Tim Gleason

The applicant, Brian Hamm, sought an order preventing the respondent, Gordon R. Baker, a lawyer, from disclosing the contents of a legal file to an intervenor in an ongoing litigation.

Hamm claimed that he and Baker were in a solicitor-client relationship, or a 'near client' relationship, and that Baker owed him a duty of confidentiality.

The court applied the Jeffers indicia to determine if a reasonable person would conclude a solicitor-client relationship existed.

The court found that Baker acted solely as corporate counsel for Northern Superior Industries Ltd. and for another investor, and that Hamm understood Baker was not representing his personal interests.

The application was dismissed.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to stay the action and set aside service on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $16,895.58, which the plaintiff largely left unchallenged.

The court found the claimed fees and disbursements to be fair, reasonable, and proportional, and awarded the defendants their requested costs in full.

In a civil procedure appeal, the appellants challenged orders permitting amendment of a statement of claim through a representation order after expiry of a limitation period.

The central issue was whether the order improperly added parties or merely corrected the naming of the legal entity represented by previously named individuals.

A majority held the request was properly treated as correction of a misnamed party, with members having notice before the limitation deadline and no demonstrated prejudice after extensive participation in the litigation.

The appeal was dismissed, with one dissenting judge who would have allowed it.

The sellers appealed an order directing the release of a $50,000 deposit to the purchaser after a failed commercial real estate transaction.

The sellers argued the purchaser committed an anticipatory breach, relieving them of the obligation to tender.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that ongoing negotiations to extend the closing date negated any repudiation.

Because there was no accepted repudiation, the sellers were required to tender to enforce the agreement, which they failed to do.

The purchaser was therefore entitled to the return of its deposit.

The proposed intervenors, former appellate counsel for the applicant, brought a motion to be added as parties to the applicant's Rule 59.06 motion, which sought to set aside a previous Divisional Court order based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant consented to the intervention but sought to restrict the intervenors from seeking costs or making submissions on underlying legal issues.

The court granted the intervention with full party rights, declined to impose the requested restrictions, and awarded costs of the motion to the intervenors.

The appellant mortgaged his family homestead farm for $350,000 and subsequently defaulted on the mortgage.

The mortgagees obtained a default judgment for foreclosure.

The appellant moved to set aside the default judgment, which was dismissed by the motion judge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made four material errors in his analysis: (1) mischaracterizing the appellant's mental frailties as merely a competency issue rather than considering their impact on his responsiveness; (2) viewing the appellant's substantial interest in the property solely as sentimental attachment rather than recognizing the substantial equity remaining after mortgage repayment; (3) confining the "reasonable prospect of repayment" analysis to refinancing rather than considering repayment through sale; and (4) failing to properly weigh the magnitude of the windfall to the mortgagees against the severe prejudice to the appellant.

The Court found that a sale of the property would generate net equity of approximately $250,000 to $337,000 after full repayment of the mortgage, and that the mortgagees would suffer no prejudice while the appellant would lose his life's savings.

The appeal was allowed and the foreclosure was converted to a judicial sale.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 25.11 to strike paragraphs from the defendants' amended statement of defence, arguing they were irrelevant and would delay the trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the impugned paragraphs were directly responsive to the statement of claim and arguably relevant to the issues of conspiracy and constructive dismissal.

Additionally, the court awarded $500 in costs to the self-represented defendants for a prior motion regarding document privilege, finding they had demonstrated an opportunity cost.

The defendant and plaintiff by counterclaim brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of defence and counterclaim to increase its damages claim from $1 million to $7 million.

The plaintiff opposed the amendments, arguing they constituted a new cause of action and were statute-barred, and that the delay in seeking the amendments caused prejudice.

The court granted leave to amend, finding that the proposed amendments merely particularized damages arising from a breach of contract that was already pleaded, and therefore did not constitute a new cause of action.

The court also found that any prejudice from the delay could be compensated for by costs or an adjournment, and ordered a further examination for discovery limited to the amendments.

A lawyer was found by the Hearing Division to have knowingly participated in mortgage fraud in seven real estate transactions, resulting in approximately $625,000 in losses.

The Hearing Division imposed the presumptive penalty of licence revocation.

The Appeal Division, by a 3-2 majority, reversed the penalty and substituted a two-year suspension, citing the Law Society's inordinate investigative and procedural delay as an exceptional mitigating circumstance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the Law Society's appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Law Society's appeal, set aside the Appeal Division's decision on penalty, and reinstated licence revocation.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision striking out his statement of claim with leave to amend and staying the proceeding pending related litigation.

