COURT FILE NO.: FS-18-7037
DATE: 20200205
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Bruce Boudreau
Applicant
– and –
Randi Jakobsen
Respondent
Self-Represented
Self-Represented
HEARD: November 12-15, 18-21, 25, 2019
Shore, J.
[1] The main issue for this trial is whether the parties were common law spouses for the purpose of spousal support.
[2] The parties lived together for at least 21 years. The parties differ on the nature of their relationship. The Applicant’s position is that the parties were common law spouses. The Respondent’s position is that they lived as roommates and were just good friends.
[3] For the reasons set out below I find the parties were common law spouses.
Background Facts:
[4] The parties met at university in 1989. They dated and broke up a few times until they eventually moved in together in 1997. The parties moved between rental apartments until the Respondent bought a house in 2008. From that time until separation they remained living in the Respondent’s home.
[5] The parties separated on April 7, 2018, when the Applicant was charged with assaulting the Respondent.
[6] The Applicant was 52 and the Respondent was 49 years old at separation.
[7] This was an unusual relationship, largely affected by the Applicant’s mental health issues. The Applicant was initially misdiagnosed as having ADHD but in 1999, after a suicide attempt, he was diagnosed with depression and anxiety. The Applicant continued to struggle with severe depression throughout the relationship with the Respondent. At times, I accept that he was isolated as a result of the depression, not being able to leave the house and at times not being able to leave his bed.
[8] In 2017, the Applicant stopped taking his medication and spiralled back into a deep depression. During trial, the Applicant fluctuated between blaming the Respondent for his isolation and lack of self-worth and accepting that his mental health played a large role in his circumstances.
[9] Both parties allege that they were victims of domestic abuse, being subject to verbal and emotional abuse by the other. However, both parties also acknowledged having a “mean streak” and showed vindictive and vengeful behaviour towards the other at times. I believe neither party could have been easy to live with.
[10] The parties both talked about optics being important to themselves and to the other party. I accept this testimony. Public perception was something clearly important to both parties.
[11] During his testimony, the Applicant kept going back to the event that triggered the separation. The separation occurred when the Applicant was charged with assaulting the Respondent. As I advised the parties in court, this incident was addressed in the criminal courts. I am not making any findings with respect to this incident.
Credibility:
[12] Given the positions of the parties with respect to the nature of the relationship, it was clear from the outset that the credibility of the parties was going to be key in determining this issue. However, by the end of the trial it was clear that neither party was a credible witness. Both parties gave whatever answer they thought would assist them in advancing their case and the answers changed during the trial. The testimony of each party was inconsistent and not reliable. Their evidence at trial did not support the facts set out in their pleadings and in most cases, contradicted same. As set out above, they both played victim during parts of the trial, but I did not see this borne by the evidence. Both parties clearly have mean streaks and showed signs of vindictiveness and manipulation during the trial.
[13] A few examples (and there are many more) of difficulty I had with their evidence:
The Applicant:
a. In chief the Applicant talked about having a low self-esteem and sense of worth that he alleges stems from verbal abuse by the Respondent. It became clear during his cross-examination and throughout the rest of the trial that there was nothing wrong with the Applicant’s self-esteem or view of his own self worth. In addition to the answers given, after he finished giving his evidence in chief his entire presentation changed, including body language, physical demeanor, tone of voice, language used, and so forth.
b. The Applicant advised he was receiving help from an organization that helps men in abusive relationships and that there was a power imbalance between him and the Respondent. The Applicant used key words such as control, abuse, and co-dependency, without being able to elaborate or provide concrete (or credible) examples to back up his allegations.
c. The Applicant’s evidence was he backs down from conflict, is non-confrontational, and passive by nature. However, the Applicant had numerous outbursts in court and became quite confrontational with many of the witnesses and while being cross-examined by the Respondent. Not liking what the witnesses had to say, he would become verbally aggressive towards them. He had several verbal outbursts in court and showed an inability to control his temper, including storming out of court on a number of occasions and showing a disregard for decorum in the court, despite numerous warnings. What was really concerning was the outburst the Applicant had at Ms. Barbara Hartley, the Respondent’s elderly aunt, as she left the courtroom. When asked about being verbally abusive to his neighbours, he said that he will give back at the same level it is given. Meaning, if his neighbours are abusive to him, he will be abusive back. He then extended this to his family. From the evidence at court, his behaviour towards the Respondent was no different. He acknowledged that they both smashed things in the house out of anger.
