Climans v. Latner

Ontario Reports

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Shore J.

February 25, 2019

144 O.R. (3d) 743 | 2019 ONSC 1311

Case Summary

Family law — Spouses — Parties having 14-year committed relationship that was sexual in nature — Parties holding themselves out to others as couple — Parties maintaining separate residences in Toronto so that applicant's children from previous marriage could be close to their school but living together at summer cottage and in Florida home — Parties "living together in conjugal relationship" despite maintenance of separate Toronto residences — Applicant being "spouse" for purposes of Part III of Family Law Act — Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, Part III.

Family law — Support — Spousal support — Respondent providing applicant with lavish lifestyle during their 14-year common law relationship — Applicant entitled to non-compensatory support based on difference between needs and means of parties — Applicant also entitled to compensatory support as she quit her job at outset of relationship to be available to respondent — Respondent's annual income at [page744] least $6.5 million — Respondent ordered to pay applicant indefinite support in amount of $53,077 per month.

The parties separated in 2015 after a 14-year relationship that was sexual in nature. During that relationship, they maintained separate Toronto residences. The applicant claimed that she kept her own house so that her children from a previous marriage could be close to their school. The respondent, who was extremely wealthy, paid all of the applicant's expenses and provided her with spending money. They exchanged rings and held themselves out to others as a couple. After the separation, the applicant brought an application for spousal support. The respondent claimed that the applicant was his girlfriend and travelling companion, not his spouse.

Held, the application should be allowed.

Section 29 of the Family Law Act ("FLA") provides that "spouse" means a spouse as defined in subsection 1(1), and in addition includes either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited continuously for a period of not less than three years. Section 1(1) of the FLA defines "cohabit" as "to live together in a conjugal relationship, whether within or outside marriage". The parties' relationship was conjugal. They were in a long-term committed sexual relationship. The respondent treated the applicant as his wife. They celebrated the anniversary of the day they met, held themselves out as a committed couple, and were perceived as a couple by their family and friends. They lived together in their summer cottage and spent alternate weekends together in Florida during the winter. In all of the circumstances, the fact that they maintained two houses in Toronto was not fatal to a finding that they "lived together" in a conjugal relationship. The applicant was a "spouse" for the purposes of the support provisions of the FLA.

The applicant was entitled to non-compensatory support based on the difference between the needs and means of the parties. The circumstances of the relationship created a pattern of economic dependency. The applicant now earned $24,000 per year as a yoga instructor, while the respondent's annual income was at least $6.5 million. Without support, the applicant would be unable to maintain a lifestyle even close to that she enjoyed during the relationship. The applicant was also entitled to compensatory support. She gave up her job at the start of the relationship to be available to the respondent and had been out of the workforce for 14 years due to their relationship. The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant indefinite spousal support in the amount of $53,077 per month. The applicant was also entitled to retroactive spousal support from the date of her application.

Campbell v. Szoke, 2003 2291 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 3471, [2003] O.T.C. 802, 45 R.F.L. (5th) 261, 125 A.C.W.S. (3d) 323 (S.C.J.); Kerr v. Baranow, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269, [2011] S.C.J. No. 10, 2011 SCC 10, 328 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 411 N.R. 200, [2011] 3 W.W.R. 575, J.E. 2011-333, 300 B.C.A.C. 1, 14 B.C.L.R. (5th) 203, 274 O.A.C. 1, 64 E.T.R. (3d) 1, 93 R.F.L. (6th) 1, 199 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1214, EYB 2011-186472; Lukic v. Zaban, [2012] O.J. No. 5256, 2012 ONSC 6078 (Master); M. v. H., 1999 686 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 238 N.R. 179, J.E. 99-1064, 121 O.A.C. 1, 62 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 46 R.F.L. (4th) 32, 88 A.C.W.S. (3d) 73; McCain v. McCain, [2012] O.J. No. 6224, 2012 ONSC 7344, 34 R.F.L. (7th) 82, 224 A.C.W.S. (3d) 377 (S.C.J.); Molodowich v. Penttinen, 1980 1537 (ON SC), [1980] O.J. No. 1904, 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376, 2 A.C.W.S. (2d) 486 (Dist. Ct.); Quesnel v. Erickson, [2012] O.J. No. 3693, 2012 ONSC 4335, 24 R.F.L. (7th) 229, 219 A.C.W.S. (3d) 132 (S.C.J.); Stajduhar v. Kerzner Estate, [2017] O.J. No. 4511, 2017 ONSC 4954, 99 R.F.L. (7th) 401, 283 A.C.W.S. (3d) 134, 2017 CFLG Â27,356 (S.C.J.); Stephen v. Stawecki, 2006 20225 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 2412, 213 O.A.C. 199, 24 E.T.R. (3d) 186, 32 R.F.L. (6th) 282, 148 A.C.W.S. (3d) 916 (C.A.); Thauvette v. Malyon, 1996 8090 (ON SC), [1996] O.J. No. 1356, 23 R.F.L. (4th) 217 (Gen. Div.), consd [page745]

Other cases referred to

Derakhshan v. Narula, [2018] O.J. No. 404, 2018 ONSC 537 (S.C.J.); Elgner v. Elgner, 2009 68827 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 5269, 85 R.F.L. (6th) 51, 183 A.C.W.S. (3d) 497 (S.C.J.); Fisher v. Fisher (2008), 88 O.R. (3d) 241, [2008] O.J. No. 38, 2008 ONCA 11, 232 O.A.C. 213, 288 D.L.R. (4th) 513, 47 R.F.L. (6th) 235, 163 A.C.W.S. (3d) 432; Goriuk v. Turton, [2011] B.C.J. No. 936, 2011 BCSC 652, 2 R.F.L. (7th) 180, 201 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1010; Katz v. Katz, [2014] O.J. No. 3909, 2014 ONCA 606, 50 R.F.L. (7th) 1, 377 D.L.R. (4th) 264, 38 C.C.L.I. (5th) 1, 324 O.A.C. 326, 243 A.C.W.S. (3d) 126; Knowles v. Lindstrom, [2015] O.J. No. 1059, 2015 ONSC 1408, 57 R.F.L. (7th) 402, 250 A.C.W.S. (3d) 94 (S.C.J.); MacKinnon v. MacKinnon (2005), 2005 13191 (ON CA), 75 O.R. (3d) 175, [2005] O.J. No. 1552, 256 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 199 O.A.C. 353, 13 R.F.L. (6th) 221, 2005 DFQ Â10,112, 2006 CFLG Â26,084, 138 A.C.W.S. (3d) 893 (C.A.); MacMillan-Dekker v. Dekker, 2000 22428 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 2957, [2000] OT.C. 610, 10 R.F.L. (5th) 352, 98 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1054 (S.C.J.); Mason v. Mason (2016), 132 O.R. (3d) 641, [2016] O.J. No. 5141, 2016 ONCA 725, 403 D.L.R. (4th) 64, 83 R.F.L. (7th) 1, 271 A.C.W.S. (3d) 589; Mercel v. Bouillon, [2012] O.J. No. 5544, 2012 ONSC 6557 (S.C.J.); Nowell v. Town Estate (1997), 1997 14545 (ON CA), 35 O.R. (3d) 415, [1997] O.J. No. 4044, 30 R.F.L. (4th) 107, 74 A.C.W.S. (3d) 522 (C.A.), revg (1994), 1994 7285 (ON SC), 19 O.R. (3d) 303, [1994] O.J. No. 1423, 4 E.T.R. (2d) 153, 5 R.F.L. (4th) 353, 48 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1130 (Gen. Div.); Reisman v. Reisman (2014), 118 O.R. (3d) 721, [2014] O.J. No. 663, 2014 ONCA 109, 371 D.L.R. (4th) 164, 315 O.A.C. 333, 42 R.F.L. (7th) 1, 237 A.C.W.S. (3d) 454, 2014 CFLG Â26,968; S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231, [2006] S.C.J. No. 37, 2006 SCC 37, 270 D.L.R. (4th) 297, 351 N.R. 201, [2006] 10 W.W.R. 379, J.E. 2006-1543, 61 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, 391 A.R. 297, 31 R.F.L. (6th) 1, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 626, EYB 2006-108061, 2006 DFQ Â11, 2006 CFLG Â26,140; Thompson v. Thompson, [2013] O.J. No. 4001, 2013 ONSC 5500 (S.C.J.)

Statutes referred to

Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 1(1) [as am.], Part III [as am.], ss. 29 [as am.], 33 [as am.], (8) (c), (9) [as am.], 34(1)(f), (i), (k), (4)

Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, s. 57 [as am.]

Rules and regulations referred to

Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97, ss. 16 [as am.], 17 [as am.], (1), 18, 19 [as am.], 20, Sch. III [as am.]

Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, rule 22(4)

Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175

Authorities referred to

Rogerson, Carol, and Rollie Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User's Guide (Ottawa: Justice Canada, 2016)

APPLICATION for spousal support.

B. Smith and J. Black, for applicant Lisa Jean Climans.

H. Niman and C. van Wirdum, for respondent Mr. Michael Elliot Latner.

[1] SHORE J.: — The applicant, Lisa Climans, seeks spousal support from the respondent, Michael Latner, under Part III of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3. The primary issue is whether the applicant is a "spouse" for the purposes of Part III of the Family Law Act. [page746] If she is not a spouse, the case ends here. If she is a spouse, then the issue of spousal support needs to be determined.

Background

[2] The parties started their relationship on October 17, 2001. They separated on May 11, 2015, after being together for 14 years.

Ms. Climans

[3] Ms. Climans is now 55 years old. She was 51 years old when the parties separated. She has two children from a previous marriage to David Climans, namely, Matthew Joseph Climans, age 28 ("Matt"), and Lindsay Rae Climans, age 25 ("Lindsay"). The children had their primary residence with Ms. Climans following her separation and divorce from David Climans. When Mr. Latner and Ms. Climans met, Ms. Climans was 38 years old, Matt was 11 and Lindsay was eight years old.

[4] Prior to her first marriage, Ms. Climans started a degree in university but never finished all the required courses. She worked as a model for many years. When the parties met, Ms. Climans was working for her brother, in sales and marketing in the construction business, earning approximately $5,000 per month. She was also receiving $850 per month of child support from the children's father. At some point the child support payments increased to $2,000 per month. Child support ended in the spring of 2018 given that the children finished school and were working.

[5] In March 2001, before the parties met, Ms. Climans purchased 1392 Avenue Road, Toronto, Ontario, for $474,500 ("Ms. Climans' house"). Ms. Climans had two mortgages registered against this property, one to the Bank of Montreal in the amount of $355,000 and another to Julius Donald Smith in the amount of $46,500. Ms. Climans was residing there with her two children when the parties started their relationship. Ms. Climans still owns and resides in this home.

[6] Following the end of the relationship with Mr. Latner, Ms. Climans trained and qualified as a yoga instructor, earning approximately $1,000 per month. She can teach two to three classes a day, four to five days per week, earning approximately $50 per hour. She is on track to earn $24,000 this year.

Mr. Latner

[7] Mr. Latner is 63 years old. He has three children from a previous marriage to Karen Latner, namely, Aaron Harold Latner, age 35 ("Aaron"), Elisabeth Wager, age 32 ("Elisabeth") and Joseph Philip Latner, age 29 ("Joseph"). When the parties [page747] met, Mr. Latner was 46 years old, Aaron was 18, Elisabeth was 16 and Joseph was 12 years old.

[8] Mr. Latner obtained a law degree from Oxford but does not practise law. He is the chairman of his family's companies. There is no dispute that Mr. Latner was a man of significant means and wealth when the parties met and continues to be so to date.

[9] Aaron, his eldest, works for the family companies so Mr. Latner sees him daily at work. Elizabeth has two children and is currently going through her own divorce. She is a stay-at-home mother. Mr. Latner speaks to her daily. He sees his grandchildren as often as he can. Joseph attends Cornell University and he speaks to him less often. Mr. Latner provides financial assistance to all three of his children.

[10] Mr. Latner has three siblings: Steven, Elysse and Joshua. Steven is retired, having previously worked with Mr. Latner in the family business. Mr. Latner is close with Steven and sees him whenever he is in Toronto.

