Tim Gleason

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to set aside an order of the motion judge, which had dismissed his motion to set aside the Registrar's administrative dismissal of his motion for leave to appeal.

The underlying action involved allegations of professional negligence against his former counsel.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge correctly applied the test from Sickinger, which requires consideration of the merits of the appeal.

Finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the proposed appeal lacked merit, the Divisional Court dismissed the motion with costs.

In the context of two related actions involving a land banking business, the parties brought several preliminary motions before a scheduled summary judgment motion.

The moving parties (defendants in the first action) sought to bring a motion for security for costs, which the case management judge deferred until after the summary judgment motion due to delay and efficiency.

The responding parties (plaintiffs in the first action) brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the second action, arguing it was statute-barred and an abuse of process.

The court dismissed this motion, finding that the discoverability of the alleged unlawful act conspiracy raised factual issues that could not be resolved on a Rule 21 motion.

Finally, the court made several specific orders regarding documentary production, applying the principle of proportionality.

The applicant moved to set aside an order requiring security for costs of $10,000 before perfecting an appeal.

The underlying appeal was from a Superior Court decision dismissing the applicant's motion to set aside a referee's final report.

The Court of Appeal upheld the security for costs order, considering the applicant's history of multiple proceedings, many found to be unnecessary or inappropriate, and the weak merits of the appeal.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the intervenor.

The applicant, Brian Hamm, sought an order preventing the respondent, Gordon R. Baker, a lawyer, from disclosing the contents of a legal file to an intervenor in an ongoing litigation.

Hamm claimed that he and Baker were in a solicitor-client relationship, or a 'near client' relationship, and that Baker owed him a duty of confidentiality.

The court applied the Jeffers indicia to determine if a reasonable person would conclude a solicitor-client relationship existed.

The court found that Baker acted solely as corporate counsel for Northern Superior Industries Ltd. and for another investor, and that Hamm understood Baker was not representing his personal interests.

The application was dismissed.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to stay the action and set aside service on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $16,895.58, which the plaintiff largely left unchallenged.

The court found the claimed fees and disbursements to be fair, reasonable, and proportional, and awarded the defendants their requested costs in full.

In a civil procedure appeal, the appellants challenged orders permitting amendment of a statement of claim through a representation order after expiry of a limitation period.

The central issue was whether the order improperly added parties or merely corrected the naming of the legal entity represented by previously named individuals.

A majority held the request was properly treated as correction of a misnamed party, with members having notice before the limitation deadline and no demonstrated prejudice after extensive participation in the litigation.

The appeal was dismissed, with one dissenting judge who would have allowed it.

The sellers appealed an order directing the release of a $50,000 deposit to the purchaser after a failed commercial real estate transaction.

The sellers argued the purchaser committed an anticipatory breach, relieving them of the obligation to tender.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that ongoing negotiations to extend the closing date negated any repudiation.

Because there was no accepted repudiation, the sellers were required to tender to enforce the agreement, which they failed to do.

The purchaser was therefore entitled to the return of its deposit.

The proposed intervenors, former appellate counsel for the applicant, brought a motion to be added as parties to the applicant's Rule 59.06 motion, which sought to set aside a previous Divisional Court order based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant consented to the intervention but sought to restrict the intervenors from seeking costs or making submissions on underlying legal issues.

The court granted the intervention with full party rights, declined to impose the requested restrictions, and awarded costs of the motion to the intervenors.

The appellant mortgaged his family homestead farm for $350,000 and subsequently defaulted on the mortgage.

The mortgagees obtained a default judgment for foreclosure.

The appellant moved to set aside the default judgment, which was dismissed by the motion judge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made four material errors in his analysis: (1) mischaracterizing the appellant's mental frailties as merely a competency issue rather than considering their impact on his responsiveness; (2) viewing the appellant's substantial interest in the property solely as sentimental attachment rather than recognizing the substantial equity remaining after mortgage repayment; (3) confining the "reasonable prospect of repayment" analysis to refinancing rather than considering repayment through sale; and (4) failing to properly weigh the magnitude of the windfall to the mortgagees against the severe prejudice to the appellant.

The Court found that a sale of the property would generate net equity of approximately $250,000 to $337,000 after full repayment of the mortgage, and that the mortgagees would suffer no prejudice while the appellant would lose his life's savings.

The appeal was allowed and the foreclosure was converted to a judicial sale.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 25.11 to strike paragraphs from the defendants' amended statement of defence, arguing they were irrelevant and would delay the trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the impugned paragraphs were directly responsive to the statement of claim and arguably relevant to the issues of conspiracy and constructive dismissal.