d. The Applicant initially testified that he was frugal with money and only spent when necessary. Then he acknowledged spending between $4,000-$6,000 per month on the Respondent’s AMEX following separation. The Applicant also testified he spent freely following separation because the Respondent could afford it.
e. The Applicant repeatedly advised that while he was being deprived of support, the Respondent took a course for $30,000 USD at an ivy league school. The evidence at trial was that the Respondent did take a course, it cost $3,000 and was paid for by her employer. Despite this evidence, he continued to maintain his initial position.
f. The evidence about the nature of his relationship with is own family changed several times during the trial.
g. While the Applicant alleged that he put his money into a joint account and all the payments for the house came from this joint account, the house was purchased in 2008. The Applicant was not working at the time, nor did he earn employment after that time.
The Respondent:
h. In her pleadings, the Respondent submitted that the Applicant was not on her extended medical and health plan available through her employment and never had been. This was simply not true. The Applicant had been on her medical plan as a spouse from at least 2000. She was aware of the Applicant making recent claims.
i. The Respondent’s initial position was that she did not provide any money to the Respondent. However, she subsequently acknowledged that he had use of a bank card and credit card, which she paid.
j. In her Answer, the Respondent denied naming the Applicant as the beneficiary on her life insurance policy, in her will, and her pension. She denied the existence of a will. She denied the existence of the Power of Attorney. This was not true. Her explanation as to why he was named as a spouse on her insurance and other documents changed during the trial, with yet a different reason in her closing submissions. She offered different excuses for naming the Applicant as a spouse in different documents. I did not find her evidence to be credible or reliable. It certainly did not help that she withheld most of these documents until the eve of trial.
k. During her cross-examination the Respondent acknowledged there were times when she considered the Applicant to be her common law spouse. The Respondent testified that there were times she had hopes to repair their relationship and that things may change, but then denied ever having more than a friendship with the Applicant.
l. The Respondent signed an affidavit in May 2018 in the criminal proceedings stating that the parties have been living in a common law relationship. During the trial the Respondent said she lied in the affidavit. Either the Respondent lied under oath and I need to be concerned about her credibility, or she did not lie in the affidavit and she has acknowledged they were in a common law relationship.
m. The Respondent refused to produce her medical records, even though several times throughout her testimony she relied on her medical conditions to explain certain actions. Therefore, I am prepared to draw a negative inference against her in certain circumstances as specifically addressed below.
n. Despite several court orders, the Respondent failed to provide proper disclosure until the eve of trial (and even then, some was still missing).
[14] Both parties called witnesses. I did not find any of the witnesses particularly helpful in deciding the issue. The Respondent’s aunt, Barbara Hartley, confirmed that for most of the last 20 years the Respondent was not very close to her family. Extended family members called as witnesses were not very helpful because they had not been involved in the Respondent’s life for most of the relationship. There seemed to be a similar 20-year gap with other witnesses.
[15] It was also concerning that despite excluding the witnesses from the courtroom, the Respondent was communicating to them the evidence being given during the trial. It also appeared to me that the Respondent coached her witnesses on the evidence she needed them to provide at trial. Much of their testimony did not stand up to cross-examination. This was especially true for Jennifer Hartley and Jasmine Ghosm. Neither of these witnesses could contribute much other than what had been told to them by the Respondent following separation. Again, there seems to be a gap in the Respondent’s relationship with them for most of the last 20 years. This goes to my previous comment that neither party had a strong support system during most of their relationship, the Applicant suffering from depression and the Respondent being engrossed in her career.
[16] Given the problems with both the parties’ and their witnesses’ credibility, I had to rely on documentary evidence to assist in deciding this case.
Analysis:
[17] Section III of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (the “FLA”) states:
29 In this Part,
“spouse” means a spouse as defined in subsection 1 (1), and in addition includes either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited,
(a) continuously for a period of not less than three years….
[18] Section 1(1) of the FLA defines “cohabit” as “to live together in a conjugal relationship, whether within or outside marriage”.
[19] The parties lived together for 21 years. The question to be answered is were they in a conjugal relationship?
[20] Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 1980 CanLII 1537 (ON SC), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), has often been cited as setting out the criteria to consider when determining whether a conjugal relationship exists. While this case dates back to 1980, it has been adopted and followed in numerous recent cases.
