 (S.C.), at para. 27, aff’d 2002 CarswellOnt 3541 (C.A.); Letford, at para. 4.
- Zegil v. Opie (1994), 1994 CanLII 7448 (ON CTGD), 8 R.F.L. (4th) 91, at para. 4 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
- Macmillan-Dekker v. Dekker (2000), 2000 CanLII 22428 (ON SC), 10 R.F.L. (5th) 352, at para. 54 (Ont. S.C.).
- Derakhshan v. Narula, 2018 ONSC 537, 51 E.T.R. (4th) 59, at paras. 32-34; S.(Y.) v. B.(S.), 2006 ONCJ 162, 29 R.F.L. (6th) 183, at para. 61.
- Stajduhar v. Kerzner Estate, 2017 ONSC 4954, 99 R.F.L. (7th) 401, at para. 65, aff’d 2018 ONCA 258, 10 R.F.L. (8th) 32, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 431.
- Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), 2004 SCC 65, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357, at para. 42; Alvarez v. Smith, 2007 CarswellOnt 2987 (S.C.), at para. 7.
- Unlike, for example, Lehner v. Grundl, 1995 CarswellOnt 2077 (Ont. Gen. Div.), var’d 1999 CarswellOnt 1318 (C.A.).
- Conde, at para. 4.
- Quesnel v. Erickson, 2012 ONSC 4335, 24 R.F.L. (7th) 229, at paras. 102-7.
- Sanderson, at p. 432.
- Stulberg v. Batler (2009), 78 R.F.L. (6th) 199, at para. 159 (Ont. C.J.), rev’d 2010 ONSC 5299, 94 R.F.L. (6th) 375.
- Cheng v. Sze, 2020 ONSC 937, 38 R.F.L. (8th) 165, at paras. 36-41.
- Kassabian, at para. 21, citing Al-Sajee v. Tawfic, 2019 ONSC 3857, 27 R.F.L. (8th) 269.
- Kassabian, at paras. 22-23.
- Alvarez, at para. 33.
- Chapman v. Ing, 2025 ONCA 292, 176 O.R. (3d) 610, at para. 11.
- Campbell v. Szoke (2003), 2003 CanLII 2291 (ON SC), 45 R.F.L. (5th) 261 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 52.
- Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269, at para. 208.
- Racco v. Racco, 2014 ONCA 330, 44 R.F.L. (7th) 348, at para. 23.
- Berger v. Berger, 2016 ONCA 884, 85 R.F.L. (7th) 259, at para. 53; R.L. v. M.F., 2025 ONCA 595, 19 R.F.L. (9th) 39, at para. 36; Farrar v. Farrar (2003), 2003 CanLII 15943 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 141 (C.A.), at para. 60.
- Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at para. 15; R.L., at para. 27, citing Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, at para. 201; Berger, at para. 95.
- Cassidy v. McNeil, 2010 ONCA 218, 99 O.R. (3d) 81; Fisher v. Fisher, 2015 ONCA 918, 2008 ONCA 918, 128 O.R. (3d) 730, mat paras. 52 to 59; Gilliland v. Gilliland (2009), 72 R.F.L. (6th) 88 (Ont. S.C.); Gonabady-Namadon v. Mohammadzadeh, 2009 BCCA 448, 74 R.F.L. (6th) 1; Mehlsen v. Mehlsen, 2009 SKQB 279, 73 R.F.L. (6th) 434; McKenzie v. McKenzie, 2014 BCCA 381, 51 R.F.L. (7th) 84; and B.L.B. v. G.D.M., 2015 PESC 1, 1118 A.P.R. 74.
- Gray v. Gray, 2014 ONCA 659, 122 O.R. (3d) 337, at para. 38.
- Moge v. Moge, 1992 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at p. 861
- Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide, (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2016), at p. 6 (“RUG”).
- Dorthee v. Bekintis, 2004 CanLII 44989 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 68.
- Gray, at para. 38, citing Moge, at p. 861.
- Kalaba v. Bylykbashi (2006), 2006 CanLII 3953 (ON CA), 23 R.F.L. (6th) 235 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 81, leave to appeal refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 144.
- Gray, at para. 27, citing Marinangeli v. Marinangeli (2003), 2003 CanLII 27673 (ON CA), 66 O.R. (3d) 40 (C.A.), at para. 74.
- RUG, at p. 8.
- R.L., at para. 42.
- Gray, at para. 28, citing Bracklow, at para. 48.
- Smith v Noel, 2023 ONSC 6682, at para. 71, citing RUG, at p. 6.
- R.L., at para. 34, citing Linton v. Linton (1990), 1990 CanLII 2597 (ON CA), 1 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), at para. 79.
- R.L., at para. 33.
- R.L., at para. 37.
- MacIntyre v. Winter, 2020 ONSC 4376, at para. 53, var’d 2021 ONCA 516, 59 R.F.L. (8th) 253.