[11] When the parties met, Mr. Latner owned and resided at 19 Old Forest Hill Rd., Toronto, Ontario. Mr. Latner's children were residing with him at 19 Old Forest Hill Road ("Mr. Latner's house"). It was his former matrimonial home with Karen Latner. When the relationship with Ms. Climans began, Mr. Latner also owned a townhome in Muskoka, at 1090 Elgin House Road (the "first cottage"). In January 2003, Mr. Latner purchased a Florida Condominium at 1121 Crandone Blvd in Key Biscayne (the "Florida Condo"). The Florida Condo was sold in 2015. In 2004, Mr. Latner sold the first cottage and purchased land at 1037 Elgin House Road. Mr. Latner built a cottage on this property, which was completed in 2005/2006 (the "second cottage"). The second cottage was sold in November 2017. Finally, in 2007, Mr. Latner purchased 21 Old Forest Hill Road, Toronto, Ontario ("Mr. Latner's new house"). Renovations were started during the relationship but not completed. Neither party lived in this home during their relationship, but Mr. Latner resides there now.

Position of the Parties

[12] The general position of each party is quite easy to summarize.

Ms. Climans

[13] It is Ms. Climans' position that the parties were spouses and she was treated as a wife by Mr. Latner. Her evidence was that she received an engagement ring, a wedding band and an eternity band from Mr. Latner during their relationship. They celebrated their anniversary each year. Mr. Latner sent letters and cards, professing his love and commitment to her and their [page748] relationship. Mr. Latner listed his brother, Steven, as Ms. Climans' brother-in-law on her passport forms and used his address as her home address. Mr. Latner was listed as her "husband" on her passport. Mr. Latner referred to her as Ms. Climans Latner in letters, cards and to other people. She walked down the aisle with Mr. Latner at Elisabeth's wedding. She said they built the 13,000 square foot second cottage together as it was considered "their" cottage. She believed them to be married for all intents and purposes, but for participating in a ceremony.

Mr. Latner

[14] Mr. Latner's position is that Ms. Climans was a travel companion, his girlfriend, nothing more. He acknowledges that they were involved in a romantic relationship, but said they never lived together and therefore were not spouses. The parties had separate bank accounts. He testified that he gave her a credit card as a matter of convenience for their expenses but that she did not have carte blanche to spend. They maintained their own homes in Toronto. Her children were her priority and his children were his priority. During their relationship, Mr. Latner asked Ms. Climans to sign a domestic contract, which was never signed. Mr. Latner's evidence was that he would never marry or move in with Ms. Climans without a domestic contract.

Credibility of the Parties

[15] Both parties started off their closing submissions suggesting that this case would be decided by a finding of credibility against one party or the other. Although I am going to provide some insight into the credibility of the parties, I disagree. The issue of credibility (and the reliability of the parties' testimony) will assist in making some findings of fact but will not be the determining factor. The parties ultimately agreed on many of the pivotal facts of their relationship.

[16] Both parties had some issues of credibility during the trial. However, while Ms. Climans had some issues with her testimony, I had more difficulty accepting Mr. Latner's testimony and found his evidence to be unreliable.

Ms. Climans

[17] I find that Ms. Climans was prone to exaggeration at times when giving her testimony. By way of example, while she may have been involved in the renovations in the Florida Condo, she exaggerated her level of involvement in same. I do not accept her evidence that she helped find the property. Mr. Latner's brother, father and sister were all in the same building. I accept Steven's [page749] testimony that he became aware of the property being listed for sale in the same building and alerted his brother. I also find that she exaggerated the time that they spent in Florida. They did not reside there from October until April as she initially claimed. Despite such problems with her testimony, I found Ms. Climans to be responsive to the questions and direct with her answers. Her answers were more or less consistent, and consistent with the other evidence.

[18] A lot of time in cross-examination was spent on the fact that on Ms. Climans' income tax returns she did not check off the "common-law" box, under the marital status section. While this is a factor to be considered, it is not determinative, nor does it preclude a finding of cohabitation. A lot of time was spent cross-examining Ms. Climans on the draft contracts and trying to impeach her credibility using same. Again, not a lot turns on the draft contracts, as set out in detail below.

[19] Her testimony was not without fault, but in most instances where there is conflict between the testimony of the parties, I accept Ms. Climans' evidence over Mr. Latner's evidence for the reasons set out below.

Mr. Latner

[20] I find that there were more problems with the evidence given by Mr. Latner during his testimony and during cross-examination. His position on various facts changed during the trial. I found Mr. Latner to be deliberately evasive when answering questions in cross-examination and unwilling to answer appropriate questions. When challenged on a point, his answers were not consistent, often ultimately deferring the question to others, such as Mr. Bester, when not willing to answer questions. I did not find Mr. Latner to be a credible witness and I therefore find his evidence to be unreliable in many circumstances throughout the trial.

[21] By way of example, when shown a picture of him and Ms. Climans in Costa Rica, with the words "will you marry me" written in the sand, along with their names joined by a heart, he first denied proposing to Ms. Climans, suggesting that the people sitting next to them wrote the message in the sand, not him. Then he said he could not recall. Then he said if he did, he was not sure what the point was.

[22] The line of questioning with respect to the purchase of a new property in Florida is an example of the coyness with which he gave his evidence. When Mr. Latner sold the Florida Condo, he bought another property in Florida. It was difficult for Mr. Smith to get a straightforward answer from Mr. Latner during cross-examination as to who owns the new Florida property, which was [page750] not included on his Form 13 financial statement. Initially, Mr. Latner testified that the property was bought by a corporation (belonging to either Mr. Latner or his current wife, he was not clear) for approximately $3 million. He would not answer who owned the property. The $3 million seems to have come from Mr. Latner's shareholder account. Mr. Latner's initial testimony was that he pays rent to occupy the Florida condominium, but he does not know how much rent he pays. The rent is not included as an expense on his financial statement. He then advised that the rent was being paid by his new wife, but he does not know what she earns or how she affords the rent. Mr. Latner then said the Florida property is held in his wife's name, because she is American and that he did not make this decision. He said that the property is not held in trust for him and therefore he did not need to include it in his financial statement. When asked why his bank statements did not show withdrawals for his Florida expenses, he said they were withdrawn from another account. He then suggested that the issue should be addressed with Mr. Bester.

[23] With respect to the second cottage, it sold for approximately $4 million. Mr. Latner was asked about the proceeds of sale. He said Mr. Bester would know where the money went, as he did not know. He would not confirm whether another recreational property was purchased, as he said it was not relevant.

[24] Mr. Latner was equally evasive when answering questions about the structural reorganization of the family companies in 2017, as a result of the winding up of a trust. Mr. Latner received $70 million from the winding up of the trust, and a further $21.5 million held through his interest in a different company. The remaining money from the trust went into a new trust for his children. The new trust was settled with $150 million, held by a holding company, and $11.878 million in another company. Mr. Latner's initial testimony was that he did not have any formal discussions on the pay-out of capital from the trust. He later acknowledged that he had the ultimate say in how the money was distributed from the trust. Although Mr. Latner is a trustee of the trust, his evidence was that he did not know who the trustees of the trust were. There were three original trustees, Mr. Latner, his father and his brother Steven. His father was replaced by Aaron. I find it highly unlikely that Mr. Latner did not know who served as trustee of the trust. Mr. Bester's evidence was that he reviewed the reorganization with Mr. Latner. The decision on how the money from the trust was to be distributed was made exclusively by Mr. Latner. Steven also did a reorganization at the same time and Steven dictated how his family money, from his family trust, was to be divided. [page751]

[25] On his financial statement, sworn May 2017, Mr. Latner claimed his income was $232,000, as set out in his 2016 income tax returns. When asked about a $10 million dividend in 2016, he claimed not to know about it. Mr. Latner struggled to keep his composure and continued to try to deflect answering questions, eventually suggesting that he may not have signed the corporate financial statements, or he may have known about it but has no recollection. He said he would accept whatever Mr. Bester said. Mr. Bester's evidence was that he would discuss dividend declarations with him.

[26] Mr. Latner initially denied that Ms. Climans ran errands for him. He then acknowledged that he did ask her to pick up things at times, but not on a daily or weekly basis. He was then presented with several invoices, signed for by Ms. Climans and said "I would ask and dispatch Ms. Climans" to do certain things. He then acknowledged that he asked her to do several things for him and she did them and finally acknowledged that she assisted him with many things.

[27] Mr. Latner was also not forthcoming with his disclosure. When initially asked for his shareholder draw account from 2012-2015, he did not provide it. His response was that Ms. Climans did not bring a motion asking for it. He then provided the disclosure just prior to trial. On cross-examination, when asked questions about his failure to include various income and assets in his Form 13 financial statement, he deferred to Mr. Bester. When asked why he failed to take certain steps (to provide disclosure), he said he would need to speak to his counsel to understand why certain decisions were made.

[28] As stated by Wilson J. in MacMillan-Dekker v. Dekker, 2000 22428 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 2957, 10 R.F.L. (5th) 352 (S.C.J.), at p. 22 R.F.L.: "Objective contemporaneous evidence is far more probative of the nature of the parties' relationship than the viva voce evidence of the parties in the midst of acrimonious and bitter proceedings."

[29] For the reasons set out above, in most instances when having to choose between Ms. Climans' testimony and Mr. Latner's testimony, I preferred Ms. Climans' testimony.

[30] The following is a summary of the facts I am relying on, having regard to the evidence presented at trial.

The Relationship

[31] The parties had met previously, when Ms. Climans briefly dated Joshua Latner, Mr. Latner's younger brother. Mr. Latner and Ms. Climans's own relationship began by chance when they met at an Esso gas station on October 17, 2001. From that point on, Mr. Latner actively pursued Ms. Climans and, by any standard, [page752] their relationship moved forward quickly. By November 2001, Mr. Latner was paying for most of Ms. Climans's living expenses and Ms. Climans started sleeping at Mr. Latner's home when her children were with their father. From early on, they were introduced to the other's children.

[32] For the first several years, their relationship was quite intense and is described in more detail below.

Commitment (rings, love letters, anniversaries, etc.)

[33] There is no doubt from the evidence given by both parties that Ms. Climans was more than a "travel companion" or "girlfriend" to Mr. Latner. The parties were in a committed relationship.

[34] In 2002, Mr. Latner gave Ms. Climans a 7.5 carat diamond ring, valued at approximately $45,000.[^1] Mr. Latner proposed to Ms. Climans on several occasions, which proposals Ms. Climans accepted. However, the parties never married. Mr. Latner also gave Ms. Climans a wedding band,[^2] followed by a diamond band (referred to as an eternity ring). Ms. Climans wore both rings throughout the relationship. In 2011, Mr. Latner gave Ms. Climans a sapphire ring, an identical copy to the one his mother wore.

[35] In 2002, Ms. Climans gave Mr. Latner rings (in different colour metals) that he wore throughout the relationship.

[36] The parties celebrated the anniversary of the day they met, every year.

[37] Mr. Latner was a prolific writer. Numerous cards and letters were entered as exhibits at trial. Throughout the entire relationship, Mr. Latner wrote many cards and letters to Ms. Climans, professing his love to her and his commitment to their relationship, in addition to the anniversary cards he gave her every year. In the cards, letters and notes, he referred to her, amongst other things, as Lisa Latner, Lisa L, LL, Ms. L (all short forms for Lisa Latner) and Mrs. Lisa (referring to her as his wife). His position at trial that he wrote these cards to appease Ms. Climans is contradicted by the sheer volume and content of these communications.

[38] Mr. Latner suggested that there were numerous communications (e-mails and texts) that would support his position regarding the state of their relationship (that they were not [page753] spouses and were not in a committed relationship). However, he failed to produce any at trial.

[39] Mr. Latner also wrote cards and gave gifts to Ms. Climans' children. In one note to Lindsay he wrote: "You are a fabulous little girl. I miss you so much when I don't see you."

[40] When Mr. Latner was in hospital dealing with health issues, Ms. Climans slept over at the hospital. On occasion, she alternated with Mr. Latner's children. She also kept track of his follow-up appointments and drove him to same. Whether on one occasion he had a "stroke" or "malignant hypertension" is not relevant. What is relevant is that both parties acknowledged that Ms. Climans slept over at the hospital to care for Mr. Latner.

[41] In 2011, when Mr. Latner suffered a bowel obstruction in the middle of the night, he called Ms. Climans to take him to the hospital.

[42] The parties were sexually active throughout the relationship.

[43] It was not a perfect relationship and both parties acknowledged that they had short periods of time where they were not speaking to each other. The parties also acknowledged that they had a few short breakups during their time together, that lasted no longer than a week.

[44] Ms. Climans' relationship with Mr. Latner's daughter (or lack thereof) also caused friction between the parties. The parties attended counselling with Howard Irving over a span of two to three years, starting in 2012, to work on their relationship and specifically Ms. Climans' relationship with Mr. Latner's daughter.

