Tim Gleason

The plaintiff obtained default judgment against the corporate defendant and two officers.

One officer, Daniel Brewer, moved to set aside the default judgment against him, arguing he had no actual notice of the proceedings after selling his shares and his counsel's subsequent withdrawal.

The court found that Brewer did not receive notice of crucial steps in the litigation due to an incorrect address used by his former counsel, and that his reliance on counsel and a co-defendant's assurance was reasonable.

The absence of actual notice, not due to Brewer's fault, was deemed a fundamental procedural flaw.

The motion to set aside the default judgment and related orders against Brewer was allowed.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a motion brought by HGR (defendants in a related solicitor negligence action) for trial together and common discoveries in two related actions.

The court had previously granted the request for trial together but dismissed common discoveries.

Both HGR and Mr. Hurst (the plaintiff) claimed substantial success.

The court found divided success but determined HGR was overall more successful.

HGR sought $12,000 in costs, and the court ordered Mr. Hurst to pay HGR $8,500.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic as a special circumstance to defer the payment of costs.

The plaintiff moved for an extension of the deadline to set the action down for trial, while the defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The action, stemming from a 1998 arrest, had been stayed due to related criminal proceedings until 2017.

The court applied a contextual approach, considering the preference for merits-based decisions and timely resolution.

It found the plaintiff provided an adequate explanation for the delay, including the criminal proceedings and subsequent steps taken to gather evidence.

The court was not satisfied that the defendants demonstrated actual prejudice.

Consequently, the plaintiff's motion was granted, extending the deadline, and the defendants' cross-motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

The moving parties, HGR, sought an order for the trial together of an employment action and a related solicitor negligence action, along with common documentary and oral discoveries.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, primarily on grounds of solicitor-client privilege.

The court granted the order for trial together, finding common questions of fact and law, overlapping damages, and a significant risk of inconsistent judicial findings if the actions were tried separately.

However, the request for common discoveries was dismissed due to insufficient evidence to determine waiver of solicitor-client privilege, emphasizing the court's duty to protect such privilege.

The appellants sought to set aside a partial summary judgment.

The motion judge had dismissed their r. 37.14(1)(b) motion, finding their defences lacked merit.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by narrowly focusing on "non est factum" and "equitable set-off" and failing to consider the broader defence regarding the legitimacy of the promissory notes, which was raised in pleadings and affidavits.

The appeal was allowed, the order below and the partial summary judgment were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Superior Court with specific terms for further proceedings, including document production, amended pleadings, and a potential new summary judgment motion.

The appellant property manager appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion, arguing that the respondent condominium corporation's action for construction defects was a nullity because it failed to provide owners with notice under s. 23(2) of the Condominium Act, 1998 before issuing a notice of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, taking the rare step of overruling its own previous decision in Medhurst.

The Court held that applying the modern approach to statutory interpretation, non-compliance with the notice provision does not render an action a nullity, as doing so would undermine the consumer protection purpose of the Act and cause injustice to the condominium owners the provision was designed to protect.

The plaintiff moved to set aside an administrative dismissal of its action.

The court considered the factors for setting aside such dismissals, including explanation for delay, promptness of the motion, inadvertence, and prejudice.

While there were periods of unexplained delay, the court found the overall delay explained, particularly given a consent timetable order.

The motion was brought promptly, and the alleged prejudice due to a witness's age was not directly attributable to the delay.

The court exercised its discretion to restore the action to the trial list, subject to an aggressive timetable, but denied costs to the plaintiff due to its significant prior inaction and non-compliance with the timetable.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order dismissing his action against the respondents (his former legal counsel) under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process.

The appellant had alleged that the respondents failed to follow his instructions, misled and deceived him, and failed to provide competent legal services in an unjust dismissal case under the Canada Labour Code.

The motion judge found that the same issue had been previously determined by Adjudicator Monteith, whose findings were upheld by the Federal Court on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in dismissing the action as an abuse of process and affirming the costs award.

The court heard four procedural motions, including motions for trial together, transfer of a Small Claims Court action, and leave to amend pleadings.

The parties reached an agreement on most issues prior to the hearing.

The court ordered that this action and a related action be tried together with common discoveries, and granted the plaintiff leave to amend the statement of claim.

The motion to transfer the Small Claims Court action was adjourned to be heard by a judge, as a Master lacks jurisdiction under section 107 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The decision on a separate motion for trial together by another set of defendants was reserved.

The appellant sued for damages relating to property flooding and brought a motion to extend the time to set the matter down for trial beyond its fifth anniversary.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay under Rule 48.14(7)(a), finding the appellant had not reasonably explained the delay.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge applied an overly stringent test, misapprehended evidence, and failed to consider the pending summary judgment motion and consent of other defendants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly articulated and applied the legal test and his decision was amply grounded in the record.