[21] The Supreme Court of Canada, in M. v. H, 1999 CanLII 686 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, adopted and affirmed the Molodowich criteria. This case concerned the right of same-sex couples to be identified as common law spouses under s. 29 of the FLA and is the leading Supreme Court case in interpreting the meaning of s. 29. While largely a constitutional case, two paragraphs of this decision relate specifically to the legal definition of “conjugal” relationships (paras. 59-60). In these paragraphs, the Supreme Court adopts the contextual and flexible definition of “conjugal” outlined in Molodowich, finding that there are many elements of a conjugal relationship that may be present in varying degrees in different relationships, and that the approach to determining whether relationship is conjugal must be flexible:
Obviously, the weight to be accorded the various elements or factors to be considered in determining whether an opposite sex couple is in a conjugal relationship will vary widely and almost infinitely. The same must hold true of same-sex couples.[^1]
[22] Justice Karakatsanis (as she then was) summarized the criteria from Molodowich in her decision in Campbell v. Szoke, 2003 CanLII 2291 (ON SC), 45 R.F.L. (5th) 261 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 51 as follows:
Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 1980 CanLII 1537 (ON SC), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), at 381-382 has set out a non-exhaustive list of criteria to be considered in determining whether a conjugal relationship exists. Elements to consider include shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support, children as well as the societal perception of the couple. These were confirmed as generally accepted characteristics of a conjugal relationship by the Supreme Court of Canada in M. v. H., 1999 CanLII 686 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). (para. 59). However, it is recognized that these elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be conjugal. [emphasis added]
[23] In Climans v. Latner, 2019 ONSC 1311, 144 O.R. (3d) 743, I dealt with a case where all of the elements of a conjugal relationship were present, but there was dispute over whether they had a shared residence. In the case before me, it is clear that most of the other elements existed, but they seem to lack a sexual relationship.
[24] In closing submissions, the Respondent said that it is possible for roommates to have sex and not be considered spouses. That is true. The determination as to whether the parties were in a conjugal relationship will depend on an analysis of all of the elements set out above. In the case before me, most of the factors indicate that the parties were spouses, without an active sex life. For the reasons set out below, in these circumstances I find the parties were spouses.
Sexual Behaviour:
[25] There was a sexual relationship between the parties initially. However, the parties did not have an active sex-life for most of their relationship. The Respondent was fixated on the fact that there was no sexual relationship for most of the relationship. But a sexless relationship is not the sole determining factor. The parties’ sex life was strongly affected by the Applicant’s depression and his anti-depressant medication. The Respondent acknowledged that the Applicant’s anti-depressant medication made it impossible for him to have sex. He was diagnosed with depression and put on medication only a few years into the relationship.
[26] The Applicant’s testimony was that they still had sex from time to time. In 2017 the Applicant saw his doctor as he had rash on his groin. The evidence at trial was that the Applicant contracted ring-worms from the Respondent. The Respondent did not address this allegation in her evidence, and she failed to provide her medical records. I draw a negative inference from her failure to provide her medical records.
[27] The Respondent submitted that she has a mild latex allergy and could not use condoms and therefore they did not have sex. Again, despite a request, she refused to produce her medical records. I am drawing an adverse inference from her failure to provide this disclosure. I do not accept her testimony in this regard. Further, latex condoms are not the only form of birth control.
[28] The lack of an ongoing sexual relationship is one factor to consider but not detrimental to the Applicant’s claim that the parties were common law spouses in the case before me. The was an abundance of evidence with respect to the Applicant’s ongoing and chronic mental health issues. Both parties testified that both his mental health issues and his medication would have made it difficult, if not impossible, for him to have sex. Considering all the other factors, I find the parties were in a common-law relationship.
Personal Behaviour:
[29] The parties’ personal behaviour supports a finding that they were spouses. The Respondent referred to the Applicant as her common law spouse in several documents between 2002 and 2015. The documents included:
i) Giving the Applicant power of attorney for property and personal care in 2015;
ii) Naming the Applicant as her spouse and beneficiary of her life insurance policy (both in 2002 and 2015);
iii) Naming the Applicant as her common law spouse (and a dependant) on her income tax returns (several years);
iv) Referring to the Applicant as her common law spouse in her will (2015) and naming him as the beneficiary, trustee and executor of her will;
v) Naming the Applicant as her spouse on her extended medical and health insurance (from at least 2000);
vi) Naming the Applicant as her spouse and beneficiary on her pension plan and on her pension plan application form (2003);
vii) Each of the parties were named as the other’s partner in the obituaries when their mothers died; and
viii) Naming the Applicant as her spouse and beneficiary on her group retirement savings plan (2015).