[45] Having regard to the above, I find that they were in a committed relationship.[^3]

Financial arrangements

[46] By November 2001, Ms. Climans quit her job to be available for Mr. Latner. She did not work throughout the 14 years of their relationship. Mr. Latner acknowledged that he wanted Ms. Climans to be available to him, whether to travel with him, run errands for him or be available to spend time with him but did not go so far as to say that he asked her to stop working. In November 2001, Mr. Latner started covering Ms. Climans' expenses. Specifically, he started paying Ms. Climans $5,000 per [page754] month and paying all the expenses on Ms. Climans' home. Mr. Latner also provided Ms. Climans with a vehicle to drive[^4] and gave her several credit cards for her use. The credit cards, some of which were in the name of "Lisa Latner",[^5] were paid for by Mr. Latner and/or one of his companies. Ms. Climans used the credit cards to pay her own expenses, as well as expenses she incurred for Mr. Latner and his house such as groceries, errands and the renovation supplies for his house, cottage and condominium. Although there was some suggestion that Ms. Climans was given a limit on the use of the credit cards, it does not appear that Mr. Latner enforced same.

[47] In addition to the above expenses, during the relationship Mr. Latner, and/or one of his companies, paid the following for Ms. Climans:

(a) fur storage;

(b) medical and dental insurance;

(d) cable and Internet;

(e) security alarm and monitoring;

(f) gas and insurance for leases;

(g) car licensing fees, maintenance and repairs;

(h) home insurance; and

(i) gardening/landscaping and outdoor maintenance.

Mr. Latner also bought Ms. Climans seven fur coats and paid for her cosmetic procedures. He paid for Ms. Climans and her children's dentist bills until they were covered under insurance. He paid Lindsay's application fee for Blythe Academy's Overseas Program.

[48] On May 8, 2002, Mr. Latner paid off the mortgage on Ms. Climans' home owing to Julius Smith in the amount of approximately $46,000. Mr. Latner also paid for renovations and work to be done to Ms. Climans' home over the course of their relationship.

[49] In 2010, Mr. Latner increased the monthly payments to Ms. Climans from $5,000 to $6,000 per month. However, in 2014, he tried (unsuccessfully) to impose some limits on Ms. Climans' spending.

[50] The parties did not have any joint bank accounts. [page755]

[51] There is no dispute that Mr. Latner was very generous to Ms. Climans and her children. They enjoyed a lavish lifestyle, thanks to his generosity.

[52] I find that almost from the start of their relationship, an economic dependency was created.

[53] The parties introduced each other to their children early on in their relationship. There was no real melding of their children into one family, but Mr. Latner explained that this was a result of the children being different ages. Later, it was clear that there was a problem in the relationship between Ms. Climans and Elisabeth.

[54] Ms. Climans and her children were invited to celebrate special occasions with the extended Latner family, including milestones and holidays. Ms. Climans and her children attended Latner family events, including a Latner family cruise in 2004 to Alaska. Ms. Climans walked down the aisle with Mr. Latner when Elisabeth got married in 2010 and stood under the chuppah (canopy) with him.

[55] Mr. Latner and his brother, Steven, were included as two of only ten men that attended Matt's bar mitzvah party. Mr. Latner went with Ms. Climans to the pre-party for Lindsay's high school graduation. Mr. Latner sponsored Lindsay's hockey team.

[56] Ms. Climans received flowers from Albert Latner, Mr. Latner's father, with a card, addressing her as his "daughter-in-law".

[57] The parties went out socially and held themselves out as a couple. They attended weddings, parties and bar mitzvah's together, sometimes just the two of them and sometimes their children were invited with them. Most witnesses acknowledged that they knew the parties were engaged and were in a committed relationship. They also attended charity events together.

[58] In Ms. Climans' passport issued in 2002, her emergency contact is listed as Steven Latner, "brother in law" as written by Mr. Latner. Her 2007 passport lists Mr. Latner as her "husband" for her emergency contact, also written by Mr. Latner.

[59] I find that the parties held themselves out to be a couple, in a long-term, committed relationship, to both family and friends.

Other

[60] While the parties disagree on the extent of Ms. Climans' involvement, Ms. Climans had some involvement in the renovation and interior design of Mr. Latner's various homes, including the first and second cottages, Mr. Latner's new house and the Florida Condo. Ms. Climans' evidence was that she worked on the [page756] properties because she was family and that these properties were considered their homes.

[61] In 2007, Mr. Latner bought 21 Old Forest Hill Road. The parties talked about building a home together. The house was still in the process of being built when the parties separated. Ms. Climans also had some level of involvement in the design of this home.

[62] I do not need to make a finding with respect to the level of Ms. Climans' involvement in the renovation and design of the various properties, because there is enough evidence, as set out above, to find that they were in a committed, long-term relationship. The issue of whether they were spouses is not going to turn on my findings on this issue.

Travel and living arrangements

[63] There is no dispute that the parties always maintained two separate residences in Toronto but stayed together whenever they travelled outside of Toronto (whether to the cottages, the Florida Condo or vacation destinations).

[64] During their relationship, Mr. Latner and Ms. Climans travelled frequently including destinations such as Miami, New York, Aspen, Alaska, Napa Valley, New Jersey, Turks and Caicos, Italy, Israel, France, Bahamas and Costa Rica. They stayed in luxury accommodations and flew either first class or by private jet. They spent extended periods of time in the Florida condo and flew to Aspen a couple of times each winter. Mr. Latner's father spent the winters in Florida. He was chairman of the family companies before Mr. Latner took over this role. Mr. Latner's evidence was that he was summoned down to Florida on almost a weekly basis. Mr. Latner paid for all their travel expenses. Ms. Climans' children (and Mr. Latner's children) would sometimes accompany the parties on their trips to Florida. Lindsay, on occasion, would bring her friends on the private jet. Mr. Latner's testimony was that in the period from 2001-2006, they "travelled extensively". The evidence at trial was that their travel increased as Ms. Climans' children got older and were less dependent on her.

[65] The parties spent the summers in Muskoka (at least July and August) at the first cottage and then at the second cottage. Lindsay spent most of her summers with them at the cottage. Matt and Mr. Latner's children were not there as often, especially as they got older. The parties would move up to the cottage at the start of the summer and move back to Toronto at the end of the summer. Their summer clothing would then be sent to the Florida Condo.

[66] In the winter, they would travel to Florida from Thursday until Monday morning on alternate weeks when Ms. Climans' children were with their father. They also travelled to Florida for [page757] winter break each year and other times during the year (such as Passover holiday, etc.).

[67] I find that the parties lived together at the cottage in the summer and resided together in the Florida Condo on a regular basis over the winter months.

[68] Why did they keep two homes in Toronto? Ms. Climans' evidence was that her children were young when the parties' relationship started and she wanted to maintain her home for them, especially since they went to school close to her home. Both children attended school near Ms. Climans' home to the completion of high school.

[69] Ms. Climans' children had their primary residence with her. They stayed with their father on alternate weekends, from Thursday evening until Monday morning and every Thursday, overnight. When the children were with their father, Ms. Climans stayed overnight at Mr. Latner's house. Her ability to stay overnight at Mr. Latner's house while the children were with her was limited.

[70] For the first couple of years, Mr. Latner had a chef cooking for him and his family at his home. When Ms. Climans' children were home, the parties usually ate dinner together at Mr. Latner's home and then Ms. Climans returned home to put the children to bed. Sometimes she would leave the children with the nanny and she would return to Mr. Latner's house for the night or just return home to sleep and get the children out to school in the morning.

[71] In 2003, Mr. Latner no longer employed a chef and Ms. Climans started cooking dinner for Mr. Latner and their respective children (although Aaron was not living at home by this time). Ms. Climans would often cook at home and then bring the food over to Mr. Latner's house.

[72] In or around 2004, Mr. Latner started eating dinner at Ms. Climans' home, as she found the back and forth difficult and Mr. Latner's kids were older at that time. It was clear that there was a lot of back and forth between the two homes and that they usually ate dinner together.

[73] The parties were in regular contact with one another throughout the day. When Ms. Climans was not sleeping at Mr. Latner's home, they started off their days with coffee and walking their dogs together. The parties were together almost every night for dinner unless Mr. Latner had business.

[74] Ms. Climans had keys to both Mr. Latner's home and the cottages. Mr. Latner had keys to Ms. Climans' home. Mr. Latner said there was no need to leave clothing at each other's home because they lived close to one another. [page758]

[75] The parties agree that something changed in 2006, but disagree on the reason. Both parties agree that around 2006, Ms. Climans' children were both in high school and spending less time with their father. Therefore, the number of nights Ms. Climans slept overnight at Mr. Latner's home was reduced. Mr. Latner did not stay overnight at Ms. Climans' house often. Ms. Climans acknowledged that she needed to be home more often for the children. However, the parties started to travel more and would still have dinner together, often without any of their children. In 2008/2009, the parties started attending yoga almost every morning together. Aaron and Elizabeth both moved out in or around 2008/2009.

[76] Mr. Latner advises that in 2005/2006, Lindsay won four tickets to the taping of "Ellen" in California and Ms. Climans refused to allow Elisabeth to attend. Ms. Climans and Lindsay left without him or Elisabeth. Mr. Latner testified that for him, this was a turning point in the relationship as he realized the extent of the rift between Elisabeth and Ms. Climans.

[77] Regardless of the reason for the change, the parties agree that Ms. Climans spent less time sleeping at Mr. Latner's house after 2006. Other than that, the relationship seems to have remained unchanged. The parties continued to travel extensively together and moved up to Muskoka each summer. They went to Florida regularly. They celebrated holidays together and with family. They continued to hold themselves out as a couple.

[78] In 2007, Mr. Latner started building the house at 21 Old Forest Hill Road. Mr. Latner and his ex-wife, Karen Latner, had lived at and raised their children in 19 Old Forest Hill Road. It was Ms. Climans' evidence that the parties were building 21 Old Forest Hill Road so that they could live together in their own home, not the one Mr. Latner lived in with Karen Latner.

Contracts

[79] During the trial, Mr. Latner spent a lot of time referring to the draft domestic contracts. His position was that he would never marry or live with Ms. Climans unless she signed a domestic contract.

[80] In June 2002, Mr. Latner presented Ms. Climans with a domestic contract. Ms. Climans took the contract to a lawyer, but no further drafts were exchanged, and the agreement was never signed.

[81] In fact, no further contracts were given to Ms. Climans until 2013, 11 years later, when problems began to develop in the relationship. In 2013, Mr. Latner again presented a domestic contract to Ms. Climans. This time, there were some discussions [page759] between the parties (and their lawyers) and a second draft was prepared. Again, the agreement was never signed.

[82] Both parties tried to use the existence of these contracts for different purposes during the trial.

[83] Mr. Latner testified several times that he repeatedly reminded Ms. Climans they were not married, and he would not move forward in their relationship without a signed contract. Ms. Climans testified that between 2002 and 2013, there were no discussions about the contract. The other evidence presented during the trial supports Ms. Climans' position on this issue.

[84] A lot of time was spent on whether Ms. Climans agreed that the background information in the draft agreements was accurate at the time it was drafted (or why she did not request changes to same), specifically the parts about the parties not living in a conjugal relationship. The agreement was never signed, so I am not giving weight to the intentions of the parties. Interestingly, no attention was given to the fact that the 2013 draft agreement, at para. 7.1.5, states that "each will be deemed always to have been and to be self-sufficient", which was not true at the time.

Post-separation

[85] The parties separated on May 11, 2015. Ms. Climans issued her application in October 2015 and the parties attended their first case conference in April 2016, when they entered into a consent order.

[86] The consent provided for the following:

(a) Mr. Latner will pay Ms. Climans $6,000 per month, uncharacterized and not taxable;

(b) Ms. Climans can spend up to $5,000 per month on the Visa provided by Mr. Latner; and

Mr. Latner was also paying the lease and maintenance on the Mercedes being driven by Ms. Climans. All the payments were made on a without prejudice basis.

[87] Mr. Latner has made all the payments under the consent order. The parties agree that Mr. Latner has paid Ms. Climans $621,783.88 net from May 2015 until December 2018. Mr. Latner agreed to continue the interim payments pending release of this decision.

[88] The parties attended mediation with Alf Mamo in June 2016, but were unable to reach an agreement. [page760]

[89] In December 2016, the parties exchanged affidavits of documents, participated in questioning and attended a Settlement Conference. An order was made requiring the parties to answer their undertakings by February 17, 2017. Some of the undertakings were answered on February 17, with some further answers coming in July 2017.

[90] In May 2017, the parties attended a Trial Management Conference and the matter was set down for trial for February 2018. The trial date was then adjourned until April 2018. Following a conference call with the parties, Justice Kiteley adjourned the trial to May 2018.