This is an addendum to the Court of Appeal's decision setting aside a summary judgment granted to the respondents.

The plaintiff sought clarification regarding the treatment of costs awarded in the summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the costs of the summary judgment motion be payable in the cause of the action, as the action between the plaintiff and respondents was ordered to proceed.

The plaintiff, an employee of Darwin Productions Inc., claimed unpaid salary and a percentage ownership interest based on an alleged employment agreement.

The respondents denied the terms and moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was statute-barred.

The motion judge granted the summary judgment, finding no evidence of a demand obligation and concluding the cause of action arose by December 2009.

The intervenor law firm appealed, arguing the motion judge erred by failing to address anticipatory breach of contract and by finding sufficient evidence to decide factual issues on summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by not addressing the anticipatory breach argument and that there was a genuine issue requiring trial regarding the terms of the employment agreement.

The defendant property manager brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff condominium corporation's action as a nullity.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements under s. 23(2) of the Condominium Act, 1998 before commencing the action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the action against the property manager for breach of contract and negligence was not the type of action caught by s. 23(1) of the Act, and therefore the notice requirements did not apply.

Furthermore, the court held that the action commenced with the filing of the Statement of Claim, not the Notice of Action, and that the plaintiff had provided sufficient notice to the owners prior to filing the Statement of Claim.

The appellant, president of the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), appealed the dismissal of a motion to strike an action brought by four rank-and-file members of the International's Toronto-based affiliate, Local 113.

The members sought a declaration that certain provisions of the International's Constitution were void for unconscionability, arguing these provisions prevented disaffiliation.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to strike but granted a temporary stay pending exhaustion of the International's constitutional amendment process.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the dismissal of the motion to strike and the temporary stay, finding the action presented arguable issues of unconscionability and that the court had jurisdiction to determine the matter.

The plaintiff, Gary Curtis, brought a motion seeking an order to schedule examinations for discovery.

The Master dismissed the motion, finding a lack of jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

The Master noted that Justice Dow had previously ordered common discoveries and trial for this action and a related action (CV-15-524203), and a Rule 21 motion to strike claims in the related action was pending before Justice Dow.

The Master determined that ordering discoveries would effectively vary a judge's order, which is beyond a Master's jurisdiction, and that the Rule 21 motion should be heard first to streamline the litigation process.

The co-respondents, Louis Montello and Las Princesas Corp., brought a motion under Rule 25(19)(d) of the Family Law Rules to set aside specific paragraphs of a final order obtained by Monique Abitbol without notice.

The impugned paragraphs disentitled Montello and Las Princesas from further participation and declared them to be holding the "Golden Beach" property in trust for Alberto Benarroch.

Applying the factors from Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, the court found that while there was no compelling excuse for the co-respondents' default in filing an Answer, they had an arguable defense on the merits.

The court determined that allowing the ex-parte declaratory relief to stand would cause disproportionate prejudice to the co-respondents and undermine the integrity of justice.

The motion was granted, setting aside the contested paragraphs, with terms including payment of prior costs and an expedited timetable for the proceeding.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for unpaid wages, equity interest, and intellectual property ownership, arguing the claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the plaintiff had discovered the material facts giving rise to his claims by December 2009 at the latest, well outside the two-year limitation period for the action commenced in January 2012.

The court rejected arguments that the unpaid wages constituted a "demand obligation" and that declaratory relief without consequential relief was exempt from limitation periods, as the plaintiff sought mandatory relief.

Consequently, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to set aside an order of the motion judge, which had dismissed his motion to set aside the Registrar's administrative dismissal of his motion for leave to appeal.

The underlying action involved allegations of professional negligence against his former counsel.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge correctly applied the test from Sickinger, which requires consideration of the merits of the appeal.

Finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the proposed appeal lacked merit, the Divisional Court dismissed the motion with costs.

In the context of two related actions involving a land banking business, the parties brought several preliminary motions before a scheduled summary judgment motion.

The moving parties (defendants in the first action) sought to bring a motion for security for costs, which the case management judge deferred until after the summary judgment motion due to delay and efficiency.

The responding parties (plaintiffs in the first action) brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the second action, arguing it was statute-barred and an abuse of process.

The court dismissed this motion, finding that the discoverability of the alleged unlawful act conspiracy raised factual issues that could not be resolved on a Rule 21 motion.

Finally, the court made several specific orders regarding documentary production, applying the principle of proportionality.

The applicant moved to set aside an order requiring security for costs of $10,000 before perfecting an appeal.

The underlying appeal was from a Superior Court decision dismissing the applicant's motion to set aside a referee's final report.

The Court of Appeal upheld the security for costs order, considering the applicant's history of multiple proceedings, many found to be unnecessary or inappropriate, and the weak merits of the appeal.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the intervenor.