[30] I accept that the Respondent deliberately failed to disclose these documents until just before the trial. While I have discretion to draw an adverse inference against the Respondent, there is sufficient evidence to support my findings, without exercising this discretion.
[31] The parties both talked about attending or wanting to attend counselling for their relationship. The Respondent uses language such as “reconciliation” and “relationship” in correspondence between them.
[32] The parties owned and cared for two dogs together.
[33] Further, when giving information to his doctors (both with Dr. Vari and the doctors at CAMH) the Applicant talks about his marital discord and his relationship with the Respondent. For this reason, I accept that the Applicant’s position of the existence of a spousal relationship was not created for the purpose of litigation, as alleged by the Respondent.
Financial Arrangements:
[34] Throughout the relationship, the Applicant was financially dependant on the Respondent. The Applicant never really earned much more than $10,000 in any year, and in many years, he earned no income. The Applicant had access to several credit cards over the 21 years, paid off by the Respondent. He also had access to a bank card, connected to the Respondent’s account.
[35] As set out above, I do not accept the Respondent’s initial evidence that she did not provide financial support to the Applicant. The Respondent tries to explain the joint account as being set up solely because the Applicant needed access to money for the dog care expenses. This does not explain her paying for the Applicant’s charges on the credit card for personal expenses on a regular basis. She paid for virtually all of his expense for most of the relationship.
[36] However, the Applicant was not financially disadvantaged by the relationship as he claimed. In fact, he enjoyed several advantages from the arrangement. The Respondent cared for the Applicant, assisting in his recovery from various mental health crisis. She supported him both financially and emotionally, alleviating his stress to assist in his healing. The Respondent paid for virtually all his expenses. The Applicant was encouraged to work. He did not suffer a financial disadvantage as a result of the relationship but received many advantages. This will be addressed further when considering the issue of spousal support below.
Social Perception:
[37] There were third parties who perceived the parties to be spouses.
[38] The parties’ primary physician was Dr. Vari. The evidence was that Dr. Vari sometimes saw them together and sometimes saw them separately. Dr. Vari assumed the parties were spouses.
[39] The doctors’ notes at CAMH all refer to the Respondent as the Applicant’s wife.
[40] The triggering event for their separation was the assault charge in 2018. The Respondent could not recall telling the police that the parties were in a common-law relationship but the police notes from her interview, the synopsis, and other documents all refer to them as common law spouses.
[41] The Respondent acknowledged that the Applicant was a huge support to her when her mother passed away. He helped clean out her apartment and put her remains in the ground. He certainly played the role of a spouse during that difficult time.
[42] Both parties were listed as significant others in the obituaries of their respective mothers.
[43] Initially the Respondent took the position that no one viewed them as spouses and they rarely socialized together. She subsequently acknowledged that as a result of the Applicant’s mental health issues, he did not want to socialize with anyone. Further, public perception was important to both parties. There were certainly times they held themselves out to be a couple. This perception benefited both parties.
[44] Both parties seemed estranged at various times from their parents/siblings. Neither party appeared to have a close group of friends during most of the relationship. As set out above, I did not find the witnesses to be helpful in this regard.
[45] The Respondent repeatedly stated that she was a private person and did not talk about her private affairs at work. She acknowledged that her focus was her career.
Travel:
[46] The parties travelled together including Paris (2000), Florida, San Francisco (2018) and Hawaii (in 2006, 2014, and 2017). Only in the last trip did the parties have two separate rooms. They stayed in one room during the other vacations.
Committed Relationship:
[47] I find that the parties were in a monogamous relationship.
[48] From reading the emails between the parties, the Respondent was certainly upset when she thought the Applicant was “cheating” on her. She also used the language “tell your new girlfriend I will see her in court”. Strange language to use if the parties were only friends.
[49] The Respondent initially suggested that she was dating other people. As her evidence emerged it was evidence that, at best, she went on some dating sites. Neither party was involved in any other romantic relationship during the entire length of their cohabitation.