[91] In May 2018, the trial was adjourned to December 2018. On November 22, 2018, Ms. Climans served a supplemental affidavit of documents. On November 26, 2018, Mr. Latner served his response to the request for information.

Witnesses

[92] Just some brief comments on some of the evidence given by the parties' witnesses at trial.

Ms. Climans' witnesses

[93] Judy Moore: Ms. Moore has been friends with Ms. Climans since 1992 and is also the co-owner of Sherwood Custom Homes, the company that built Mr. Latner's second cottage. Sherwood Custom Homes was hired in 2004, broke ground in 2005 and completed the build in 2006. She advised that she met Ms. Climans at the site several times and was in contact with her once every two weeks to talk about the progress, trades and decisions. She acknowledged that the important decisions on structure and design were made by Mr. Latner and that the tradespeople were friends with Mr. Latner, given that he was in the construction business. She spoke to Ms. Climans about the interior of the cottage. Ms. Climans provided the raw materials, such as tiles, millwork and lighting fixtures. Ms. Moore also saw the parties up at the cottage throughout the summer of 2009, when she was going through her own separation and found both parties to be extremely supportive. Mr. Latner was always kind to her. She had dinner with them a couple of times a year in Toronto and maintained a friendship with Ms. Climans. Her evidence was that Ms. Climans tried to divide her time between Mr. Latner and her children and that Mr. Latner commented a few times that "we are married" in her presence.

[94] Chaim Talpalar: Mr. Talpalar has been Ms. Climans' neighbour since she moved into her home. They share a driveway and a common wall. Mr. Talpalar saw Mr. Latner coming and [page761] going from Ms. Climans' home over the years and was aware that they were together a lot. He visited Ms. Climans and Mr. Latner at "their" cottage. He is aware that one of Mr. Latner's employees, Sergei, was overseeing the renovations on Ms. Climans' house. Sergei also did maintenance around Ms. Climans' house and Mr. Talpalar would sometimes pay him to do work on his home too.

[95] Rachel Milanovich: Ms. Milanovich was Ms. Climans' neighbour from 2000 until 2006, when she moved down the road. She saw Mr. Latner at Ms. Climans' home.

[96] Lindsay Climans: It is always difficult (and sad) when a parent has a child (even an adult child) testify. Both parties put their daughters in this position at this trial. I found Lindsay to be sincere in her testimony. Lindsay is now 25 years old and graduated in June 2017 from the University of Toronto. Lindsay recalled being in either grade 4 or 5 when the relationship began. Lindsay testified that in the first few years of their relationship, she saw Mr. Latner almost every day and they would usually eat dinner together at his house, where Yvonne, his chef, would cook dinner. Initially, Aaron, Elisabeth and Joseph ate dinner with them, although they were less present as the years went on. After the first couple of years, she recalls her mother cooking at home and "schlepping" dinner over to Mr. Latner's. Her mom got tired of taking everything over there, so Mr. Latner started eating dinner at Ms. Climans' house regularly. She also recalls having regular Shabbat dinners at either Albert, Steven or Mr. Latner's house. Occasionally, they would go out to dinner. Once she reached high school, she was home a lot on her own as her mother was often away or out with Mr. Latner. She remembers their travel schedule increasing once she was in high school. She ordered a lot of take-out. She started becoming anxious about her mother's absences. After high school, she was more independent and had a boyfriend. She remembers her mom being away a lot, but it no longer bothered her.

[97] The first summer after she was introduced to Mr. Latner was spent at his townhome on Lake Joseph (except for the time that she was with her father). When the new cottage was built, she moved up there for the summer each year (except for the time she was with her father). At first, she attended day camp at the Lake Joseph Club, and, as she got older, she secured summer jobs in the area. She worked in Muskoka for five years, moving up to the cottage every summer. Joseph also worked at the camp, so he was also up there a lot. Elisabeth came less frequently, and Aaron stayed in the boat house, so she saw very little of him. Lindsay described the cottage and the fact that she had her own room. She said at the start of the summer she would move up and unpack. [page762]

[98] She said that from the ages of 10-21 she spent winter breaks in Florida, as well as the odd long weekend and sometimes Passover. She recalls flying on Air Canada at first, and then on the private jet. She invited her friends to fly with them on rare occasion.

[99] She recalls not being close to Joseph, but he was always nice to her. Aaron essentially ignored her for the first ten years but then they became good friends. He often checked in on her. She did not have a good relationship with Elisabeth.

[100] Lindsay thought that Mr. Latner was smart and funny. She enjoyed talking to him and texted with him often. She felt that she had a good relationship with him. She acknowledged that in the last two years of the relationship she started not to like him. In the summer, they would go on boat rides together. She introduced him as either Mr. Latner or her step-dad.

[101] Darcy Hagerman: Darcy owns the yoga studio that Mr. Latner and Ms. Climans attended before their break-up and where Ms. Climans currently works. She taught private lessons up at the second cottage five to seven days a week starting in 2006 and for a few summers thereafter. Ms. Climans and her children were based up at the cottage for the summer. She became friends with both of the parties and found them both to be kind and supportive. In Toronto, they both attended morning classes together at her studio on a regular basis for approximately five years. In 2011, Mr. Latner and Ms. Climans came on her Yoga Retreat to Costa Rica. It was at this retreat that Mr. Latner proposed to Ms. Climans again. Darcy was present. Mr. Latner was also very generous. He paid for people to come on the Costa Rica trip and paid off her legal bills when she opened her Thornhill Studio. He was generous without being asked. Mr. Latner has since stopped attending at her studio. She owns two studios. In regards to Ms. Climans' teaching, Darcy said it is hard to support oneself by just teaching yoga alone. Most people teach yoga to supplement other income.

Mr. Latner's witnesses

[102] Dr. Jeremy Freedman: Dr. Freedman has known Mr. Latner for 35 years. He is a close friend of Mr. Latner's and Mr. Latner will call him for counselling and professional advice. Dr. Freedman is a surgical oncologist. He gave evidence about Mr. Latner as a father. He had met Ms. Climans at lifecycle events in the Latner family as well as at social events. He has seen them together at the cottage in the summers. He found them to be very respectful to one another. He spoke to Mr. Latner before the relationship ended. Mr. Latner was unhappy but he cast no blame on either one of the parties. [page763]

[103] Richard Sacks: Mr. Sacks is an accountant and a partner at the accounting firm MNP LLP who started working with the Latner family approximately 20 years ago. He helped with the structural reorganization resulting from the settlement of the family trust. His evidence was that the current structure was created to avoid significant tax consequences on the winding up of the trust. The work was largely done by MNP and Howard Carr (at the law firm Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP). The contact person representing the family trust was John Bester. Mr. Sacks explained that a piece of art was sold to one of Mr. Latner's companies and he received a promissory note in return. Mr. Latner draws down on the money owing to him to receive income. The transaction was set up to allow Mr. Latner to take the money out at a reduced tax rate. He pays 26.5 per cent tax rate instead of 53 per cent tax rate. If he took the money out as a dividend, he would still be paying a tax rate of 40 per cent. Mr. Latner's tax savings was between 26.5 per cent and 13 per cent of his income from capital gains.

[104] Jonathan Bester: Mr. Bester joined the Mr. Latner's group of companies nine years ago as a controller. He is now their CFO. He helped put together the disclosure requested in this litigation. He testified that, with respect to Mr. Latner's income, until 2016, money was advanced to both Mr. Latner and Steven as they needed it, to meet expenses, and at the end of the year MNP would decide how to allocate and characterize the payments. As of 2016, they have been advancing a more regular amount each month.

[105] With respect to the sale of the art, Mr. Latner was given advice from both Mr. Bester and Mr. Latner's other advisors. The sale came about because the government was threatening to increase the capital gains rate so both Mr. Latner and Steven sold art they owned personally to companies (that they owned) to capture the advantageous capital gains tax rate at the time. The sale was discussed with Mr. Latner and he had to sign the sale documents.

[106] Previously, Mr. Latner's shareholder account would go up and down, depending on his spending. Now, his income is structured so that he is simply drawing on the money owing to him from the sale of the art.

[107] Steven Wise: Mr. Wise is Mr. Latner's close friend and business associate. He has known Mr. Latner his entire life. Mr. Wise convinced Mr. Latner to buy the first cottage, following Mr. Latner's divorce from Karen Latner. His evidence was that Lindsay did not like Mr. Latner and over the summer Lindsay stayed at his cottage more than at Mr. Latner's (Lindsay is good friends with his daughter). He acknowledged that Ms. Climans and Lindsay moved up for the entire summer. During cross-examination, Mr. Wise became belligerent. He clearly took the role [page764] of Mr. Latner's advocate. When shown pictures of Lindsay smiling at the cottage or at social events with Mr. Latner, he refused to acknowledge she appeared happy. He was not a particularly helpful witness and I choose not to give his evidence much weight.

[108] Elisabeth Wager: Elisabeth is Mr. Latner's daughter. She is 33 years old. She is married, but separated and has two little children, Temmy, age seven, and Wolf, age five. She is a stay-at-home mother. She is close to her father and they speak daily. Her children are also close to their grandfather, often sleeping over at his house. I had difficulty accepting Elisabeth's testimony. She struggled with her answers, seeming intent on ensuring her testimony supported her father's position in the litigation, even if not responsive to the questions.

[109] Elisabeth was 16 years old when Mr. Latner and Ms. Climans started their relationship. She said that it was rare that Ms. Climans came over, even for dinner, despite both Ms. Climans and Mr. Latner giving evidence that they ate dinner together almost every night. During cross-examination she acknowledged that she could not really recall. She testified that Ms. Climans never took part in their celebration of Jewish holidays, despite evidence to the contrary by other witnesses. I do accept that Elisabeth and Ms. Climans had a strained relationship, and that this put a strain on Mr. Latner's relationship with Ms. Climans. Elisabeth started university in 2003.

[110] She acknowledged that it was important to Mr. Latner that Ms. Climans be under the chuppah for her wedding. She acknowledged that Mr. Latner and Ms. Climans travelled together a lot.

[111] It is clear that Elisabeth wanted to help her father in this litigation. Her answers and responses were awkward at times. It was clear she wanted to please her father. I am not criticizing her. As mentioned above, it is very difficult when a parent puts a child in this position.

[112] Steven Latner: Steven is Mr. Latner's older brother. He has been married to his wife Lynda for 45 years and they have four children together. Steven is also a shareholder in the family companies. He semi-retired approximately one year ago. He worked with Mr. Latner for approximately 30 years. He has also known Ms. Climans for a long time, attending her wedding to David Climans. He said Mr. Latner and Ms. Climans's relationship was strained as a result of the children. He could not recall Ms. Climans being involved in the renovations to the Florida Condo. He said that on religious holidays at his home, Ms. Climans would come in to say hello but then go next door to her relatives.

[113] Lynda Latner: Lynda met Michael Latner when he was 14 years old. They always got along. Mr. Latner is a lot like Steven [page765] Latner in that they are both sometimes abrupt and have a temper. She met Ms. Climans when Ms. Climans was in her late teens. She attended her wedding to David Climans, but they lost contact shortly thereafter. She saw her again when she started dating Michael. She was close to Ms. Climans and thought she was a kind, caring person, who cared deeply for Mr. Latner. She said that sometimes Mr. Latner and Ms. Climans attended the holidays at her home. Ms. Climans would attend but the children would go to their relatives, who lived next door. She said the relationship was stressed because of the children. Ms. Climans attended the Latner family cruise to Alaska as part of the family. Ms. Climans attended the breakfast following Yom Kippur as part of the greater family. Although there were non-family members present, Ms. Climans was invited as family. She gave Ms. Climans clothing from her vintage designer clothing business free of charge because she does not charge family. She said she was told that the diamond ring worn by Ms. Climans was an engagement ring. Lynda was very sincere when giving her testimony.

Law and Analysis

Were the parties spouses?

[114] Part III of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (the "FLA") states:

In this Part, "spouse" means a spouse as defined in subsection 1(1), and in addition includes either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited, (a) continuously for a period of not less than three years[.]

[115] Section 1(1) of the FLA defines "cohabit" as "to live together in a conjugal relationship, whether within or outside marriage".

[116] Was Ms. Climans a spouse? There is no question that her relationship with Mr. Latner was longer than three years. Did Mr. Latner and Ms. Climans

(a) "live together"

(b) "in a conjugal relationship"?

