Tim Gleason

The appellant, president of the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), appealed the dismissal of a motion to strike an action brought by four rank-and-file members of the International's Toronto-based affiliate, Local 113.

The members sought a declaration that certain provisions of the International's Constitution were void for unconscionability, arguing these provisions prevented disaffiliation.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to strike but granted a temporary stay pending exhaustion of the International's constitutional amendment process.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the dismissal of the motion to strike and the temporary stay, finding the action presented arguable issues of unconscionability and that the court had jurisdiction to determine the matter.

The plaintiff, Gary Curtis, brought a motion seeking an order to schedule examinations for discovery.

The Master dismissed the motion, finding a lack of jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

The Master noted that Justice Dow had previously ordered common discoveries and trial for this action and a related action (CV-15-524203), and a Rule 21 motion to strike claims in the related action was pending before Justice Dow.

The Master determined that ordering discoveries would effectively vary a judge's order, which is beyond a Master's jurisdiction, and that the Rule 21 motion should be heard first to streamline the litigation process.

The co-respondents, Louis Montello and Las Princesas Corp., brought a motion under Rule 25(19)(d) of the Family Law Rules to set aside specific paragraphs of a final order obtained by Monique Abitbol without notice.

The impugned paragraphs disentitled Montello and Las Princesas from further participation and declared them to be holding the "Golden Beach" property in trust for Alberto Benarroch.

Applying the factors from Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, the court found that while there was no compelling excuse for the co-respondents' default in filing an Answer, they had an arguable defense on the merits.

The court determined that allowing the ex-parte declaratory relief to stand would cause disproportionate prejudice to the co-respondents and undermine the integrity of justice.

The motion was granted, setting aside the contested paragraphs, with terms including payment of prior costs and an expedited timetable for the proceeding.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for unpaid wages, equity interest, and intellectual property ownership, arguing the claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the plaintiff had discovered the material facts giving rise to his claims by December 2009 at the latest, well outside the two-year limitation period for the action commenced in January 2012.

The court rejected arguments that the unpaid wages constituted a "demand obligation" and that declaratory relief without consequential relief was exempt from limitation periods, as the plaintiff sought mandatory relief.

Consequently, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

In the context of two related actions involving a land banking business, the parties brought several preliminary motions before a scheduled summary judgment motion.

The moving parties (defendants in the first action) sought to bring a motion for security for costs, which the case management judge deferred until after the summary judgment motion due to delay and efficiency.

The responding parties (plaintiffs in the first action) brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the second action, arguing it was statute-barred and an abuse of process.

The court dismissed this motion, finding that the discoverability of the alleged unlawful act conspiracy raised factual issues that could not be resolved on a Rule 21 motion.

Finally, the court made several specific orders regarding documentary production, applying the principle of proportionality.

The applicant moved to set aside an order requiring security for costs of $10,000 before perfecting an appeal.

The underlying appeal was from a Superior Court decision dismissing the applicant's motion to set aside a referee's final report.

The Court of Appeal upheld the security for costs order, considering the applicant's history of multiple proceedings, many found to be unnecessary or inappropriate, and the weak merits of the appeal.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the intervenor.

The applicant, Brian Hamm, sought an order preventing the respondent, Gordon R. Baker, a lawyer, from disclosing the contents of a legal file to an intervenor in an ongoing litigation.

Hamm claimed that he and Baker were in a solicitor-client relationship, or a 'near client' relationship, and that Baker owed him a duty of confidentiality.

The court applied the Jeffers indicia to determine if a reasonable person would conclude a solicitor-client relationship existed.

The court found that Baker acted solely as corporate counsel for Northern Superior Industries Ltd. and for another investor, and that Hamm understood Baker was not representing his personal interests.

The application was dismissed.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to stay the action and set aside service on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $16,895.58, which the plaintiff largely left unchallenged.

The court found the claimed fees and disbursements to be fair, reasonable, and proportional, and awarded the defendants their requested costs in full.

In a civil procedure appeal, the appellants challenged orders permitting amendment of a statement of claim through a representation order after expiry of a limitation period.

The central issue was whether the order improperly added parties or merely corrected the naming of the legal entity represented by previously named individuals.

A majority held the request was properly treated as correction of a misnamed party, with members having notice before the limitation deadline and no demonstrated prejudice after extensive participation in the litigation.

The appeal was dismissed, with one dissenting judge who would have allowed it.

The appellant mortgaged his family homestead farm for $350,000 and subsequently defaulted on the mortgage.

The mortgagees obtained a default judgment for foreclosure.

The appellant moved to set aside the default judgment, which was dismissed by the motion judge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made four material errors in his analysis: (1) mischaracterizing the appellant's mental frailties as merely a competency issue rather than considering their impact on his responsiveness; (2) viewing the appellant's substantial interest in the property solely as sentimental attachment rather than recognizing the substantial equity remaining after mortgage repayment; (3) confining the "reasonable prospect of repayment" analysis to refinancing rather than considering repayment through sale; and (4) failing to properly weigh the magnitude of the windfall to the mortgagees against the severe prejudice to the appellant.