- Climans (ONSC), at para. 143
- Roseneck v. Gowling (2002), 2002 CanLII 45128 (ON CA), 62 O.R. (3d) 789 (C.A.), at para. 65; Naegels v. Robillard, 2020 ONSC 3918, 43 R.F.L. (8th) 65 (Div. Crt.), at para. 16.
- Gray, at para. 28.
- Bracklow, at para. 48; Kalaba, at paras. 81, 83.
- See, generally, J.E.H. v. P.L.H., 2014 BCCA 310, leave to appeal refused, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 412, and the cases cited therein; R.L., at paras. 54-59; Zapfe v. Zapfe, 2019 ONSC 4065, 29 R.F.L. (8th) 321, at para. 32.
- Ms. White calculated the investible assets by taking the total value of Mr. Saroli’s real estate holdings, deducted the personal use property, added the value of savings, securities, pension values, and business interests, subtracting his estimated 2025 tax liability for becoming non-resident for tax purposes, and deducted other debts.
- Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 920, at para. 29.
- Plese v. Herjavec, 2020 ONCA 810, 49 R.F.L. (8th) 28, at para. 56.
- Climans (ONSC), at para. 179.
- For example, neither party asserted that there was any legal obligation of the respondent or dependant to provide support for another person (s. 33(9)(h)), there are no children to care for or consider (s. 33(9)(k), (l)(iii), (iv), and (vi)), there was no suggestion that Ms. La France contributed to the realization of Mr. Saroli’s career potential (s. 33(9)(j)), and as explained above in the reasons why there is no compensatory award, the responsibilities assumed by Ms. La France during cohabitation had no effect on her earning capacity (s. 33(9)(l)(ii)).
- Family Law Act, s. 33(9)(a) and (b); Mason v. Mason, 2016 ONCA 725, 132 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 66.
- Family Law Act, s. 33(9)(c) and (d).
- Family Law Act, s. 33(9)(e).
- Family Law Act, s. 33(9)(f).
- Family Law Act, s. 33(9)(g).
- Family Law Act, s. 33(9)(l)(i).
- Family Law Act, s. 33(9)(l)(v).
- Family Law Act, s. 33(9)(m).
- RUG, at p. 58, citing Volcko v. Volcko, 2015 NSCA 11, 55 R.F.L. (7th) 253, leave to SCC refused [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 141; J.L.A. v. M.J.G.G., 2014 BCSC 1391; S.R.M. v. N.G.T.M., 2014 BCSC 442; Frank v. Linn, 2014 SKCA 87, 48 R.F.L. (7th) 34; Margie v. Margie, 2013 CarswellOnt 18641 (S.C.); Goriuk v. Turton, 2011 BCSC 652, 2 R.F.L. (7th) 180; T.N. v. J.C.N., 2013 BCSC 1870; Breed v. Breed, 2012 NSSC 83; Dobbin v. Dobbin, 2009 NLUFC 11, 875 A.P.R. 6; and Dyck v. Dyck, 2009 MBQB 112, 239 Man. R. (2d) 137.
- Bondaruk v. Bondaruk, 2025 ONSC 7147 at para. 210.
- Davis v. Crawford, 2011 ONCA 294, 106 O.R. (3d) 221, at para. 51.
- Davis, at para. 60.
- Davis, at para. 65.
- Davis, at paras. 67-68.
- Racco v. Racco, 2014 ONCA 330, at para. 31.
- D.B.S. v. S.R.G,, 2006 SCC 37, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231, at para. 2; Cassidy, at para. 44.
- Samoilova v. Mahnic, 2014 ABCA 65, 41 R.F.L. (7th) 83, at para. 28.
- Pettkus v. Becker, 1980 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, at p. 848; Belvedere v. Brittain Estate, 2009 ONCA 1, 94 O.R. (3d) 655, at para. 38.
- Pettkus, at p. 849; Sorochan v. Sorochan, 1986 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38, at pp. 44-45.
- Lovsin v. Hodgins, 2008 ONCA 371, 39 E.T.R. (3d) 170, at para. 7.
- Kerr, at para. 113.
- Martin v. Sansome, 2014 ONCA 14, 118 O.R. (3d) 522, at para. 52.
- Kerr, at para. 103.
- Cameron v. Vincent, 2024 ONSC 6531, 14 R.F.L. (9th) 454, at para. 84 to 86.
- Kerr, at para. 109; Belvedere, at para. 46; Boudreau v. Jakobsen, 2020 ONSC 5264, at para. 68.
- Belvedere, at para. 47.
- Joseph v. Molnar, 2020 ONSC 5237, at para. 92, citing Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.S., 2017 ONCJ 506, 98 R.F.L. (7th) 225, at para. 44 (and the cases cited therein); Stec v. Blair, 2021 ONSC 6212, 93 C.B.R. (6th) 217, at para. 59; Yenovkian v. Gulian, 2019 ONSC 7279, 62 C.C.L.T. (4th) 45, at para. 45.