Defining a "conjugal relationship"

[117] Molodowich v. Penttinen, 1980 1537 (ON SC), [1980] O.J. No. 1904, 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Dist. Ct.) has often been cited as setting out the criteria to consider when determining whether a conjugal relationship [page766] exists. While this case dates back to 1980, it has been adopted and followed in numerous recent cases.

[118] The Supreme Court of Canada, in M. v. H., 1999 686 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, adopted and affirmed the Molodowich criteria. This case concerned the right of same-sex couples to be identified as common-law spouses under s. 29 of the FLA. It is the leading Supreme Court case in interpreting the meaning of s. 29. While largely a constitutional case, two paragraphs of this decision relate specifically to the legal definition of "conjugal" relationships (paras. 59-60). In these paragraphs, the Supreme Court adopts the contextual and flexible definition of "conjugal" outlined in Molodowich,finding that there are many elements of a conjugal relationship that may be present in varying degrees in different relationships, and that the approach to determining whether relationship is conjugal must be flexible:

Obviously, the weight to be accorded the various elements or factors to be considered in determining whether an opposite sex couple is in a conjugal relationship will vary widely and almost infinitely.[^6]

[119] In Campbell v. Szoke,[^7] the parties had a 17.5-year relationship. They lived together in Florida for six months each year but maintained separate residences in Ontario. The plaintiff was seeking spousal support while the defendant denied that they cohabited as spouses. Mr. Szoke's position was that the plaintiff was paid to care for him in Florida because of his injury and health problems. In Ontario he lived with his son and daughter-in-law. The evidence did not support Mr. Szoke's position and instead supported Ms. Campbell's position that he treated her as a spouse. Justice Karakatsanis summarized the criteria from Molodowich in her decision in Campbell v. Szoke, at para. 51, as follows:

Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 1980 1537 (ON SC), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 at 381-382 has set out a non-exhaustive list of criteria to be considered in determining whether a conjugal relationship exists. Elements to consider include shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support, children as well as the societal perception of the couple. These were confirmed as generally accepted characteristics of a conjugal relationship by the Supreme Court of Canada in M. v. H., 1999 686 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (para. 59). However, it is recognized that these elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be conjugal.

[120] Given the facts set out above, there is no doubt that all the elements/criteria set out in Molodowich were present in the relationship between Ms. Climans and Mr. Latner and lead to the [page767] conclusion that their relationship was a conjugal relationship. They were in a long-term, committed relationship. Mr. Latner treated Ms. Climans as his wife. Their relationship was sexual in nature. They held themselves out as a committed couple and were perceived as a couple by their family and friends. Ms. Climans was considered family by the extended Latner family. The parties participated in social activities as a couple. Mr. Latner supported Ms. Climans financially. They travelled extensively together. They lived together at the cottage each summer.

[121] The one issue that gives me pause is whether they had a "shared shelter". Did Ms. Climans and Mr. Latner "live together", even though they maintained two houses in Toronto, and if not, is it fatal to Ms. Climans' claim for spousal support?

Defining "living together"

[122] Finding that the parties maintained two separate residences in Toronto is not the end of the inquiry as to whether they lived together. In considering the flexible approach put forth by the Supreme Court of Canada in M. v. H., and in considering whether maintaining separate residences eliminates a party's ability to be considered a spouse, Justice Karakatsanis, in Campbell v. Szoke (referred to above), states:

The fact that the parties maintain separate residences does not prevent the finding of cohabitation. The court must look at all of the circumstances and consider the reasons for maintaining another residence, such as to facilitate access with one's children: Thauevette v. Maylon (1996), 1996 8090 (ON SC), 23 R.F.L. (4th) 217 at 222 (Ont. Gen. Div.). Continuous daily cohabitation is not a necessity for a finding under section 29 of the Family Law Act. A couple who lived together only on weekends was found to be cohabiting in Hazelwood v. Kent, [2000] O.J. No. 5263 at 8 (Ont. S.C.J.). Whether a couple has cohabited continuously is both a subjective and an objective test. Intention of the parties is important. Where there is a long period of companionship and commitment and an acceptance by all who knew them as a couple, continuous cohabitation should be found: McEachern v. Fry Estate, [1993] O.J. no. 1731 at para. 21 (Ont. Gen. Div.).[^8]

[123] Justice Karakatsanis found that the parties lived together as common-law spouses. At para. 56, Justice Karakatsanis carries on to state:

In fact, I find that Frank occasionally stayed the night. I accept that he may have avoided staying the night after he became convinced later in the relationship that it would attract financial responsibility. However, I do not believe it to be a prerequisite that they lived together all the time or that he stay the night at her apartment. Initially the apartment was maintained to house Kathleen's children. Subsequently it was maintained because of Frank's son. Ultimately Frank thought he could avoid financial responsibility [page768] by maintaining the separate apartment. The evidence is clear that he was there almost every day well into the evening and that they otherwise continued to act as spouses in every other way.

[124] In Stephen v. Stawecki, 2006 20225 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 2412, 32 R.F.L. (6th) 282 (C.A.),the question was whether the parties were living together three years prior to the date Mr. Stawecki died, to determine if Ms. Stephen was a spouse for support purposes on the date of his death. There was no dispute that they were living together on the date of his death. Three years prior, the parties each had their own homes but were looking to purchase a house together. They were spending three to four nights per week together. The appellants in that case argued that the court should impose a "bright-line rule", stating that parties must have "moved in" together to be considered to "live together"/"cohabit". Despite their not living together the trial judge found that the parties had shown the necessary intent to cohabit by

(a) being exclusive to one another;

(b) sleeping, shopping, gardening, cooking, cleaning, socializing and living together as a couple; and

[125] The Court of Appeal declined to impose a bright-line rule, stating that the law recognizes a variety of different relationships and living arrangements, making such a rule impossible and inconsistent with the flexible approach to spousal relationships outlined by the Supreme Court in M. v. H.[^9] Further, the court stated, at para. 4, that "the specific arrangements made for shelter are properly treated as only one of several factors in assessing whether or not the parties are cohabiting".

[126] In Thauvette v. Malyon, 1996 8090 (ON SC), [1996] O.J. No. 1356, 23 R.F.L. (4th) 217 (Gen. Div.), the parties also maintained separate homes. At the time the parties started their affair, both parties were involved in other relationships. The plaintiff was married and the defendant was involved in a long-term common-law relationship. Both parties eventually left their partners. The plaintiff first moved into a home owned by the defendant, who was still living in his matrimonial home with his wife at the time. Subsequently, the defendant separated from his wife. He did not move in with the plaintiff but rented alternate accommodations. The parties wanted to keep their children separate and apart and this way the defendant could exercise access with his own children separate and apart [page769] from the plaintiff and her children. The defendant spent four to five nights a week at the plaintiff's home. The defendant took the position that the plaintiff was just a girlfriend and that he carried on relationships with other women during this time. He did not disclose these relationships to the plaintiff. Counsel for the defendant argued that the parties did not live under the same roof as they maintained separate residences. However, defendant was spending, on average, four or five nights a week with the plaintiff. Justice Roy, starting at paras. 32, 33, 34, 35 and 39, states:

In my opinion, the fact the defendant maintained a separate residence does not in itself mean he did not cohabit with the plaintiff. In today's society, couples who carry on independent careers often in different cities could hardly be said to live under the same roof. There are instances where couples share more than one residence, like a cottage where one of the parties spends much more time than the other. Would the courts conclude thereby these people did not cohabit if they had not married? I think not.

In my opinion, the court has to look at all of the circumstances and consider the reason for maintaining another residence.

Here, there is a consensus amongst the parties, it was in the best interest of everyone involved the defendant maintain a separate residence to facilitate access with his children, away from the plaintiff's family.

The defendant argues the plaintiff was just a girlfriend like all the other women with whom he had had affairs.

The problem is the defendant never advised the plaintiff of his intentions towards other women. At no time was he ever candid or discuss with her or explained to her his rules and conditions for their relationship. In fact, he tried to convince her otherwise.

[127] Justice Roy concluded that upon reviewing all of the circumstances, including the conduct of the parties, there was cohabitation.

[128] What is clear from a review of the case law is that each case is fact-specific. To determine whether the parties lived together in a conjugal relationship, all the factors must be considered in conjunction with one another. However, there needs to be some element of living together under the same roof. The very definition of "cohabit" requires that the parties live together in a conjugal relationship.

[129] There is a clear difference in the relationship of the parties in the cases that found the parties to be "cohabiting" from those that found they were not.

[130] In Nowell v. Town Estate (1994), 1994 7285 (ON SC), 19 O.R. (3d) 303, [1994] O.J. No. 1423 (Gen. Div.), appeal allowed on other grounds(1997), 1997 14545 (ON CA), 35 O.R. (3d) 415, [1997] O.J. No. 4044 (C.A.), the parties had a 24-year affair. Ms. Nowell knew that Mr. Town was married with children and Mr. Town was clear that he would not leave his [page770] wife. They maintained separate residences. Ms. Nowell did not receive any direct support from Mr. Town. They developed their own social network in which the affair was well known. Justice Jarvis found [at para. 9] that "[c]onsenting adults with separate residences, who visit one another, cannot be said to cohabit".

[131] Mr. Latner's lawyers rely on Quesnel v. Erickson, [2012] O.J. No. 3693, 2012 ONSC 4335, 24 R.F.L. (7th) 229 (S.C.J.). In that case, the parties had a child together and the mother was arguing that she was a spouse because they [at para. 95] "cohabited in a relationship of some permanence". In considering whether the parties were spouses, Justice Hennessy states:

The parties did not share a residence during the time that Ms. Quesnel now alleges that they cohabited. This fact alone does not preclude a finding of cohabitation. The case law recognizes that, given a variety of relationships and living arrangements, there should be a full assessment of their relationship in order to determine whether they cohabited in a relationship of some permanence.[^10]

[132] In reviewing the evidence and considering the facts (in a similar analysis to that set out in Molodowich), Justice Hennessey concluded that the parties were no more than a dating couple. There was no evidence that they lived in a "marriage-like" relationship. The parties had had dinner with Mr. Erickson's brother and wife and family a couple of times. They were seeing each other exclusively. However, they did not merge any part of their financial lives. They did not do any domestic services for one another. They did not participate in neighbourhood or community activities. They did not inform their families that they were in a committed relationship.

[133] The respondent's counsel also relies on the case of Lukic v. Zaban, [2012] O.J. No. 5256, 2012 ONSC 6078 (Master), a decision of Master MacLeod. This was a motion for interim support from the estate of Steve Zaban, under the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26(the "SLRA"). The issue was whether Ms. Lukic was a spouse. Mr. Zaban helped Ms. Lukic set up a lingerie store. He permitted her to live in his home for eight months. He purchased a car for her use and gave her the use of his credit cards. However, the parties were not sexually intimate (Mr. Zaban could not have sexual intercourse) and they had separate bedrooms. They did not cohabit for even close to three years. It was unclear whether the relationship was even a romantic one. There was no corroboration to Ms. Lukic's position that they were in a marriage-like or even a romantic relationship. They did not [page771] hold themselves out as a couple in the community. They did not travel together on holiday. At para. 20, Master MacLeod states:

It is possible to cohabit while maintaining separate residences but in that case the evidence will have to be overwhelming that the lives of the parties were so intertwined that they must be considered to be in a spousal relationship despite that fact.

[134] After a review of the factors set out in Molodowich, Ms. Lukic was found not to be a spouse.

[135] Justice Dunphy specifically considered the term "living together" in Stajduhar v. Kerzner Estate, [2017] O.J. No. 4511, 2017 ONSC 4954, 99 R.F.L. (7th) 401 (S.C.J.). This is another estate case where a party was seeking support as a dependent under the SLRA. Section 57 of the SLRA defines a "dependant" as "the spouse of the deceased". The definition of a "spouse" under the SLRA is the same as in section 29 of the FLA. Ms. Stajduhar alleged that she was a dependent of the late Jeffrey Kerzner and that they cohabited for not less than three years in a conjugal relationship before his death. Mr. Kerzner was providing some level of financial support before his death. Dunphy J.'s comments, at para. 52, are helpful:

The real world of human relations more closely resembles a spectrum than a well ordered world of binary certainties. A myriad of close relationships exhibiting some elements of dependency exist in the world of real people leading real lives. The inquiry I must undertake cannot be reduced to a simple checklist. While it is clear that the substance of the relationship needs to be examined, that examination must proceed in the light of the minimum requirements of the legislation.