The Court found that a sale of the property would generate net equity of approximately $250,000 to $337,000 after full repayment of the mortgage, and that the mortgagees would suffer no prejudice while the appellant would lose his life's savings.

The appeal was allowed and the foreclosure was converted to a judicial sale.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 25.11 to strike paragraphs from the defendants' amended statement of defence, arguing they were irrelevant and would delay the trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the impugned paragraphs were directly responsive to the statement of claim and arguably relevant to the issues of conspiracy and constructive dismissal.

Additionally, the court awarded $500 in costs to the self-represented defendants for a prior motion regarding document privilege, finding they had demonstrated an opportunity cost.

The defendant and plaintiff by counterclaim brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of defence and counterclaim to increase its damages claim from $1 million to $7 million.

The plaintiff opposed the amendments, arguing they constituted a new cause of action and were statute-barred, and that the delay in seeking the amendments caused prejudice.

The court granted leave to amend, finding that the proposed amendments merely particularized damages arising from a breach of contract that was already pleaded, and therefore did not constitute a new cause of action.

The court also found that any prejudice from the delay could be compensated for by costs or an adjournment, and ordered a further examination for discovery limited to the amendments.

A lawyer was found by the Hearing Division to have knowingly participated in mortgage fraud in seven real estate transactions, resulting in approximately $625,000 in losses.

The Hearing Division imposed the presumptive penalty of licence revocation.

The Appeal Division, by a 3-2 majority, reversed the penalty and substituted a two-year suspension, citing the Law Society's inordinate investigative and procedural delay as an exceptional mitigating circumstance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the Law Society's appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Law Society's appeal, set aside the Appeal Division's decision on penalty, and reinstated licence revocation.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge who refused leave to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim by striking certain defences and counterclaims.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge failed to provide explicit reasons for denying leave to amend and that leave should only be denied in the clearest of cases.

The court allowed the appeal and varied the order to grant leave to amend.

The plaintiff, Tarion Warranty Corporation, brought a motion to restore its action to the trial list and for a timetable, after the action was due to be dismissed for delay.

The court applied the two-part test requiring an acceptable explanation for the delay and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation, citing the complexity of the construction claim, extensive discovery, and the necessity of resolving a related action (the 1592 action) before fully particularizing damages.

The court also found no specific evidence of non-compensable prejudice from the opposing defendants, despite a strong presumption of prejudice due to the delay.

The motion was granted, restoring the action to the trial list and setting a timetable for future steps.

The plaintiff, Bob Kinnear, on behalf of Local 113 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant, Lawrence J. Hanley, representing the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), from imposing a trusteeship over Local 113 and from disciplining its members.

The motion also sought to authorize Kinnear to represent Local 113 members and to have Local 113 provide the undertaking as to damages.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction to restrain the trusteeship and ordered Local 113 to provide the undertaking, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the unconscionability of International's constitution, irreparable harm to democratic rights, and that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiff.

The request for a representative order was deferred.

Following a six‑day trial in which the plaintiffs successfully recovered unpaid legal fees and defeated a counterclaim alleging solicitor’s negligence, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs had obtained judgment for $90,454.81 and dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaim seeking over $428,000.

The court considered the discretionary framework under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, Rules 49 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the effect of a prior Rule 49 offer to settle for $60,000.

Finding the plaintiffs were entirely successful and that their settlement offer was more favourable than the ultimate result, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Costs were fixed in all‑inclusive amounts for both the main action and the counterclaim.

The plaintiff lawyer and his professional corporation sued a former client for unpaid legal fees.

The client counterclaimed for solicitor's negligence, alleging the lawyer failed to collect settlement funds and mishandled an ex parte Mareva injunction, forcing an improvident settlement.

The court found the lawyer's services were necessary, beneficial, and in accordance with instructions, though it slightly reduced the accounts for excessive time.

The counterclaim was dismissed, as the court found no breach of the standard of care and concluded the client's settlement decision was based on damaging evidence from a co-party, not the lawyer's actions.

Following dismissal of a summary judgment motion brought by certain defendants, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs for successfully resisting the motion and for related procedural steps including a consent amendment to the statement of claim.

The court applied the discretionary criteria under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the significance of the motion to both parties and the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s litigation steps.

While the plaintiff largely succeeded, the court adjusted the claimed amount modestly based on reasonable expectations of the losing parties.

Costs were fixed in favour of the plaintiff against the moving defendants and separately against another defendant for an earlier substituted service motion.

The respondents brought a preliminary motion to strike portions of an elector’s application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act on the basis that several alleged contraventions were commenced outside the six‑week time limit in s. 9(1).

The court examined the legislative history and jurisprudence interpreting the provision and concluded that s. 9(1) functions as a temporal qualification for applicants rather than a conventional limitation period.

The relevant inquiry focuses on the applicant’s actual or constructive knowledge of the facts giving rise to the alleged contravention, not on what a reasonably diligent person could have discovered from publicly available information.

The court held that the applicant’s uncontradicted evidence established that she commenced the application within six weeks of acquiring the requisite knowledge.

The moving parties failed to prove earlier knowledge that would render the application untimely.