Shared Shelter:
[50] The parties moved in together in 1997. They continued to live together as they moved to subsequent accommodations. The parties moved into the home purchased by the Respondent in 2008. The parties remained living together in the Respondent’s home until separation. The parties looked for rental accommodations together as recently as 2017.
[51] For the reasons set out above, I find that the parties were common law spouses for the purpose of determining spousal support under the FLA.
Spousal Support
Entitlement:
[52] I find that the Applicant is entitled to non-compensatory support. The Applicant was dependent on the Respondent throughout their relationship. He cannot afford to maintain a lifestyle even close that which was enjoyed during the relationship.
[53] The Applicant is not entitled to compensatory support. Contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, I find he was financially advantaged as a result of the relationship and is not entitled to compensatory support. He had a place to live and all his expenses paid for during the relationship. He was encouraged to work. I accept that at times he was unable to work due to his mental health issues, but other times he chose not to work. The Applicant alleged that he made work-related sacrifices for the relationship. There was no evidence to support his position. He submitted that he was willing to make sacrifices in moving with the Respondent to San Francisco for work, but his evidence at trial was that he would benefit from the move.
[54] The support is non-compensatory and really based on the needs of the Applicant and the disparity in the parties’ incomes. Although the parties have been living together for a long time, there is no compensatory basis for support.
Objectives of Spousal Support:
[55] Section 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act sets out the objectives for spousal support.
[56] As set out above, I find the Applicant suffered an economic disadvantage as a result of the breakdown of the relationship but was financially advantaged as a result of the relationship.
[57] The Applicant is not taking reasonable steps to contribute to his own support. Following separation, the Applicant acknowledged that he was not willing to contribute to his own support if it meant taking a job that he considered was “beneath him”. Further, while on ODSP, he did not take advantage of any of the resources available to him for retraining or employment.
[58] There may have been periods of time following separation when the Applicant was not able to work due to his depression, but he did not provide any independent evidence. It is the Applicant’s onus to prove that he is not able to work and/or to contribute to his own expenses. I find he did not meet this onus.
Respondent’s Income:
[59] The Respondent is the Senior Director of Payroll at Maple Leaf Sports and Entertainment. In 2018 her line 150 income, as reported on her income tax return, was $202,193.58. Her income consists of salary ($153,000), car allowance ($7,200), and a bonus ($42,075).
[60] As of September 16, 2019, her base salary increased by 2% to $156,000 (an additional $1,000 in 2019). She also received her car allowance ($7,200) and rental income from renting out the apartment in her basement ($1,500 per month). Her bonus in 2019 was $41,565. For 2019, I find her income to be $220,765.
[61] Assuming the Respondent continues to earn a bonus of approximately $40,000, her income in 2020 will be $221,200 ($156,000 base + $7,200 car allowance + $40,000 bonus + $18,000 rental income).
Applicant’s income:
[62] There is no dispute that the Applicant suffers from depression, anxiety, paranoia, and other mental health issues. There were definitely times during the relationship that he was so depressed that he was unable to get out of bed or leave the house, let alone maintain a job. He had previously been misdiagnosed with ADHD. In the spring of 2018, he attempted to commit suicide. He remained in the psychiatric ward for four weeks. The trigger for this episode was that he stopped taking his anti-depressant medication. He continues to attend for ongoing therapy. He is taking his medication.
[63] However, the Applicant was clear that working a minimum wage job was beneath him. His exact wording was that it would “kill his sole”. He held himself out as a “freelance art consultant”. He suggested that although he was not really earning a living in that position, it was important for the Respondent that he maintain that image and that it was equally as important to the Applicant.
[64] The Applicant did not provide independent evidence during the trial as to his current state or his current ability to work. He has the onus of proving why he is unable to contribute to his own support following separation. The evidence does support that when on his medication and attending therapy, he was able to work, as he did during certain periods of the relationship. I will therefore impute income to him starting in 2020, at minimum wage, being $29,120 per annum. There was no proof that he was ever able to earn more than minimum wage.
Joint Family Venture:
[65] The Applicant also made a claim for $400,000 as a remedy for unjust enrichment or a finding of a joint family venture.