[136] The question before Justice Dunphy was whether a romantic partner can make a claim for dependent relief without establishing that she lived together with the deceased for at least three years. Justice Dunphy was not persuaded that the parties ever lived together. The couple had a loving relationship and Mr. Kerzner was generous to Ms. Stajduhar. The parties maintained separate residences throughout. In looking at whether the parties ever lived together, para. 65 states:

Living together implies something more than having conjugal relations, spending time together or doing so for a long time. It cannot be defined by a simplistic accounting of days or nights spent at this or that address. It imports the concept of a common abode where both our primarily resident. That place may change from time to time depending upon the lifestyle of the couple. However, there ought to be a place readily identifiable as a place where both are ordinarily to be found most of the time when they are at "home".

[Emphasis in original] [page772]

[137] However, in that case, the parties spent a lot of time together, but there was no evidence that they slept at each other's houses, except on exceptional instances, such as illness or other similar events. They did not go on holiday together even once in six years. At para. 71, Justice Dunphy states that "[t]he texture and feel of a relationship involving a couple 'living together' as opposed to 'going steady' over a lengthy period of time is quite absent from [the claimant's] evidence viewed as a whole". The conclusion was that Ms. Stajduhar "has supplied insufficient evidence to present a convincing case that she lived together with Jeffrey at any identified time".

[138] In Derakhshan v. Narula, [2018] O.J. No. 404, 2018 ONSC 537 (S.C.J.), Mr. Derakhshan was seeking spousal support from Ms. Narula, claiming they were in a common-law relationship. The parties enjoyed a romantic relationship and, for one year, Mr. Derakhshan resided at Ms. Narula's house. However, the evidence fell short of establishing that they were in a spousal relationship. There was no evidence of any express intention by either of them to enter a long-term relationship. They did not hold themselves out socially as spouses. Their finances were kept entirely separate. They travelled separate and apart (except for trips to India). Shead J. ultimately found that, "[t]aking into account the other evidence, I conclude that Derakhshan has failed to prove that he and Narula were in a spousal or common-law relationship".[^11]

Conclusion

[139] I find that Ms. Climans and Mr. Latner were spouses for the purpose of spousal support having regard to all the factors. The dynamic of their relationship was such that all of the elements were present to some degree or another, but when viewed all together, lead to the conclusion that they were spouses:

(a) Committed relationship: The parties were in a committed 14-year relationship, as set out in more detail above, having exchanged rings (even if only "commitment rings", as described by Mr. Latner), celebrated their anniversary each and every year, exchanged numerous love letters with expressions of deep commitment, Mr. Latner calling the applicant Mrs. Latner (or other similar names), and Ms. Climans caring for Mr. Latner during hospital stays. There was an expectation that Ms. Climans be available to Mr. Latner, and run errands for him. [page773]

(b) Financial Arrangements: Mr. Latner paid for Ms. Climans' expenses for the entirety of the relationship, provided her with a lavish lifestyle, paid off one of her mortgages and created a financial dependency.

(c) Extended Family and Social Perception: Ms. Climans was treated as family by the extended Latner family. The parties held themselves out as a couple in a long-term committed relationship to both family and friends. They have referred to each other as spouses in public. Ms. Climans participated in the extended Latner family lifecycle events and even walked down the aisle with Mr. Latner at his daughter's wedding, standing under the chuppah (canopy) with him.

(d) Living together:

(i) I find that every summer, Mr. Latner and Ms. Climans moved up to and lived together at the cottage. This was their summer home, where they could be located throughout the summer for almost the entire 14 years.

(ii) I also find that for the first several years of the relationship, Ms. Climans was residing at Mr. Latner's home on a regular basis, when her children were not in her care, being alternate weekends. I accept that she maintained a separate home for her children, to be close to their school, and by the time they graduated the parties were already in the process of building a home together. This may have changed later in the relationship but was certainly present in the first few years.

(iii) The parties also lived together as spouses when in Florida.

Had these been the only factors, I would not have concluded that they were spouses. However, when taken into account along with all the other dynamics in this relationship (summarized above), I conclude that they were common-law spouses.

Spousal Support

Standing

[140] Given my finding that Ms. Climans is a spouse within the meaning of the Family Law Act, she therefore has standing to seek support.

Entitlement

[141] Is Ms. Climans entitled to spousal support? [page774]

[142] It is Ms. Climans' position that she is entitled to spousal support, both compensatory and non-compensatory support, based on the accustomed standard of living enjoyed while they were together. It is Mr. Latner's position that she is not entitled to support. Mr. Latner's position is that she is not entitled to compensatory support because she did not suffer any economic disadvantage caused by the relationship and Ms. Climans had nothing to do with his success, since he was already a wealthy man when they met. Her current financial circumstance is as a result of her mismanagement of her own money. Mr. Latner also took the position that she is not entitled to non-compensatory support. Specifically, the amounts that he paid to her following separation should have "cushioned Lisa into self sufficiency"[^12] and she should have made better efforts to become self-sufficient.

[143] I find that Ms. Climans is entitled to non-compensatory support, based on the difference between the needs and means of the parties. The circumstances of this relationship clearly created a pattern of economic dependency. Ms. Climans has a need for support. Currently, Ms. Climans' only source of income is from teaching yoga. She continues to rely on the interim without prejudice support payments from Mr. Latner to meet her day to day needs. There is no dispute that Mr. Latner has significant means. Mr. Latner's position during the trial was that his ability to pay support was not relevant. There is a huge difference in the parties' incomes. For 14 years, Mr. Latner provided Ms. Climans with a lavish lifestyle, one that she cannot maintain on her own income. Ms. Climans will be unable to maintain a lifestyle even close to that which she enjoyed during the relationship. In fact, she cannot even afford the lifestyle she enjoyed prior to the relationship.

[144] Ms. Climans is also entitled to compensatory support, which will inform the amount and duration of support. A compensatory basis for spousal support can be found when a recipient has suffered economic loss or disadvantage as a result of a role played during the relationship. Ms. Climans gave up her job at the start of the relationship to be available to Mr. Latner. She has been out of the workforce for 14 years, due to the relationship. Mr. Latner acknowledged that he wanted Ms. Climans to be available to him. It was partially for this reason that he started to cover all of her expenses.

[145] However, it cannot be said that Ms. Climans contributed to Mr. Latner's success (or that Mr. Latner owes his success due [page775] to Ms. Climans' role in the relationship). Mr. Latner did receive some benefit from Ms. Climans during the relationship, however, when Ms. Climans and Mr. Latner met Mr. Latner was already well established in his family's business. Ms. Climans had no role to play in the acquisition or improvement of the family business. Any benefit conferred on Mr. Latner by Ms. Climans did not survive the breakdown of the relationship. Ms. Climans' compensatory claim in this regard exists but is weak.

What is Mr. Latner's Income?

[146] Mr. Latner did not really take a position on what his true income is for support purposes. He acknowledged that this is a case where means is not an issue. It was Ms. Climans' position that because Mr. Latner failed to provide adequate financial disclosure to determine his true income or even take a position as to his true income, an adverse inference should be drawn against him. She also takes the position that given that Mr. Latner did not deny, or refuse to admit and give reasons for his refusal, the statement that "he has the ability to pay any amount to Lisa for her support", he is deemed to have admitted same, pursuant to rule 22(4) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99. It is Ms. Climans' position that Mr. Latner's income is in excess of $5 million each year.

[147] In this case, Ms. Climans' position is correct, in that the quantum of spousal support is going to be driven mainly by the recipient's needs. However, I still need to make some finding with respect to Mr. Latner's income.

[148] The starting point for determining income under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (the "SSAGs") is the definition of income under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175(SSAGs, s. 3.3.2). Those guidelines and the Ontario Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97(the "CSGs") are virtually identical.[^13] Section 16 of the CSGs provides that subject to ss. 17 to 20, a spouse's annual income is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading "Total income" in the T1 General form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency, adjusted in accordance with Schedule III.

[149] Sections 17 and 18 permit a court to depart from line 150 income where the court is of the opinion that the determination of the spouse's line 150 income would not be the fairest determination of income. [page776]

[150] Section 17(1) allows a court to consider patterns or fluctuations in a spouse's income over the last three years:

17(1) If the court is of the opinion that the determination of a . . . spouse's annual income under section 16 would not be the fairest determination of that income, the court may have regard to the . . . spouse's income over the last three years and determine an amount that is fair and reasonable in light of any pattern of income, fluctuation in income or receipt of a non-recurring amount during those years.

[151] Section 18 allows the court to add all or part of the pre-tax corporate income for the most recent taxation year for a corporation of which a spouse is a shareholder to that spouse's income.

[152] Section 19 addresses imputing income to a spouse and sets out a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which income may be imputed.

[153] Mr. Latner's income is a combination of employment income, dividends, rental income and capital gains. Mr. Latner owns shares in MELCO.[^14] MELCO, in turn, holds shares in three companies, referred to collectively as "Shiplake".[^15] This structure came about in 2016/2017, when there was a structural reorganization, primarily to pre-empt the 21-year deemed disposition rule for the Michael Latner Family Trust No. 3 (the "Trust"). At the same time, the existing corporate structure was simplified by amalgamating some of the companies. For example, Bentley, a holding company, was amalgamated into Shiplake Holding. Mr. Latner now draws his income primarily from his shareholder account in MELCO.

[154] Further, Mr. Latner was a discretionary beneficiary of the Trust, which he controlled. The Trust had a value of approximately $220 million in 2015. The Trust assets were subsequently transferred into MELCO, as set out above. As part of the reorganization (and distribution of the trust assets), Mr. Latner allocated $70,000,000 of the Trust assets to himself, paid some money out to his children, and reallocated the rest (approx. $150 million) to his children. Mr. Latner now owns his interest in MELCO by way of two different tranches of shares, one worth approximately $70 million and the other worth approximately $21.5 million.

[155] Mr. Latner's net worth is hard to determine with any accuracy on the disclosure provided and the evidence given [page777] during trial. His position changed throughout his various financial statements and disclosure, but his most recent financial statement (April 3, 2018) shows his net worth to be $137,875,120. What is known is that at separation Mr. Latner owned 19 Old Forest Hill Road (worth approx. $5 million) and 21 Forest Hill Road. He owned a cottage worth $4 million and the Florida Condo. He owned boats, cars and significant art (the art being worth over $38 million as per his financial statement) at separation. He had approximately $3.5 million in personal (non-corporate) investments plus the corporate assets and trust assets. The Trust assets were around $220 million at separation. Mr. Latner had full control over these assets.

[156] In considering s. 16 of the Guidelines, I find that Mr. Latner's income tax returns do not reflect his true income. His income from his tax returns is as follows:

(a) 2015 -- $5,676,015

(b) 2016 -- $232,694

(c) 2017 -- $14,355,553.79 This included a $26,464,000 capital gain from the sale of a personally owned piece of art to one of his companies, as well as a $86,467 loss from the sale of the second cottage (sold for $4 million).

[157] I also find that Mr. Latner's Form 13 financial statements do not reflect his true income. His income from his various financial statements can be summarized as follows:

(a) $273,401 -- set out in his financial statement sworn November 6, 2015.

(b) $232,694 -- set out in his financial statements sworn May 24, 2017 and April 3, 2018.

[158] In order to determine income available to Mr. Latner from which to pay support, it is important to look at MELCO and the related companies, not simply the income reported on his personal income tax returns.

[159] Under s. 18 of the Guidelines, I can consider the pre-tax corporate income from his companies. The pre-tax corporate income for MELCO and Shiplake during these years can be summarized as follows: [page778]

[160] Further, Mr. Latner's income (whether considering his income tax returns, his financial statements or his pre-tax corporate income) fluctuates each year. I find that looking at his income over a three-year period to be the most fair and reasonable approach in these circumstances. However, based on the evidence presented at trial (or lack thereof), it is difficult to make a finding as to his true income. Nonetheless, I do have sufficient information to determine how much Mr. Latner drew from MELCO for his own expenses over the last three years.

[161] Mr. Latner took the position that he draws money from MELCO to meet his expenses and the accountants determine how to treat the draws at the end of the year. Mr. Bester gave testimony that they are now paying Mr. Latner a more regular sum each month to keep track of money being drawn from his account. The money flowing into and out of Mr. Latner's MELCO shareholder account can be summarized as follows:

[162] Mr. Latner had use of just over $8.6 million per year, on average, for the last three years. I appreciate that some of this money may technically be characterized as a draw on capital for income tax purposes, but given the history of how he earns his income, his organizational structure and the disclosure provided, I find that without further information this is the most accurate way to determine the funds to which he had access for the purpose of determining his income for spousal support. This does not take into account the beneficial tax rate as a result of some careful tax planning by his advisors.

