Shannon Chace

The appellants brought an application alleging that the federal and provincial governments violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to implement effective strategies to reduce homelessness and inadequate housing.

The respondents successfully moved to strike the application on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was not justiciable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application raised political rather than legal issues, lacked a judicially discoverable and manageable standard, and was therefore not justiciable.

The appellant, a milk farmer, provided unpasteurized milk to individuals through a 'cow share agreement' and was convicted of selling and distributing unpasteurized milk contrary to the Health Protection and Promotion Act and operating an unlicensed milk plant contrary to the Milk Act.

On appeal, he argued the legislation did not apply to his private arrangement and violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cow-share program was a public marketing scheme caught by the legislation.

The court also held that the prohibition on unpasteurized milk did not violate the right to life, liberty, or security of the person, and was not arbitrary or overbroad given the scientific evidence of public health risks.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, appealed his 8-month sentence for sexual interference against a child and challenged the constitutionality of the 14-day mandatory minimum sentence under s. 15(1) and s. 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenges, finding that the mandatory minimum did not disproportionately disadvantage Aboriginal offenders in a discriminatory manner and did not create institutional bias.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to 90 days intermittent custody followed by three years' probation, citing fresh evidence of the appellant's remorse and the significant delay in the proceedings.

The appeal concerned a constitutional challenge to Ontario’s separate labour relations regime for agricultural workers.

The Court held that s. 2(d) of the Charter protects a meaningful process of collective action toward workplace goals, including employee representations that employers must consider in good faith, but does not constitutionalize any particular model of labour relations.

The majority interpreted the Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002 as implicitly requiring good faith consideration of employee representations and concluded that the claimants had not established that the statutory scheme made meaningful association effectively impossible.

The s. 15 challenge also failed because the record did not establish substantive discrimination, and the claim was premature.

The respondents, who suffered from severe alcoholism, were denied disability benefits under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act (ODSPA) because s. 5(2) disqualifies individuals whose sole impairment is substance dependence.

The Social Benefits Tribunal found this provision discriminated against the respondents based on disability, contrary to s. 1 of the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision but proposed a new test for discrimination.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal rejected the Divisional Court's new test, finding it improperly removed the requirement to prove disadvantage and reversed the burden of proof.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Tribunal's finding that s. 5(2) of the ODSPA was discriminatory and rejecting the appellant's expert evidence that the policy was medically appropriate.

The applicant, a manager of a hazardous waste facility, sought judicial review of a justice of the peace's order compelling him to submit to an interview and produce documents under s. 163.1(2) of the Environmental Protection Act.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the order, finding that the statutory provision authorizes investigators to use devices and techniques but does not explicitly confer the power to compel third parties to answer questions or produce documents.