[66] The Applicant submits that the Respondent was unjustly enriched by the relationship and that he played the role of a househusband and suffered a deprivation. Although the Applicant was not working, I do not find that the Respondent was unjustly enriched by his services during the relationship. I find that the Applicant neither played the role of a supportive househusband nor did he contribute financially to the expenses of the home. He was unemployed from the time the home was purchased until and following separation.
[67] The Applicant testified that he was responsible for every facet of the renovations. I find this to be untrue. Mr. Sousa, the contractor, gave credible and reliable evidence that it was the Respondent and not the Applicant who was involved in all facets of the renovations.
[68] As set out above, I find that the Applicant enjoyed significant advantages as a result of the relationship. The Applicant did not contribute physically or financially in any significant way to the renovations in the home, to the parties’ finances, or to the upkeep and maintenance of the home. I do not find that there was an intention to treat the property as jointly owned. There is no basis for me to find a joint family venture or unjust enrichment.
Damages
[69] The Respondent is seeking damages for the destruction of her home. The Applicant did start the demolition of the interior of the home and left it a complete mess. However, Mr. Sousa’s evidence was that the garbage was not dissimilar to the garbage he would have had if he did the demolition instead of the Applicant.
Restraining Order:
[70] The Respondent is seeking a restraining order, alleging she fears for her life. I do not believe she is or was fearful for her life. However, the Applicant has repeatedly threatened to “expose” the Respondent on social media and/or attend at her place of work. There is a history of the Applicant relentlessly calling the Respondent’s cell phone (as seen from the phone records), which is also her work phone, interfering with her ability to do her job. He did show an inability to control his temper, even while in court.
[71] The Applicant should not be permitted to jeopardize the Respondent’s employment. There is no reason for him to be communicating with her. The parties do not have children together.
Order:
[72] Order to go as follows:
a. Commencing May 1, 2018, until and including December 31, 2018, the Respondent, Randi Jakobsen, shall pay the Applicant, Bruce Boudreau, spousal support in the amount of $3,273 net per month. The spousal support is a net amount because the parties cannot adjust their 2018 income tax returns to allow for the deduction/inclusion of spousal support from their income. The Respondent therefore owes retroactive spousal support for 2018 in the amount of $26,184, subject to the adjustment at paragraph 62(c) below.
b. Commencing January 1, 2019, until and including December 31, 2019, the Respondent shall pay the Applicant spousal support in the amount of $5,399 per month. The Respondent therefore owes retroactive spousal support of $64,788, subject to the adjustment at paragraph 62(c) below. This amount shall be tax deductible to the Respondent and included by the Applicant when determining their incomes for 2019.
c. The Respondent shall receive credit for the money already advanced to the Applicant, being $2,000 in November 2018 plus $32,000 incurred on her credit cards, for a total of $34,000 net. Therefore, the retroactive spousal support owing from the Respondent to the Applicant as of December 31, 2019, is $56,972 ($26,184+$64,788-$34,000).
d. Commencing January 1, 2020, the Applicant shall be imputed with an income of $29,120. The Applicant’s income has been calculated at $221,200. Therefore, commencing January 1, 2020 and on the first day of each month thereafter until amended by court order or agreement, the Respondent shall pay the Applicant spousal support in the amount of $4,922 per month. This amount shall be tax deductible to the Respondent and included by the Applicant in his income when determining their incomes for income tax purposes.
e. In addition to a review of spousal support in the event of a material change in circumstances of either party, spousal support shall be reviewed no later than December 31, 2025.
f. The Respondent shall maintain the Applicant on her extended medical and health insurance plan at work, so long as it is available to her at no additional cost.
g. The Respondent shall maintain the Applicant as an irrevocable beneficiary on her life insurance policy available through her employer as security for her spousal support obligation. This obligation shall also be reviewed no later than December 31, 2025 and specifically the quantum.
h. The Applicant’s claims for damages, joint family venture, and/or unjust enrichment are dismissed.
i. The Applicant shall be restrained from calling the Respondent or communicating with her in any method other than email, which emails shall be limited to once per week and only if necessary for the purpose of resolving issues arising from this order.
j. Support deduction order to issue.
k. Unless the support Order is withdrawn from the offices of the Director of Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the support Order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed.
Shore, J.
Released: February 5, 2020
COURT FILE NO.: FS-18-7037
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Bruce Boudreau
Applicant
– and –
Randi Jakobsen
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Shore, J.
Released: February 5, 2020
[^1]: M. v. H, at para. 60.