[163] Of the $12,738,289 drawn in 2018, $7,497,382 went to pay taxes, largely as a result of the art sale. But even without taking into account income taxes paid for 2018, he still had use of [page779] over $5,200,000 that year, plus his normalized income taxes paid. He would still have had an average income of over $6.5 million per year, for the last three years, or at least $7 million for 2018.

[164] If I were to go through the exercise of determining his income for support purposes as provided for under the Guidelines (by starting with his income tax returns, grossing up dividend income as well as capital gain income), his income would be even higher. Suffice to say, I am satisfied that there is sufficient income from which to pay support. In this case, Ms. Climans' needs, measured against her standard of living during the relationship, will be the driving factor in determining the quantum of spousal support, not Mr. Latner's means.

Ms. Climans's needs and income

[165] Ms. Climans' position is that she is entitled to spousal support in the amount of $67,000 to leave her with $34,700 net. She has a projected budget of $34,679 net per month. Mr. Latner's position is that even if Ms. Climans is found to be entitled to support, he has discharged his obligation in paying her $621,783.88 net since separation. If spousal support is to be ordered, his position is that the quantum should not be based on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines as his income is over $350,000.

[166] With respect to her expenses, Ms. Climans provided a proposed budget of $34,679 net per month. During cross-examination, she acknowledged that her budget was a wish list. She included groceries of $2,800 per month plus $2,000 for meals outside the home, as the amount she spent during the relationship. The $4,800 per month for food would have included Mr. Latner and her children. Mr. Latner is not responsible for the expenses for her children. I would therefore reduce these two items by $2,000 total. The estimated $6,000 per month for vacations included at least one of her children. There were a few other expenses which were not entirely accurate. I would reduce her budget for vacations to $4,000 per month. Her voice lessons ($1,600 per month), boxing ($350 per month), personal trainer ($433.33 per month), Canadian National Ballet lessons ($165 per month), gifts ($1,000 per month) and car lease (at $1,332 per month, even though Mr. Latner agreed to transfer the car to her as the lease is up shortly) were all part of her "wish list". The monthly total for these items is $4,880.33. I would reduce the overall amount to $3,000. This would still give her a discretionary amount but perhaps not incurring all of the expenses at the same time. For example, if the car is transferred to her, her proposed budget is immediately reduced by $1,332 per month. If and when [page780] she needs to replace the car, she may no longer be taking voice lessons. Or she may find she is not spending $1,000 per month on gifts. She will still have significant discretionary funds to spend on these items. I have left many of her other lifestyle expenses such as her talk therapy ($1,000 per month), her beauty care (over $1,900 per month), her clothing ($5,000 per month), alcohol ($200 per month) and renovations on her home, without any reduction as they are reflective of the lifestyle and expenses she enjoyed during the relationship.

[167] As such I would reduce her needs, as set out in her proposed budget, by a total of $5,880, for a total budget of $28,800 net per month (being $34,679-$5,880).

[168] It is within the court's discretion to draw the line at certain types of lavish expenditures, such as private jets and plastic surgeons[^16] and to adjust budgets when circumstances dictate. In McCain v. McCain,[^17] the husband's income was $9.7 million, and he was worth over $500 million. The wife had a budget of $118,803 net per month, and assets between $15-17 million. The court determined spousal support by looking at the wife's budget. The court ordered spousal support of $175,000 per month, or approximately $87,500 net per month. The court looked at the wife's budget and reduced same to arrive at the support amount. The judge commented that while incomes do not need to be equalized, the spousal support should be sufficient so that the wife does not need to sell her house or use her capital. However, McCain was decided on a motion for support. In Elgner v. Elgner, 2009 68827 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 5269, 85 R.F.L. (6th) 51 (S.C.J.), the husband's income was $3.8 million, and the wife's budget was $140,000 per month. The court also determined spousal support by looking at the wife's budget, with adjustments to same. In this case the court ordered spousal support of $110,000 per month.

[169] In Knowles v. Lindstrom, [2015] O.J. No. 1059, 2015 ONSC 1408, 57 R.F.L. (7th) 402 (S.C.J.) the parties' lifestyle during the relationship was found to be relevant to the context of establishing the applicant's needs for support purposes. The case was a motion for interim spousal support. The husband earned $1.5 million but did not pay tax. The parties lived together from 2002-2012. The husband argued that the wife was not a spouse. [page781] The motion judge found that the wife satisfied him on a prima facie basis that she was a spouse. The SSAG range was from $35,000-$45,000 per month. The wife was asking for $30,000 per month. The judge ordered $25,000 per month.

[170] Ms. Climans is currently on track to earn $24,000 this year as a yoga instructor. There is no dispute that Ms. Climans has an obligation to contribute to her expenses, but it is very unlikely that she will earn enough to be self-sufficient and afford the lifestyle she enjoyed during the relationship. In considering section 33(8)(c) of the FLA, Ms. Climans should have an incentive to contribute to her own expenses. The Court of Appeal, in Reisman v. Reisman,[^18] confirmed that limits on spousal support are an effective way to emphasize a recipient's obligation to work towards self-sufficiency so long as it is still within the context of the recipient's age, skills, education, opportunity for retraining and realistic employment prospects.

[171] Ms. Climans was 51 years old at separation. She recently completed her training to be a yoga instructor. Being a yoga instructor may not be the most reasonable step to contribute to her own expenses. Evidence was presented at trial that teaching yoga is a good way to supplement income but not a means by which to support oneself. Ms. Climans is not going to earn more than $24,000 per year teaching yoga. A lower award of spousal support may encourage a recipient to make greater efforts towards self-sufficiency, or at least contributing to her expenses at a more reasonable level. Ms. Climans is an articulate, bright and motivated individual. I am satisfied that she could be earning more than what she is earning as a yoga instructor. Ms. Climans is currently earning approximately $24,000 per year. This is less than minimum wage. She has a positive obligation to contribute to her own expenses, within reason. She is never going to be earning an income sufficient to support her current lifestyle but given her age, her skill set and her previous employment I find that she can be earning more than she is currently earning as a yoga instructor. I find that at this time, she can be earning at least minimum wage, and I would impute $30,000 of income to her. However, Ms. Climans' income, whether at $24,000 or an imputed income of $30,000, is not going to have any real impact on meeting her expenses (the impact is less than $500 gross per month in spousal support). [page782]

Considerations for quantum and duration

[172] Once entitlement has been determined, the issues of quantum and duration must be determined. The parties' positions with respect to quantum are set out above.

[173] The FLA provides a framework to determine support:

Order for Support

33(1) A Court may, on application, order a person to provide support for his or her dependants and determine the amount of support.

Purposes of order for support of spouse

(8) An order for the support of a spouse should,

(a) recognize the spouse's contribution to the relationship and the economic consequences of the relationship for the spouse;

(b) share the economic burden of child support equitably;

(c) make fair provision to assist the spouse to become able to contribute to his or her own support; and

(d) relieve financial hardship, if this has not been done by orders under Parts I (Family Property) and II (Matrimonial Home).

Determination of amount for support of spouses, parents

(9) In determining the amount and duration, if any, of support for a spouse or parent in relation to need, the court shall consider all the circumstances of the parties, including,

(a) the dependant's and respondent's current assets and means;

(b) the assets and means that the dependant and respondent are likely to have in the future;

(c) the dependant's capacity to contribute to his or her own support;

(d) the respondent's capacity to provide support;

(e) the dependant's and respondent's age and physical and mental health;

(f) the dependant's needs, in determining which the court shall have regard to the accustomed standard of living while the parties resided together;

(g) the measures available for the dependant to become able to provide for his or her own support and the length of time and cost involved to enable the dependant to take those measures;

(h) any legal obligation of the respondent or dependant to provide support for another person;

(i) the desirability of the dependant or respondent remaining at home to care for a child; [page783]

(j) a contribution by the dependant to the realization of the respondent's career potential;

(k) Repealed: 1997, c. 20, s. 3 (3).

(l) if the dependant is a spouse,

(i) the length of time the dependant and respondent cohabited,

(ii) the effect on the spouse's earning capacity of the responsibilities assumed during cohabitation,

(iii) whether the spouse has undertaken the care of a child who is of the age of eighteen years or over and unable by reason of illness, disability or other cause to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents,

(iv) whether the spouse has undertaken to assist in the continuation of a program of education for a child eighteen years of age or over who is unable for that reason to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents,

(v) any housekeeping, child care or other domestic service performed by the spouse for the family, as if the spouse were devoting the time spent in performing that service in remunerative employment and were contributing the earnings to the family's support,

(v.1) Repealed: 2005, c. 5, s. 27 (12).

(vi) the effect on the spouse's earnings and career development of the responsibility of caring for a child; and

(m) any other legal right of the dependant to support, other than out of public money.

[174] Further, the introduction of the SSAGs has provided considerable assistance in addressing questions of quantum and duration of spousal support.

[175] In Fisher v. Fisher (2008), 88 O.R. (3d) 241, [2008] O.J. No. 38, 2008 ONCA 11, at para. 96, the Court of Appeal held that although the SSAGs are not legislated or binding they are a useful tool, provided that "the reasonableness of an award produced by the Guidelines must be balanced in light of the circumstances of the individual case, including the particular financial history of the parties during the marriage and their likely future circumstances".

[176] In Thompson v. Thompson, [2013] O.J. No. 4001, 2013 ONSC 5500 (S.C.J.), at para. 61, the court sets out a number of factors to consider in determining the appropriate quantum and duration of support within the ranges. These include:

a) The strength of any compensatory claim for support . . .

b) The recipient's needs . . .

c) The age, number, needs and standard of living of the children. [page784]

d) The payor spouse's needs and ability to pay.

e) The need to preserve work incentives for the payor.

f) Property division and debt . . .

g) Self-sufficiency incentives in relation to the recipient spouse.

[177] Although Mr. Latner's income is greater than $350,000 and the ranges under the SSAGs may not apply (see discussion below), the considerations set out above are still helpful in determining the quantum of support.

[178] As set out in the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User's Guide, 2016, the formulas and amounts are no longer presumptive applicable once the payor's income exceeds the "ceiling" of $350,000 of income.

The formulas are not to be applied automatically above the ceiling, although the formulas may provide an appropriate method of determining spousal support in an individual case, depending on the facts.

[179] With income above the ceiling, spousal support requires an individualized, fact-specific analysis, having regard to the legislative framework, set out at section 33(9) of the FLA. There is further discretion given to the court in these circumstances. Further, once the payor's income is "far" above the ceiling, then the amount of support ordered will usually be below the low end of the SSAG range, but SSAG ranges are still calculated and sometimes the outcome will fall within the SSAG range.[^19]

Duration

[180] With respect to duration, Ms. Climans' position is that she is entitled to indefinite spousal support. Mr. Latner had two different positions. The first was that Ms. Climans is no longer entitled to spousal support given that she has received in excess of $621,000 since separation. In the alternative, he took the position that I should order significantly time-limited step-down spousal support, urging significant weight be put on the need to promote economic self-sufficiency. His reasoning for time limited support was that it would allow Ms. Climans to gradually adjust her standard of living from the one enjoyed during the relationship to one based on her own income.

[181] Under the SSAGs, spousal support is payable for a duration of between seven to 14 years, unless the years of their relationship and Ms. Climans' age total 65 or more (the Rule of [page785] 65). Ms. Climans was 51 years of age at separation (or to be exact, 51 years, nine months and 13 days). Ms. Climans has taken the position that they started cohabiting as of November 1, 2001 and separated May 11, 2015. This means that they cohabited, by her calculations, for 13 years, six months and 24 days. By her calculations she hits the "Rule of 65" (65 years and five months), and is asking for indefinite spousal support. While I may not agree that they started cohabiting as early as November 1, 2001, there is a five-month leeway. It was Mr. Latner's position that the parties never cohabited, so he did not provide any evidence or take a position as to the start date. I find that at some point in those first five months of the relationship, the parties did start cohabiting.

[182] However, even if Ms. Climans hits the Rule of 65, this does not mean that she will receive spousal support for life. There have been cases that have ordered time-limited support, even in light of a result of indefinite support under the SSAGs. In Fisher v. Fisher, even though the wife met the Rule of 65, at para. 88, the Court of Appeal held:

To provide the appellant with a reasonable transition following her nineteen-year marriage, it is my view that the appellant will need support for seven years, beginning with the year of separation. In my view, a seven-year order complies with the spousal support objective of recognizing the appellant's economic disadvantage arising from the marriage and its breakdown, while also encouraging the appellant to complete her transition to self-sufficiency, whether by reason of earning a higher income or, more likely, by adapting her lifestyle to her then income.