Additionally, the court awarded $500 in costs to the self-represented defendants for a prior motion regarding document privilege, finding they had demonstrated an opportunity cost.

The defendant and plaintiff by counterclaim brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of defence and counterclaim to increase its damages claim from $1 million to $7 million.

The plaintiff opposed the amendments, arguing they constituted a new cause of action and were statute-barred, and that the delay in seeking the amendments caused prejudice.

The court granted leave to amend, finding that the proposed amendments merely particularized damages arising from a breach of contract that was already pleaded, and therefore did not constitute a new cause of action.

The court also found that any prejudice from the delay could be compensated for by costs or an adjournment, and ordered a further examination for discovery limited to the amendments.

A lawyer was found by the Hearing Division to have knowingly participated in mortgage fraud in seven real estate transactions, resulting in approximately $625,000 in losses.

The Hearing Division imposed the presumptive penalty of licence revocation.

The Appeal Division, by a 3-2 majority, reversed the penalty and substituted a two-year suspension, citing the Law Society's inordinate investigative and procedural delay as an exceptional mitigating circumstance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the Law Society's appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Law Society's appeal, set aside the Appeal Division's decision on penalty, and reinstated licence revocation.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision striking out his statement of claim with leave to amend and staying the proceeding pending related litigation.

The court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, noting that pleadings motions rarely warrant appellate review.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a substantial indemnity basis due to the moving party making unfounded and serious allegations of improper conduct against opposing counsel.

The defendants moved for leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action.

The underlying motion argued that the plaintiffs' notice of action was a nullity and that the statement of claim was delivered after the two-year limitation period expired.

The motions judge had found the notice of action sufficient and relied on the Rules of Civil Procedure to cure any defects.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding conflicting decisions regarding the required level of detail in a notice of action and good reason to doubt the correctness of the underlying decision.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge who refused leave to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim by striking certain defences and counterclaims.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge failed to provide explicit reasons for denying leave to amend and that leave should only be denied in the clearest of cases.

The court allowed the appeal and varied the order to grant leave to amend.

The plaintiff, Tarion Warranty Corporation, brought a motion to restore its action to the trial list and for a timetable, after the action was due to be dismissed for delay.

The court applied the two-part test requiring an acceptable explanation for the delay and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation, citing the complexity of the construction claim, extensive discovery, and the necessity of resolving a related action (the 1592 action) before fully particularizing damages.

The court also found no specific evidence of non-compensable prejudice from the opposing defendants, despite a strong presumption of prejudice due to the delay.

The motion was granted, restoring the action to the trial list and setting a timetable for future steps.

The plaintiff, Bob Kinnear, on behalf of Local 113 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant, Lawrence J. Hanley, representing the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), from imposing a trusteeship over Local 113 and from disciplining its members.

The motion also sought to authorize Kinnear to represent Local 113 members and to have Local 113 provide the undertaking as to damages.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction to restrain the trusteeship and ordered Local 113 to provide the undertaking, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the unconscionability of International's constitution, irreparable harm to democratic rights, and that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiff.

The request for a representative order was deferred.

The complainants sought leave to appeal the penalty decision of a Hearing Officer regarding a police superintendent's misconduct during the 2010 G20 Summit.

The superintendent had been found guilty of unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority and discreditable conduct for ordering the 'kettling' and unlawful arrest of protestors, and was penalized with a forfeiture of 30 days off.

The Commission granted leave to appeal, finding that the appropriateness of the penalty for a senior commander in these unprecedented circumstances is of significant importance to the policing profession and the public.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal by her supervisor and the school board.

The personal respondent and the union requested that the Tribunal defer the application pending the resolution of related grievances filed by the union.

The applicant opposed the deferral, stating she did not consent to or have knowledge of the grievance filed on her behalf.

The Tribunal denied the deferral request, finding it inappropriate to defer the application for a grievance the applicant did not initiate or consent to.

The Tribunal directed the matter to proceed to mediation.

The appellant private school terminated the respondent teacher's employment for cause after discovering he had falsified student grades and lied to cover up the improprieties.

The trial judge found the respondent had been wrongfully dismissed and awarded damages, including lost long-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, holding that the trial judge erred in his application of the McKinley test.

The Court found the teacher's intentional misconduct and academic fraud struck at the heart of the employment relationship, justifying summary dismissal.