The court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, noting that pleadings motions rarely warrant appellate review.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a substantial indemnity basis due to the moving party making unfounded and serious allegations of improper conduct against opposing counsel.

The defendants moved for leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action.

The underlying motion argued that the plaintiffs' notice of action was a nullity and that the statement of claim was delivered after the two-year limitation period expired.

The motions judge had found the notice of action sufficient and relied on the Rules of Civil Procedure to cure any defects.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding conflicting decisions regarding the required level of detail in a notice of action and good reason to doubt the correctness of the underlying decision.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge who refused leave to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim by striking certain defences and counterclaims.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge failed to provide explicit reasons for denying leave to amend and that leave should only be denied in the clearest of cases.

The court allowed the appeal and varied the order to grant leave to amend.

The plaintiff, Tarion Warranty Corporation, brought a motion to restore its action to the trial list and for a timetable, after the action was due to be dismissed for delay.

The court applied the two-part test requiring an acceptable explanation for the delay and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation, citing the complexity of the construction claim, extensive discovery, and the necessity of resolving a related action (the 1592 action) before fully particularizing damages.

The court also found no specific evidence of non-compensable prejudice from the opposing defendants, despite a strong presumption of prejudice due to the delay.

The motion was granted, restoring the action to the trial list and setting a timetable for future steps.

The plaintiff, Bob Kinnear, on behalf of Local 113 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant, Lawrence J. Hanley, representing the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), from imposing a trusteeship over Local 113 and from disciplining its members.

The motion also sought to authorize Kinnear to represent Local 113 members and to have Local 113 provide the undertaking as to damages.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction to restrain the trusteeship and ordered Local 113 to provide the undertaking, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the unconscionability of International's constitution, irreparable harm to democratic rights, and that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiff.

The request for a representative order was deferred.

The appellant private school terminated the respondent teacher's employment for cause after discovering he had falsified student grades and lied to cover up the improprieties.

The trial judge found the respondent had been wrongfully dismissed and awarded damages, including lost long-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, holding that the trial judge erred in his application of the McKinley test.

The Court found the teacher's intentional misconduct and academic fraud struck at the heart of the employment relationship, justifying summary dismissal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $200,000 for breach of a factoring agreement that was not pleaded.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's finding that it was liable for intentional interference with economic relations and the award of $175,000 in damages at large to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the $200,000 judgment because the claim was not pleaded and would have been statute-barred.

The Court dismissed the cross-appeal, upholding the finding of intentional interference with economic relations and the damages at large award, and refused to allow the respondent to raise equitable set-off for the first time on appeal.

The appellants appealed an order regarding disclosure and examination of garnishees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the order under appeal was interlocutory rather than final, as it did not dispose of the appellants' rights on a final basis.

Costs of $8,500 were awarded to the garnishees on a partial indemnity basis.

Following a six‑day trial in which the plaintiffs successfully recovered unpaid legal fees and defeated a counterclaim alleging solicitor’s negligence, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs had obtained judgment for $90,454.81 and dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaim seeking over $428,000.

The court considered the discretionary framework under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, Rules 49 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the effect of a prior Rule 49 offer to settle for $60,000.

Finding the plaintiffs were entirely successful and that their settlement offer was more favourable than the ultimate result, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Costs were fixed in all‑inclusive amounts for both the main action and the counterclaim.

The plaintiff sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a summary judgment decision that denied his claim for damages in lieu of bonus payments following his wrongful dismissal.

The plaintiff's counsel had inadvertently missed the appeal deadline due to a misunderstanding of the rules.

Applying the test for extending time, the court found that the plaintiff had a bona fide intention to appeal, the delay was reasonably explained by solicitor error, there was no prejudice to the defendant, and the proposed appeal had sufficient merit.

The court granted the extension of time and awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff lawyer and his professional corporation sued a former client for unpaid legal fees.

The client counterclaimed for solicitor's negligence, alleging the lawyer failed to collect settlement funds and mishandled an ex parte Mareva injunction, forcing an improvident settlement.

The court found the lawyer's services were necessary, beneficial, and in accordance with instructions, though it slightly reduced the accounts for excessive time.

The counterclaim was dismissed, as the court found no breach of the standard of care and concluded the client's settlement decision was based on damaging evidence from a co-party, not the lawyer's actions.