[183] In Mercel v. Bouillon, [2012] O.J. No. 5544, 2012 ONSC 6557 (S.C.J.), the parties had a 14-year relationship and the wife met the 65-year rule. Her spousal support was terminated after 17 years.

[184] At some point in time, Ms. Climans may have to adapt her lifestyle to meet her means. By ordering indefinite support, I am not necessarily making a finding that she is entitled to permanent spousal support.

Summary on support

[185] I have decided on the quantum of support based on the following factors (all of which were discussed in detail above):

(a) This is a needs-based support award, with a weak compensatory element (lower end of support).

(b) The parties had a 14-year relationship. They enjoyed a lavish lifestyle. A dependency was created almost from the start of the relationship. Ms. Climans relied on the financial support from Mr. Latner (higher end of support). [page786]

(c) Ms. Climans does not have the ability to support herself at this time, and certainly not at a level that she enjoyed during the relationship (or even before the relationship). Her income is currently $24,000 per year. Her primary asset is her home. She does not have any significant savings for the future (higher end of support).

(d) Ms. Climans' needs, as per her budget, adjusted as set out above, are approximately $28,800 net per month.

(e) Mr. Latner's income for spousal support purposes is at least $6.5 million, although likely higher. There is unlikely to be a material change in circumstance in his income or asset base.

(f) Ms. Climans did not contribute to Mr. Latner's earnings and career development. He entered the relationship with significant means and income. This has not changed (lower end of support).

(g) Ms. Climans was 38 years old when the parties met. She was 51 years old at separation and in good health. She does not have the ability to support herself, but she should and could be earning more than $24,000 to contribute to her own expenses (lower end of support).

(h) Mr. Latner is currently 63 years old. He has had some health scares over the last few years (lower end of support).

(i) This was a second marriage for both parties and there are no children of this relationship (lower end of support).

(j) The duration of support will be indefinite (lower end of support).

[186] Weighing the factors set out above, along with the other considerations set out in the Family Law Act, such as lifestyle, ages, contribution to expenses, a weak compensatory claim, the duration of support and the length of the relationship, I find that Ms. Climans is entitled to indefinite spousal support in the amount of $53,077 per month, which will net her $28,800 per month. This will leave Ms. Climans with just over 11 per cent of the net disposable income of the parties. The Divorcemate calculation is attached.

Retroactive Support

[187] Ms. Climans is requesting spousal support retroactive to the date she issued her application. Mr. Latner is asking that her claim for retroactive spousal support be dismissed because [page787]

(a) her needs were being met by him following separation;

(b) she did not bring a motion for support; and

[188] Section 34(1)(f) of the FLA permits orders for retroactive support. A spouse's obligation to pay support starts at separation. A spouse is expected to commence support proceedings in a timely manner. I find that Ms. Climans commenced her proceedings in a timely manner.

[189] In Kerr v. Baranow, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269, [2011] S.C.J. No. 10, 2011 SCC 10, the Supreme Court concluded that the considerations it had set out for child support retroactivity in S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.)[^20] are also relevant in deciding the suitability of a "retroactive" award of spousal support. The factors for consideration for retroactive support are [at para. 207]:

[T]he needs of the recipient, the conduct of the payor, the reason for the delay in seeking support and any hardship the retroactive award may occasion on the payor spouse. However, in spousal support cases, these factors must be considered and weighed in light of the different legal principles and objectives that underpin spousal as compared with child support. I will mention some of those differences briefly, although certainly not exhaustively.

[190] The court referred to the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, where the court held that the date of the initiation of court proceedings for spousal support is the usual commencement date for the support order, unless there is a reason for making the order commence on a different date.[^21]

[191] After reviewing the facts in Kerr v. Baranow, the Supreme Court of Canada found the trial judge was justified in making a retroactive order where the recipient was in need, there was no delay in applying for support, and there had been no inordinate delay between the date of application and the date of the trial. The payor had the means to provide support and had prompt notice of the claim for support (see paras. 215-219).

[192] Finally, in Knowles v. Lindstrom, the judge ordered support retroactive to the date the application was issued, finding the wife was entitled to support from the date that she gave notice.

[193] Likewise, I find that Ms. Climans needed support (and had depleted her capital to meet her ongoing expenses), issued her application within a few months following separation and [page788] as of that time Mr. Latner was on notice that she would be seeking same. Mr. Latner had the ability to pay. The imposition of retroactive spousal support will not create a hardship for Mr. Latner. Further, it is clear from the evidence presented at trial that Mr. Latner was not entirely forthcoming with his financial disclosure. Finally, given Ms. Climans' limited resources (especially compared to Mr. Latner), I find it was reasonable to push this matter to trial rather than bringing a costly motion for support. The issue of whether she was a "spouse" needed to be determined prior to the questions of entitlement and quantum.

[194] I am not going to order spousal support for the period prior to her application and she does not seek this relief in her application. The application was issued on October 8, 2015.

[195] I would not impute any income to Ms. Climans until January 1, 2019. Therefore, to determine the retroactive support payments owing, I have relied on the actual income earned by the applicant each year. Given that the parties cannot file their income tax returns for any year prior to the last calendar year, I have calculated the entire retroactive lump sum support payment owing as being net of tax (in that the support is not to be included in Ms. Climans' income for income tax purposes, nor deducted from Mr. Latner's income). Further, Mr. Latner has advanced $621,783.88 net of tax by way of without prejudice payments from separation to the date of trial. He shall receive credit for these payments.

[196] The retroactive lump sum spousal support owing is $421,795.12 net, calculated as follows:

[197] For spousal support owing for January and February 2019, Mr. Latner shall also receive credit for any payments made to or on behalf of Ms. Climans, as per the agreement between the parties, dated April 6, 2016, for January and February 2019. [page789]

[198] On a final note, it may have been appropriate in this case to make an order for lump sum spousal support, in lieu of ongoing support. Section 34 of the Family Law Act states that a court may make an order (a) requiring that an amount be paid periodically, or (b) requiring that a lump sum be paid, or to make an award comprising both forms of support. In reviewing his financial statement, there is no doubt that Mr. Latner has the ability to pay a lump amount. Both parties would have benefitted from finality and a clean break. However, Ms. Climans limited her submissions for a lump sum payment to simply cover the compensatory, and not needs based, support. As such, I had insufficient submissions before me on which to base an order for lump sum support.

Life Insurance

[199] Ms. Climans has requested an order requiring Mr. Latner to have a life insurance policy to secure the support obligation. Mr. Latner made no submissions in this regard. Ms. Climans referred to Katz v. Katz, [2014] O.J. No. 3909, 2014 ONCA 606, as authority for the court to make the order.

[200] Section 34(4) provides that "an order for support binds the estate of the person having the support obligation unless the order provides otherwise".

[201] Section 34(1)(i) permits a court in an application under s. 33 to "make an interim or final order . . . requiring that a spouse who has a policy of life insurance as defined under the Insurance Act designate the other spouse or a child as the beneficiary irrevocably".

[202] Section 34(1)(k) gives a court discretion to make an interim or final order "requiring the securing of payment under the order, by a charge on property or otherwise".

[203] In Katz v. Katz, the Court of Appeal confirms [at para. 69] that a court does have jurisdiction, under para. 34(1)(k), "to order a spouse to obtain an insurance policy to secure payment of the order following the payor spouse's death". However, at para. 74 of the decision, the Court of Appeal states:

That said, where there is no existing policy in place, a court should proceed carefully in requiring a payor spouse to obtain insurance. This case demonstrates the desirability of having evidence of the payor's insurability and of the amount and cost of the available insurance. Careful consideration should be given to the amount of insurance that is appropriate.

[204] There was little to no evidence led by either party during the trial with respect to the issue of life insurance. I cannot state with any certainty if Mr. Latner has a policy of life insurance and I certainly have no information to make a decision as to whether [page790] he can obtain same and at what cost. I find that there was insufficient evidence before me and I therefore I cannot make an order with respect to life insurance, as requested by Ms. Climans.

[205] Order to go as follows:

(a) I find that the applicant, Lisa Climans, and the respondent, Michael Latner, were spouses under Part III, s. 29 of the Family Law Act.

(b) The applicant shall be imputed with an income of $30,000 commencing January 1, 2019.

(d) The respondent, Michael Latner, shall pay the applicant, Lisa Climans, spousal support in the sum of $53,077 per month, commencing January 1, 2019 and on the first day of each month thereafter. This amount is deductible by the respondent and to be included by the applicant when determining their incomes for income tax purposes. The respondent shall receive credit for the monthly payments made in January and February 2019, in accordance with their agreement, dated April 6, 2016.

(e) Within 90 days of the release of this judgement, the respondent shall pay the applicant a lump sum payment of $421,795.12 in satisfaction of all retroactive spousal support owing between them, up to and including December 31, 2018.

(f) If the parties are unable to agree on costs, if any, they shall arrange a conference call for either 9:00 am or 9:30 am on a date to be arranged through my administrative assistant.

(g) Support deduction order to issue.

On consent:

(h) At the end of the current lease/financing, the respondent shall transfer the motor vehicle currently driven by the applicant, into the applicant's name, at no cost to the applicant. However, as between the applicant and the respondent, as of January 1, 2019, the applicant shall be responsible for the monthly lease payments.

Application allowed.

Notes

[^1]: Mr. Latner seemed confused about when he gave Ms. Climans the 7.5 carat diamond ring, but I accept Ms. Climans' evidence on this issue. Michael acknowledged that he is not good with dates and gets confused. He initially said he gave her the ring in 2008.

[^2]: Ms. Climans called it a wedding band, Mr. Latner referred to it as a commitment ring.

[^3]: During his testimony, Mr. Latner hinted at possibly having other sexual partners towards the end of the relationship. For reasons set out below, when discussing the credibility of the parties, I chose to give little to no weight to same. In any event, it would not change my finding with respect to the nature of their relationship throughout most of the fourteen years. He also provided no details and never spoke to Ms. Climans about same.

[^4]: Initially, she drove a GMC Yukon Denali and then received a new leased Mercedes-Benz every few years thereafter.

[^5]: In 2014, Mr. Latner changed the credit card to the name Lisa Climans.

[^6]: M. v. H., at para. 60.

[^7]: Campbell v. Szoke, 2003 2291 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 3471, 45 R.F.L. (5th) 261 (S.C.J.).

[^8]: Campbell v. Szoke, at para. 52.

[^9]: Stephen v. Stawecki, at para. 4.

[^10]: Quesnel v. Erickson, at para. 99.

[^11]: Derakhshan v. Narula, at para. 50.

[^12]: See para. 199 of his written closing submissions.

[^13]: Mason v. Mason (2016), 132 O.R. (3d) 641, [2016] O.J. No. 5141, 2016 ONCA 725, at para. 53.

[^14]: He holds his interest in MELCO through Michael Latner Holdings ULC as well as MEL Holdings Inc.

[^15]: "Shiplake" is comprised of Shiplake Holdings Ltd., Shiplake Developments Ltd. and Shiplake Properties Ltd.

[^16]: Goriuk v. Turton, [2011] B.C.J. No. 936, 2011 BCSC 652, 2 R.F.L. (7th) 180, at para. 56.

[^17]: McCain v. McCain, [2012] O.J. No. 6224, 2012 ONSC 7344, 34 R.F.L. (7th) 82 (S.C.J.).

[^18]: (2014), 118 O.R. (3d) 721, [2014] O.J. No. 663, 2014 ONCA 109.

[^19]: See SSAG: The Revised User's Guide, by Carol Rogerson and Professor Rollie Thompson, as well as Goriuk v. Turton, supra.

[^20]: [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231, [2006] S.C.J. No. 37, 2006 SCC 37.

[^21]: MacKinnon v. MacKinnon (2005), 2005 13191 (ON CA), 75 O.R. (3d) 175, [2005] O.J. No. 1552 (C.A.).

End of Document

Climans v. Latner

Case Summary

Background

Ms. Climans

Mr. Latner

Position of the Parties

Ms. Climans

Mr. Latner

Credibility of the Parties

Ms. Climans

Mr. Latner

The Relationship

Commitment (rings, love letters, anniversaries, etc.)

Financial arrangements

Extended family and social perceptions

Other

Travel and living arrangements

Contracts

Post-separation

Witnesses

Ms. Climans' witnesses

Mr. Latner's witnesses

Law and Analysis

Were the parties spouses?

Defining a "conjugal relationship"

Defining "living together"

Conclusion

Spousal Support

Standing

Entitlement

What is Mr. Latner's Income?

Ms. Climans's needs and income

Considerations for quantum and duration

Duration

Summary on support

Retroactive Support

Life Insurance

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Issues

Statutory Provisions 9

Legal Tests 2

Legislation 5